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Abstract 
 
An exploration of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria. 2000-2018. 
Contextualising the religious landscape, historic and contemporary dynamics in Christian-
Muslim relations, and Eastern Christian frameworks of engagement. 
 
Andrew William Harvey Ashdown 
Doctor of Philosophy 
May 2019 
 
This study explores, from a Christian theological and ecclesial perspective, Christian-Muslim 
relations in Syria between 2000 and 2018.  Focussing on research undertaken within 
government-held areas during the Syrian conflict, it offers an original contribution to 
scholarship on the context in modern Syria.  Providing the historical and contemporary context 
for the interreligious dynamic, I introduce and describe the plural Christian and Muslim 
landscapes that have cohabited and interacted in Syria prior to and during the Ottoman period 
and in the century since, and how this relationship has been impacted by the conflict.  I 
examine the complex issues that underlie the relationship, particularly the roles of culture and 
religious leadership, and challenge the view that the analytical concept of sectarianism is 
adequate to describe the complex communal frameworks in the Middle Eastern context. 
Rather ‘sectarianism’ is understood as a primarily western discourse that misleads western 
understanding of the regional communal dynamic.  I also examine the important influence of 
Islamism on religious and political developments in recent decades, Islam’s struggle in 
grappling with modern Statehood, increased ‘secularism’, and how to ensure that freedom of 
religious expression and practise for all communities is sustained in Muslim-majority contexts.   
 
The wider context of the religious landscape is evidenced through substantial qualitative 
fieldwork.  Building on previous research into the nature of religious leadership, the study 
demonstrates that Near Eastern religious leaders create a model for interreligious relations, 
seek reconciliation between different groups, and promote humanitarian initiatives for their 
communities.  Examining Eastern Christian theologians and their approaches to Christian-
Muslim relations, the study posits the view that Eastern Christianity in Syria is marked by deep 
ecclesial plurality and a long-standing engagement with Islam.  Moreover, the theology and 
spirituality of the ‘Antiochene paradigm’, inhabiting the same cultural environment as Islam, is 
uniquely placed to play a major role in dialogue as Christians and Muslims face increasing 
political and religious challenges.  Its potential in this respect has been under-recognised. 
 
The thesis offers an original contribution to knowledge and understanding of the changing 
Christian-Muslim dynamic in Syria and the region.  Most importantly, the thesis offers a new 
understanding of the religious landscape, and a door to exploring how Eastern Christian 
approaches to Christian-Muslim relations may be sustained and strengthened in the face of 
the considerable religious and political challenges faced by both communities today. 
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Considering Christian-Muslim relations in Syria 2000-2018, this study places in context, from a 
Christian theological and ecclesial perspective, the contemporary and historical interaction of 
Christianity and Islam in Syria, up to and including the recent Syrian conflict.  With research 
undertaken in government-held areas during the conflict, the thesis offers an original 
contribution to scholarship on the historical and contemporary religious dynamics in modern 
Syria and develops our understanding of the significance of the Antiochene Eastern Christian 
paradigm for the future of interreligious dynamics in the region.  Prior to 2011 this subject had 
received little scholarly attention.  Some studies had examined Christianity in Syria, and others 
Islam in Syria, but there has been little authoritative description of the modern history and 
character of Christianity in Syria, and almost no engagement with the Christian leadership 
inside Syria during the war.  
 
Since 2011, there have been a plethora of articles and publications about Syria.  Almost all 
their sources are from outside Syria and have prioritised perspectives of the multi-factional 
groups opposed to the Syrian government, the majority of which hold to Islamist ideologies.  
Few have attempted to address the multi-dimensional contemporary communal dynamics 
within government-controlled areas of Syria, and none have reflected upon Christian 
perspectives.  This study therefore contributes to a significant gap within the literature – an 
area of discourse that for practical and political reasons, was completely neglected outside the 
country throughout the conflict.  Given that the majority of the population remaining in Syria 
during the war, and the majority of the internally displaced within the country lived within 
those areas, excluding their relational dynamic and experience represented a huge gap in 
contextual understanding.1  Yet, this is what western academic, religious, political and media 
discourse did for most of the eight year conflict.  This is the first study that seeks to fill that 
gap. In a highly charged context, academic rigour requires that different contexts are examined 
and understood.  This is particularly important when one is considering complex communal 
frameworks that are undergoing situations of rapid and traumatic change. 
 
1 Balanche notes: “The most diverse and populous area is the one controlled by the regime’s army. 
Although many of this zone’s residents are Alawites—that is, followers of the Alawi branch of Shia 
Islam—the majority are Sunnis, and many minorities have fled there as well.  In contrast, rebel zones are 
almost exclusively Sunni Arab. The few minorities who lived in these areas have fled or been forced to 
convert to Sunnism.” (Balanche, 2018, p. xv)  In 2015, it was estimated that 10 million of the 16 million 




This study places this dynamic within the wider religious and geopolitical context.  Most 
scholarship views the region from external historic and cultural perspectives that have had 
major geopolitical influences upon the region.  The wider geopolitical context is undergoing 
major political, cultural and religious upheaval that is having a profound impact locally and 
regionally, and upon communal relationships and demographics.   
 
The interreligious dynamics explored here are affected by a confluence of regional forces that 
have had multiple influences, and have created a distinct and dynamic religious context.  The 
following have all been instruments of profound change in the region: the development and 
influence of Sunni Islamism during the last century; the Shi’a revival in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and 
the Gulf, and the increasing tensions between these two expressions of Islam; the civil war in 
Lebanon; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and recent developments in Israel; the Iraq war and 
the consequent existential threat to Christian communities in Iraq; western interventions in 
Afghanistan and Libya; the effects of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.  Combined with changing 
geopolitical alliances between Saudi Arabia, Israel, Europe, America, the Gulf and Turkey, and 
Iran and Russia’s role in the region, it is evident that the complex geopolitical and communal 
dynamics of the whole region are being reframed.2  A realistic understanding of the cultural, 
religious, historical and contemporary landscapes in these contexts is therefore vital to 
informing and helping navigate the future direction of communities within these complex 
changing societies. This study attempts to meet that challenge in the Syrian context. 
 
How do culturally plural societies respond to this complexity?  Lebanon, with its similar social 
and religious make-up of society but different political structures to Syria (communal as 
opposed to lay-oriented Constitution), posits one model of managing communal difference.  
The changing demographic in Syria as a result of the war will certainly affect communal 
relationships, and understanding those changes, both locally and within their wider context, 
will be essential to establishing a long term peace in the post-conflict human landscape.  
 
Reflecting this, the study explores how the complex trajectory of the conflict which has 
involved multiple players has impacted Syria’s communities.  In a context in which plurality has 
been embedded in society, many Syrians dislike any discourse that suggests a ‘sectarian’ 
 
2 For more on the Shi’a Revival, see: (V.  Nasr, 2016) (Nuruzzaman, 2019).   Also, for analysis of Russia’s 
role, see: (Centre for Mediterranean, 2019) Russia in the Middle East. The Russian Bear in Mind. 
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narrative.  Hence this study also explores the appropriateness of the term ‘sectarian’.  Western 
political analysis has given little meaningful attention to the inter-communal character of Syria 
within government-held areas.  I suggest that the misrepresentation of this inter-communal 
identity has created a self-limiting and misleading political framework for understanding the 
political religious context within Syria, which this study seeks to address. 
 
Written from a Christian perspective, this thesis considers the Eastern Christian theological and 
ecclesial contributions to the interreligious context prior to and during the Syrian conflict.3  
Reflecting on the contribution of several indigenous Christian theologians from different 
Eastern, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant traditions, the thesis explores how the theology, 
doctrine and traditions of the eastern churches – the ‘Antiochene paradigm’ - contributes to 
enabling a constructive engagement with the Muslim community in the Middle East, especially 
in the face of growing rigidity in Islamic thought and the increasing impact of militant Islam.4  
Following the thought of such theologians as Clement, Massignon, Khodr, and other 
contemporary Eastern Christian leaders, the thesis considers how the long history and 
experience of Christian-Muslim encounter can inform western Christianity’s encounter with 
Islam, both in the aftermath of the brutality of war in Syria, and amidst the inevitable 
consequences both regionally and beyond.  The thesis also explores the role of Protestant 
expressions of Christianity in the Eastern Christian paradigm.  Due to the historic ‘othering’ of 
Eastern Christian traditions within Protestant discourses, there have been tensions between 
the two religious cultures.  However, significant efforts are currently being made to restore 
ecumenical trust and discourse.  
 
Exploring the role of religious leadership in Syria and in the region, a role rooted in cultural and 
historically evolved frameworks, this study suggests that it has been widely misunderstood in 
western discourse, and that the lack of engagement by western leaders with religious leaders 
in Syria has led to an imbalanced understanding of the social, cultural, political and religious 
realities within the country.  Additionally, this study extends previous study of religious 
leadership in the region and explores how models of Eastern Christian leadership are informing 
the nature of religious leadership in the region, and their representational, bridge-building and 
reconciliation capacities in situations of conflict. 
 
 
3 For a helpful brief introduction to some of these issues see: (Hamid, 2014). 
4 The ‘Antiochene paradigm’ theme explored here develops the academic contributions of Massignon, 
Clement, Khodr, Sudworth and Hugh-Donovan. 
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Christianity has been present in Syria since its earliest days, and prior to the rise of Islam was 
the dominant faith in the region, a fact little appreciated in western imaginations of Syria.  
Given the existential threat of violence in the region when extreme religious ideologies or 
political interests threaten the fragile balance between multiple communities,5 many Syrian 
Christians and Muslims as this study shows, stress that the historic presence of the Christian 
faith in the region should always be protected.   Ever since the emergence of Islam, the two 
faiths have engaged, mutually influenced each other, and notwithstanding occasional periods 
of hostility, have coexisted.6  Both have diverse and long-established traditions in Syria, with 
Christian denominations from all five ecclesiastical ‘families’ of churches, existing alongside 
broad expressions of both Sunni and Shia Islam.  In Syria, this plurality of religious and cultural 
expression involves multiple communities living alongside each other. Though there have been 
instances of inter-communal violence, most notably in 1840 and 1850, and inter-communal 
tensions, this plurality has for the most part been characterised by an attitude of mutual 
acceptance and tolerance (Goddard, 2000; S. H. Griffith, 2008). 
 
Thus, despite the restrictions on ‘minority’ communities of Ottoman systems of governance, 
no one community has in the past been able to dominate religious and political discourse.7  
This coexistence is real, but the nature of Christian-Muslim relations is varied and complex and 
differs according to context (Rabo, 2012, p. 79).  And it has been impacted by the conflict.   As 
Najib Awad writes: “Underneath the external façade of variety, colourful interaction and 
interreligious coexistence … lurks another more sophisticated, and less ideal and bright, 
history”, wherein Christians have at times been reduced to a “homogenous millet” struggling 
to survive as a minority, and identified negatively by some Muslims, with western powers 
whose people happen to share the same religious faith (Najib Georg Awad, 2012, pp. 66-67).  
Nevertheless, Christians and Muslims for the most part hold equal status in the law under the 
Constitution, something that is widely applauded and allows a high degree of religious 
freedom.  However, the plurality of personal status law is based on mandatory religious 
affiliation, and this can sustain religious division and create discrimination where gender is 
 
5 For an introduction to militant Islamism, see Chapter 2.  See also: (Sivan, 1985) (Calvert, 2010) (Lefevre, 
2013).  
6 Understandings of ‘coexistence’ will be considered in Chapter 3. 
7 The issue of when the concept of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities emerged will be explored 
(Makdisi,2000).  Whether the analytical framework of ‘sectarianism’ might be an over-simplified 
designation imposed on a highly complex multi-layered communal relational context will be considered.  
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concerned (Eijk, 2016).  Moreover, the President must be Muslim.  For these reasons, the 
designation of ‘secular’ to the Constitution requires qualification.8    
 
Until the start of the conflict in 2011, Syria possessed one of the largest concentrations of 
Christians in the Middle East.  Their origins are closely linked to the origins of Christianity 
(Anthony O'Mahony, 2013, p. 232).  The diversity and complexity of the ecclesial context in 
Syria, with its Oriental, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant expressions; and of the Muslim 
presence has been under-recognised, both in academic study hitherto, and in analysis of the 
current context. 
 
Interest in the religious, social and political context in Syria has increased dramatically as a 
result of the conflict.   In 1997, William Dalrymple wrote an account of his 1994 journey around 
the Middle East, and his encounters with Christian communities in the region.  From the Holy 
mountain instantly became a best seller, and opened people’s eyes to an interreligious context 
in the region of which many westerners were unaware.   In this book, Dalrymple mentions a 
meeting with Mar Gregorius Yohanna Ibrahim in Aleppo, (one of the bishops who was 
kidnapped in 2013, whose fate is still unknown).   Dalrymple quotes him:  
 
Christians are better off in Syria than anywhere else in the Middle East.  Other than 
Lebanon, this is the only country in the region where a Christian can feel the equal of a 
Muslim.  In Syria there is no enmity between Christian and Muslim.  If Syria were not 
here, we would be finished.  Really.  It is a place of sanctuary, a haven for all the 
Christians: for the Nestorians and Chaldeans driven out of Iraq, the Syrian Orthodox 
and the Armenians driven out of Turkey, even some Palestinian Christians driven out 
of the Holy Land by the Israelis (Dalrymple, 1998, p. 150).   
 
This was a view commonly expressed by Syrians prior to the conflict, and a reality that the 
conflict has profoundly strained, and in some cases fractured.  
 
However, we must not be oversentimental about the coexistence that has largely prevailed in 
the region.  Many Eastern Christians comment that their continued presence in the region has 
in recent decades required a degree of personal and institutional caution at a religious, social 
 
8 Family and personal status laws in Syria, originating in Ottoman systems of governance, have always 
been marked by legal plurality that have made it difficult to uphold the Government’s secular ideology. 
“The government has been engaged in a delicate balancing act of, on the one hand, upholding its official 
secular discourse and policies, and, on the other hand, maintaining the status quo and appeasing, most 
importantly, a significant segment of its conservative Sunni Muslim citizens.” (Eijk, 2016, p. 207) 
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and political level.  The dramatic reduction in the percentage of Christians in the region during 
the last forty years is witness to the strain under which Christian communities have lived for a 
whole variety of social, religious, economic, and political reasons.  Najib Awad, an expatriot 
Syrian Christian living in the United States, describes the history of Eastern Christians, as “a 
multifarious, sophisticated narrative of ‘perpetual strife for survival as a minority in a non-
Christian majority world,’” that is being put under even greater strain by the heightening of 
Sunni-Shi’a religious tensions, and the rise of “terrorist Islamic entities” (Najib George Awad, 
2017, p. 65).9  He also writes: “The external rich history of plurality that is portrayed via the 
architectural versatility hides underneath it an internal, parallel history of suffering, 
uncertainty, fear, pressure, difficulty, death and perpetual strife for survival as a minority in a 
non-Christian majority world” (Najib Georg Awad, 2012, p. 89).  This is a reality that cannot be 
ignored, and that Christians and Muslims in the wider region will need to address in the years 
ahead if coexistence is going to prevail. 
 
A historical background to Christian-Muslim engagement in the Middle East. 
 
The long-standing coexistence of Christianity and Islam, with varying degrees of tolerance over 
the years is well documented.  Moreover, when Islam presented itself, it did so in a context 
that was already deeply religious and plural.  In this plural context, all communities have, to a 
greater or lesser degree, been represented at all levels of society.  This makes for varied 
relations where shifts in power can powerfully impact inter-communal relations.  Today, it is 
believed that Christians still make up around 5-7 per cent of the population.  
 
Ever since the inception of the Muslim faith, there has been dialogue and cross-fertilisation of 
beliefs and philosophy. Mohammed himself is believed to have met and debated with 
Christian monks and Jewish communities and it appears that his thoughts and actions were 
influenced by Jewish communities and by the practices of Christian monasticism in the Arabian 
peninsula.  Certainly, both Jewish and Christian writings and thinking find echoes in the pages 
of the Qur’an (Goddard, 2000, pp. 19-24), and some Muslim faith rituals and practices find 
their origins in early Christian and monastic practices.  This is reflected in some Qur’anic 
sayings which declare that not all ‘People of the Scripture’ are alike, and that those who 
‘believe in God and the Last Day, and enjoin right conduct… and vie with one another in good 
works.  These are of the righteous.  And whatever good they do, nothing will be rejected of 
 
9 Also (Najib Georg Awad, 2012) 
15 
 
them’ (Volf, 2010a, p. 48).10 The Qur’an records a heated debate concerning the divinity of 
Christ between the Christians of Najran and the Prophet himself, which indicates that 
Christians were allowed freedom of worship and a degree of acceptance at the time (Ayoub, 
2007, p. 35).  As Ayoub writes: ‘From its inception, Islam was nourished by the piety, lore and 
spirituality of the people of the Book, Jews and Christians.  In ancient Arabia, it was the desert 
monks who provided healing and hope, faith and fulfilment for generations of men and 
women’ (Ayoub, 2007, p. 17).11  Thus, initially, under Muslim rule, Christians were generally 
well treated, as long as they did not try to unsettle the balance of power (Goddard, 2003a, p. 
19).  
 
Syria’s tradition of plurality and diversity means that the country has always been a place of 
refuge.  Survivors of the Armenian and Syriac genocides in 1915 sought refuge in the country, 
and in the 1950s the Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate moved to Damascus after a thousand years 
at Deir ul Zafaran in Turkey, becoming the worldwide headquarters of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church.  Indeed, three Patriarchates – the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox and Greek 
Catholic – are all situated in Damascus.  Before the start of the current conflict, Kurds, 
Palestinians and Iraqis all found refuge in the country.  Nevertheless, although Jews, Christians 
and Muslims, along with other minority groups, lived in relative harmony in the Middle East 
until the turn of the 20th Century, the history of Christianity under Muslim rule generally in the 
region, despite substantial engagement, for many reasons has been one of ‘continuous, if 
gradual, diminishment’ (S. H. Griffith, 2008, p. 14). 12   
 
Varying attitudes towards Christians are expressed in the Qur’an.  This reflects changing 
contexts as Islam grew in power and influence, and as some Christians ‘became less receptive 
to some of Muhammad’s theological claims’ (Goddard, 2000, p. 26). As the Muslim community 
expanded, it increasingly came into contact with Eastern Christian, Byzantine, and Zoroastrian 
faith communities that surrounded the region.  On the one hand, this resulted in theological 
dialogue on key commonalities and variations of belief; and on the other, as Muslim rule 
became more established, there was a need to establish ‘a more conciliatory approach to the 
existing population’ (Goddard, 2000, p. 46).  There is much debate as to why Islam spread so 
quickly from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa and Europe.  Two key reasons are that so 
much of the Christian world at the time was bitterly divided; and that Muslims offered a 
 
10 Q: 3:113-115  See also: Q 49:13, Q 2:62, Q 5:69 
11 Q 3: 59-63 
12 See also: (Hanna, 2007). 
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greater degree of protection to the local population than Byzantine rulers.  It was in these 
early days of Muslim expansion that the system of ahl al-dhimma  (the People of the 
Covenant), was established for those who were ahl al-kitab (People of the Book), namely Jews 
and Christians (Goddard, 2000, p. 46).  There is also much debate over the extent to which this 
system was both a system of protection and a system of domination in which dhimmis were 
regarded as second class citizens. 
 
During and following the rule of Caliph Al-Ma’mun (813-833), considerable dialogue and 
development in Islam took place. He established the Bayt al hikma (House of Wisdom) in 
Baghdad ‘whose purpose was the translation of Greek and other works into Arabic… 
Emissaries were sent to Byzantium to find and purchase both scientific and philosophical 
works’ which were then circulated throughout the Islamic world (Goddard, 2000, p. 52).  This 
encounter with western philosophical ideas engendered much debate, ‘and awareness of the 
need to present the doctrines and religious arguments of the others on their own terms before 
refuting them’ (Zebiri, 1997, p. 138). Christians, such as John of Damascus, ‘the first Christian 
to have made a serious attempt to study and understand Islam’, were influential in the Muslim 
court (Zebiri, 1997, p. 24).  As already mentioned, the development of this relationship was 
partly rooted in the adoption, as early as the 9th Century, of Arabic as the primary liturgical 
language of the indigenous Churches. The use of the Arabic language in the first centuries of 
Islam’s emergence, was instrumental in enabling both theological and philosophical debate 
with Islamic scholars. The topics most vigorously debated usually centred around Christological 
and Trinitarian doctrines; the prophet-hood of Muhammad; the revelatory status of the 
Qur’an; the Christian veneration of icons and crosses; and what constitutes true religion (S. H. 
Griffith, 2008, p. 78).   
 
During the 7th to 10th Centuries of the Christian era, as Islam spread across the region, amidst 
the flowering of Islamic art, architecture, philosophy and theology, there was considerable 
engagement between Muslim, Christian and Jewish philosophers and theologians, who were 
even included in the Courts of the Caliphs.   During the Umayyad and Abbasid periods in 
Damascus and Baghdad respectively, Christians, being familiar with Greek for cultural 
purposes, Arabic in daily living and Syriac for daily life, offered education to Muslim Arabs, and 
were instrumental in administrative and civic functions of the Caliphate, as well as in 
strengthening Islamic engagement with science and philosophy.13 
 




Under Caliph Mutawakkil (822-861CE) however, further development of the Shari’a law saw a 
shift from widespread engagement with the Christian faith and philosophy, to a greater 
suspicion of Christians and their faith.   As Ayoub puts it: ‘With the development of the schools 
of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the deepening conflict between Christendom and the world of 
Islam, the people of dhimmah came to be regarded as a special category, not only different 
from but also inferior to Muslims’ (Ayoub, 2007, p. 37).  This development ultimately resulted 
in Islam becoming a ‘closed’ religion.  Nevertheless, the designation of Christians as ahl al-kitab 
– a familial term, ‘People of the Book’ – remained. 
 
The subsequent centuries saw a significant series of encounters between Islam and 
Christianity.  The Crusades, which initially targeted Eastern Christians, Muslims and Jews, and 
happened at a time when the Arab world was flourishing in science, philosophy and medicine, 
left a lasting legacy of mistrust in the Arab world for Western Christianity, both among Eastern 
Christians and Muslims– a legacy that continues today and which is only deepened by 
contemporary western policies in the region.  The Crusades also resulted in a revival of Islam 
and a deeper encounter for Christians with the Muslim faith (Goddard, 2000, p. 91).  It was out 
of this encounter that the Abbot of Cluny, Peter the Venerable (1092-1156) proposed a 
systematic study of Islam.  His achievement provided ‘an alternative view which was influential 
in some circles’, and which did ‘have some later influence’ (Goddard, 2000, p. 96). Francis of 
Assisi, who travelled to Egypt to meet with the Sultan in 1219, was also instrumental in the 
Catholic Church in demonstrating a different approach towards Islam, and continues to have 
relevance for the study of Christian-Muslim relations (Saxby, 2006).14   
 
We cannot overestimate the importance of Al-Ghazali in the development of Muslim thought 
and philosophy in relation to other faiths, and in relation to Islamic understandings of faith and 
reason. His forty volume work, Iḥiyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn (‘The Revival of the Religious Sciences’) 
brought together Sunni theology and Sufi mysticism and had a profound impact on Islamic 
thought.  Also influential was the Muslim Kingdom of Granada, which inspired the translation 
of Arabic and Greek works into Latin, and the establishment of Arabic schools across Europe in 
the 14th Century (Goddard, 2000, pp. 96-99).  At the same time, the Mendicant Missionary 
Orders of monks, inspired by Francis’ visit established a different model for inter-faith 
 
14 See also:  (S. M. Thomas, 2018). 
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encounter.15  Meanwhile the presence of the Crusader Kingdoms in the Levant ensured a 
depth of encounter between Eastern and Western Christians that was to strengthen the 
Christian presence in the region.  
 
The 15th Century saw the collapse of the Muslim State in Spain, the discovery of the Americas 
by Christopher Columbus, and Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the route around the Cape of 
Good Hope, making possible more substantial contact with the Muslim communities of Asia.  
As the Muslim world became surrounded by European influence, so theological attitudes 
within both Christian and Muslim faiths became more exclusive.   
 
The 17th and 18th Centuries again saw a shift amongst Christian missionaries in their approach 
to the Muslim world, influenced by the universalistic approach of the Jesuits, and such figures 
as Francis Xavier in South India and Japan; Matthew Ricci in China, and Robert de Nobili in 
India.  ‘These figures are outstanding because of their sensitivity to local cultures and religion, 
their insistence on the importance of learning languages, and their flexibility in seeking to 
make Christian ideas comprehensible in the local idiom’ (Goddard, 2000, p. 120).  The Jesuits 
particularly, with their understanding of ‘the ability of human nature to participate in the work 
of redeeming grace’ were instrumental in inspiring a new dialogue with those amongst whom 
they lived and worked (P. L. Heck, 2009, p. 56). 
 
The balance of Christian-Muslim relations was destabilised by the relaxing of millet laws by 
Egypt in the 1830s, and the tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire in 1839 and 1856.  These 
saw the approval of freedom of worship, and the granting of equal political status to the ahl al-
dhimma.  Given the number of Jews and Christians in Government service, and the economic 
advantages and higher education that many possessed, many Muslims feared that equal status 
would damage the Islamic character of the State and endanger the dominant position of 
Muslims in administrative circles.   Taking advantage of this new freedom, simple acts such as 
the ringing of Church bells or public Christian processions helped result in serious Muslim riots 
against Christians in Aleppo and Damascus in 1850 and 1860  (Ma'oz, 2014, pp. 242-243). 
 
The modern rise of nationalism, and the colonialism and missionary endeavours of the 19th and 
20th Centuries further impacted relations between Christians and Muslims, and contributed to 
 




the Sunni Islamic revival under scholars such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani’, Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan, Muhammad Abduh, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi,  Hasan Al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb, who 
in their different ways sought to respond to the challenges to Islamic faith presented by 
modernity, and to strengthen Islam in a way that engaged relevantly with the modern world in 
a manner true to the  tenets of Islam.16   These scholars are the founding influence of Islamic 
currents in the contemporary world, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which sought a return 
to ‘pure’ Muslim principles in both faith and politics, and rejected the western secularism with 
which Christianity was associated.  This has been a very significant factor in recent political 
developments, the rise of sectarianism, and the violence that have taken place in the region, 
and in the criticism of the Baathist governments in Baghdad and Damascus.17 
 
It can be seen from this brief historical survey that dialogue and encounter of some sort has 
been experienced throughout the history of Christian-Muslim relations.  It has taken place 
both at an institutional level, and through individual debates between Muslim and Christian 
scholars.  
 
It is impossible to practise Christian-Muslim dialogue today without acknowledgement of the 
historical relationship of Christianity with imperialism, colonialism, and recent conflicts (Zebiri, 
1997, p. 29).  Today, ‘Muslims are deterred by what they see as Western perpetrated global 
injustice, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (Zebiri, 1997, p. 36).  Indeed, the Arab-
Israeli conflict has been a major political aspect of Syrian domestic politics, and many 
Palestinian refugees have been allowed to settle in the country.  Centuries of Christian-Muslim 
engagement have been deeply affected by recent western interventions in the region, and the 
growing perception amongst many Muslims that indigenous Christians somehow belong to a 
‘western’ faith, whose political intrusions have wrought upon the region violence, corruption, 
destabilisation, injustice and hypocrisy.  This is not to absolve the corruption and oppression of 
many Arab governments.   Indeed, the fact that some governments have been perceived to be 
more secularised and ‘western’ in their sympathies and alliances, and following policies that 
serve the needs of the wealthy rather than the poor, has allowed Islamist ideologies to 
influence the politically or economically disenfranchised.    
 
 




Several other factors that have affected the increasingly fragile Christian-Muslim relationship 
in Syria.  Among them has been the more juridical emphasis in Sunni Islam and its demand in 
recent decades that the application of Shari’a law should be the major source of legislation, 
versus the more progressive Sunni and Shi’a Muslim communities, who, along with other 
minority communities, value the diversity of Syria’s faith communities, and fear the limitation 
upon personal freedoms that the imposition of Islamic law would entail.  This fear has been 
enhanced by the radical Islamism that has been unleashed by most of the militant groups that 
have been operating in Syria during the current conflict. 
 
Understanding the current context. 
 
There are multiple reasons why the violence reached the levels that it did during the Syrian 
conflict.  The study will explore the extent to which religious ideology and internal and external 
social, cultural, economic and political factors played a role in exacerbating tensions, and how 
Syrians view the multi-layered dimensions of the conflict.  The degree to which this conflict can 
be considered ‘sectarian’ will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  Nor should it be 
forgotten that Syria has historically been a place of refuge for multiple communities.  Over the 
years, the country has hosted millions of refugees, amongst them Armenians, Syriacs, Kurds, 
Palestinians and Iraqis.  Many have stayed and made their home in the country, their religious, 
cultural and social traditions adding to the rich diversity and complexity of Syrian society 
(Chatty, 2017). 
 
Syria contains some of the most diverse expressions of Islam and Christianity anywhere in the 
world. Learning from their historical and contemporary relational dynamic, and from Eastern 
Christian theological engagement with religion and politics in Syria, especially from their 
response to conflict, offers the possibility of discerning new frameworks for dialogue in the 
complex religious contexts that are emerging in the region.  This study provides a platform for 
these evolving relational dynamics to be considered. 
 
The religious and political context in the Middle East has been deeply affected by the 
constantly changing multifactional and multidimensional nature of the conflict.  And the 
religious and social demographic that emerges from the displacement or migration of millions 
of people is likely to have a further significant impact on society.  To what extent will the 
increasingly juridical emphasis of Sunni Islam in Syria and the wider region affect the plurality 
of religious ‘space’?  How will Sunni citizens in a ‘secular’ State negotiate the changes in Sunni 
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Islam?  How will other communities negotiate that change?  What impact does the increasing 
influence of Shi’a Islam have on the religious dynamic, especially given Syria’s close 
relationship with Iran?  Will the impact of religious reform in Russia in relation to both 
Christianity and Islam be relevant to Syria, given Russia’s influence and role in Syria?  Will 
minority groups have the same freedom of expression in the future?  The changing face of 
communal identity in the region will impact Syrian society, and these are necessary questions, 
even if unarticulated in the public sphere.   Hopefully this work will provide context to explore 
these questions further. 
 
Given the changing religious dynamics in the world, the increasing radicalisation of some 
expressions of religious discourse, and the fact that in 2010, about 31% of the world’s 
population were Christian and about 23% of the world’s population were Muslim, 
understanding the complex history and dynamic evolution of Christian-Muslim relations, and 
the fears posed by the rise of religious extremism is of profound importance.18  This study 
seeks to learn from that evolving context, so that we can discern how a hopeful, constructive 
and positive dynamic can prevail and inform the wider political and religious context. 
 
My encounters with the rich diversity of the Christian and Muslim presence in Syria have 
inspired an in-depth and on-going engagement.  When the conflict broke out, it was evident 
that the religious context in Syria was understudied and little understood outside the country, 
and that a greater understanding was much needed.  From a social and religious perspective, 
both prior to the conflict and even in its midst, Syria represented one of the most diverse and 
pluralistic contexts in the region. To lose this identity would be catastrophic for all the 
communities in the region. It would also have a serious impact on the place and role of women 
in Syrian society who, particularly in urban areas, currently enjoy more social and cultural 
freedoms than women in most countries in the region (Ventura, 2018). Throughout the 
conflict, in the face of radicalised ideologies and increased sectarian tension, diverse 
communal groups have continued to coexist. Understanding and engaging with the way in 
which these groups have  achieved this is one step towards preserving Syria’s historic diversity.  
It will also help us discern how Christian and Muslim communities can recover trust, tolerance 
and peaceful coexistence and respect, not just in Syria, but in the region and beyond.   
 




All visits in Syria have been in government-held areas of the country, or areas that have been 
recaptured from militant factions.  It has not been possible or feasible to enter areas under the 
control of militant opposition groups, though I have visited some of these regions shortly after 
their recapture by government forces.  This is relevant to the research findings.  It was 
estimated in December 2017 that 75% of the population of Syria who remained in the country 
lived in government-held areas, including 6.3 million internally displaced people who had fled 
from areas controlled by the militant opposition.19 These inevitably included persons who 
supported the militants.  Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Lattakia being the most populous 
cities, contain members of most communities, and are largely representative of the wide 
communal make-up of Syrian society.  At the time of the visits, they also included millions of 
internally displaced people who had fled areas that were not under government control.  I 
have sought out varying voices from all these and other more rural areas of the country.  I 
have only on a few occasions experienced reluctance to converse.  People have usually spoken 
remarkably openly, often with passion and conviction.  Many have been keen to share their 
experiences and their views.  All quotations and references in this thesis are shared with 
consent. 
This research represents a ‘snapshot’ of the religious context in Syria taken during a traumatic 
period in the country’s history.  I make no claim of a singular narrative across the complex 
social and religious landscapes across Syria, with its diverse expressions in rural and urban, 
different class, ideological or social contexts.  My conversations have however crossed many of 
these boundaries, and it has been humbling to engage with Syrians during this time.  Many 
have opened their hearts, shared their stories, and offered generous hospitality.  At the time 
that this research was undertaken, few foreigners were visiting Syria, and the reality of life ‘on 
the ground’ inside government-held areas of the country was rarely reported upon.  This study 
therefore offers original insights and perspectives that have been under-represented in 
western discourse but which have lasting relevance for the interreligious landscape. 
 
19 At the time of writing, (December 2017/January 2018) this was a constantly changing figure as more 
areas were re-taken by the Syrian Government from militant factions, and as more refugees and 
internally displaced persons return to their homes in government-held areas.  The key areas that remain 
outside government-control at the time of writing, are those north of the Euphrates (the ‘Kurdish’ 
areas); areas in the south of the country, adjacent to the Golan Heights; and a shrinking area in Idleb 
Province.  
The UN confirms that between the months of January and June 2017, approximately 600,000 refugees 
and internally displaced persons returned to their homes, primarily in the Aleppo area. 19 See: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40460126   “Syria War: Almost 500,000 refugees return 
in 2017 – UN.”   30 June 2017 
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The Framework for this study. 
 
Chapter 1 contextualises the complex ecclesial mosaic that makes up the Christian presence in 
the country, which goes back to “the origins of Christianity itself.”(Anthony O'Mahony, 2013, 
p. 232), and in which the full breadth of ecclesial expression in all five Christian ‘families’ of the 
Church are to be found. (See also Appendix 1).  This diversity brings both enrichment and 
challenge to the religious life of the country, and to the ontological life of the Church 
communities.    
 
Similarly, it is essential to understand the broad expressions of Islam that are represented in 
the country, which are as equally diverse as the Christian presence, and which represent 
almost every wing of Islamic theology and political tendency.  Chapter 2 explores this mosaic 
and considers the role of political Islam in Syrian society in recent decades, and its significant 
impact on Christian-Muslim relations in the country.    
 
Chapter three considers some of the Christian responses to Islam, and explores the role that 
models of religious leadership have played both historically and contemporaneously within the 
context.  A further section considers the extent to which sectarianism exists and has influenced 
recent developments within Syria, and examines the concept of ‘sectarianism’. 
 
Chapter four examines in more detail the history of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, and 
explores how Christian and Muslim communities have related to each other in the midst of the 
conflict, with particular consideration for how the conflict has impacted that engagement.  
Interviews with a range of religious leaders, and a reflection on the experience of Syrians in 
Maaloula , Aleppo and Sadad inform this chapter.   Analysis of a questionnaire undertaken 
with Syrians from different communities, that deals with these issues is to be found in 
Appendix 5, and further informs the findings in this chapter. 
 
Finally, we consider how a number of Eastern Christian theologians, representing the 
‘Antiochene paradigm’ of Eastern Christianity have contributed to the theological under-
pinning, and practical effectiveness of Christian-Muslim engagement in the region, and reflect 
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on how the combination of local practice and Christian theology, evidenced by on-the-ground 
research, might inform the future development of inter-religious relations.20   
 
This study is focussed on the subject from a Christian theological and ecclesial perspective.  A 
detailed study of Christian-Muslim relations from a Muslim perspective requires further study. 
More importantly, an engaged Christian understanding of this dynamic is vital for the 
continued flourishing of the Christian presence in the region.   
 
As an evolving society in which complex interreligious dynamics have been at work throughout 
its history, contemporary Syria represents an ideal context for cutting-edge research into 
Christian theological and political thought in Muslim-Christian relations.  My distinct 
contribution is to understand Christian-Muslim relations in Syria in the context of evolving 
questions about the roles of religious identity, religious leadership and the challenges of 
Christian engagement with Islam. And of the particular but under-recognised value of 
Antiochene theological and ecclesial contributions to that discourse.  
  
 
20 I agree with Georges Khodr who believes that “Eastern Christians are better qualified for dialogue 
with Muslims than Western Christians.  He calls attention to Arab Christians’ knowledge and 






This research has involved an interdisciplinary engagement including academic research and 
qualitative ethnographic fieldwork inside government-controlled areas of Syria, examining the 
historic and contemporary dynamics of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria in the midst of a 
conflict that has profoundly altered society and the wider political context for Christianity and 
Islam.   The fieldwork took place during eight visits to Syria between 2015 and 2018, and has 
drawn on the experience of previous visits to Syria in 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2014.  In 
Syria, all recent research visits have been in government-controlled areas, including areas 
recently recaptured from militant control when visited.  Interviews have also been conducted 
with church leaders, academics, and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and in Erbil, Iraq.   
Personal context 
 
Since 1982, I have been a regular visitor to the region, and started visiting Syria in 2003.  Prior 
to the conflict, I led groups to Syria and visited independently.  In these years many Syrians 
expressed the belief that political and economic reforms were creating a strong future.  The 
tourist industry was developing, with increasing numbers of tourists discovering the country’s 
abundant historical treasures.21  In 2010, months before the outbreak of the crisis, historic 
sites were being restored, tourist facilities developed and infrastructure improved.  
Simultaneously, there were tensions and a more visible presence of conservative Islamic 
influence on the streets.  Economic, social and religious strains were clearly exacerbated by the 
presence of over 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria’s towns and cities, and a million people who 
had migrated from the rural areas into the cities as a result of the devastating drought which 
began in 2006 (Chatel, 2014), (Shahi, 2018).  
Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011, I have visited Syria ten times, and have travelled 
widely throughout government-held areas of the country, including areas most affected by the 
conflict, experiencing car bombs, shelling and street battles. Entering the country at the 
invitation of religious leaders, I have had remarkable access to large areas of the country and a 
wide variety of people.  I have met hundreds of ordinary Syrians including Sunni, Shi’a, 
Alawites, Druze and Christians of all denominations, and by visiting camps for the internally-
displaced, have been able to talk with many who fled militant-controlled areas.  I have also 
 
21 The Syrian Tourism Ministry noted a 40% increase in tourists between 2009 and 2010, and had 
planned to open 85 new hotels in 2011.  https://www.thenational.ae/business/travel-and-tourism/syria-
sees-tourist-numbers-leap-40-1.583832  (Accessed 21 April 2019). 
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met faith, civic and political leaders in Damascus, Homs, Saidnaya, Maaloula, Aleppo, Daraa, 
Tartous, Deir Ezzor, Lattakia, and the leaders of most internal political parties.22   
A few of my recent visits have been as a member of faith delegations at the invitation of faith 
leaders, that have included members of the House of Lords and senior clergy. This has given 
me access to a wide variety of people, including senior religious and political figures in a more 
formal context, but also the opportunity to build contacts and friendships.  On most other 
occasions, I visited the country at the invitation of Church leaders, staying with friends, and 
travelling extensively in the country without official accompaniment.  For example, during a 
one month visit in May 2017, my travels throughout Syria were at no point accompanied by 
any ‘official’.  This has been possible because I have built trust and been transparent about my 
interests and intentions. Had this not been the case, the same freedom of movement may not 
have been possible.  Trust has developed by listening and sensitively negotiating profoundly 
sensitive and complex dynamics, without prejudging, and without imposing external 
prejudices.  With trust established I have been able to engage in semi-structured interviews 
and informal conversations.23  Undoubtedly, the fact that few foreigners have attempted to 
enter Syria and engage with ordinary Syrian people, or with religious or civic leaders in an 
open-minded way, has enhanced the opportunities I have been offered to engage and learn.   
My visits to Syria have included first hand witness of the impact of violence.  In 2014, two men 
were blown up in a car by an in-coming shell within 50 metres of my hotel room, and I 
watched as two further shells landed near crowds on their way to work.  During the same visit I 
travelled to meet terrified displaced civilians on the edge of Yarmouk refugee camp, which had 
been occupied by militant factions, and heard their traumatic stories. During the same week, 
not an hour went by that random shells were not falling at points all over the city.  Later that 
year, I visited families of the victims of a car-bomb that had exploded two days before in 
Homs, and was attending a reconciliation meeting of Shi’a, Sunni, Christian leaders and local 
civic leaders in Homs, when gun-battles and shelling erupted just a block away. Some months 
 
22 Apart from the National Progressive Front in the Syrian Parliament that consists of nine parties 
dominated by the ruling Ba’ath Party, who make up the main political framework in Syria, there are 
some twenty internal opposition parties.  See : 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/political-parties.htm   These opposition parties are 
not to be confused with the militant groups involved in the conflict that international media refer to as 
‘opposition’.  
23 Following the criteria of Merton and Kendall (1946).  See (Flick, 2015, pp. 140-141) 
27 
 
later, I conversed with soldiers at a checkpoint in Homs, just 24 hours before they were all 
killed in a car bomb explosion at the same location.  
I have stayed in three monasteries during my visits: Mar Mousa Monastery near Nebek, the 
Monastery of St. James the Persian at Qara, and St. Sergius Convent in Maaloula.  Whilst 
staying at Qara for three nights in 2015, ISIS front lines were just one kilometre away, with 
shells falling and gun-battles taking place each night adjacent to the monastery.  I was also in 
Aleppo when the city was finally re-captured in December 2016 and was one of the first 
foreigners to enter East Aleppo, hours after the last snipers had been cleared from the east of 
the city, meeting hundreds of people as they emerged from terrifying ordeals, and witnessing 
the celebrations of tens of thousands of people in Aleppo on the first night in four years when 
there was no shelling or bombing in the city.  
This study therefore emerges, not simply from an academic interest, but from a long-term 
engagement with Syria and the wider region, during which relationships have developed and 
insights gleaned and evolved over an extended period of time.  During this time I have had to 
learn how to engage with the deep social, religious and political complexities of the constantly 
changing context.  This means that my methodology has been fluid and flexible.  Sometimes, 
research can only be achieved through the building of trust and relationships.  An illustration 
of the fragility of this engagement, and the care and sometimes circular approach that has to 
be taken, is that on two occasions, I have unintentionally offended interlocutors by suggesting 
a negative interpretation of a given reality. On each occasion, it was a misunderstanding of 
intention, but could have been damaging, and though I reconciled with the persons involved, 
their trust in me was damaged.  During visits, notwithstanding generous hospitality and warm 
welcome, I have sometimes had to be aware of suspicion towards me as a foreigner, but this 
has usually transformed into appreciation for being genuinely interested in the nature and 
well-being of Syrian society.24  Whatever people’s political persuasions or religious affiliation, 
many Syrians feel betrayed by the international community’s political and military policies and 
there exists a suspicion of western political and religious interests in the country.   
The dynamic of western Protestant encounter with Orthodox and Eastern Christianity has long 
been a sensitive one, and being a Church of England priest has added another layer of 
 
24 An example of this suspicion is that in June 2018, following negative British media coverage of a visit 
to Syria of which I was a part, I was reliably informed that a member of Syrian security had raised the 




complexity to my conversations and interactions.   For these reasons, it has not been sufficient 
to hold to one or even a handful of ‘models’ of encounter in order to learn, discern and 
engage.  In such a complex and conflicted social, religious and political context, I have had to 
frame semi-structured conversations carefully in order to elicit open responses.  
My commitment to this subject has been personally, emotionally, financially and professionally 
costly, and therefore a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. However, I believe that the kind of 
breadth, depth and quality of experience, engagement and encounter that I have received in 
Syria, can bring to light deeper insights, truths and perspectives than are possible from a 
distant ‘academic’ approach.  Nevertheless, I have sought to bring academic diligence, 
thoroughness and integrity to all encounters and reflection. 
For all these reasons I have become increasingly aware of the complex historical, theological 
and political dynamics that have moulded, and continue to mould, Christian-Muslim relations 
in Syria and in the region.  Despite the conflict, communal coexistence remains visible on the 
streets of Syria in daily life.  People from different communities continue to live, work and 
socialise together.  Churches and mosques are often sited side by side.  And freedom of 
worship, religious identity and practice are enshrined in the Personal Status law of the Syrian 
constitution25 (Eijk, 2016).  This characteristic of Syrian society has remained unchanged in 
government-controlled areas of the country throughout the crisis, and is one reason why many 
Syrians are quick to deny – and be offended by - any suggestion of sectarianism in Syrian 
society.  (See Appendix 5). 
Those with whom I have engaged have represented all communities.  Diverse political points 
of view have been expressed to me in multiple conversations throughout the country, and 
some of this diversity is to be found within the questionnaire responses.  Syria is often referred 
to as a ‘dictatorship’, or a ‘police state’ (Baczko, 2018; Lesch, 2013; McHugo, 2014).  There is a 
complex ‘security apparatus’ that is clearly unpopular and leads to caution in political 
discourse.  But during conversations in homes, restaurants and in both private and public 
meetings, people have often expressed diverse views quite openly.  It is very common to hear 
criticism of corruption within society or within government bodies. But the popularity of the 
President personally appears widespread.  It is frequently expressed in conversation both 
 
25 Article 3 of The Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, 2012 stipulates: “The State shall respect all 
religions and ensure the freedom to perform all the rituals that do not prejudice public order.  The 





privately and publicly with spontaneity and authenticity.  On the regular occasions when the 
President appears unannounced at public events, or in people’s homes, at special events, or in 
the streets, in mosques, schools or churches, he is swamped by enthusiastic crowds.  The 
thousands of people celebrating spontaneously on the streets of Aleppo when the last district 
of East Aleppo was recaptured by the Syrian Army in December 2016, and in Damascus after 
East Ghouta was liberated in May 2018, both of which I personally witnessed, were full of 
unconstrained and visibly authentic loyalty for the Syrian Army and President.26  In an article 
entitled ‘Pax Syriana:  The staying power of Bashar Al-Assad’, Alam writes: 
The clichés in Syria never worked: despite the usual Sunni v Shi’a debate and dictator v 
democracy argument, these were always too simplistic and rhetorical for a multi-
ethnic state such as Syria.  Similarly, most observers ignored the Christians of the Arab 
world, and Syria was the heart and birthplace of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the 
only place in the world where Aramaic was spoken, the language of Jesus.  As 
Christians were being killed in Iraq post-2003, thousands came to seek shelter in Syria, 
and once the war in Syria started in 2011, these same Christians saw the same killers 
reappear in Syria this time. Almost all the Christian groups in the region and Arab 
world have stood in full support of Assad during this war.  Indeed Syria has always 
been seen as the bastion and pillar of Eastern Christianity and the most tolerant 
country, which Pope John Paul II stated as a model of how other countries should be 
like (Alam, 2019, p. 7). 
 
Undoubtedly, conflict is lucrative for some, but the vast majority of Syrians are weary of war.   
Most people are appalled at the violence unleashed by the conflict, realise that the multiple 
militant factions are divided and that most have promoted a sectarian, radicalised ideology.  
Thus, whatever people’s political opinions or allegiances, many people have expressed the 
belief that the militant factions are incapable of forming a united government or preserving 
 
26 A writer from Aleppo writing under the name of ‘Edward Dark’, a frequent critic of the Syrian 
government wrote on 31 March 2015: “A regime that has no support among its own population cannot 
survive years of civil war, no matter how powerful it is or how much support it gets from abroad, it just 
goes against all logic.  A large part of the Syrian population still inside the country still supports the 
regime.  Many are from Syria’s numerous and diverse religious minorities, but a sizable number are also 
from the Sunni populations in the large and cosmopolitan cities of Damascus and Aleppo.” 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/syria-why-assad-still-power-544952547  (Accessed: 7 October 
2018)    And writing in ‘The Spectator’ magazine in July 2018,  John Bradley admits: “Far more important 
for Assad is that, in the eyes of most of the Syrian people, he is a hero — and not least for having saved 
their bacon by wiping out Islamic State.” https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/07/assad-is-back-for-good-
in-syria-and-with-trumps-blessing/ (Accessed: 7 October 2018).  This is not to deny the very different 
attitudes of exiles and those who oppose the government.   
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the secularist and pluralist framework of Syrian society.27  As the war has evolved, so too have 
people’s views, opinions, and in some cases, allegiances. 
When I met the Syrian Ambassador in London in 2005 to prepare to lead a group visit to the 
country, he acknowledged that there would be security keeping an eye on the group, but 
stated that this was both for our, and for the country’s safety.  He said that the threat of 
outside influences wishing to destabilise the country could not be underestimated.  With the 
benefit of hindsight, he has been proved right.   Whilst Syria is an authoritarian State and the 
Parliamentary system is not ‘democratic’ in a western sense, nevertheless there is a system of 
proportional representation.  In fact, there are more Christian and more female 
Parliamentarians in Syria than in any other country in the Middle East.  Notwithstanding 
political limitations, Syria’s secular-based constitution provides far greater social and religious 
freedom than many other countries in the region. This has particular relevance for all religious 
identities. 
During my visits to Syria, I have encountered conflicting narratives between realities on the 
ground and those presented in the international media.  In the face of such conflicting 
accounts, I do not seek to take a one-sided approach, but rather to enable narratives to be 
heard that most media outlets, and many scholars have ignored.  This may in part be because 
few have sought to listen to voices, or been able to witness realities inside government-held 
areas of Syria, or have prioritised the voices of exiles or people inside areas controlled by 
militant groups.  I believe that the fact that I have engaged with Syrians inside government-
controlled parts of the country is a necessary part of scholarship on Syria, and lends a 
uniqueness and authenticity to this study.  My hope is that through this study conflicting 
accounts may be better understood.   It also seeks to offer a Christian perspective of the 
interreligious dynamics that are built into Syrian society, how they have been impacted by the 
conflict, and how they might be transformed into a source of good in the future. 
Research Design 
 
This study uses an empirical qualitative approach to explore links between the context and 
dynamics of the Christian and Muslim structures of Syrian society.  The design used is similar to 
that proposed by Maxwell (2002), which considers the goals, conceptual frameworks, research 
 
27 This interview with respected Middle Eastern Analyst, Sharmine Narwani, offers an informed analysis 
that illustrates this: https://www.salon.com/2019/04/21/reporter-sharmine-narwani-on-the-secret-
history-of-americas-defeat-in-syria/  (Accessed: 21 April 2019). 
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questions, methods and validity as “an integrated and interacting whole, with each component 
closely tied to several others, rather than being linked in a linear or cyclic sequence.” (Maxwell, 
2005, p. 216).  The issues that influence the historical and contemporary context and relational 
dynamic of Islam and Christianity in Syria are inter-connected.  Thus, they are explored 
together. 
The study takes a sociological approach accepting that truths can be ascertained by 
observation, experience and enquiry. Christian-Muslim relations as a subject cannot be neatly 
defined or summarised. It has multiple and diverse expressions, both between and within 
different contexts.  Whilst I am sympathetic to a paradigm that recognises that theories can be 
generated, hypotheses tested and knowledge produced by collecting facts, the fact that 
positivism rejects ‘values’ renders it inadequate in my view as a paradigm to be solely adopted 
when exploring religious and social matters.  In their detailed study of the Civil War in Syria, 
Baczko, Dorronsoro and Quensay undertake a critique of what they term the ‘neopositivist’ 
“obsession with quantification mistaken for scientificity” which they say “obscures serious 
methodological problems” in data selection, category definition and interpretation (Baczko, 
2018, pp. 6-7).28  This is one reason why, in addition to the multiple complexities and 
challenges of undertaking interviews that can be quantitatively analysed in the context of the 
Syrian conflict, the quantitative element of this research – analysis of a questionnaire - has 
been placed in an appendix.    
My research seeks to examine the historical, practical, social, theological and religious 
structures and mechanisms, under which Christian-Muslim relations have developed and been 
lived out in Syria, in contexts of both peace and conflict. The aim is to understand the 
expression and experience of Christian-Muslim relations in the challenging circumstances of 
Syria; how these have been impacted by the conflict; and reflect on how the eastern Christian 
paradigm might inform their positive development and expression in the future.  
Contextualising this epistemology within the framework of existing knowledge is essential to 
understanding its current expression. 
Given the complexity of the subject, in order to establish a contextual understanding and to 
discern a realistic ‘picture’ of how we view the development of the Christian-Muslim dynamic 
 
28 The Baczko, Dorronsoro , Quesnay study: Civil War in Syria. Mobilization and Competing Social Orders, 
published in 2018 by Cambridge University Press, was based on research undertaken exclusively within 
‘rebel’ held areas of Syria, and with opposition figures in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.  They argue 
for a sociological approach to the study of Civil wars.  Their study is based on interviews with 162 
individuals, and other informal encounters.  In this, their methodology is not dissimilar to mine. 
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in the face of current challenges, I have used a varied methodological approach: one that 
examines current literature on the subject, uses an interpretative approach to contextualise 
my own experiences, and reflects on eastern Christian theological contributions to the subject.  
It is these that are going to most inform future Christian-Muslim encounter in the region.  This 
may be considered ambitious, but it is only reflection on these aspects, each hitherto under-
studied, that is going to enable a new epistemology of the subject, and provide an original 
contribution in the field of Syrian studies and interfaith relations in the country. 
Strategy 
 
The design and strategies used in the study were not established from the beginning but 
evolved over a period of time as the research took place.  The research context and design 
illustrate why a variety of qualitative and interpretative strategies and approaches are adopted 
to produce effective results.   I use both inductive and deductive strategies (Maxwell, 2005).   
My starting thesis is that a broad spectrum of Christian and Muslim expression has lived side 
by side in Syria for centuries, with - notwithstanding periods of tension during different eras - a 
level of mutual engagement within a context of pluralism and diversity that has been 
understudied in western discourse (Goddard, 2000; Griffith, 2008). This pluralism and diversity 
has been influenced by the location of Syria as a crossroads of trade, culture and empire, 
between Europe, Africa and Asia over millennia.   The survival of this pluralism within everyday 
Syrian society, and peoples’ determination to maintain it, even in the face of religious 
radicalism and sectarian violence, helped inspire this research.   
From the inductive perspective, only one aspect of my study involves quantitative data of 
analysis and this is to be found in Appendix 5.  Qualitative analysis - Interpretation of 
experience, conversations with many individuals over an extended period of time, reflection 
on responses to the questionnaire, consideration of contextual realities, and the academic 
publications of experts, all help to inform the findings.  One could ask if overall inferences from 
such processes are reliable, or question whether ‘generalisations’ or claims based upon this 
process, can be assumed to be correct.  That is a valid question.  By the very nature of the 
subject, there are a variety of conclusions that, though inter-related, are complex and multi-
layered.  Thus, the research combines interpretative processes, with deductions from the 
research contributing to how the findings can most effectively inform future developments.  In 




Huberman and Miles (1988) recognised that a qualitative, realist approach to research requires 
less hard data, and, allowing for the relevance of personal feelings, intentions and experience, 
enables a more unstructured approach to the gathering of sources, material and the 
generating of a contextual understanding of the realities and processes leading to the 
outcomes described.  However, this requires an understanding and reflection of motives, 
prejudice, bias and validity.  In the past, personal experience has sometimes been viewed 
negatively in the research world.  But increasingly, the value of personal experience and 
perceptions has been acknowledged.  They are “not simply a source of ‘bias’,” but can provide 
valuable insight and data (Maxwell, 2005, p. 220).  Strauss and Corbin (1990) recognise that 
“the touchstone of your own experience may be more valuable an indicator for you of a 
potentially successful research endeavour” (Strauss. A., 1990, pp. 35-36).  Strauss adds that 
‘experiential data’ offers a worthwhile source of insights, hypotheses and validity.   This is 
relevant to this research, which builds on years of experience and insights developed through 
on-going engagement with the subject.  
Academic research into literature relevant for this study has been undertaken in England.  
Literature covered includes books and journal articles by western and eastern Christian 
scholars, Muslim Middle Eastern scholars, western and Middle Eastern political historians.  
Subjects explored have been: the history and theology of eastern Christianity; Islam within 
Syria; political histories and accounts of Syria and the neighbouring region; studies on 
sectarianism and political Islam.  I have also visited and interviewed academic figures and 
institutions in Lebanon. I have sought to encourage honest and open input and reflection from 
interlocutors, conscious that each person (including myself) brings their own context, interests, 
prejudice and perspective to the subject, and have therefore sought to interview a range of 
people, who reflect diversity of thought in the subject.   
Limitation of research to within government-held areas might attract criticism of bias.29  
However, substantial material is available from the perspective of militant-controlled areas, 
where the population is now less representative of wider Syrian society (Balanche, 2018).  This 
study seeks to fill a gap in contemporary Syrian scholarship.  In the company of delegations 
and in formal meetings, discourse was restricted.  However, in most other encounters, there 
 
29 This criticism is rarely levelled against academic scholarship that has prioritised discourse from within 
‘rebel’-held areas.  Nor against media and other agencies whose sources throughout the Syrian conflict 
were almost exclusively embedded within areas under militant control, and whose narratives generally 




was considerable freedom of discussion and open conversation.  Far from my identity being a 
hindrance to conversation as might be expected, it seemed to encourage candid dialogue. 
Lebanon offers a useful context in which to explore this subject, for Lebanon and Syria share 
close religious and institutional affinities In terms of communal diversity, a shared history in 
the Ottoman Empire, and issues faced in the field of Christian-Muslim dialogue and relations.   
Additionally, the patriarchates of three of the major Churches in Lebanon- Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Melkite, and Syrian Orthodox – are all to be found in Damascus (Chapter 3).  However, 
one has to be aware of the political sensitivities and complexities that exist between the two 
countries, which affects political views and relationships between faith communities.   
Qualitative methods of research have been undertaken throughout Syria during several visits, 
meeting with a broad spectrum of people, in a variety of contexts representing the diverse and 
varied ways in which Christian-Muslim relations have been impacted by the conflict.  
Interviews have been undertaken with Christian leaders in Syria and in Lebanon to explore 
contemporary and historical theology and praxis and to discuss the role of faith communities 
in conflict transformation and peace-building in Syria.  Semi-structured, non-directive in-depth 
interviews have been undertaken with key figures, both lay and clergy, who are involved in 
Christian-Muslim dialogue, and a written questionnaire has been given to willing participants 
(Appendix 5.)  I have also had numerous informal conversations. 
Here, I must distinguish between the process applied to the interviews and the questionnaire.  
Interviews have taken place over a period of time, and have allowed for in-depth questions 
and answers related to the subject.  These have been open conversations.  It is not possible to 
analyse these conversations in any quantitative way.   I have therefore used an Interpretative 
paradigm in reflecting on and analysing these interviews to inform my thinking and thesis.30 
Some quoted excerpts from such conversations have been included in the thesis, but they 
have not been recorded in detail, other than by informal notes. In order to minimise any 
possible discomfort or fear of disclosure, no voice recorder has been used.  Consent has been 
received. When I have mentioned to Christian and Muslim faith leaders in Syria that I am 
undertaking this research, there has been warm approval, and a recognition that such a study 
is needed and could be valuable. 
 
30 The interpretative paradigm, as formulated by Wilson in 1970, recognises that subjects ascribe 
meaning to objects, experiences, events, and that these “subjective viewpoints become an instrument 
for analysing social worlds.”  (Flick, 2015, pp. 24-25) 
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The questionnaire consists of four fixed questions.  
1. Are interreligious relations important to you and to your faith traditions?   
2. In what ways was Christian-Muslim coexistence visible prior to the conflict? 
3. In what ways has the conflict affected Christian-Muslim relations 
4. Do you think each faith community needs to restore trust and maintain positive 
coexistence and respect?  How? 
 
Though I have met and had informal conversations with some of those who responded, a 
majority of responses were completed online.  I have analysed all the responses to the 
questionnaire quantitatively and qualitatively.  In the questionnaire, carefully framed open 
questions explored the experience, motives, purpose and method expressed in Christian-
Muslim relations in the country, and considered what has been successful and not so 
successful in the context of conflict.  Understanding the sensitivities of the subject that I am 
studying, and the reluctance that many Syrians express in engaging in any kind of perceived 
sectarian analysis, I have had to frame the questions in ways that will not offend, and will 
encourage open, honest responses.  Of course, this cannot be guaranteed.  But doing so 
appears to have achieved its aim. Consideration has been given to the impact of the conflict on 
inter-religious dynamics, and to the role that styles of leadership in the context play in both 
intra and inter-religious relationships.  (Appendix 5).  
It is impossible for any researcher to claim neutrality.  With my substantial experience of Syria, 
I bring my own experience and understanding of the context.  However, I have tried not to 
impose personal bias. My position as a Church of England priest and my desire to encourage 
Syrian voices to be heard and expressed, has seemed to encourage openness and trust from 
both male and female interviewees.  Since Anglican Church membership in Syria is very small, 
and has little influence in the ecclesiastical and political context in the country, I could be seen 
as comparatively ‘neutral’, in a way that I would not if I belonged to any of the Christian 
denominations with strong ecclesial interests in the country.31  As I have indicated, being 
‘Protestant’ could raise suspicion of underlying ecclesial agendas, but the ability to build 
relationships has substantially reduced that suspicion.   
In all contexts, I have made clear that I do not ‘represent’ the Anglican Church in any official 
capacity, and that this is an independent study.  That has alleviated concern of underlying 
interests.  And the cultural context means that my age, maleness, and ordained status have 
 
31 All Saints Church, Damascus is the only Anglican Church in Syria. It has a congregation of about 80 
Sudanese (former refugees) and 40 Syrians.  The Church is run by local lay leaders and has had no priest 
in residence since 2011.  It comes under the Anglican Diocese of Jerusalem. 
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inspired respect.  It has been interesting and unexpected, that the fact that I am middle-aged, 
male and ordained, has elicited a remarkably open and friendly response from male and 
female students.  They have been the most responsive to discussion and critical debate.  
Holding religious or political status can have a restrictive impact on encounters, However, I 
have not sensed this to be the case in the majority of my encounters.  This may partly be 
because encounters with foreigners have been a rarity in Syria in recent years.  
Given the academic basis of this work, a word on terminology is necessary.  Mainstream media 
refers to fighters opposed to the Syrian government as ‘rebels’.  This term is problematic for 
three reasons.  Firstly, the term suggests a bias that implies political legitimacy and support for 
‘rebel’ groups.  (Those who support them tend to use the term ‘rebels’.  Note that this is the 
term used by most western media who have been consistent in their support for these groups.  
Most Syrians who oppose them reject the term ‘rebel’ and regard them as ‘terrorists’32).  
Secondly, the groups that mainstream media term as ‘rebels’ in fact consist of multiple 
factions with little cohesion, the majority of whom hold to Islamist ideological positions, that 
both unites and divides the factions (Baczko, 2018).  They also include tens of thousands of 
foreign fighters who cannot be regarded as representative of the Syrian people or of Syrian 
opinion. Thirdly, many Syrians inside Government controlled areas of the country regard them 
as ‘terrorists’.   
Much testimony from people whose towns and villages have been attacked by militant groups; 
from fighters who have laid down their arms; and evidence left behind by the factions 
themselves in areas where they have been defeated, suggests that those whom the West has 
regarded as ‘moderate’ have worked alongside radicalised factions since very early on in the 
conflict. This has also been widely documented in published articles and recent books on the 
subject.  Having had many conversations with people who were involved in early 
demonstrations for political reform, it is true that at the earliest stage of the conflict, 
demonstrators included students and professionals.  But according to accounts that I have 
heard from people who were involved, many who sought peaceful change and reform 
abandoned the demonstrations when they became violent and were infiltrated by external 
operators.  As Dam writes:  
Whatever the truth, it is clear that by June 2011 violence and counterviolence had 
increased to such an extent that any return to peaceful discussions and dialogue 
 
32 The militant groups that the west terms ‘rebels’, and many Syrians refer to as ‘terrrorists’, daily 
commit random acts of terror, targeting civilian areas and civilian infrastructure.  Hence, ‘terrorist’ could 
be a valid nomenclature under the dictionary definition of what terrorism entails. 
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between regime and opposition had become extremely difficult.  No less important 
was that the Syrian Revolution had already, to some extent, been kidnapped by radical 
Islamists (Dam, 2017, p. 87). 
 
However, to term all these groups ‘terrorists’ - the designation used by many Syrians of all 
communities - could suggest an alternative political bias.  To use the term ‘opposition forces’ 
would also be inadequate, given the widely acknowledged existence of tens of thousands of 
non-Syrian participants amidst those forces.  Whilst these groups do oppose the Syrian 
government, the extent to which foreign fighters are involved limits their legitimacy in 
‘opposition’ to the Government, but suggests that they are rather fighting a proxy war.33  
Additionally, there are several internal opposition parties in Syria, many of whose leaders I 
have met, who oppose the fighting factions and any violent opposition, and whom many 
Syrians recognise as the ‘internal peaceful opposition’.   I have therefore chosen to use the 
terms ‘militants’  or ‘Islamists’ depending on the group referred to for those fighting against 
the Syrian government.  When I use the term ‘rebel’, it will be only done so in italics, in order 
to recognise that this is regarded by many as a flawed and inadequate designation.  Where I 
quote Syrian voices, I will use the term that they have used. 
It has not been possible to visit areas controlled by militant groups.  The risk of kidnap and 
death would be high, as these areas are controlled by multiple militant factions, where persons 
who adhere to a different ideology to those in control, or are perceived to have connections 
with the Syrian government, are often murdered.  Most of the civilians of these areas have 
fled, either abroad, or into government-controlled areas, and there are few if any Christians in 
these areas (Balanche, 2018, p. xv).  Most external refugees and internally displaced originate 
from these areas.  Thus, any attempt to interview in those areas would put myself, and anyone 
I attempted to interview at life-threatening risk.  Any remaining civilians in these areas are 
likely to be supporters of the militant groups, or could risk execution if they expressed an 
alternative view to those held by the occupying forces.  Therefore, these areas can no longer 
be regarded as representing the social and religious diversity that still prevails within 
government-controlled areas of the country.  This means that I have met few, even among the 
 
33 This fact is widely acknowledged.  See: (Phillips, 2016) The Battle for Syria.  International Rivalry in the 
New Middle East.  In ‘Shadow Wars’, Davidson, speaking of a ‘domestic nucleus of opposition’, writes: 
“Even if most of the Syrian population remained loyal to the government, as also initially seemed to be 
the case in Libya, it became increasingly apparent that such a nucleus was to serve as the conduit for 
external support and perhaps even a full-scale intervention.” He continues: “By 2012, with the Syrian 
uprising still not having evolved into a fully national revolution or even a sectarian civil war, there was a 
growing realization that much more direct support was required” (Davidson, 2016, pp. 316-318). 
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many who fled from ‘rebel’-controlled areas (the majority of whom are Sunni), who support 
the militants.  Certainly, given that most of the militant opposition follow an Islamist ideology 
(Baczko, 2018; Lister, 2015), it is almost impossible to find a Christian, whatever their political 
views, who supports them.34 Interestingly, I have found far more reticence by civilians to share 
views in refugee camps in Lebanon and Iraq than in Syria itself.  Might this be because the 
residents of these camps are mostly Sunnis, who may fear radicalised Islamists in their midst? 
Given that this research reflects on the interreligious dynamics from a Christian perspective, it 
is accompanied by theological reflection on the contribution of a number of eastern Christian 
interlocutors, including Georges Khodr, Patriarch Aphrem, former Melkite Patriarch Gregorios 
Laham, Archbishop Jeanbart, Antoine Audo, Paolo Dall’Oglio, and indigenous Protestant 
thinkers.  Each of these figures have been active and influential participants in the 
development of Christian religious and political thought, especially as it relates to Christian-
Muslim coexistence before 2011 and during the on-going conflict in Syria.  Although most have 
been widely quoted, their contributions have not been studied to date.  I have had the 
privilege of meeting and interviewing most of these figures, and have read writings published 
by them in English and French.   
In summary, my perspectives on this study have been moulded by a lifetime in the Church, 
over thirty years visiting the Middle East, multiple conversations with Christian and Muslim 
friends in the region, and numerous visits to Syria and Lebanon.  That breadth of experience 
brings I believe an authenticity to the subject, the results of the research, and my 
interpretation of them. 
The validity of these findings rests on the comparison and evaluation of multiple sources: 
academic writings by experts; conversations with a wide variety of people; interpretation of 
questionnaires; and reflection on personal experience.  The criteria that I have followed in 
choosing and analysing sources, whilst being aware of the particular complexities of gathering 
reliable information in the midst of conflict, has closely followed those recommended by 
Lincoln and Guba in 1985: trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, transferability and 
confirmability (Lincoln, 1985). Despite the variety of communities in the Syrian context, 
general positions on certain questions from a wide sample can be ascertained.  From these 
 
34 Syrian Christians who originally supported the opposition include ex-patriot intellectuals.  Christians in 
Syria who had sympathies with early demonstrators, speak of suspending their support when the 
demonstrations became violent and sectarian in tone. Some fought with the militants (Baczko, 2018, p. 
108).  Chapters 4 and 5 of this study outline more common Syrian Christian perspectives on the conflict. 
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positions, a picture emerges of a context in which there is yet hope, and which offers positive 
precedents and models for moving forward in a complex, changing relationship that is 
challenging and of importance and relevance, not just for Syria and the Middle East, but for the 










Studying the Subject 
 
Prior to 2011, little academic material was available in English on Syria and the Syrian religious 
landscape.  Studies have been undertaken on Christianity in Syria and on Islam on Syria, but 
specifically on relations between the two, there has been little research.  Since 2011, there has 
been a glut of publications about Syrian politics and history, and some of these can be found in 
the bibliography, but all of these have been written through a particular academic or political 
lens, and perspectives of Syrians from inside government-controlled areas of Syria are hard to 
find.  Even though tolerance and engagement have for the most part been a defining feature 
of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria for centuries, the theological and practical nature of that 
engagement has not been studied.  Until 9/11 little attention was given to the subject, but 
since the tumultuous events that have recently engulfed the region, an examination of how 
Christian-Muslim relations have been positively modelled in the past, and how they are 
impacted by conflict, has become profoundly timely and relevant.  In recent years, there has 
been increased study of Christianity in Syria and the wider region.  There has been an even 
greater explosion of study of Islam, and particularly the rise of religious extremism.  It is 
impossible to examine issues of faith in Syria without exploring the communal and political 
dynamics in the country.  Many works on this aspect of Syrian society have been published 
since the start of the conflict in 2011.   However, no study has been undertaken on the inter-
religious dynamics in the country in recent years from the Christian perspective. In this 
literature review, I will therefore take the main individual themes of the Research subject and 
identify some of the literature that is available around them. Connections with this literature 
help inform and focus the fieldwork.  The themes identified are:  Christianity in Syria and its 
theological approached to dialogue, Islam in Syria, Muslim and Christian Relations, and the 
political context. 
Christianity in Syria 
 
In recent decades, the study of Christianity in Syria has been a specialised area of research.  
Middle Eastern Christianity had previously been an under-recognised and poorly understood 
aspect of the religious mosaic in the region.  Indeed, many people in Europe and America were 
unaware even of the presence of indigenous Christians in the region.  As far as Syria is 
concerned, both academic study of the subject, and media coverage of the regional conflicts, 
has highlighted both the Christian presence and some of the challenges they face.  Until 
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comparatively recently, studies of Syrian Christianity were focussed on the theological 
contributions of early Christian writers, such as St. John of Damascus, or Ephrem the Syrian.  
Sebastian Brock of Oxford University is generally regarded as one of the foremost scholars in 
the field of Syriac language and studies.  Since the 1970s, his works have focussed on the 
language, culture and theology in which Syriac Christianity emerged, and its interaction with its 
local context.  For the purpose of this research, his writings provide a useful background and 
comparison with the writings of Middle Eastern theologians on the subject.   
 
An important recent contributor to the study of Christianity in the Middle East has been Sidney 
Griffith (b.1938) whose main foci have been Arabic Christianity, Syrian monasticism and 
Muslim-Christian relations.  His work: Griffith, S. H. (2008) The Church in the Shadow of the 
Mosque. Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam is a key introduction to the subject, and 
the history of Christian-Muslim engagement and coexistence in the region.  A key motivation 
for Griffith is that “the intellectual heritage of the eastern Christians belongs to the whole 
Church, and we are the poorer without any knowledge of it” (Griffith,2008,p. 3).  He has also 
contributed many articles to journals, such as: (S. Griffith, 2001) 'Melikites', 'Jacobites', and the 
Christological Controversies in Arabic in Third/Ninth Century Syria. In: D. Thomas, ed. Syrian 
Christians under Islam, the first Thousand Years, which help inform and develop an 
understanding of how early Christological controversies have moulded the nature, 
development and diversity of Christianity in the region.  Similarly, Dr. Erica Hunter, Senior 
Lecturer in Eastern Christianity at SOAS in London has contributed much to the study of Syriac 
Christianity in Iraq and Syria in numerous journal articles and chapters in books on the subject. 
 
David Thomas has been another significant contributor to the field of Syrian Christianity.  His 
edited collection of writings: (D. Thomas, 2001) Syrian Christians Under Islam, the First 
Thousand Years, which includes contributions from Sidney Griffith and Samir K.S, is an 
important collection of studies of Syriac Christian writings from the first millennium of the 
Christian era, their impact upon the Christian communities at the time, and the Christian 
engagement with the rise of Islam, which was ambiguous.  Christians were very much at the 
heart of early Islamic life and of the caliphate, and were instrumental in translating Greek texts 
into Arabic, so enhancing Islam’s engagement with philosophy, science, literature and 
medicine.   
Yet at the same time, Christians were subject with others to dhimmi status which placed 
limitations on their capacity to advance within society.  The status of Christians and other 
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minority groups during the Ottoman period is of profound importance, and has influenced the 
way that minority communities have seen themselves and been treated throughout the 
region.  Benjamin Braude, whose work focuses on racial, religious and ethnic identity in 
Muslim culture, makes a significant contribution to this history.  The two volumes that he 
edited with Bernard Lewis in 1982, entitled Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire; The 
Functioning of a Plural Society, have been very usefully condensed in 2014 into an abridged 
edition: (Braude, 2014) Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire..  This work examines the 
impact of the Millet system on the economy and social structure of Ottoman society. 
A further seminal work in this field is an edited collection of significant writers on the subject 
of Christianity in the Middle East by Andrea Pacini: (Pacini, 1998)  Christian Communities in the 
Arab Middle East.  Drawing together a wide range of scholars on the subject from a more 
recent perspective, the collection of articles includes studies of  Christian-Muslim relations, 
political contexts in the region; the phenomenon and reasons for Christian emigration from 
the region, Christian Identity, and Social and Economic contexts in individual contexts. 
 
A more specific relevant dimension to this research is the role and relevance of models of 
religious leadership in the Middle East, especially that of eastern Christian Patriarchal 
traditions.  Fiona McCallum from the University of St. Andrews has led the way in this research.  
Her contributions include: (McCallum, 2007) The Political Role of the Patriarch in the 
contemporary Middle East. Middle Eastern Studies, 43(6), pp. 923-940.  
(McCallum, 2008) The Maronite Patriarch in the Contemporary Era - Tradition and Challenges. 
In: (A.  O'Mahony, 2008). Christianity in the Middle East. Studies in Modern History, Theology 
and Politics. pp. 39-67;   
(McCallum, 2012a) Christian Political Participation in the Arab World. Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations, 23(1), pp. 3-18  
(McCallum, 2012b) Religious Institutions and Authoritarian States: Church-State relations in 
the Middle East. Third World Quarterly, 33(1), pp. 109-124.  
 
These studies add an important insight into how the role of leadership in the respective faiths 
significantly impact upon interactions between Christians and Muslims, and Christian 
development within the Middle Eastern context.  The role of social, civic and religious 
hierarchies, and Church-State relations (particularly the millet system) have often secured a 
sense of religious independence for Christian communities in the region, but they have also 
sometimes restricted the capacity of Christian communities, by virtue of established systems 
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of governance and hierarchy, to adapt in relation to changing political and social 
circumstances.   
Some work has been recently undertaken exploring what it means to be ‘Christian’ in the 
Middle East, especially given the rise of radicalism, political Islam, and persecution of 
minorities in the region.  A short book, edited by Mohammad Girma and Cristian Romocea, 
was published in 2017 entitled: Christian Citizenship in the Middle East: Divided Allegiance or 
Dual Belonging?.  This work takes a look at what Christian citizenship means within a Middle 
Eastern context.  It is positive that it includes reflection by Middle Eastern Christians on issues 
of identity and belonging within the region.  Its weakness is that its contributors come from a 
western Christian background, and live mostly outside the region.   
A similar work, published in 2012, and written by one of the contributors to the 
aforementioned Christian Citizenship in the Middle East, Najib George Awad, also addresses 
the place of Christians in most recent times.  And Freedom became a Public Square. Political, 
Sociological and Religious Overviews on the Arab Christians and the Arabic Spring, looks at the 
role of Christian communities in Middle Eastern societies, and the potential they have as 
mediating communities in the midst of conflict, as ‘bridges’ between western and eastern 
societies.35 
A recent and important contribution to the study of what it means to be Christian in Muslim 
countries and to the concept of secular nationalism, is a collection of essay edited by Kail Ellis 
and published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2018 for series on Minorities in West Asia and North 
Africa.  (Ellis, 2018) Secular Nationalism and Citizenship in Muslim countries. Arab Christians in 
the Levant. This work, written in three parts, examines the historical roots, context, cultural 
and political contributions of the Christian communities of the Middle East.  It goes on to 
examine more recent issues of human rights and persecution and how sectarian and political 
conflicts are impacting the Christian communities in the region. 
 Most of the contributions from Middle Eastern Christian writers, whether as books or journal 
articles. including those upon whose work I am reflecting - Georges Khodr, Antoine Audo and 
Paolo Dall-Oglio - are published primarily in Arabic or French.  As yet, no detailed study of their 
writings has been undertaken.  However, articles that have been published in English are 
helpful.  These are mentioned in the section below on Muslim-Christian relations in Syria, 
which have been their primary focus.  An interesting study on the relation between George 
 
35 See further critical reflection on this book in Chapter 3.1: Christian responses to Political Islam 
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Khodr’s spiritual theology and Karl Rahner’s theology, and how the two engage with an eastern 
Christian theological approach to the Middle Eastern context, has been written by Sylvie 
Avakian: (Avakian, 2012b) The 'Other' in Karl Rahner's Transcendental Theology and George 
Khodr's Spiritual Theology. (Aviakian is a lecturer at the Near East School of Theology in Beirut).  
This has helped inform my reflection of the Christian theological contributions of the chosen 
Christian figures in the research, who are deeply influenced by the mystical theology of the 
early ‘Fathers’, who suggest like them, that man is “naturally oriented towards God and the 
possibility of self-transcendence”36, and adopt an Aristotelian approach to experience and 
religious engagement.  A useful contribution to an understanding of Christan-Muslim dynamics 
in Syria during the last century is the detailed history of Maloula in French by Frederic Pichon, 
and published in Beirut. 
 
Very important to the development of academic research in the subject of Middle Eastern 
Christianity, has been the Centre for Middle Eastern Christianity at Heythrop College, London 
University, and in particular the work of Anthony O’Mahony.  Sadly in 2018, Heythrop College 
closed bringing to an end over two hundred years of academic research and excellence hosted 
by the Jesuits in London, but Blackfriars, Oxford has now become the base from which 
O’Mahony is able to continue his work nationally and internationally.  O’Mahony has edited 
nearly twenty volumes or special issues of scholarly reviews, and has contributed numerous 
articles on the subject of Middle Eastern Christianity to different journals.  Among the 
collections of works published by Heythrop are:  A. O'Mahony, A. Ed. (2008) Christianity in the 
Middle East. Studies in Modern History, Theology and Politics. London: Melisende, and:  
O'Mahony, A.  Ed. (2010) Eastern Christianity in the Modern Middle East.  London, New York: 
Routledge.  Bringing together respected academics in this field of research, these collections, 
along with others, provide up-to-date critical studies and analysis of different aspects and 
complexities of the diverse context of Christianity in the region. 
It is indicative of the relatively recent importance laid on the subject that academic reference 
works have only comparatively recently been published.  The Cambridge History of Christianity 
volume that deals with Eastern Christianity, though first published in 2006, was republished in 
paperback only in 2014:  (Angold, 2014)  The Cambridge HIstory of Christianity. Eastern 
Christianity. This work, by examining different denominations in the region, seeks to 
summarise the story, diversity and influence of Eastern Christianity upon the Christian world as 
 




a whole.  A paperback edition of Blackwell’s Companion to Eastern Christianity, which was first 
published in hardback in 2007, was published in 2010.  (Parry, 2010) The Blackwell Companion 
to Eastern Christianity.  Offering introductory but fairly comprehensive articles to the history, 
theology and context of the eastern Church, this is one of the few available works to do so.  In 
2014, Northern Illinois University Press published: (Noble, 2014) The Orthodox Church in the 
Arab world, 700-1700. An Anthology of Sources. The back cover of the book states: “The first of 
its kind, this anthology makes accessible in English representative selections from major Arab 
Christian works written between the 8th and 17th Centuries.  Until now, the vast majority of 
these important texts have remained unpublished or unavailable in English.  Translated by 
leading scholars, this anthology encompasses the major genres of Orthodox Christian literature 
in Arabic.”  
In 2018, a major contribution to the study of Christianity in the region was published by 
Edinburgh University Press as part of an on-going project to publish a complete series of 
‘Companions to Global Christianity’. (Ross, 2018) Christianity in North Africa and West Asia, is a 
comprehensive reference work examining the Christian demographic, ecclesial, and 
theological landscape of the region.  This is an invaluable contextual resource for 
understanding the Christian presence in the region. 
Whilst studies in English are now recognising the diversity of the history, theology and ecclesial 
and liturgical expression of the Christian traditions in the Middle East, there is considerable 
work to be done in translating and studying the writings of contemporary eastern Christian 
theologians and academics.   
Muslim-Christian Relations in Syria 
 
This is the area of study that is most under-researched, which is surprising given the level of 
historical engagement and coexistence between the faiths over the centuries.  Anglican 
Bishop, Kenneth Cragg  was the leading western scholar to have explored the subject of 
Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle East.  His seminal work first published in 1956, The 
Call of the Minaret has been reprinted many times since, and was foundational for the 
development of research into Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle East.  Cragg’s engaging 
approach with Islam, has nevertheless been criticised for being ‘orientalist’ and missionary by 
design. “A.L.Tibawi went so far as to describe Cragg as ‘frankly a missionary whose object is to 
convert Muslims to Christianity or at least make them accept Jesus not simply as one of God’s 
prophets but as Christ, the Son of God.” (Goddard, 2003b, p. 91).  However, others have 
followed to expand on his work and take a more contemporary approach.   
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Vatican II’s ‘Nostra Aetate’ has had a profound impact on the development and study of inter-
faith, and Christian-Muslim dialogue and relations.  In turn, it is believed that Vatican II was 
influenced by the religious, political and theological thought of Louis Massignon, whose belief 
in the divine inspiration of Islam, and the shared concepts of sacred hospitality and mystical 
substitution in both Islam and Christianity, allowed for close engagement between the faiths.  
See: (Krokus, 2012) Louis Massignon's influence on the teaching of Vatican II on Muslims and 
Islam. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. 23:3, 329-345.  
 
(Hugh-Donovan, 2014) Louis Massignon, Olivier Clement, Thomas Merton, Christian de Cherge: 
Radical Hospitality, Radical Faith. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 55(3-4), pp. 473-494 
also develops this theme.  Massignon had a deep influence on Jesuit priest, Paolo Dall’Oglio, 
who sought a spiritual encounter between Islam and Christianity through  the monastic 
tradition of hospitality and dialogue.  See: (Anthony O'Mahony, 2015) Louis Massignon: A 
Catholic Encounter with Islam and the Middle East. In: God's Mirror. Renewal and Engagement 
in French Catholic Intellectual Culture in the Mid-Twentieth Century. 
 
Other scholars who have deepened understanding of Christian-Muslim relations generally are 
Sidney Griffith and Hugh Goddard, whose writings include his classic and invaluable 
introduction to the subject:  (Goddard, 2000) A History of Christian-Muslim Relations..  In 
Goddard, H. (2003) Challenges and Developments: Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle 
East. International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 3(2), pp. 15-35, he provides 
insight into the historical complexities of current Christian-Muslim interactions.   
 
The writings of Richard Sudworth, a Church of England priest who was appointed Inter-faith 
Adviser to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2018, and who wrote his PhD Thesis on the subject 
of the Church of England and Islam, provide a helpful contemporary Anglican perspective on 
the subject of Christian-Muslim relations.  Sudworth, Richard J. (2013) The Church of England 
and Islam: contemporary Anglican Christian-Muslim relations and the politico-theological 
question, 1988-2012. [Doctoral Thesis].37  His writings since have focussed on how Christianity 
has sought to engage within the context of the political challenge of Islam.  ((Sudworth, 2013)  
Christian Responses to the Political Challenge of Islam. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 
24(2), pp. 191-211.  (Sudworth, 2014) Responding to Islam as Priests, Mystics and Trail Blazers: 
Louis Massignon, Kenneth Cragg, and Rowan Williams. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 
 
37 (Sudworth, 2017) 
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55(3-4), pp. 451-472.)   Sudworth follows Massignon, Cragg and Rowan Williams in identifying 
mysticism and sacred hospitality as key ways in which Christianity and Islam can continue to 
engage with Islam in the context.  
 
The importance of Middle Eastern theologians in their engagement with Islam has until now 
been underestimated.  Most of their writings however are in Arabic.  Heidi Hirvonen has 
produced a useful study of the different perspectives of four Lebanese thinkers (including 
George Khodr) as regards Christian-Muslim dialogue: (Hirvonen, 2013) Christian-Muslim 
Dialogue. Perspectives of Four Lebanese Thinkers. In this work, she reflects on the doctrinal, 
ethical and social dimensions of dialogue from the four perspectives, and suggests models of 
coexistence based on moral, social and ethical commonalities.   
 
Antoine Audo, the Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo has been an important interlocutor in Syria .  In 
spite of the difficulties of dialogue, (largely due to Muslim restraint he says), he believes that 
engaging at social, ethical and doctrinal level is vital to mutual understanding and coexistence. 
See: (Audo, 2010a) Eastern Christian Identity:A Catholic Perspective. In: A. O. &. J. Flannery, ed. 
The Catholic Church in the Contemporary Middle East. London: Melisende, pp. 19-38 
(Audo, 2010b) Isaac of Ninevah, John of Dalyatha and Eastern Spirituality. One in Christ: A 
Catholic Ecumenical Review, 44(20,2), pp. 29-48. 
(Audo, 2010d) The Synod of Bishops: The Catholic Church in the Middle East. One in Christ, 
44(2), pp. 196-210. 
 
Two useful books examine the philosophy, praxis and theology of Paolo Dall’Oglio in the field 
of Christian-Muslim dialogue at Mar Mousa Monastery.  They are both published in French.  In 
(Dall'Oglio, 2009) Amoureux de L'Islam, Croyant en Jesus. Dall’Oglio himself presents his vision 
of Christian-Muslim dialogue from a passionate perspective rooted in Christianity, and the 
vision and theological heritage of Massignon.  In (De Montjou, 2006) Mar Mousa. Un 
Monastere, un homme, un desert,  De Montjou narrates the experience of spending time at 
the monastery and interviewing Dall’Oglio. 
The lack of published works on the specific subject of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Syria 
contributes to the importance of this research.  The profoundly complex context of conflict is 




Islam in Syria. 
 
This is perhaps the most complex area of the subject.  Understanding the development of the 
‘Islamic Revival’ in the 19th and 20th Centuries, and the Muslim Brotherhood that emerged 
from it, is essential to informing the diverse context of Islam ‘on the ground’ in Syria.  Four key 
works have informed this dimension of the study. (A.  Rahnema, 2005) Pioneers of Islamic 
Revival provides an excellent introduction to the key figures who have influenced the Islamic 
Revival in the Middle East and South Asia.   (Wickham, 2013) The Muslim Brotherhood.  
Evolution of an Islamist Movement., offers a detailed analysis of the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt.  Although the Syrian Brotherhood differs to a degree and claims to be a 
separate organisation (which is debatable), the Egyptian origins and principles of the 
movement remain relevant.  The history, role and factions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 
are examined in: (Lefevre, 2013) Ashes of Hama.  The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.  Also 
important is Thomas Pierret’s work: (Pierret, 2013) Religion and State in Syria. The Sunni 
Ulama from Coup to Revolution. This is a detailed study of the Syrian Ulama from 1946 
onwards, and examines the complex dynamics of Islam in the last 70 years, that have helped 
mould the current situation.   
 
Very helpful to understanding Islam’s approaches to other communities is a work by Yohannan 
Friedmann.  Published in 2003, (Friedmann, 2003) Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith 
relations in the Muslim Tradition, examines how Islam deals with various aspects of social and 
religious issues in society as they relate to minority, and particularly Christian communities in 
their midst.   
 
Beyond these works, I have been dependent on a variety of journal articles, most of which 
trace the rise of salafism and exploration of sectarianism in Syria.  See for example: (Phillips, 
2015) Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria. Third World Quarterly, 36(2), pp. 357-376. Available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788  (Accessed 6 October 2016),  (Drevon, 
2016) Embracing Salafi Jihadism in Egypt and Mobilizing in the Syrian Jihad. Middle East 
Critique, 25(4), pp. 321-339.  
 
Accessing any writings by Syrian Sunnis in English is difficult.  So I was very fortunate to be 
given a copy of a report co-ordinated by Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zeid in Lebanon, describing a 
range of contributions by Sunni scholars in Syria to the Syrian Crisis.  (Zeid, 2015) From the 
heart of the Syrian Crisis. A report on Islamic Discourse between a culture of war and the 
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establishment of a culture of peace, was published in March 2015 by the Adyan Foundation in 
Beirut, with the support of Korad Adenauer Stiftung in Germany.   
 
A fascinating development within the Islamic community in Syria took place in November 
2017.  During a visit to the Grand Mufti of Syria, Dr. Hassoun, on 28 November 2017, he gave 
me copies of three newly published volumes that were shortly to be distributed to every 
mosque in the country.  In November 2017, the Ministry of Awqaf in Syria declared that every 
mosque in Syria should utilise these volumes that provide frameworks for teaching Islam.  Two 
volumes address “The Intellectual and Ideological basics of combating the Extremism and 
Takfiri terrorism and so-called Political Islam”, and a further volume offers a systematic 
framework for how sermons should teach Islam and challenge extremism in every mosque in 
the country.38  This is a significant development that will no doubt be seen by some as a means 
of asserting religious and political control, but it is primarily intended to challenge the rise of 
radical Islamism, and the teaching of preachers who have been educated in the Wahhabi 
traditions.   As far as Christian-Muslim relations are concerned, this can only be a positive thing 
for the country, as it attempts to encourage moderate Islamic tradition, and respect for 
pluralism. 
 
Politics in Syria 
 
If one is to engage in a study of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, it is impossible to separate 
religion from politics.  Prior to 2011, there were few books available on the political history of 
Syria.  It was a ‘niche’ subject.  Since then, there have been a plethora of publications 
examining both the history of Syria, and the political context of the conflict.  The lack of 
introductory material available is exemplified by the fact that when McHugo published his 
work: (McHugo, 2014) Syria, From the Great War to Civil War  London: Saqi Books, it 
immediately became a bestseller, and within a year had been republished In paperback as 
Syria, A Recent History.  Understanding the Alawite community is essential to understanding 
Syrian politics.  Four useful books have been published in this respect.  (Kerr, 2015) The Alawis 
 
38 Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Awqaf. (2017) The Intellectual and Ideological basics of combating 
the extremism and takfiri terrorism and so-called the Political Islam. Vols 1 &2   Damascus 
Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Awqaf (2017)  The general approach of the Friday sermons in the 
mosques of the Syrian Arab Republic.  The whole modern religious speech.  The pulpit is a public site that 




of Syria. War, Faith and Politics in the Levant,  brings together a variety of scholars to explore 
the history, culture and politics of the Alawite community.  (Goldsmith, 2015) Cycle of Fear. 
Syria's Alawites in War and Peace offers a more detailed historical analysis.  Meanwhile, (Dam, 
2013) The Struggle for Power in Syria.  Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party 
presents a detailed account of how the Assad family came to rule Syria.   In 2016, Stefan 
Winter published (Winter, 2016) A History of the Alawis.  Examining historical records, the 
book challenges traditional understanding of Alawi exclusion from local societies.  A useful 
work for understanding the role of minorities in Syria is: (White, 2011) The Emergence of 
Minorities in the Middle East. The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria. White 
proposes that the concept of ‘minority’ has only come to have any real meaning since the rise 
of the nation states, and that until these develop, “there is no reason for members of specific 
communities to start to see themselves as linked to all other members of the same 
communities within the state, whether as majority or minority.” (White, 2011,p,61).  This 
would explain the long history of relatively peaceful coexistence.  
 
An earlier work has been helpful in exploring what ‘democracy’ means in the Middle East.  
(Salame, 1994) Democracy without Democrats covers two centuries of political development 
within the Middle East, and seeks to approach the subject from a Middle Eastern perspective. 
 
Other very recent works that address the conflict include: (Lister, 2015) The Syrian Jihad.  Al-
Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. Lister offers the most detailed 
analysis of the rise of the Islamic factions fighting in Syria.  (Baczko, 2018) Civil War in Syria. 
Mobilization and Competing Social Orders is an informative field-work based insight into the 
development and structure of the militant groups and the institutions that they sought to 
establish.  Meanwhile, (Phillips, 2016) The Battle for Syria.  International Rivalry in the New 
Middle East examines the crucial role that external influences and international interests have 
played in feeding and prolonging the war.  There are also many articles appearing in journals 
on the political and religious dimensions of the conflict in Syria.   
In 2017, Nikolaos Van Dam published a new book entitled, (Dam, 2017) Destroying a Nation.  
The Civil War in Syria.  Like most western academics, Van Dam is highly critical of the record of 
the Syrian government, but this work is also very critical of the brutality and fragmentation of 
the multiple ‘opposition groups’; realistic about the level of violence that they have 
perpetrated, and of the external influences upon and support given to those groups from an 
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early stage in order to promote a ‘war by proxy’; and critical of the west’s refusal to engage 
with the Syrian government, acknowledging that this refusal has helped to prolong the conflict. 
Understanding issues surrounding sectarianism is crucial to reflecting on matters relating to 
plural, diverse societies, especially in the Middle East.  One recent work that very helpfully 
informs this study. Published in 2017,  (Hashemi, 2017) Sectarianization. Mapping the new 
politics of the Middle East explores why sectarianism has become such a destructive force in 
the Middle East today and attempts to explain how this has happened, and what it means for 
the future. 
Ussama Makdisi offers a further important contribution to understanding Ottoman society and 
its continuing influence on sectarian dynamics in the region in: (Usama Makdisi, 2000) The 
Culture of Sectarianism. Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Lebanon. 
It is worth noting that almost exclusively, the books and articles that are being written on the 
history and politics of Syria are from ‘western’ academics, perpetuating a ‘western’ 
perspective both on the history and the politics.  An example of a western academic who 
challenges the mainstream academic presentation of the Syrian conflict is offered by Stephen 
Gowans.  (Gowans, 2017) Washington’s Long War on Syria examines, as the back cover quotes, 
the “decades-long struggle for control of Syria, and demolishes each and every argument 
Washington, its allies, and the mainstream media have advanced to justify the unjustifiable 
regime change in Syria”.  
Since the start of the Syrian conflict, there has been a significant increase in academic 
scholarship about Syrian history and politics. The Centre for Syrian Studies’ at the University of 
St. Andrews, and publishers such as C. Hurst & Co, and Saqi Books in London, have played a 
major part in this increase in Syrian studies.  Among the works published are: (R. Hinnebusch, 
Zintl, T. , 2015) Syria. From Reform to Revolt. Vol.1. Political Economy and International 
Relations. And (Salamandra, 2015), Syria. From Reform to Revolt. Vol 2. Culture, Society and 
Religion.   But almost all Syrian voices that have been a part of this academic debate in Europe 
or America are from the exiled or ex-patriot Syrian community, (only some of the works 
quoted above contain articles or chapters from Syrians, all of whom are political or academic 
exiles) and there is a significant disconnect between the voices, views and experience of exiles, 
and those of Syrians ‘on the ground.’  Academic integrity requires that alternative narratives 
are considered, even, or perhaps especially, when they challenge the mainstream agenda.  
Given the complex and multiple narratives that exist in and regarding Syria, it remains to be 
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seen if internal Syrian academics will at any point in the future find a voice and a platform in 
the international community.   
This study seeks to offer insights into the Christian-Muslim interface as experienced by Syrians 
inside Syria, whilst also taking note of Syrian voices outside Syria, both before and during the 









This chapter presents a brief survey of the history and diverse ecumenical expressions of the 
Christian presence in Syria. It introduces the important role that Christianity has played 
through its encounter with Islam, in establishing and rooting within Syria a culture of religious 
and social plurality which continues, despite the trauma unleashed by the recent conflict, to 
offer hope for the future. Exploring the historical background is essential to understanding the 
contemporary religious context and why it is so relevant to the wider contemporary Christian-
Muslim dynamic. 
 
The Christian landscape in Syria illustrates the plurality and confluence of eastern Christian 
communities in a way that is almost unique anywhere in the world.  Damascus is home to the 
three Antiochene Patriarchates: the Eastern Orthodox, the Oriental Orthodox, and the Greek 
Melkite, and every ecumenical family of the Church is represented in the country.   
 
The religious and cultural identity of Syria is profoundly influenced by the history of 
Christianity.  It has a rich, complex and ancient identity, emerging as it does at the crossroads 
of some of the great cultures of the region.  Yet, despite the fact that the Middle East is the 
“place of origin of Christianity” and that “eastern Christians constitute one of the largest 
Christian traditions in the world”, Christianity in the Middle East until recent years has been 
significantly understudied (Anthony O'Mahony, 2017, p. 159).  Since its earliest days, 
Christianity has been present in the region.  Within a few years of the resurrection, we read in 
the book of Acts of St. Paul heading to Damascus to persecute an already established Christian 
community in the city.39  St. Luke tells us that it was in Antioch in Syria that Christians were 
first labelled as such (Acts 11:26), and the many remains of Christian Churches and buildings 
dating from the earliest days of the Christian faith in the region witness to the strong presence 
of the Christian faith at the time.40 
 
39 Acts 9:1-22 
40 For helpful reference works on Eastern Christianity, see: (Angold, 2014) (Parry, 2010) (Ross, 2018) 
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1.2 The early centuries 
 
Prior to the conquest of the Middle East by Islam in the seventh century, there was a diverse 
Christian presence on the fringes of the Arabian peninsula and along the Euphrates. 
Throughout the third and fourth centuries of the Christian era, monks and missionaries had 
preached in the region, and many tribes had been converted (Hanna, 2007, p. 58).  The 
evidence and remains of these monastic and hermit communities are spread across the region, 
and monasticism had a deep impact on the practice of Islamic devotion – an influence that 
continues in Syria today.41    In the dying years of the Roman and Greek Empires, many Arab 
and Yemenite tribes migrated from all over the Arab peninsular to the region of the Euphrates 
and Tigris, and were converted.  The trade routes in turn spread the Christian faith throughout 
the Arabian Peninsula; to Abyssinia in the south, and north and East to Persia and beyond. The 
poet Hassan Ibn Thabit (562-674CE) who travelled from Medina to Damascus, provides in one 
of his poems a wonderful image of the local Christian community during Lent:  ‘Passover is 
approaching, the children are hastily threading coral wreathes/ They compete in reciting 
prayers to God and all imprecations to Satan/ Prayers to Christ in that monastery and 
supplications of priests and monks’ (Hanna, 2007, p. 56).  And Khalidi, writing from a Muslim 
perspective on Islamic theocracy, and presenting a positive slant on Christian-Muslim 
engagement in early Islam, writes : “From inscriptions, from Syriac, Ethiopic, and Byzantine 
sources, from modern analysis of pre-Islamic Arabian poetry, from newly discovered early 
Islamic materials, a picture is emerging of a pre-Islamic Arabia where diverse Christian 
communities, in Arabia itself or in its immediate vicinity, purveyed rich and diverse images of 
Jesus” (Khalidi, 2001, p. 4).  It is to be remembered however that Islamic origins lie in a Judeo-
Christian paradigm, and whilst providing an Islamic perspective on Christian roots, Khalidi 
tends to understate the Judeo-Christian origins of Islam, promoting instead an Islamic 
understanding of the person of Jesus.  
 
Such was the influence of the eastern church, that at the Holy Synod of Nicaea in 325CE it was 
reported that the Patriarch of Antioch, a Syrian, “governed a jurisdiction that extended all over 
the continent of Asia, even including India” (Murad, 2007, p. 89).  Moreover, Syriac Christianity 
was a ‘genuinely Asian Christianity’.42  It did not come with the European ‘cultural, historical 
 
41 For a thorough study of the impact of early monasticism, see:  (Chitty, 1966).  
42 See (Heyberger, 2010) Eastern Christians, Islam and the West: A Connected History. Also: (Anthony 
O'Mahony, 2017) Eastern Christianity and Jesuit Scholarship on Arabic and Islam. Modern History and 
Contemporary Reflections.  
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and intellectual trappings’ of the streams of Christianity that developed in the West, but was 
rooted in the Arab world and shared the same culture, traditions and social customs of the 
region (Brock, 1985, p. 15). The spread of Christianity throughout the Middle East meant that 
languages spoken by Christians then, as now, would have included Coptic, Armenian, Ethiopic, 
Greek and Arabic (S. H. Griffith, 2008, pp. 8-9).  By the time Islam emerged, Christians were ‘by 
far the majority of the population’ from Alexandria to Persia, and from the Arabian peninsula 
to North Africa. 
 
Given the cultural and linguistic diversity and plurality of the Christian communities across the 
ancient world; and the political tensions both within the region and between east and west, 
theological interpretation of doctrine varied widely as Christians sought to define their 
message in the light of local philosophical and cultural traditions (Emma Loosley, 2010).43  
Indeed, many have argued that this diversity, fragmentation, and lack of ‘empire-wide 
identification’ may also have later facilitated the Muslim conquest when it came (Tomass, 
2016, pp. 30-31). 
 
Theological disagreements in the early Church, rooted in Christological debates concerning the 
nature of Christ, were to help cause the fracturing of the Christian community that remains a 
characteristic of the ecclesial context today.  Once the Edict of Toleration was issued in Milan 
in 313CE, Christians were able to focus on defining the faith which until then had been 
persecuted.  Christian Centres had already emerged in Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch, Rome 
and Constantinople, with the eastern Churches holding very different theologies to those of 
the west, and, with linguistic differences as well as political and social issues adding to the 
controversies that raged.  The first schism occurred after the Council of Ephesus in 431CE, 
when Nestorius refused to recognise the status of Mary as Theotokos (God-bearer) preferring 
the title of Christotokos (Christ-bearer). In this debate lay the question of Jesus’ divine and 
human status.  The long-standing Christological debate between the theology of Cyril of 
Alexandria and Nestorius focussed on the extent to which the humanity and divinity of Christ 
were united. The Antiochenes believed that the Alexandrian position implied a divinity that did 
not allow for the humanity of Christ, whilst the Alexandrians believed that the Antiochene 
position implied two separate beings. The Council of Ephesus preferred the definition that 
Jesus was both fully human and divine, having two natures.  Thus, those faithful to Ephesus 
 
43 See also: (Anthony O'Mahony, 2013) Christianity in the Middle East.  Modern History and 
Contemporary Theology and Ecclesiology. An introduction and Overview.  
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became known as ‘miaphysites’, a term that remains today for the family of Eastern Churches 
that hold to this theology.  The schism that followed Ephesus was to act as the ‘midwife’ in the 
creation of the Church of the East (Emma Loosley, 2010, p. 5).44 
 
In 451CE, the Council of Chalcedon affirmed the dual divine and human nature of Christ in one 
person.  The consequent schism resulted in the creation of the Miaphysite family of Churches, 
a family that were well established by the end of the sixth century, and spread from the Levant 
to Central Asia.    There were several attempts to heal the divisions, but as Brock states: “The 
division became fossilized as a result of the Arab conquests of the 630s, since the anti-
Chalcedonian churches, located in areas which came under Muslim rule, were now separated 
politically from the Byzantine Empire and the Christian West” (Brock, 2008, p. 19).  It is partly 
this political and physical separation that has enabled the history, theology and heritage of the 
Eastern Churches to remain so distinctive and separate, and until recently under-studied and 
under-recognised in the West. 
 
Most Syriac-speaking Christians prior to the Islamic conquest followed a Christological 
formulation rooted in Cyril of Alexandria’s theology (d.444), the so-called ‘Jacobite’ or 
‘Miaphysite’ position; or expressed by the inappropriately labelled ‘Nestorian’ theology of 
Theodore of Mopsuestia (ca 350-428).45   Thus, “already at the time of the Islamic conquest 
and throughout the early Islamic period , most Aramaean Christians, along with the Copts in 
Egypt, and the Armenians in Cilicia and the Caucasus, did not accept the ‘Byzantine’ imperial 
orthodoxy of the first six ecumenical councils” (S. H. Griffith, 2008, p. 13).  Those who did 
accept the Byzantine Orthodox positions came to be known as ‘Melkites’ (‘Imperialists’, 
royalists’), who held to their Byzantine liturgical traditions, but were keen to be faithful to their 
eastern roots.  They were the first to use Arabic as the language of liturgical use. (S. Griffith, 
2001, p. 9; S. H. Griffith, 2008, p. 11)   The earliest known ‘Melkite’ theologian to write in 
Arabic was Theodore Abu Qurrah (ca 750-825) who was known for his sustained theological 
 
44 For studies of the Church of the East: (Wilmhurst, 2011); (C. Baumer, 2006)  
45 The title ‘Jacobite’ refers to an itinerant preacher named Jacob Bardaeus who travelled widely in the 
region espousing the views of Cyril of Alexandria.  He played a formative, but not exclusive, role in the 
creation of the Syrian Church.  (E. Loosley, 2008)  Peter, Paul and James of Jerusalem. In Ed. O’Mahony, 
A & Loosley, E. Eastern Christianity in the Modern Middle East.  
However, it should be acknowledged that the terms ‘Jacobite’ or ‘Nestorian’, being associated in the 
west with ‘heretical’ theological positions, are both inadequate to express the theology upheld by these 
oriental Churches, and are regarded locally as insulting to the Church of the East, which is one of the 
most ancient of Christian Churches, and one of the most important, extending as it did from Syria to 
China and throughout Central Asia.   
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defence of Christianity against Islam (Lamoreaux, 2005).  Thus, by the time of the Muslim 
conquest, the schisms within the Christian community meant that distance had already 
developed between the eastern Christians of Antioch and Alexandria , and Rome and 
Constantinople.  The Church ‘families’ that existed at the time were as follows: 
  
1. The Oriental Orthodox (non-Chalcedonian) Churches: Armenian Orthodox, Coptic 
Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox.   
2. The Byzantine (Chalcedonian) Greek Orthodox (‘Melkite’) Patriarchates of Jerusalem, 
Antioch and Alexandria.     
3. The Church of the East.  
 
One branch of the Syrian Church that did not reject Chalcedon, was the Syriac Maronite 
Church. Found mostly in the Mount Lebanon region, the Maronite Church was named after the 
4th Century hermit – Mar Maroun, “whose ascetic life attracted disciples who founded a 
monastery in his memory”.  It maintained relative autonomy under Muslim rule, and continues 
to be the most numerous group of Christians in Lebanon (McCallum, 2008) and a self-
governing eastern Catholic Church following the Antiochene tradition, in full communion with 
Rome. For many Lebanese, the Maronite Church represents the indigenous Christian heritage 
of Lebanon, and continues to have a significant political influence in Lebanese society.  
Christian communities, including the Maronites, were persecuted during the Mamluk period, 
and Maronite survival and growth was largely due to their presence in the remote mountains 
of the coastal region.  It wasn’t until the Crusader period that they were rediscovered, and in 
supporting the Crusaders, their importance and influence grew (R. Haddad, 1970, p. 10).  
Maronites were Invited to teach eastern languages and literature in France and Italy during the 
Middle Ages, and it is partly due to their educational ministry in Europe that the western 
churches began to become aware of the importance and presence of the eastern Church.  
Today, the Maronite Church plays a unique role in Lebanese national identity, operating an 
elaborate institutional infrastructure of schools, universities, hospitals and social ministries 
within civil society, out of an organisational structure rooted in monastic life.  Chartouni 
writes: 
 
“Although far from being a unique example of nativist rejection of Islamisation, the 
Maronite Church was the only one that succeeded in questioning the dhimmitude 





1.3 Encounter with Islam 
 
Doctrinal controversies and Byzantine persecutions of the ‘heretical’ Christians of the east 
weakened Christian communities in the region, and ensured that when the Arab armies 
invaded in the seventh century, they were vulnerable to conquest.  Eastern Christians whose 
cultural and spiritual home was far removed from Byzantine Europe, felt alienated under 
Byzantine rule.  Benjamin Braude writes:  
 
The theological disputes between the central government in Constantinople and the 
provincial populations in Egypt and Syria (that is, historic Syria, made up of today’s 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestine) weakened the bonds of loyalty that the 
periphery might have felt for the core.  Although all were Christians, the divisions 
between the Copts in Egypt and the Jacobites in Syria, on the one hand, and the so-
called Orthodox, on the other, were so great that many of the non-Orthodox – after 
the initial chaos of military conflict – could almost welcome the Muslim invaders as 
liberators from the persecution they had endured under Byzantine theological 
oppression. (Braude, 2014; Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 2014, p. 7).  
 
Sidney Griffith posits a more nuanced approach.  He notes that the Muslim conquerors, in 
areas of the Levant over which they assumed control, found Christians in the region already “in 
a state of theological and cultural diversity”, which they continued to express under Muslim 
domination, adopting Arabic and incorporating themselves into “the ways of life of the Islamic 
polity” which “they helped to create”, thus identifying firmly with the new world of Islam.  
Griffith further points out that by the time western Christians re-entered the region during and 
after the crusades, the indigenous Christians living alongside the Muslims, “had already begun 
their long slide into that demographic insignificance in the Middle East that is the fate of their 
communities in modern times” (S. H. Griffith, 2008, p. 13).  Modern judgement on the historic 
narrative of Christians acquiescence with Islamic rule is rendered more complex by Griffith’s 
research. 
 
Initially, under the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus (661-744), and then under the ‘Abbasid 
Caliphate in Baghdad (750-1258), and notwithstanding the legal requirements of non-Muslims 
under the ‘Covenant of Umar’, which included the al-jizyah poll tax for ‘protection’ of non-
Muslim subjects, and the second-class civil and social status that dhimmi status established, 
Christians were able to enjoy a period of relative stability under occupation (S. H. Griffith, 
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2008, pp. 14-18).46   During this period, Christians adopted the language of Arabic, and became 
vital conduits of Greek philosophy and theological dialogue, taking an influential administrative 
place within the courts of the Caliphs.  In 775, the Patriarch of the Church of the East moved 
from Seleucia –Ctesiphon to Baghdad, becoming “the most influential non-Muslim at the 
Court” (Berg, 2010, p. 253).  Most famous was Patriarch Timothy I (780-823), who was involved 
not only in politics and religious dialogue, but also in the expansion of the Church.47   
 
During the 8th and 9th Centuries, Syriac scholars from all the Churches were involved in the 
‘Translation movement’ undertaken by the Abbasid Caliphs, during which a huge of amount of 
Greek philosophical, medical and scientific works were translated to Arabic, mostly by 
Christians (Emma Loosley, 2010, p. 15).   It is worth noting, with Samir, that “the merits of Arab 
science in the mediaeval era are often extolled.  It is too often forgotten or unknown that 
although the Arab world of the time was certainly Muslim in structure, the scholars who held 
philosophical, scientific and linguistic knowledge were mostly Christians, not Muslims, and that 
those who imparted this knowledge from Greek or Syriac, were almost exclusively Christians” 
(Samir Khalil Samir, 1998, p. 82).  As “heirs of Syrian and Greek cultures, these sons of the Arab 
world  (the Christians), were vital intermediaries for the transmission of science to the new 
rulers” (Hechaime, 1998, p. 156). 
 
However, a degree of tolerance and coexistence did not mean that life as a Christian among 
Muslims was without difficulties.48  It is true that there were few persecutions, but incidences 
of hostility between Muslims and Christians are recorded, and freedom of religious observance 
was restricted.  Given that Islam was a new religious and political movement, it was inevitable 
that there would be violence.   As Islam emerged, it developed a strong sense of hierarchy in 
relation to other religions.  Non-Muslim religious communities were classified in Islamic law 
according to their relationship to Islam, but even though Christians and Jews were classified as 
‘Ahl al-Kitab’, (People of the Book), they were still ‘kuffar’ or ‘unbelievers’, and had a dhimmi 
status, that required payment of the jizya tax to guarantee their safety and place in the Dar al-
Islam (Abode of Islam).   Muslims also had strict rules about apostasy and inter-religious 
 
46 The ‘Covenant of Umar’ is named after the stipulations and treaties concluded during the time of the 
second Caliph Umar 1 (634-644) with cities conquered during this period. 
47 A reflection and commentary on Patriarch Timothy’s debate with Caliph al-Mahdi in 781CE, can be 
found in: (Samir K Samir, 2001) The Prophet Muhammad as seen by Timothy 1 and other Arab Christian 
Authors. In. (D. Thomas, 2001) Syrian Christians under Islam, the First Thousand years. 
48 For a study of the history of Christians and Jews under Islam, see: (Ye'or, 1996). 
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marriages.49  For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that this attitude towards 
Christians continues amongst many Islamic scholars, and even today, marriages between 
Christians and Muslims are frowned upon.50  Since Syria has agreed a Constitution in which 
minority communities are protected under Syrian law, many Christians believe that their 
freedom of religion and status within society would be compromised should the country adopt 
an Islamic Constitution, which is the declared intention of most of the groups who wish to see 
a change of government.51 
 
Under Muslim control, calm prevailed as long as Christians did not upset the balance of power. 
“If you had no political demands, if you did not aspire to power of any kind, everything was 
fine.  You were free to develop within your own culture and within your own religion, as long 
as you accepted the supremacy of Islam” (Samir Khalil Samir, 1998, p. 71).  Viewed as a 
‘dhimmi’ people, and as ‘People of the Book’, Christians could be granted protection and peace 
in the Dar Al-Islam (House of Islam), as long as they paid the Jizya tax.  This could place great 
financial strain on Christian communities.  The application of Shari’a Law on non-Muslims 
restricted the personal freedoms of Christians.  They wore distinguishing clothes.  They were 
forbidden to practise certain trades and from taking positions of responsibility in politics or the 
army.  They were permitted to worship freely, but processions, public Christian symbols, and 
proselytization were forbidden.  Marriage between Christians and Muslims was only allowed if 
the Christian party converted to Islam.  Conversion the other way around was forbidden.  This 
regulation remains to this day and has clear demographic implications as far as the Christian 
and Muslim population are concerned.  For all these reasons, Christianity saw a significant 
decline in numbers during the period of Muslim rule.   
 
The Crusades presented a period when Eastern and Western Christians once more 
encountered each other.52  Flannery notes that “when the city of Edessa became the first Latin 
 
49 For an account of the struggles of ‘dhimmi’ status in Islam, see: (Friedmann, 2003) Tolerance and 
Coercion in Islam.  Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. 
50 Cf. Qur’an Al-Ma’idah 5:5 “The Qur’an explicitly forbids marrying idolaters (2:2,21; 60:10-11), but this 
verse allows intermarriage with the People of the Book, suggesting the possibility of extensive social 
relations between Muslims and members of these religious communities.” Ed. Nasr, S. H. (2015) The 
Study Quran.  
51 An internet search of ‘Are rebels in Syria ‘moderate’?’ or ‘Rebel groups in Syria and Islam’, produces 
dozens of articles from numerous sources which provide justification for this fear. 
52 The Crusades represented a period of encounter, negotiation, pacts and conflict between the western 
invaders and the Indigenous Arab communities.  The memory of the Crusades remains strong and 
continues to inform the attitude of some Muslims to western Christianity.  There was brutality on both 
sides.  An excellent account from an Arab perspective is to be found in: (Maalouf, 1984)  The Crusades 
through Arab Eyes. 
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State in the East during the First Crusade (1098-1144), relations between the Syrian Church 
and the Crusaders were generally cordial” (Flannery, 2008, p. 143).  It was during this period 
that the seeds were sown, and the first tentative steps were taken, to talks about union with 
Rome. As O’Mahony writes: “In the thirteenth century, Catholic missionaries, Dominicans and 
Franciscans had been active among the faithful of the Church of the East”, and this was to lead 
in 1445 to a union between the Church of the East and Rome.  Henceforward, the term 
‘Chaldaean’ “has been used for those members of the Church of the East who are in union 
with Rome” (Anthony O'Mahony, 2017, p. 167). With the exception of the Maronite Church, it 
would be some centuries before Catholic Churches of the East were formed. 
 
1.4 Christianity under the Ottomans 
 
Under the Ottomans, conditions once again improved for the Churches, and “the percentage 
of Christians in the Fertile Crescent tripled” (Fargues, 1998, p. 52).  There are several reasons 
for this, one of which was undoubtedly the millet system, under which legal recognition and a 
degree of administrative autonomy was given to religious communities. Millet bodies, which 
included the churches, became intermediaries between the Church and the State, and the 
Patriarchs were given political authority and status within their communities and in the State. 
The churches were able to manage their own civil, penal and taxation administrative affairs.  
Requirements for conversion in the event of inter-religious marriage, and the Jizya tax, were 
gradually removed.  And the requirement that all Ottoman subjects, regardless of their ethnic 
or religious status, should serve in the army was altered.  Non-Muslims – in return for payment 
of an exemption tax – were excluded from the requirement for conscription.  Other forms of 
discrimination such as restrictions on land purchase were also removed.  Under the ‘tanzimat’ 
– the period of political and economic reform undertaken by the Ottoman Empire between 
1857-1860 - the economic and social incentives for conversion to Islam were substantially 
reduced, creating increased opportunities for minority communities and serious tensions with 
some Muslim groups.53  The Tanzimat reforms were in part at least “meant for international 
consumption at a time when the Ottomans desperately needed Britain’s help” (James A Reilly, 
2019, p. 56).  Christians also had a lower death rate than Muslims, partly because they were 
 
53 See: (Issawi, 2014) The transformation of the Economic position of the Millets in the Nineteenth 




heavily concentrated in the urban and coastal areas where standards of living were better, and 
wider contact with the Mediterranean world was possible.54    
 
This Christian encounter with the West during the Ottoman period was further secured by the 
sending of Capuchin, Carmelite, Jesuit and Dominican Catholic missionaries to the east in the 
17th Century; by the arrival of western diplomats, and the establishment of Catholic 
educational institutions. Under this influence, further schisms formed within the Oriental 
Churches.   As early as the 15th Century, in response to the Ottoman threat, there had been 
attempts to unite the Catholic West with the Byzantine East.  At the Council of Florence in 
1439, religious leaders had almost reached agreement in the union of east and west, but this 
had been rejected by a majority of monks, authorities, and the populace in the East.  A Union 
had even been proclaimed in Hagia Sophia in Istanbul on 12 December 1452, but this was only 
seen as provisional until the threat of the Ottomans disappeared, and was never accepted by 
most eastern churches.  With the fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453, the Council of 
Florence became obsolete.   In 1662, the Syrian Catholic Church was formed after a schism 
with the Syrian Orthodox.  The Greek Catholic ‘Melkite’ Church was formed in 1724.  In 1741, 
the Maronite Church adopted Roman customs and united completely with Rome, but retained 
their Syriac liturgy. The Armenian Catholic Church was established in 1742.  In 1847, the Latin 
Patriarchate was settled in Jerusalem, and in the 19th Century, a Coptic Catholic community 
was established.   
 
Thus was created the Eastern Catholic family of Churches, who remained faithful to Eastern 
liturgy, but came under the authority of Rome.  The Melkites were the first, in the seventeenth 
century, to adopt Arabic as the primary liturgical language.  Robert Haddad identifies three 
reasons for the adoption of Arabic within Christian liturgy: the decline of Syriac as a vernacular 
tongue; the concentration of Melkite communities in urban centres that were dominated by 
Arabic literary culture; and the reduced influence of Byzantine Orthodoxy (R. Haddad, 1970, p. 
20).  This strengthened the distinctiveness of the Eastern Churches and stressed their 
indigenous nature within the eastern context.  Additionally, between the fall of Constantinople 
in 1453 and the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516, the Orthodox churches of the East had 
been largely cut off from the Patriarchate in Constantinople.   Thus they had developed a 
degree of ecclesiastical and cultural independence (R. Haddad, 1970, p. 21). 
 
54 See:  (Fargues, 1998) The Arab Christians in the Middle East. A Demographic Perspective  In Ed. Pacini, 




In the period before the nation states were created in the twentieth century, the main identity 
marker for the people of the region, given their religious and tribal diversity, was their religion.  
This means of identity, formalised by the Ottomans in the millet system, allowed a degree of 
legal and religious autonomy within the juridical framework of Sunni Islam, but it also laid the 
foundation for potential sectarian division when political or religious dissension occurred. As 
Phillips writes: “Politicised sect identity in Syria developed alongside, and interacted with 
national identity…..Politics remained mostly local, with tribe, class and region as important as 
religion or sect, depending on context” (Phillips, 2015, pp. 363-364).55 
 
The Tanzimat reforms that found expression in the Edict of Gulhane in 1839 and that were 
further developed in the Hatt i-Humayun Decree in 1856, were rooted in increasing levels of 
trade and communication between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.  They involved a 
western-inspired radical transformation of every aspect of Ottoman society – military, 
economic, social, intellectual, legal and political (Braude, 2014, p. 273), and sought to 




For the first time in the history of any Muslim state, in 1839 the Ottomans implicitly 
accepted a revolutionary political equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects.  They 
declared this equality more explicitly in 1856 and finally, announced it constitutionally 
in 1876.  The jizya, or poll tax on non-Muslims, was abolished in 1855.  A concept of 
secular Ottoman citizenship was introduced in 1869.  The Ottoman purpose in this 
massive ideological and legal reordering of the empire or Tanzimat was clear:  it was to 
stave off further European intervention and to consolidate imperial power (Hashemi, 
2017, p. 27). 
 
The reforms however evoked considerable Muslim opposition.  With improved communication 
and trade links, including railways, telegraph and steamships, between Europe and the 
Ottoman empire, Europeans tended towards Christian trading partners in priority to Muslim 
colleagues, and sought to secure their own interests within the region (Ellis, 2018, p. 36). 
 
55 For a study of the development and impact of the ‘Millet’ system, see: (Braude, 2014) Christians and 
Jews in the Ottoman Empire.   This book challenges some of the foundational “myths” of the millet 
system, arguing that its development was more gradual than traditionally understood. 
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Christians benefited economically more than their Muslim neighbours, and became more 




Broadly speaking, the development of Muslim antagonism toward Christians during 
the reform era was linked to new socioeconomic changes in Syrian towns.  On the one 
hand there was the remarkable and conspicuous economic prosperity of many Syrian 
Christians and their rapid emancipation from the old restrictions on their public 
conduct.  On the other hand, there developed a growing economic gap between 
Christians from upper and middle classes and Muslims from the middle and lower 
classes; the latter, as well as some rich Muslims, also suffered from the new economic 
and political developments (Braude, 2014, p. 246). 
 
Additionally, some Muslims, particularly amongst the Ulama, opposed the principle of 
freedom of worship and feared that the equal status given to Christians would damage the 
Islamic character of the Ottoman state, and damage their political influence in the government 
institutions.  However, criticism of the Tanzimat reforms was not confined to Muslims.  Many 
Christians were concerned that the new arrangements diminished the influence of traditional 
ecclesiastical establishments, and were not pleased that the new freedoms removed the 




Yet although religio-political causes, and motives of self-preservation, played a 
dominant role in shaping the newly emerging Muslim-Christian conflict, social and 
economic forces (as well as cultural, psychological, and other factors) were also 
interwoven into that complex fabric of inter-group relations  (Braude, 2014, p. 242). 
 
It was not long before these multiple tensions erupted into violence.  In 1850, an anti-
conscription protest in Aleppo, coinciding with the rise of communal economic tensions, 
developed into a massacre of Christians in the city.   Ten years later, a mob turned on the 
Christians of Damascus.  These massacres “coincided with a civil war in neighbouring Mount 
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Lebanon between Maronite Christains and Druzes, - a war which also ended in 1860 in utter 
defeat and massacre of Maronite Christians in several towns” (Hashemi, 2017, p. 28). 
 
Hashemi continues:  
 
But these events were not about Christianity or Islam.  Instead these events pointed to 
a very specific nineteenth century moment that witnessed three things happening 
simultaneously. The first was the sudden, top-down disestablishment of the system of 
symbolic and legal Muslim supremacy without any cultural preparation on the part of 
Ottoman Muslim elites whose empire was under enormous European military, political 
and economic pressure.  The second was the reality of western imperialism that 
claimed to protect the Christians of the Orient who were themselves increasingly 
associated with Europe. The third was the agency of some local Christians and Muslims 
who adopted a more strident perspective on their new-found rights in a rapidly 
changing imperial landscape (Hashemi, 2017, p. 29). 
 
Throughout this period of reform, especially in Mount Lebanon, it was Europeans who sought 
to influence the balance of power, providing resources and managing local power structures.  
Indeed, it could be suggested that it was a perceived European threat to Islam and Ottoman 
power that represented one of the greatest sources of Muslim antagonism towards Christian 
communities, who were seen to be intimately partnered with European interests – a 
perception, influence and legacy that remains present today.  
 
As Makdisi writes: 
 
On its terrain, Europeans, Ottomans, and locals were locked in a war over the meaning 
and direction of the Tanzimat, which itself contained several overlapping discourses of 
religious equality, Islamic tradition, political legitimacy , past glory and present 
sovereignty, all framed implicitly by a Europe-dominated modernity (Usama Makdisi, 
2000, p. 57). 
 
The result was a series of political compromises concluded by the Ottoman and European 
powers, that institutionalised political structures in such a way that complex plurality can only 
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be resolved through a system of communal representation – a modified form of the millet 
system. 
 
Despite the fact that the massacres resulting from the Tanzimat reforms took place over a 
hundred and fifty years ago, they have left a lasting memory.  In one of the Christian villages 
that was attacked and suffered sectarian murder at the hands of jihadi groups during the 
recent conflict, a villager said to me: “We are afraid that this will happen again.  They attacked 
us a hundred years ago.  They have turned against us now.  And we are afraid that they will 
wait for the next opportunity to do the same again.”  I have heard similar comments in 
different parts of Syria.  It is one example of how the recent conflict  has damaged trust and 
interreligious relationships. 
 
However, sensitive issues of trust are not confined to interreligious matters.  They also exist 
ecumenically.  During the formation of nation States, and the colonial endeavours of the 19th 
Century, there was an increase in Protestant missionary activity, and the region witnessed the 
arrival of an array of Protestant denominations.  Presbyterian, Anglican, Baptist, Evangelical 
churches all established themselves in Syria and throughout the Levant, to create the fifth 
family of Churches in the region.  All have added to the complex, diverse – and sometimes 
conflicting – Christian mosaic in Syria and the wider region.  There have inevitably been times 
of tension between the faith communities. To many these developments have been a source 
of Christian enrichment and diversity. But this is not necessarily how all Syrian Christians see it.  
Some believe that this multiplication of Churches, and the significant and influential presence 
of western Christianity, has from an eastern orthodox perspective, “increased disunity, division 
and conflict in the body of the Church.”56  This remains a profoundly sensitive matter for the 
Orthodox churches of the east, particularly given the numerical growth in some of the 
Protestant churches in recent decades.  The author has heard this view expressed in dialogue 
with Christians in Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut, during regular visits to both Lebanon and 
Syria.57  There also exists a perception that in some cases, the provision of aid by some 
 
56 Quoted from an unpublished lecture:  His Eminence Metropolitan John, Archbishop of the Antiochene 
Orthodox Archdiocese of Western and Central Europe.(2010) Christians in the Middle East. Lecture 
Given at St Botolph’s Church without Bishopsgate, London. 12 June 2010. 
57 A good example of this tension is this article in ‘Christian Today’ magazine dated 16 May 2017, in 
which Fr. Alexi Chehadeh of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Damascus, expresses concern that aid 
from the Protestant churches of the west are negatively impacting eastern Christians.  Whether true or 
not, the article highlights the tensions that exist in some quarters between the ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ 
churches. An additional complexity is that some Orthodox Christians do not place any distinction 
between the various ‘evangelical’ or Protestant denominations, but view all of them with equal 
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Protestant churches to Syrian refugees, whatever their status, has been accompanied by ‘soft’ 
forms of evangelism (Kraft, 2017).  Nevertheless, although work remains to be done in 
promoting ecumenical as well as inter-faith dialogue, and proclaiming an ecclesiology that 
“proclaims unity in diversity”, shared suffering during the recent conflict has strengthened 
ecumenical relations and cooperation within Syria (Anthony O'Mahony, 2013, p. 240). 
 
1.5 The twentieth century onwards. 
 
Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1914, Christians numbered about 24% of the 
population of the Empire, and 30% in the area of Greater Syria, which includes Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, Israel and Palestine, and Christian communities played a key part in the social, political, 
economic and religious landscape of society (Fargues, 1998, p. 62).   But with the factors 
previously described: the rise of the nation states; the fall of the Ottoman Empire; the British 
and French Mandates in Palestine and Syria; and the emergence of the Muslim renewal 
movements; this situation was to dramatically alter.   
 
As nation states developed, religious identities were manipulated and used to promote ruling 
agendas within emerging countries.  The British and French Mandates in Palestine and Syria 
played a crucial role in developing this tendency and establishing a power framework that 
differed to that which existed under Ottoman rule. Perceived economic and political injustices 
within the nation states fractured societies and religious communities.  During the French 
Mandate, ecumenical differences arose between the Catholic denominations that ‘by and 
large welcomed French rule’, and the Orthodox Christian communities that ‘sought to 
strengthen ties to their Muslim compatriots in the name of Syrian and Arab identification’ 
(James A Reilly, 2019, p. 97).  The betrayal of political commitments to indigenous 
communities at the end of the Mandates, including the marginalisation of minority non-Sunni 
groups, and the establishment of the State of Israel, which resulted in the dispossession of 
several hundred thousand Palestinians from their homelands, created communal, State and 
religious tensions that remain to this day.  Additionally, the Lebanese war; American 
interventionism in the Gulf and in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya; the ‘Arab Spring’; the ‘War on 
Terror’; the growth of Sunni-Shi’a tensions, and the rise of political Islamism – have all 
contributed to the destabilisation of the region, and the mass emigration of Christians from 
 





the Middle East to other parts of the world. In parts of Iraq, Christian communities that dated 
to the earliest days of the Christian Church have almost disappeared, and in other parts of the 
region, the ancient presence of Christianity is under threat, or reduced to such a degree, that 
the Christian influence on Arab society as being part of the historical essence of that society, is 
being seriously eroded.58  This changing context could profoundly alter the framing, balance 
and the culture and history of the religious communities in Syria and the region.59 
 
The 20th and early years of the 21st Century have been devastating for Christian  
communities throughout the region.    In contrast to the figures quoted above, it is estimated 
that today Christians make up less than 4% of the population of the Middle East.  In Syria, of an 
estimated population of Christians of 10-12% prior to the conflict, it is impossible to provide 
accurate figures, but it is thought that half or more have left the country.60  In December 2016, 
Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo, Antoine Audo suggested that three quarters of the Christian 
population of Aleppo might have left the city by that date, leaving an estimated 40,000 
Christians in the city.61  In Palestine, Christians now number less than 2% of the population.62  
In Iraq, Christian communities have been decimated by the war and by flight from ISIS 
persecution. Thus, it is possible to say that “ninety years have wiped out four centuries of 
Christian resurgence” (Fargues, 1998, p. 63).  The rise of the nation states has helped provide 
the context in which this decimation of the Christian communities has taken place.   However, 
there is another story.  And that is that modern Syria has been a place of refuge for Christians 
during a century of crises: for Armenians and Syriacs displaced during the Ottoman period in 
the early years of the twentieth century; for Palestinians in the mid-twentieth century; and for 
Iraqi Christians during the 1990s and 2000s (Chatty, 2017).  Crucially, the country, home to 
three eastern Patriarchates, Syrian Christianity has played an important part in the renaissance 
of Eastern Christianity in the Levant, and in increased western awareness of the importance of 




59 For a helpful article on the current threats facing the Church in Iraq, and the challenges of ‘living with 
Islam’ in this context, see: (Girling, 2015) ‘To live within Islam’: The Chaldean Catholic Church in Modern 
Iraq. 1958-2003.  Also: (Girling, 2018) The Chaldean Catholic Church: Modern History, Ecclesiology and 
Church-State Relations. London: Routledge 
60 Some estimates of numbers of Christians leaving, and remaining in Syria have been published in a 
report by Open Doors: Those who Remain: Christians in Syria and Iraq. Published 1 May 2017. 
61 Interview with Bishop Audo on 17 December 2016 in Damascus. 
62 For an excellent wide-ranging collection of essays on the subject of Christianity in the Holy Land, see:  
(Ateek, 2007)  The Forgotten Faithful.  A window into the life and witness of Christians in the Holy Land.  




In Syria, religious communities for the most part coexist, and possess no political or 
geographical centre.  Christianity is therefore a natural part of the established ‘mosaic’ of 
Syrian society, and inhabits part of the ‘sacred space’ that makes up the diverse religious 
communities in the country. This is visible in the abundance of mosques and churches that 
stand side by side in the country’s cities, towns and villages.  As an increasing number of 
studies on religious leadership in the region, particularly in Lebanon, are discovering, 
communal identity has been enhanced by the implementation of the nation States.  Prior to 
their establishment, communal identities were distinct, but the structure of the nation States, 
building on the Ottoman legacy, bureaucratised religious difference, ensured “the 
compartmentalization of religious and secular institutions” (Henley, 2015, p. 166), and 
institutionalised both Christian and Muslim religious systems and hierarchies that had 
previously been more fluid than imagined, and that had crossed the boundaries created by 
Statehood. 
 
Eastern Christian communities now find themselves in a changing context and a period of 
profound uncertainty.   Yet, despite the conflict, Syria has remained one of the most religiously 
diverse countries in the region, with a historic heritage of coexistence in which religious 
communities, until the start of the Syrian conflict, lived in comparative stability and mutual 
respect. This does not mean that communities have not prioritised their own interests or that 
tensions have not existed.  This study explores how, even amidst the horrors of the conflict, 
many Christian and Muslim communities in Syria have continued to engage and work together, 
and attempted to reconcile and serve their suffering communities. 
 
1.6 Ecumenical developments and recent challenges. 
 
Despite the political insecurity and conflict during recent decades, substantial progress has 
been made in ecumenical relations in the region.  It is hard to overstate the impact of the 
establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948, and of Vatican II and Nostra Aetate, in 
challenging the Churches to reflect on their ecumenical differences, and to posit a more 
inclusive view of other faiths.  The encyclical of Pope Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex (1951), was 
profoundly influential in motivating subsequent ecumenical developments.  The encyclical 
acknowledged that the ecclesial schism between eastern and western Churches at the Council 
of Chalcedon in 451 was based on theological misunderstandings.  In 1993, the Joint 
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Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church 
issued the ‘Balamand Declaration’. This declaration sought to end the concept of ‘uniatism’ by 
which it was believed that ‘true salvation’ only exists within one church or another.   The 
Declaration acknowledged the right of the eastern churches to exist and that individuals 
should have freedom of conscience in practising their faith.   The Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox churches declared themselves to be ‘sister’ churches, and that rebaptism is both 
unnecessary and should be avoided.  Whilst the issue of relationship between the national 
church, diocesan churches and regional Churches has not been resolved, this was a significant 
moment given the millennium of fractured relations, and the Churches are aware that a more 
effective ecumenical relationship is necessary (Anthony O'Mahony, 2013, pp. 240-241).  In 
1996, the Synod of the Melkite Churches of Antioch affirmed the intention to bring the two 
Antiochene Patriarchates into a closer union.  As yet, the fulfilling of this intention has not 
been possible due to concern over how such a union might impact their wider relations.   
 
It is not surprising that there should be theological difficulties in overcoming a millennium of 
schism, but churches in Syria and the region recognise the need for ecumenical cooperation.  
In the face of the conflict in Syria, ecumenical cooperation and engagement has increased 
between all the Churches, and inter-religious cooperation has grown.   Speaking prior to the 
Syrian conflict, Antoine Audo, the Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo, echoing many Christian leaders 
in the region, wrote: “The vocation of Eastern Christians will be to become a bridge, or better, 
a model of communion between the Christian west and the Muslim world” (Audo, 2010a, p. 
17).  He further suggests that “a spirituality of communion, rooted in the person of Christ, may 
allow each Church to be itself in its liturgical and patristic tradition, at the same time opening 
itself in a spirit of welcome for the other, and of dialogue” (Audo, 2010c, p. 198).  In a 
conversation in Damascus in December 2016, Bishop Audo confirmed that this was now more 
important than ever.  
 
The Churches in Syria, even before the conflict, faced challenges.  These included: the diversity 
of Churches and divergences in identity and theology; the reality of being a numerical minority 
in a multi-religious and ethnic context; the fact that ties with the West and western 
Christianity can be seen both as an asset and as a threat by non-Christian Syrians; and the level 




Notwithstanding these difficulties, Habib Moussalli presents an interesting account of 
Christianity in Syria in 1998 when he noted that “the Syrian State can be said to be the 
guardian of the Church in some ways, an official protection which is not without benefits” 
(Moussalli, 1998, p. 289).  He wrote: 
 
The Patriarchs are building everywhere in Syria and work is proceeding rapidly.  The 
Christian communities are completely free to buy land and to build as they please, 
whether churches, clinics, blocks of flats for new, young families, or multipurpose 
buildings for catechism or youth clubs.  Besides giving its permission, the State also 
provides the construction materials (iron, concrete, piping, and so on) at a subsidized 
price, the same as for government projects. We can suppose that the fact that the 
Church is building in Syria today is a sign of its confidence in the future... From a 
careful observation, it could be honestly concluded that there is no form of 
persecution against Christians in Syria.  There is complete freedom of worship, which is 
guaranteed by the constitution.  Christmas and Easter are official holidays and some 
liturgical celebrations are broadcast on radio and television…. There are always two or 
three Christian ministers in the Council of Ministers, and they are there undoubtedly 
more on account of their technical expertise than their religious affiliation (Moussalli, 
1998, pp. 286-289).  
 
This ‘protection’ which the State has afforded the Christian and other minority communities, in 
comparison to the sectarian violence that they have suffered at the hands of the militant 
groups fighting the government, helps to explain the position that Church leaders have 
maintained during the conflict.  But this is not an idealised account.  Moussalli speaks in the 
same chapter of the “constant sense of insecurity, a desire for extra security” that Arab 
Christians feel, which comes in part from continually feeling “a sense of belonging and 
estrangement at the same time.  Thus without feeling confined in his Arab Christian identity, 
he nevertheless feels the constant need to reinforce it, to retrieve it, to enrich it and to stress 
all its nuances…. In his desire to claim both history and modernity, his Christian roots in a 
predominantly Muslim world, and his openness towards the West, he has the ability to 
assimilate or distance himself.”  Add to this the sense of threat from “the religious revival in 
Muslim circles on a social and political level” and we see the potential vulnerability of the Arab 
Christian identity  (Moussalli, 1998, pp. 289-290). 
 
Since the start of the conflict in Syria, Christian emigration from Syria has multiplied 
significantly. Razek Siriani writes:  
 
No wonder Christians in Syria felt threatened and unprotected when the uprising 
started in March 2011 and even more so when it later took on a militant aspect.  
Christian communities felt that the rise of militant Islam against the ruling regime, and 
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its initial success, would threaten their very presence and protection as a substantial 
minority group in the country.  This led to a mass exodus of Christians, particularly 
intellectuals and young people, from Syria.  This has come about not because 
Christians feel unaffiliated or disloyal to their land, nor because they feel they have no 
stake in its future.  The reason for the large-scale emigration is that many Christians 
feel that their lives and the lives of their children are threatened by a grim and 
uncertain situation.  They fear that a society marked by tolerance, safety, plurality, 
coexistence and a mosaic type of life will probably be replaced by one that is exclusive, 
monolithic and fanatically Islamic.  Such fears are not exclusive to Christians.  Many 
Muslims have opted to leave the country for similar reasons, particularly those whose 
political affiliations make them feel vulnerable. Yet, many Christians, despite the 
atrocities and difficulties of life in a war situation, have opted to remain in the country 
or have left only as a last resort (Siriani, 2018, pp. 108-109). 
 
Because of the level of emigration, there is an even greater need for further ecumenical and 
inter-religious dialogue and co-operation. For the loss of Christians in Syria and in the Levant is 
a dangerous threat to the pluralism within Levantine society, and the longstanding social, 
economic, political and religious traditions and dynamics that have enabled the cohesion, 
stability and coexistence of different religious and cultural communities in the region.  As part 
of this, a recovery of the theological traditions of the east, particularly Patristic theology and 
Spirituality, with its unique oriental roots and character can contribute much to strengthening 
a shared Christian identity within the Middle Eastern context.63     
 




In this chapter, we have briefly examined the complex history that has produced the diverse 
Christian presence in Syria, and the factors that have affected and are affecting Christianity’s 
contemporary existence and inter-relational dynamics within the Syrian context.  Syria holds a 
unique place.  From here Christianity emerged and spread eastwards and westwards. The 
theological controversies that raged during the early centuries of the Christian era resulted in 
ecclesiastical schisms that produced diverse ecumenical expressions which remain today.  
Meanwhile, Christianity’s engagement with early Islam was significant, and helped to establish 
a level of coexistence that enabled Christians for the most part to survive and flourish, even as 
a dhimmi community, and despite periods of serious tension such as the inter-religious riots 
and attacks in Damascus and Aleppo in 1860.  During the four hundred years of Ottoman rule, 
 
63 See: (Audo, 2010b)  Isaac of Ninevah, John of Dalyatha and Eastern Spirituality. In One in Christ: An 
Ecumenical review. 44.2.  29-48 
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the millet system, whilst limiting the Christian communities in some respects, enabled a degree 
of institutional and administrative independence that preserved their status and religious 
freedom within society.  After the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, institutional 
independence was preserved within the structures of the new nation States, and in Syria 
specifically, freedom of religious expression remains enshrined within the Syrian Constitution.   
 
In the light of the Syrian conflict, a degree of fracturing and lack of trust has inevitably 
developed between members of different religious and communal identities.  As we shall see, 
religious leaders, even in the midst of conflict, are working together to encourage and restore 
trust within and between their communities.  In many respects, the challenges presented by 
substantial emigration and brutal conflict have strengthened ecumenical relations between 
the Christian communities as they recognise their need of each other in order to maintain the 
stability and influence of the Christian presence. This study considers the means and 
effectiveness of that process.  One area where hope lies is in the fact that most Syrians, of 
whatever faith community, and despite the trauma that the whole country has experienced, 
are keen to preserve the rich diversity and plurality of the country, within a secular framework 
that respects and protects all groups within the country.    
 
However, the future remains unpredictable and uncertain. What will the Christian presence 
look like after the conflict?  With an estimated 50% of Christians having emigrated, how will 
the churches survive?  How will each of the faith communities adapt to the new ethnic, 
religious and social dynamics created by the loss of millions of citizens, both by death in 
conflict, and by emigration?  As Fr. Alexi Chehadeh, Greek Orthodox Archimandrite says:  
 
We have always had complete freedom of faith and worship and we still do.  But faith 
leaders will face great challenges. The balance of Christians and Muslims has changed.  
But there are many other changes.  We now have a serious gender imbalance. It is 
estimated that because of the numbers of deaths of young men in the Syrian army, 
and the level of emigration of young men, 70% of Syrian society are now women, and 
30% are men.  There are also many widows that we now need to support.64 The 
destruction of factories and major infrastructure, means an increase in 
unemployment, and that could have an impact on social stability.  People will be less 
likely to be able to afford a higher education. These are social problems. There is no 
place for sectarian ideology, and we cannot afford to talk of religion as a factor of 
 
64 For a helpful insight into the status of women in Syrian society, see: (Ventura, 2018) ‘Thank God we 




division. Rather, we need to serve the needs of society, and play a part in healing 
society.65 
 
Despite the emigration of many Christians during the Syrian conflict, those who remain are 
determined to preserve the Christian presence, and Christianity’s vital role in preserving the 
religious space in which diversity and plurality can flourish.  It is a wish shared by many 
Muslims in the country who commonly say that “without the presence of Christians, Syria will 
lose something vital to the quality and plurality of its identity.”66  As Sidney Griffith writes: the 
“intellectual heritage of eastern Christians belongs to the whole Church and we are the poorer 
without any knowledge of it” (Griffith, 2008, p. 3).  This study adds to our knowledge and 
understanding of the context, in the hope that post-conflict, trust can be restored. 
 
What this chapter has not addressed is how the ‘Islamic renewal’ movement from the 1930s 
onwards, has impacted not just Islam, but the fragile Christian-Muslim relational dynamics in 
the region.  In order to understand this, it is now necessary to introduce the equally diverse 
and complex Muslim mosaic within Syrian society. 
 
65 Interview with Archimandrite Alexi Chehadeh. Director of DERD.  Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. 
Damascus 31 May 2017 








Just as the Christian mosaic in Syria is pluralist and complex, the Muslim mosaic is multi-
layered and diverse.   This chapter describes key elements within the Muslim landscape in 
Syria, the history, nature and evolution of which has profoundly affected the Christian-Muslim 
dynamic.  It explores the importance of the rise of Salafism and political Islam in the twentieth 
century, and identifies different expressions of Islam within the country. (Also included in 
Appendix 2).  Finally, a reflection on recent developments in Sunni Islam in Syria helps inform 
the context in which post-conflict inter-religious dynamics might develop.  The landscape of 
Islam in Syria cannot be separated from regional developments in Islam in recent decades, 
particularly the titanic tensions between Arab Nationalism and political Islamism, as expressed 
in Egypt, Libya and Iraq (Gerges, 2018), or the complex geopolitical dynamics between Sunni 
and Shi’a across the region (V.  Nasr, 2016) (Nuruzzaman, 2019).   
Most figures put the percentage of Sunni Muslims (including Kurds) in Syria prior to the 
current conflict at approximately 74% - a majority, but one that is far from uniform in political, 
social or religious adherence and practice.67  Remaining Muslim groups, including Alawites, 
Shi’a, Druze and Isma’ili, amounted to a total of about 16% of the population.   This communal 
balance, and the fact that the Alawite/Shi’a minority have held the axis of power for over forty 
years, and promoted secular modernity, has in part helped fuel resentment amongst some 
Sunnis that has long pre-dated the current crisis.  The government has tried to quell communal 
tensions by including significant representation from all communities within Parliament and 
leadership in the Army, and encouraging religious freedom for minorities.  However, all 
communal groups in the country have been accused of manipulating communal tensions on 
occasion for political advantage.   
At the time of writing, and given the displacement and emigration of so many Syrians, it is 
impossible to provide accurate figures for any of the communities that remain in Syria.  The 
dominance of Sunni Islam within Syria belies the fact that the Sunnis themselves are diverse 
 
67 According to most available figures.  For example, see: https://fanack.com/syria/facts-and-figures/  
or: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html/ (Accessed: 10 
December 2018)  See also: (Balanche, 2018, p. 13). 
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and represent different shades of religious and political adherence with local and regional 
variations.   Just as some Sunnis espouse strictly conservative Muslim practices, so there are 
many Sunnis in Syria who welcome the religious and social plurality and diversity of the 
country, and the secular basis of the Constitution.   As Thomas Pierret writes: “There is no such 
thing as a unified ‘Syrian’ religious scene” (Pierret, 2013, p. 12).  There has always been a 
“regional fragmentation” in the Syrian Ulama, with a particularly strong rivalry between the 
two urban centres of Aleppo and Damascus.  It is important to recognise that many Sunnis 
support an Arab nationalist perspective as opposed to that of political Islamism. Tension 
between these two paradigms have heightened significantly in recent years and contributed to 
political unrest. 
The demographic change caused by the conflict is likely to have significant implications.  The 
departure of an estimated 50% of Christians from the country; a reduction in other minorities; 
and a rise in the percentage of poorer Sunnis due to the socio-economic crisis, and the 
emigration of many professional Syrians; will lead to a changing demography that is bound to 
have an impact on the socio-economic and politico-religious make-up of the country. 
 
2.2 The Islamic ‘Reform’ movements.  Salafism and the rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Islam has been profoundly impacted by the developments of the Islamic ‘reform’ movements 
in Damascus and Cairo.  Of these, the Salafi movement has been instrumental in moulding the 
development of Islam in the last century across the Arab world.  Defined as a return to the 
original teachings of the Qur’an and the sunna, there is debate as to whether salafism 
emerged as early as the late 19th Century, or primarily in the early 20th Century, but it played a 
major part in influencing the shape of political Islam in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, and setting agendas for renewing the strength of Islamic civilisation within the 
modern world  (Lefevre, 2013, pp. 3-17).    
Essentially, the Salafist movement sought “a return to the ideas and morals of the era of the 
Prophet Mohammad – that is, claimed textual literalism – at the expense of Islam’s 
subsequent rich tradition of religious interpretation, law and practice” (Abdo, 2017, p. 46).  
The salaf are regarded as the first three generations of Muslims, from the time of the Prophet, 
and salafism represents the following of the traditions and teachings of those elders.   
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Louis Massignon was instrumental in introducing salafiyya theology to a western audience, as 
an intellectual movement that was committed to modern reform in the Islamic world.  He 
suggests that the salafiyya movement was founded in the 19th Century by Persian Shi’a scholar 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897).  Lauziere argues that Massignon was misleading in 
presenting Rida in 1925 as a “current leader” of the salafiyya movement, and was mistaken in 
suggesting that Salafism existed in the late nineteenth century.  He argues for a more gradual 
and nuanced development in the salafiyya movement in the early years of the twentieth 
century (Lauziere, 2016, pp. 37-41).  In any case, the movement sought to reconcile the 
teachings of Islam with the modern world and the realm of science.  Afghani saw the 
movement as a reawakening of Islam in the face of western colonial influence and propounded 
an early form of Islamic Nationalism resting on the faith of the Prophet.  
 It was however Afghani’s most prominent student, Egyptian Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905) 
who laid the foundations for the salafiyya movement.  Abduh had a greater interest in 
intellectual matters than political, and sought to reconcile the philosophy of the 
‘enlightenment’ and the western emphasis on ‘reason’, with the Islamic demand of faith and 
the primacy of Allah in all things.  His emphasis on the heritage of the Mediaeval Mu’tazalite 
theologians (especially Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina) who had introduced the concept of reason to 
interpret Islam and its scripture was met with acute opposition from the ulama.   
Syria’s situation between Europe, Asia and Africa and as a place of encounter for cultures, 
philosophies and faiths, is one reason that Syrians pride themselves on the diversity and 
religious plurality of Syrian culture.  But given the historic importance of Syria during the 
Umayyad period and beyond, it is not surprising that Syria has also been an important locus of 
Islamic scholarship.  Paul Heck notes:  
Syria has long been a center of religious renewal, including such figures as Umar b. Abd 
al‐Azīz (d. 720), al‐Awzāī (d. 774), Abū al‐Alā al‐Maarrī (d. 1058), al‐Ghazālī (d. 1111), 
Ibn Arabī (d. 1240), Sib Ibn al‐Jawzī (d. 1256), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Ibn al‐Qayyim al‐
Jawziyya (d. 1350) and Amad Kuftārū (P. Heck, 2004, p. 185).    
 
It is notable that the most influential Muslim theologian and jurist for conservative Islam spent 
most of his life in Syria.  Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) was a proponent of Hanbali theology 
(Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, 780-855 CE), which is the foundation of purist Salafi thought and 
expression. But his writings and thinking have been widely used to develop and promote 
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Wahhabi and Salafist principles.68 Hanbal and those who adhered to his theology, rejected 
speculative theology (kalam), and metaphorical interpretation (ta’wil), and “conceived of 
Salafism as a purist approach to Islam, characterized by an adherence to neo-Hanbali theology, 
an abhorrence of innovation, a strong commitment to the use of scriptures as proof texts, and 
a desire to recapture the unique truth of Islam – that is, the purported orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy of the pristine Muslim community” (Lauziere, 2016, p. 99).69 
Opposition to salafi tendencies was inevitable given the peaceful coexistence with minorities 
in the country, and the popularity of sufism in 19th and 20th Century Syria.  And it was this 
feature of Syrian society that initially encouraged the Syrian Ikhwan, when it was founded to 
claim to be more politically moderate.70  However, salafism also developed in accordance with 
the sectarian ethos of particular centres, most notably the contrast between Aleppo, with its 
abundance of sufi scholars and tradition, and Damascus, which had a more salafist approach to 
Islamic development (Lefevre, 2013, pp. 4-11).   Thus, two salafist trends developed.  The first 
had more in common “with the Hanbali school of Islamic law, the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah 
and the Wahhabiyya movement, than with Al-Afghani or Abduh.”   The second “evolved into 
Arab-Muslim nationalism,” sections of which eventually endorsed Wahhabi ideology (Tomass, 
2016, p. 91).71   
During the 19th Century, Islamic jamiat – clubs or societies that promoted intellectual or 
political goals amongst ordinary people–developed throughout the Ottoman Empire.  These 
were important for establishing a sense of Muslim identity, particularly under the French 
Mandate, when many felt that they had to defend Islam against western influences.  Salafism 
was a more elitist movement that sought to gain influence through educational and judicial 
systems.  It produced several journals, which gained a wide readership amongst lawyers, 
academics and civil servants.  Together, these movements “provided the political and 
organisational basis upon which the Islamic movement was to structure its actions”(Lefevre, 
 
68 For studies on the rise of Sunni Muslim fundamentalism, see: (Sivan, 1985) (Calvert, 2010) (A.  
Rahnema, 2005) 
69 Further 19th century Syrian figures who influenced the development of salafism in Syria include 
Damascene Jamal al-Din Qasimi (1866-1914), who advocated a salafism that sought reformation of 
religious doctrines and Ibn Hanbal’s literal interpretation of the scriptures.  He also declared sufism to 
be ‘un-Islamic’.    Another component of Syrian reformism is represented by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi 
(1849-1902) in Aleppo and Tahir al-Jaza’iri (1852-1920).   These figures had a social-political focus on 
reforming Islamic societies.  Both were initially opposed by the majority of Ulama (Pierret, 2013, pp. 
102-103).   
70 Ikhwan is the name given to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
71 One of the most significant Syrian propagators of the restoration of Arab political power according to 
Wahhabi ideology was Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (1886-1969). 
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2013, p. 19).  Thus emerged in 1946 the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood  (Al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun).   
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949).  
Focussing initially on education, the movement moved into politics, and by the 1930s had 
become a violent protest movement, first against British rule, and then against the Egyptian 
government.  A military officers’ coup in July 1952 brought them to prominence, but a failed 
assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954 led to life imprisonment for their leader Hasan al-
Hudaybi, and a coup attempt in 1965 led to the execution of many of their leaders, including 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), whose influence continues in the movement (Gerges, 2018).  Qutb, 
who was educated in both Egypt and America, developed a hatred of western lifestyles and 
attributed the weakness of Arab societies to their own infidelity (khiyana) to Islamic 
principles.72  None of these figures differed greatly in their theology from Al-Wahhab.  
However, the Muslim Brothers, in common with their modern counterparts, and unlike close 
adherents of wahhabi salafiyya, adopted modern clothing and acceptance of the nation state, 
as a means to fulfil their ideology. Despite their apparent willingness to consider welcoming 
aspects of modern life and State systems (Lefevre, 2013), they nevertheless sought “to create 
an authentically Muslim state with an elected leader that would eventually embrace all Muslim 
peoples.  The aim of this Islamic State would be to enforce Muslim law within its border and to 
send out missionaries to evangelise Islam throughout the world” (Tomass, 2016, p. 94). 
Lefevre claims that the Syrian Brotherhood “was in its origins a peaceful group committed to 
the principles of constitutionalism and political liberalism”, and that apart from its 
confrontation with the Ba’ath party in the 1970s and 80s, it remained a peaceful movement 
(Lefevre, 2013, pp. 19-20).  This claim could be vigorously debated. The Syrian Ikhwan certainly 
proclaimed from the beginning their commitment “to a democratic form of government” 
(Lefevre, 2013, p. 27) and were distinct from their counterparts in the rest of the Arab world, 
in that they were “militantly fundamentalist in tone but distinctly modernist in concept” 
(Humphreys, 1979, p. 6).  He does admit however, that it was “bound to remain part of the 
wider Ikhawani framework which tied it to its Egyptian founders” (Lefevre, 2013, p. 20),  and 
that their violent history, both in Egypt, and in Syria, has led to deep suspicion of the 
movement on the part of the Ba’ath Party and many Syrians, including Sunnis, who wish to 
maintain a secular constitution.  There remains deep scepticism amongst many Syrians at the 
 
72 ‘Khiyana’ is the Arabic noun for ‘unfaithfulness’, ‘infidelity’, ‘betrayal’.  ‘Kufran’ is the Arabic noun for 
‘unbeliever’, ‘atheist’.  
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claim of a moderate, peaceful basis to the Muslim Brotherhood movement.  Given the support 
that exiled Muslim Brotherhood leaders and their followers in Europe and America, have 
consistently given to fighting Islamist factions in the war in Syria; and the alliances that 
“moderate” Ikhwan-associated groups have made with extreme Islamist factions, whilst 
claiming to desire ‘freedom’ for all sections of Syrian society, has increased scepticism amongst 
many Syrians.  The  sectarian violence of those groups during the conflict raises serious 
questions about the depth of their tolerance and political Islam’s peaceful intentions (Fuller, 
2003, p. 29).73 
At Syrian Independence from France in 1946, the National Bloc that had led the nationalist 
struggle came to power.  But it soon faced many other parties, including the newly formed 
Ba’ath Party, founded by a Christian, Michel Aflaq, and a Sunni colleague: Salah al-Din al-Bitar; 
and the newly formed Muslim Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood clearly represented a 
political challenge, so the government dissolved their alliance with the Rabitat al-Ulama 
(Union of Ulama), transferred their property to the Waqf, and closed down the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood newspaper al-Manar.   The failure of the new government to address the 1948 
establishment of the State of Israel caused further tensions resulting in a coup in 1949, during 
which secularist reforms were imposed and the Ikhwan once again disbanded.  A few months 
later, a subsequent coup and elections within the Assembly were held, during which three 
Ikhwan members were elected to Parliament, two of whom became ministers in the new 
government.  During debates in Parliament in 1950, the Muslim Brotherhood members pushed 
for a clause in the Constitution that Islam should be enshrined as the ‘State religion’.  After 
much debate, a compromise was agreed, that whilst Islam would not be declared as the ‘State 
religion’, a clause would be inserted into the Constitution that stated that the Head of State 
should be a Muslim, and that Islamic Jurisprudence – fiqh – should be the main source of 
legislation.  The pressure that the Muslim Brotherhood applied on this matter earned them 
 
73 Fuller suggests an Islamist “shift in orientation towards moderation and democracy,” as follows: “The 
majority of Islamist movements have long since reached the conclusion that democratization is the best 
overall vehicle by which to present their agenda to the public and to gain political influence… Islamists 
are becoming prime advocates of concepts of democracy and human rights, precisely because they are 
the primary victims of its absence.” (Quoted in: Awad, Najib G. (2012) And Freedom became a Public 
Square.  Political, sociological and religious overviews on the Arab Christians and the Arabic Spring. p.42)  
Awad goes on to suggest that the “long standing, conventionally claimed phobia of an Islamist ruling 
system in the Arab world of the Near East are no longer the most accurate lenses one should use to read 
the recent Western powers’ views and visions about what the situation would mount to in the Arab 
world in the light of the latest uprisings.” (Awad, 2012, p. 43) It is remarkable that Awad, a Syrian 
Christian living in America, could have such confidence one year into the conflict in Syria.  Since Fuller’s 
assessment in 2003, and Awad’s in 2012, the actions of multiple Islamist movements across the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia might suggest that this has proved to have been a vain hope. 
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support from the Syrian Ulama, but the latter were also furious at the Ikhwan’s acceptance of 
the compromise.  Earlier political battles in the 1940s however, between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Communist Party, during which the Ikhwan called for Muslims to follow 
the teachings of Mohammed, rather than Stalin or Lenin, had further increased their 
popularity.  By the 1950s, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had become a significant part of the 
State apparatus. 
During the 1950s, influenced by the nationalist trends across the region, and inspired by 
Nasser in Egypt, the secular Ba’ath party made substantial progress in Syria. By 1954, in the 
face of growing popularity for the Ba’ath Party, severe repression from the Government of 
Colonel Adib Shishakl in Syria, and the suppression of the Brotherhood in Egypt, the Syrian 
Brotherhood decided not to contest elections.  Instability in the country led to a decision to 
accept a ‘Pan-Arab Union’ with Egypt in 1958 which created the ‘United Arab Republic’.  This 
however was short-lived, especially as part of the agreement had been that the Ba’ath Party 
should be dissolved, and that most of the leadership of the UAR was perceived to be in the 
hands of Egyptians.  A coup by Syrian Military Officers in 1961 (mainly from Muslim 
minorities), the re-establishment of the Ba’ath Party in 1962, and a further coup on 8 March 
1963, placed the Ba’ath Party firmly in control of the country – a move that would have 
profound significance for Syria to the present day.  As one considers the complexity and 
political tensions of Syrian society in the first half of the twentieth century, the influence of 
what Syrians perceive to have been outside interference in their internal affairs cannot be 
overstated, when it comes to understanding the political psychology behind the growth of the 
Ba’ath Party, and the attitudes of Syrians to subsequent developments in the country and to 
Syria’s relationship to the wider world.  
From their respective inceptions, there were tensions between the Ba’ath Party and the Syrian 
Ikhwan.  These were rooted in ideological differences between the political Islam of the 
Ikhwan and the secularism of the Ba’ath Party, but Lefevre identifies other factors that 
nurtured discontent.  He claims that “large sectors of Syrian society had become alienated by 
the regime’s policies in virtually every aspect of life.”  These include; a bias towards rural areas; 
socialist policies; an alleged ‘sectarian’ make-up of the party; and a sense of some areas being 
privileged over others (Lefevre, 2013, p. 43).  All of these to a degree contributed to an 
increasingly polarised political scene in Syria during the 1970s, and eventually to the terrible 
massacres, committed by both the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian Government against 
them, in the 1980s.   Since the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed in Syria.  
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile, who remain bitterly opposed to the Ba’ath 
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Party, and continue to hold to a conservative Islamic ideology, have been calling for ‘regime 
change’ ever since their exclusion from Syrian politics, and have played a key role in advising 
western governments, and in the ‘High Negotiations Committee’ of the Syrian Opposition, 
which represents the ‘rebel’ factions in Syria.74 
This discussion illustrates that whilst the plurality of the Levantine religious landscape has 
encouraged diversity and coexistence, the seeds of Salafist ideology were already present in 
Syrian Islamic traditions and scholarship.  However, external influences upon the Salafist and 
Wahhabi tendencies in the Syrian Islamic landscape during the last century cannot be 
overstated.  Many Syrians with whom I have spoken around the country recount how salafist 
influences have been strengthened by the numbers who, in the decades prior to the current 
conflict, travelled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to live and work, and who on their return 
to Syria, invited imams from these countries to preach in their mosques.  Many of these, 
funded by their own countries, preached strict salafi and Wahhabi principles.   
Political Islam continues to represent a huge challenge to the region.  As early as 1994, Kramer 
wrote: “Wherever, over the past two decades, Arab regimes have embarked on a course of 
political liberalization, loosening the restrictions on political articulation and association, 
Islamist activists have emerged as the strongest force of opposition” (Kramer, 1994, p. 202). 
Democratic processes, not least as witnessed during the ‘Arab Spring’, have allowed political 
Islam to take the ascendancy.  And yet, the radical Islamism that has emerged has often 
challenged the freedoms that democratic process seeks to secure.  This is undoubtedly one of 
the key reasons that the multiple Islamist groups fighting against the Syrian Government have 
failed to secure the support of most ordinary Syrians. 
 
2.3 Other factors affecting the Islamic ‘landscape’. 
 
Religious landscapes are also impacted by political developments. The position of the religious 
minorities in Syria in the 19th and early 20th Centuries was “considerably affected by political 
interference on the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire by France, England and Russia”.  
The French in particular, “favoured the military recruitment of special detachments among 
Alawis, Druzes, Kurds Circassians and other minorities” (Dam, 2013, pp. 3-4).  This represented 
a reversal of the military role of minority groups, and enhanced their status, and power 
potential in the region, increasing resentment from some amongst the Sunni majority, who 
 
74 For a further detailed study of recent developments in Salafism in the region, see: (Cavatorta, 2016). 
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were “appalled by the introduction of French imported secular norms, which, in their eyes, 
threatened the Islamic traditions of the Syrian province”(Lefevre, 2013, p. 13).  This 
resentment continued to grow under the Ba’thist secular constitution that protected 
minorities, who were seen by some as being vassals of the occupier, refusing to establish an 
Islamic Constitution.    
Nevertheless, it is possible for communal, religious, tribal or socio-economic factors to be over-
emphasised when attributing rising tensions in Syria.  Other factors such as ideology, inter-
generational conflict, personal ambition, corruption, the rural/urban interface, and outside 
interference can and have also played a part in the development of conflict (Dam, 2013, p. 12).  
External interference particularly, has played a significant role in the development of the war 
in Syria since 2011 (Phillips, 2016).75   Indeed, many Syrians argue that although sectarian 
tension has been provoked and manipulated in the course of the war, the diversity of the faith 
communities in themselves has rarely in Syria’s history had a causal influence in destabilising 
the country. 
In the years prior to the Syrian conflict, several factors were influencing the landscape of Islam 
in Syria.  These include: the polarisation of some communal groups; the strengthening of 
Shari’a law in conservative Sunni ideology; the secular constitution of the country; the rise of 
the minority communities; the presence of large numbers of refugees from Iraq and Palestine 
and their respective communitarian allegiances; the rise of Shi’a influence in the region;  the 
impact of “post 9/11 wars launched by the United States and its allies” (Drevon, 2016, p. 322); 
and decentralised authority within Sunni Islam, which makes any cohesive or united response 
to political, economic and social upheavals, almost impossible to achieve.  
Tensions between Sunni and Shi’a have been exacerbated not just by the ascendency of Alawi 
power in Syria, but also across the region by the Shi’a “revival” that followed the fall of the 
Ba’athist Government in Baghdad, and which has been “fired by the intervention of the West 
in Afghanistan and Iraq which have unleashed historic religious forces to fuel an age-old 
antagonism between the two sides that had not been anticipated by Washington or London” 
(Anthony O'Mahony, 2006, p. 4).  The shifts in power that have been unleashed by these 
interventions have profound implications for the region and the heightening of communal 
tensions, especially between the Sunni majority and Shi’a majority nations, and their 
 
75 External interference from an early stage is often cited by many witnesses in the conflict. In April 
2015, a leading member of the Internal Syrian Opposition told me that he had been told in 2010 by an 
external opposition figure to prepare for an uprising that had already been planned.  
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respective allies. Indeed, Abdo argues that the uprisings of the inaptly named ‘Arab Spring’ 
“occurred on the heels of a surge in Shi’a power in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon”, and that the 
violence that has followed is not just a result of political rivalry, socioeconomic grievances, and 
international interventionism, but that “the fundamental cause of the violence lies elsewhere”.  
“Islam itself,” she says, “is being rethought and revised in the midst of political upheaval in the 
Middle East” (Abdo, 2017, p. 46).  Sunni/Shi’a tensions should not however be overstated in 
the Syrian conflict.  Sunnis who support the secularly-based Constitution and the pluralist 
nature of Syrian society have been as much victims of Sunni jihadist violence as anyone else.  
And the majority of the Syrian Arab Army are Sunni. 
Shi’a and Sufi traditions have historically had a significant influence on Islam in Syria, both in 
Aleppo and Damascus.  The Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus, (burial place of the daughter of 
Ali , the founder and most celebrated martyr of Shi’ite Islam and granddaughter of the Prophet 
Mohammad), and the Shrine of Hussein in the Ommayad Mosque in Damascus are of global 
significance for Shi’a Muslims, and despite several car bombs planted by jihadists in the vicinity 
of Sayidda Zeinab in recent years, both shrines have remained well visited by Shi’a pilgrims 
from Iraq, Iran and other parts of the Middle East, throughout the conflict.76 
The recent conflict in Syria has had a traumatic impact upon every aspect of Syrian society, and 
the extent to which the communal and religious ‘balance’ of society has been altered has yet 
to emerge.  Inevitably relationships between religious groups have been strained.  Of 
particular concern will be whether those sunni who hold to a more conservative salafist 
ideology will accept the secular space that is likely to prevail constitutionally. It is to be hoped 
that the plurality of Islam within Syria will survive, and will once more be able to flourish.  It is 
much more likely to do so under the secular constitution, which allows the dialogical space 
that the secular and religiously plural can cohabit and make their respective contributions to 
society.  
In order to understand the Muslim landscape in Syria, there follows a brief survey of the 
various Muslim communities. 
2.4 The Alawi 
 
Alawites represent the largest and most important minority Shi’ite group in Syria.  Their 
importance is heightened by the fact that the ruling Assad family are from this group and have 
 
76 For a study of issues surrounding the Shi’a presence in Mamluk Syria, see: (Winter, 1999) 
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promoted Alawite ascendency within all circles of Syrian society.   Significant Alawite 
communities exist across Northern Lebanon, the Syrian coastal mountains and plain, Turkey, 
and into Syria.  Prior to the conflict, it is believed that they comprised “12 to 15 percent of the 
Syrian population, or approximately three million people”(Goldsmith, 2015, p. 6).  Due to the 
importance of their political role in Syria in recent decades, and their influence on the 
country’s religious landscape, the following summary will be more detailed than that of other 
Islamic communities discussed in this chapter.  
Alawi faith was founded on the beliefs of charismatic Shi’a theologian, Muhammad ibn Nusayr 
al-Bakri an-Namiri (d.883 or 873).  Born in Iraq, he “declared himself to the bab (door) to the 
eleventh Shi’a Imam, al-Hasan al-‘Askari”(Farouk-Alli, 2015, p. 31).  Although regarded as 
heretical by other Shi’as , Nusayr (Alawis were called ‘Nusayris’ until the twentieth century) 
gathered a group of followers.  After his death, he was succeeded by a Persian Sufi who 
travelled to Egypt and deeply influenced  another Sufi, as -Sayyid al-Husayn ibn Hamdan al-
Khasibi (d.974) who later settled in Aleppo and established a Sufi order there.  In turn, al-
Khasibi influenced Abu s’id al-Maymun at-Tabarani (d 1031), who lived in Aleppo and Latakia, 
and whose doctrines became the basis of the Alawi faith.  Compelled by persecution, the 
Alawis settled primarily in Syria, and in their early days there, experienced a degree of security 
and integration.  In the city of Harran (now in Turkey) they mingled with philosophers, 
Sabaeans and astronomers, and “many of the pagan aspects of Alawite tradition have been 
attributed to the interaction with this city” (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 19).  The Byzantine sack of 
Aleppo in 962; the resumption of strong Muslim (Sunni) power in the city in 1025; and the 
arrival of the Seljuk Turks in 1070, significantly reduced their influence, and forced many into 
the mountains, where their isolation and exclusiveness gave them the scope to consolidate 
their doctrines, and where evidence suggests that conversions of some of the local Christian 
Maronite and Shi’a populations took place (Goldsmith, 2015, pp. 13-43). 
Alawis root their beliefs in the traditional religious notion that humans were expelled from 
heaven for their disobedience to God.  Subsequently, God has appeared seven times in the 
persons of Abel, Seth, Joseph, Joshua, Asaf, St. Peter, Ali ibn Abi Talib, and then in the imams 
as far as the eleventh Imam.  “However, the true character of the Essence is hidden by the 
presence of the Veil in Adam, Noah, Jacob, Moses, Solomon, Jesus and Mohammad.” Those 
who recognise the Essence – the Alawite faith claims hidden religious knowledge - are freed 
from the body, and return to its ultimate place with God (Tomass, 2016, p. 76).  Amongst the 
Shi’a, Alawites are alone in regarding Ali as an Incarnation of God Himself, and part of a divine 
triad along with Muhammad, and Salman al-Farsi, a companion of the Prophet, one of the 
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primary reasons that they are labelled heretics by other Muslims.   They are believed to have 
adopted some Christian practices, most notably the use of wine in rituals, and the celebration 
of Christmas being two examples.  Their doctrines however are rejected by both Shi’a and 
Sunni alike, though more severely by Sunni.  Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) was the first senior Muslim 
theologian to charge Alawi with being infidels.  In 1305, partly concerned at the need for 
Islamic unity in the face of the Crusader and Mongol threats, Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (d.728CE) 
ruled that the “Alawiyya heresy is more severe than the Jews and Christians, and even the 
Brahmins who worship idols” (Tomass, 2016, p. 78).  Following this judgement, over 20,000 
Alawi were massacred.  Similar judgements were given in 1516 and 1820 which saw further 
massacres.   During these persecutions, the Alawi fled to their mountain strongholds in a 
pattern of persecution followed by gentle re-integration, that continued for several hundred 
years.  As Farouk-Alli writes: “The lot of the Alawis was thus never enviable.  They were at best 
tolerated and at worst the victims of terrible persecution” (Farouk-Alli, 2015, p. 33). Their self-
imposed ‘entrenchment’ in the mountains meant that they could rarely be subdued, and also 
strengthened their sense of distinct identity, whilst at the same time enabling them to be 
incorporated into the Ottoman system of ‘millets’, earning a source of income through their 
agricultural trade with the coastal plains (Goldsmith, 2015, pp. 38-39). 
A recent study of the Alawis (Winter, 2016) challenges the traditional view of the Alawites as a 
marginalised and systematically persecuted sect.  Winter, through studies of numerous 
Ottoman records suggests that the Alawis were in fact throughout their history integrated into 
wider Syrian society, and that whilst sources “tell of fiscal exploitation, war and migration,” 
they also speak of “alliances between Bedouin and ‘Alawis, promotions to government office, 
and intercommunal friendship” (Winter, 2016, p. 10).  
Goldsmith, hinting at this more nuanced history, identifies four stages in the increased 
integration of Alawites into Syrian society, leading towards the position that they now hold.  
The first was the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire between 1832 and 1918.  This 
was followed by Alawite involvement in the French-sponsored Alawite State from 1919 to 
1945, which was part of a deliberate ‘divide-and-rule’ policy engineered by the French.  This 
“sought to pit Syria’s ethno-religious minorities against the Sunni majority”, and enhance 
divisions between urban and rural classes (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 58).  Following the French 
withdrawal in the 1930s, the Alawites made a “pragmatic decision….not to oppose the sect’s 
incorporation into the majority Sunni, independent Syrian State.”  From 1946-1963, they 
sought active involvement in Syrian society and “played a part in the development of political 
ideologies for a religiously diverse state.”   Finally, from 1963 to 1971, the Alawites supported 
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the Ba’th party’s rise to power, and the ideology of cross-sectarian social engagement.   
Following Independence, the Alawites, along with other minorities, sought advancement 
within the State, but “the only real path to a stable income for the economically disadvantaged 
Alawites remained the military” (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 68). Meanwhile, increasingly well-
educated Alawites began to engage in national politics.  The Sunni majority were prepared to 
tolerate this as long as they didn’t threaten the unity of the State.   
Throughout their history, whether in isolation or engaging with the nationalism and secularism 
of the Ba’ath Party, Alawites never lost their strong sense of ‘asabiyya’ (tribal solidarity and 
identity).  In the 1950s, they successfully promoted themselves as ‘Orthodox’ Muslims, and in 
1952, the Mufti of the Syrian Republic recognised the Alawite faith as part of the Twelver 
Shi’ite faith. Subsequently, in 1958, the Al-Azhar school in Cairo formally recognised the 
Twelver Shi’ites as “religiously correct”(Goldsmith, 2015, p. 73). 
There remains debate as to the extent to which the development of Alawite power was 
initially motivated by communal interests.  Through years of persecution and insecurity, their 
strong sense of ‘asabiyya’ was natural.  The Ba’th Party ideology allowed them to integrate 
into the State system , meaning that, as Goldsmith puts it, “many ordinary Alawites went from 
‘serving the notables and the feudal lords to serving the new Ba’thist men’ who became the 
new ‘lords’ of Syria” (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 76).  Their main motivation at this point may have 
been simply to gain equality within the Syrian State.  Opposing groups however, in a sign of 
mutual distrust - saw this as a deliberate action to gain advantage.   
The 1920s onwards, partly in response to the Mandate and the growth of Christian models of 
institutionalised education, saw a revival in traditional religious education, and an effort to 
‘reform’ Islam and Shari’a law (fiqh) to make it applicable to the needs of the modern world.  
The University of Damascus, and its Faculty of Shari’a, created in 1954, was part of this process 
(Pierret, 2013, p. 38).  
Immediate post-independence governments “chose to manage Islam by establishing formal 
institutions and regulations”, placing the local muftis under the authority of a Grand Mufti in 
1947, and in 1949, “giving the government ownership of all mosques in the country, even 
those built with private funds” (Pierret, 2013, p. 18).  By contrast, the Ba’ath Party, in order to 
limit the influence of the religious ulama on government policy, refused to allow them a place 
within the State apparatus.  Ironically, Pierret points out, “the exclusion of the religious 
elite…enabled it to devote all its energy to community work, with the result that it played a 
major role in setting in motion the Islamic ‘awakening’” (Pierret, 2013, p. 22).  During this 
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period, the ulama created many Islamic madrasas under the influence of local religious 
leaders, that became instrumental in strengthening more conservative Islamic adherence.  
Thus ironically, Ba’athist secularism indirectly strengthened the position of those who wished 
to instil ‘traditional’ religious Islamic values. 
Between 1958 and 1961, the attempt to create an Egyptian-Arab republic under Nasser (the 
United Arab Republic) – a decision ratified in Syria by exclusively Sunni Officers - saw increased 
sectarian tensions, as power was transferred to mainly Egyptian figures, and the power of the 
Ba’th Party was curtailed.   The Separatist coup that followed (1961-1963) was led by 
Damascene Sunni officers, a situation that hastened their demise as non-Damascenes were 
alienated.  When the military coup of 1963 took place amidst numerous army purges, Sunni 
representation in the military was weakened, and the Ba’th Party called up military figures of a 
minority background to help establish control.  At the time of the coup Alawis comprised five 
of the fourteen members of the Ba’thist Military Committee.  That Alawi officers subsequently 
played an important role in the military is not surprising.  Indeed, the leadership of the 
Committee was in the hands of three Alawis: Muhammad ‘Umran, Salah Jadid, and Hafiz al-
Assad.  These played a key role in transforming the Ba’thist armed forces, and were 
subsequently accused of polarising the armed forces through appointments at all levels, in 
order to secure sectarian interests and power.  Examining the history of this period closely, it 
should be noted that it is unfair to accuse any one group of operating for sectarian interests.  
All groups it seems were acting accordingly. 
Meanwhile tensions between military leaders increased amidst changing allegiances.  In 
December 1964, Alawite Major-General Muhammad ‘Umran was expelled from Syria, accused 
of being responsible for sectarian tensions in the military.  But confrontations between the 
most important military figures continued.  Alawite General Salah Jadid’s sectarian policies 
threatened to undermine Alawite gains, and in 1968 Hafiz al-Assad, seeing the need to deepen 
trust between different communities, moved to secure the loyalty of a majority of important 
military units.  By November 1970, Hafiz al-Assad “had assumed control of the levers of power 
in Syria and Jadid was arrested and imprisoned.  Assad enjoyed the backing of the key units in 
Syria’s military, which by then had Alawites loyal to him in most of the key 
positions.”(Goldsmith, 2015, p. 80)77  The more pragmatic Assad was now in control of both 
the Ba’th Party and the Army. 
 
77 For this period of Syria’s history, and reflection of the sectarian issues within the Syrian military, see: 
(Dam, 2013, pp. 15-47); (Goldsmith, 2015, pp. 45-80); (Kerr, 2015) 
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As far as the Ulama were concerned, the political uncertainty of the period, meant that during 
the 1960s, most of the most influential founders of the Faculty of Shari’a went into exile, 
leaving it exposed to the influence of more traditional clerics, the most famous of whom was 
Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti (1929-2013), who was “a staunch critic of the Muslim Brothers” (Pierret, 
2013, p. 38),(Christmann, 1998).  Nevertheless, members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
continued to teach at the University throughout the 1970s – a period that saw a significant 
growth in the development of private religious institutions founded by local sheikhs and 
largely untouched by the authorities. Such was the lack of interest by the Ba’ath Party in State-
run religious institutions, that Islamic seminaries were not included when private schools were 
nationalised in 1967 (Pierret, 2013, p. 43).  Throughout the 1960s,  there was an “increasingly 
clear separation between the religious and the secular” (Pierret, 2013, p. 63).  Tensions within 
the Muslim Brotherhood between those who sought violent confrontation to attain power and 
those who did not wish for violence, eventually led to a split in the organisation.  And tensions 
between the Ikhwan of Aleppo, and the Sufi community who had a significant influence in the 
city also increased (Lefevre, 2013, p. 88). 
Hafez al-Assad took power in November 1970, in a move that saw the ascendancy of the 
Alawite community for the first time in their history.  Goldsmith writes that during the period 
of Hafez al-Assad’s rule, the Alawite community became “increasingly obscured”, partly due to 
the fact that Hafez, for very pragmatic reasons: discouraged sectarian discourse in the country, 
and was aware that the international community were scrutinising developments (Goldsmith, 
2015, p. 82).  Recognising the need for the support of all communities in Syria, Assad 
incorporated non-Alawites into the power structure.   He also appointed many Alawites into 
senior government, military and security roles, and drafted a new constitution in 1973 
removing the requirement that the President must be a Muslim. Given that some Sunnis still 
regarded Alawites as not truly ‘Muslims’, some non-Alawites claimed this new constitution, 
though secular by intention, was based on a sectarian agenda.  It is recognised however that 
Assad’s intentions could not be defined simply as sectarian.  He genuinely supported a secular 
ideology, but needed sectarian particularity in order to maintain power.  In an interview with 
Leon Goldsmith in 2011, Alawite Sheikh Nasir Eskiocak said:  
When Hafez al-Assad took the power, Syria was held stable by him for thirty years.  He 
was taking care of Syria and its rights.  On one hand he ruled in a very dictatorial way 
but faith; he had dictatorial power, but fair and with justice…..Hafiz al-Assad….didn’t 





him that they replaced him with his son Bashar al-Assad.  He was a conciliatory ruler 
who helped conciliate… with righteousness and equality (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 87). 
 
The secular basis of the Syrian Constitution in a country so communally and religiously diverse 
as Syria raises a serious question over what gives any person or group of people the ‘right to 
rule’?  Does a communal majority automatically have that ‘right’?  And is such a ‘right’ 
questionable if the ideological or religious principles adopted by or imposed by that majority, 
become detrimental to the freedom and well-being of ‘minority’ communities?  Many Syrians 
have continued to hold that until the conflict began in 2011, the governments of both Hafez 
and Bashar Al-Assad held the social and religious ‘balance’ and freedoms of Syrian society, as 
long as they did not “prejudice public order”, in a way that was exemplary in the region.78    
Notwithstanding this, President Assad’s promotion of family members to senior positions in 
powerful departments of government, and corruption in government departments, became a 
source of discontent for many Syrians.  In a later echo of some of Hafez’s policies, during the 
years leading up to the Syrian conflict that started in 2011, it was corruption amongst the elite 
and in the government, the abuse of power particularly in the security apparatus, and the 
perceived neglect of the rural poor that were the main sources of complaint amongst the 
population. 
By the early 1970s, the rise of a militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the ‘Fighting 
Vanguard’, led to stronger political repression of the group, including the arrest in 1973 of 
Marwan Hadid, the leader of its militant faction.  However, the massacre of 83 Alawite cadets 
at a Military Academy in Aleppo in June 1979, led to even tighter government control and 
suppression.    In 1980, Hafez al-Assad narrowly escaped an assassination attempt.  In 
retaliation, a massacre was ordered in the prison at Palmyra, where many of the militant 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters were being held.  This massacre which reportedly killed 
several hundred prisoners, is an indication of the level of hatred that already existed and 
continues to exist, between the Alawite community and the Muslim Brotherhood.  This also 
set the scene for the events of February 1982, when, following an Islamist uprising in Hama, 
one of the primary strongholds of the ‘Fighting Vanguard’, the Syrian government besieged the 
city and put down the uprising in a brutal battle and siege.  The numbers of those killed is 
 
78 The constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic that was passed in 2012 guaranteed religious freedom in 
Article 3 and Article 33 as follows: “The State shall respect all religions, and ensure the freedom to 
perform all the rituals that do not prejudice public order; The personal status of religious communities 
shall be respected and protected.” 
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disputed.  One thousand Syrian soldiers were killed. Estimates for militants and civilians killed 
range from 1000,79 to a probably hugely exaggerated figure of 40,000.80   This event does 
however remain seared in the consciousness of Syrians, particularly those who supported 
either wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Following this defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
many were imprisoned and executed, and many fled the country.  Some of these were to 
become leading exiles who have consistently urged western governments to overthrow the 
Syrian Government, both under Hafez al-Assad, and his son, Bashar al-Assad.  Though the 
political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood had originally taught a modern interpretation of 
political Islam, that aimed to respect and promote democratic principles, the Islamic 
movement’s firmly sectarian tone divided the movement and led to a level of violence that 
further nurtured its radicalisation. 81 
Throughout these years, international events, global economic interests, and religious 
displacements have played a significant role in moulding the political, communal and economic 
developments in the country.  External influences that were destabilising the State of Syria and 
enhancing sectarian tensions include: the 1967 Six Day War with Israel when the Golan Heights 
were occupied; the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990); the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (1982); the 
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988); the legacy of the Cold War geopolitical ambitions of the ‘Super-
powers’; the Gulf War (1990-1991), and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003.82  It is well known that 
some of the ‘Fighting Vanguard’ travelled to join Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan “where their skills 
and networks were enhanced and their ideology strengthened” (Pierret, 2013, p. 141).  Syria 
had a tense relationship with Iraq, which remained, prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein, a 
steady provider of funds and arms to Syrian militants.  Thus, during the Iran-Iraq war, Syria 
improved relations with Iran, an alliance that has remained strong and influential.  
 Russia has also played an important role as an ally with Syria, with major strategic and 
economic interests.  Russia’s only naval base on the Mediterranean is at Tartous, and she has 
access to the oil and gas fields and pipelines. But Russia has also taken a sophisticated 
approach to Christian-Muslim relations.  Russia has not only sought to counter militant 
Islamism, which has been a growing threat within her own borders, but has linked the Eastern 
 
79 Syria. Bloody Challenge to Assad. Time. 8 March 1982 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921108,00.html  (Accessed: 6 March 2017) 
80 Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2005 
81 For a study of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, see: (Lefevre, 2013) And for the wider background to 
the Muslim Brotherhood: (Wickham, 2013). 
82 The geopolitical ambitions of the global powers in the region go back to the 19th century, with 
constant competition between the European States and Russia for political and economic influence.  
Some of this is told in (Fisk, 2006).   See also: (Davidson, 2016) 
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Christian presence and role in Antioch to that of Christianity in Russia and positioned herself as 
a saviour of the Christian presence in the Middle East.83  This is notably in contrast to the U.S. 
and European alliance whose policies have favoured the Islamists opposing the Syrian 
Government.  This strategic positioning represents a major re-framing of the political, cultural 
and religious geopolitics of the region.   
2.5 Recent developments in Sunni Islam in Syria. 
 
In 2015, a report, under the co-ordination of Lebanese scholar Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zeid, 
was produced that sought to “shed light on the role of Sunni Muslim religious discourse in the 
Syrian crisis … and how to assess this discourse and turn it into a tool to end violence and build 
peace”.   Produced with support from Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Germany, the report, 
entitled ‘From the heart of the Syrian Crisis’ was published by the Adyan Foundation in Beirut.  
The report explores the history of Sunni theological interpretations of Jihad; assesses how 
these have influenced the Jihadist conflict in Syria; and offers a new model of how Jihad can be 
interpreted in a non-violent way.  It 
 “attempts to point the way towards an alternative religious discourse that builds for a 
post war era, so that religious discourse might become a tool to build, reform and 
protect, not a toll to provoke and mobilize for war and conflict……..so that religious 
discourse might be part of the solution and not the problem.”84   
 
Given its intention and origin, revealing some of the ideology behind the militant opposition in 
Syria, the report is worth considering in some depth. 
Amongst the examples cited is the influential thinking of Abu Musab al-Suri (b. 1958).   Al-Suri 
is “an Islamic preacher, Mujahid, writer and lecturer.”85  Born in Aleppo, he joined the ‘Fighting 
Vanguard’, and was a follower of the militant thought of Marwan Hadid.  He was in the higher 
military command of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ during the conflict in Hama, and was a 
member of Al-Qaeda.   Al-Suri’s reputation was enhanced by the publication of his book The 
Global Islamic Resistance Call (Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-‘alamiyyah) which 
seeks to provide an intellectual and political basis for bringing together multiple Jihadist 
factions globally into a unified force.  
 
83 For a report on Russia’s role, see: (Centre for Mediterranean, 2019) Russia in the Middle East. The 
Russian Bear in Mind.  
84 Back page of the report: (Zeid, 2015) From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. 
85 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. P.25-27 
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Al-Suri provides a critique of why Jihadism has not been widely accepted in Syria.  He even 
acknowledges: “It is known that those who are committed to their religion in this nation, as 
well as its scholars, revival circles and religiously committed individuals do not follow the Salafi 
trend in their majority.”86   The weaknesses Jihadis exhibit that Abu Musab Al-Suri identifies 
include: a general lack of knowledge; the low educational, behavioural and moral levels 
manifested by young men who embark on jihad; ignorance at all levels of knowledge, 
particularly in political, security and scholarly realities; the promotion of exaggeration and 
extremism as “trademarks” of religiosity; the absence of constructive self-criticism; “the 
prevalence of ‘each Mujahid for his own’, “ without guidance or constraints; and the inability 
to build their own project.87   These characteristics have been frequently alluded to in 
conversations that I have had with Syrian politicians from different parties, and with Syrian 
soldiers, who show no fear of the jihadists they are fighting, for many of these reasons. 
The Adyan Foundation notes the writings of Dr. Muhammad Al-Habash. (b. 1962).  Married to 
the granddaughter of renowned Sufi Scholar and former Grand Mufti, Dr. Kuftaru, Dr. Habash 
was deeply influenced by Sufi thinking (Pierret, 2013, p. 130).  He has degrees from Damascus, 
Beirut, and Khartoum Universities, and is author of more than 50 books in the fields of Islamic 
culture and dialogue of civilizations. He recognises pluralism as a key feature of Islamic life, and 
his argument “for an Islamic rejection of what he calls the ‘monopoly of salvation’” caused 
considerable debate in Syria (P. Heck, 2004, p. 185).  In 2003, he was elected as an 
independent member of the Syrian Parliament, and was a supporter of the Syrian 
Government.  But following his severe criticism of the Syrian Government after 2011, and his 
support of the demonstrations, he left Syria in 2012, and is currently associate professor of 
religious studies at Abu Dhabi University and an adviser to the Doha International Centre for 
Interfaith Dialogue.   
Habash’s contribution is his understanding of the origins of extremism and ISIS.  He does not 
accept the view that it is purely an externally created phenomenon.  But rather he writes that 
“ISIS is the last step in a chain of inevitably ascending dialectics emanating from the acts of 
oppression that the people suffered under their tyrannical regimes, and mixed with the eager 
wishes longing for a just world which we portrayed in our desperate religious discourse under 
the title of the caliphate.”88   Al-Habash acknowledges that the characteristic of Syrian Islam is 
 
86 Abdul-Hakim, Omar (Abu Musab Al-Suri), Da’wat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyyah Al-‘Alamiyyah. P.610-
611   Cited in From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. P.37 
87 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis.  P.39 
88 Quoted in: From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. Pp 46-49 
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not one naturally inclined to extremism.   In a speech at the UPF Interfaith Consultation on the 
Crisis in Syria, held in Amman, Jordan from 11-13 October, 2013, and published in the journal, 
Dialogue and Alliance, Vol 27, No 2, 2013, he states:  
Almost all Syrians are moderates and centrists; they do not support the war and 
destruction but instead seek reconciliation and coexistence. I would say that the 
majority in Syria is a silent majority that has nothing to do with this war and is not a 
party in this conflict. 
The extremists of the regime and the opposition pose a real threat to the life of all 
Syrians. What is needed is a unified position to outlaw violence in all its forms and to 
invite everyone to lay down their arms and engage in the dialogue of reason and 
logic…. 
We call for the departure of all strangers who entered Syria to participate in the war, 
especially when they increased the pains and suffering of the people; the people have 
tasted the greatest scourge and harm from the actions of these groups.89 
 
The Adyan Foundation report suggests that the most important point to note from Dr. 
Habash’s contributions Is his admittance “that religious discourse is responsible for today’s 
violent reality, without exempting the other factors of their responsibilities,” and that “such an 
admission calls for a serious and radical revision of the Islamic religious discourse, as well as its 
methods, connotations, and the messages it contains, if we are to restore this discourse to the 
authentic values of Islam, including freedom, justice, dignity and humanity.”90 
After surveying some key thinkers in Sunni Syrian Islamic thought, the report concludes that, 
notwithstanding the generally moderate nature of Levantine Islam, Jihadi culture and the 
exclusive culture found in the most extreme fatwas against non-Muslims and “dissenting 
Muslims”, is “a culture that is inherent in the Syrian awareness.” One of the consequences of 
this, the report concludes, is the rivalry that will exist as a result of any revolution, evidenced 
from the 1980s onwards, and especially during the Syrian conflict.  
These findings admit the presence of radicalised thinking embedded within Syrian society since 
the end of the Ottoman Empire, a fact alluded to and feared by a number of Christians and 
Muslims with whom I have spoken in Syria.  Those involved in creating the report admit that 
Jihadi culture represents a threat to Syrian youth and to the plural culture of Syrian society; 
that an emphasis on a violent interpretation of Jihad has “marred the concept of Jihad and the 
image of Islam, not to mention as well as spilling innocent blood and destroying the country’s 
 
89 http://www.upf.org/resources/speeches-and-articles/5718-ma-al-habash-the-crisis-in-syria 
90 From the heart of the Syrian crisis. p.49 
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infrastructure”.  They therefore urge that the concept of Jihad follows the lines of “intellectual, 
jurisprudential and doctrinal approaches” that do not advocate violence and exclusion.91 
These conclusions show that the fear expressed by both Christian and Muslim Syrians of 
Islamic fundamentalism and extremism as practised by Islamist forces in the country is 
understandable and justifiable. As Thomas Pierret writes: “Despite the very sensitive character 
of such a claim in Ba’athist Syria, political reformists do not hide the fact that they are 
indebted to the Muslim Brothers” (Pierret, 2013, p. 138). That is why there remains profound 
suspicion amongst many members of religious minorities - and Sunnis - who value and wish to 
preserve the plurality and diversity of Syrian society, of those who have sympathies or 
associations with the Muslim Brotherhood.  
2.6 Interpreting Jihad. 
 
In trying to address this concern the Adyan Foundation report proposes an alternative 
understanding of Jihad, as suggested by by Jawdat Sa’id (b.1931).  On the basis that “it goes 
without saying that Syria enjoys a confessional, sectarian, nationalistic and intellectual 
diversity, which renders it impossible that its environment is one solely of a violent Jihadi 
religious environment, as some might think,” Jawdat Sa’id seeks to eliminate violence from 
Islamic communities.  In fact, he has been called “the Gandhi of the Arab world”.92 
Jawdat Sa’id is a Syrian intellectual born in the Syrian Golan.93  He completed his secondary 
education in Egypt, where he was influenced by the Pakistani thinker, Muhammad Iqbal, and 
the Algerian thinker, Malik Bennabi.  His works are dedicated to the theme of non-violence.   
Having witnessed the violence in both Egypt and Syria in the 1950s and 1960s, he writes:  
The disease of violence is not restricted to the youth only, although they are the ones 
more susceptible to carry it.  The entire world is inflicted with this germ:  the left-wing 
and right-wing alike, and even the hidden corners of Sufism harbour the genes that 
carry these cultural legacies …we carry the germ of the failed son of Adam whose 




91 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis.  pp 50-52 
92 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis.  p.55 
93 For further comment on Jawdat Sa’id, see: Pierret, T. (2013) Religion and State in Syria. 133-134 
94 Sa’id, Jawdat, (1993) Math’hab Ibn Adam Al-Awwal: Mushkilat A-‘Unf Fil ‘Ilm Al-Islamiy, Dar Al-Fikr. 5th 
edition, Damascus. P.236   Quoted in From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. pp56-57 
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Jawdat Sa’id affirmed that violence and regime change have only exacerbated problems in 
society, and “forced the Islamic world into vicious circles of violence,”95 and advocated that the 
Muslim world should learn from European civilisation that at least sought to establish legal and 
political systems that respected the rights and equality of all.  He believes that good 
governance cannot be achieved under compulsion.  Rather, it is achieved by following a 
peaceful example.  Non-violence, he maintains, is a means of achieving change.  He outlines 
the characteristics of non-violence as: 
1. Not getting involved in acts of killing. 
2.  Not imposing any opinion by force. 
3.  Willingly bearing pain for the said principles and not inflicting pain for them. 
4.  Dedicating oneself to the cause and directing and guiding others in that cause. 
5. Making people understand what holding on to principles means. 
He then identifies the traits that characterize the methodology of non-violence as: 
1. Creating a favourable atmosphere for understanding, thinking and exchanging advice. 
2. Individuals making the effort to be an example in this respect. 
3. Ensuring that this effort entails good, so that it is reflected on everyone. 
4. Ensuring clarity, honesty, and transparency and a strong foundation. 
5. Eliminating fear from imprisonment, ordeals and misery 
6. Stripping one’s opponents of the arguments and pretexts they use to persecute 
peacemakers. 
7. Identifying righteous models to join the ranks of the just. 
8. Awakening the spirit of Ijtihad and renewal, and avoiding conventional imitation and 
dependency.96 
 
Jawdat Sa’id then proceeds to provide textual proofs for his proposal from the Qur’an and the 
Hadith, and rational proofs from the evidence of history.  From these he suggests that 
misinterpretation of the real meaning of Jihad has “infected the Muslim mind” and caused 
considerable harm to Islam.97  What is needed Is a change in the culture of Islam to one “that 
rejects violence and adopts positive, peaceful methods for change.”  He continues: “Our 
situation will not change unless we change our own conditions….thus, brotherhood, 
cooperation and happiness will take the place of pain, blood and war.”98 
A difficulty with this positive interpretation is that this is not how jihad has been understood 
by many of the militant groups who have sought to change the status quo in Syria, or how it 
 
95 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis.  p.57 
96 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis   p.60   Summarised from: Sa’id ,Jawdat (1993) Math’hab Ibn Adam 
Al-Awwal: Mushkilat A-‘Unf Fil ‘Ilm Al-Islamiy, Dar Al-Fikr. 5th edition, Damascus.pp 93-94 
97 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. p.64 
98 Sa’id ,Jawdat (1993) Math’hab Ibn Adam Al-Awwal: Mushkilat A-‘Unf Fil ‘Ilm Al-Islamiy, Dar Al-Fikr. 5th 
edition, Damascus.p.95.  Quoted in From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. p.64 
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has been experienced by non-Muslim communities in Syria during or before the conflict.  
Although the term literally means ‘struggling’ or ‘striving’ for good over evil, which can be both 
a spiritual and a physical struggle,  Jihad has come to be associated, both in the west and in the 
east with “aggression and struggle for a religious cause” (Siddiqui, 2007, p. 85).    The Qur’an 
uses the term in a variety of meanings.  They range from warfare (Q 4:90; 25:52; 9:41) to 
contemplative spiritual struggle (Q 22:78; 29:6)(Esack, 1997, pp. 106-107).  For many Muslims, 
Jihad has been understood as a spiritual battle between right and wrong lived out in one’s 
daily life.  This is sometimes called the ‘greater’ jihad - the struggle of a believer to fulfil his or 
her religious duties.  Whereas the jihad of the Sword – the physical struggle against the 
enemies of Islam, was reportedly spoken of by Mohammad as the ‘lesser’ jihad.  It is fair to 
suggest that the majority of Muslims in Syria prefer the moderate Islam that coexists alongside 
other communities.  Nevertheless, it is the latter understanding of jihad that has taken more 
prominence in the ideology of Wahhabism and the militant Salafist  tendency.  And this has 
caused real fear amongst many Syrians about the influence of militant interpretations of Jihad. 
Siddiqui writes: “Mostly, the Qur’an places emphasis on peace and avoidance of any 
transgression, ‘If your enemy inclines towards peace, then you also incline towards peace and 
trust in God (Q8:61).  However, the Qur’an also contains verses which urge the believer to kill 
the enemies of Islam in self-defence”(Siddiqui, 2007, p. 85) (eg Q 2: 191-193; 9:5).  We cannot 
avoid some of the harsh and exclusivist Suras in the Qur’an.  Indeed, there are over a hundred 
verses that speak of war with non-believers, and these have often been emphasised by 
Islamist scholars who have wanted to return to a ‘purist’ understanding of the Qur’an.  It is 
therefore clear that how scholars interpret scripture today is one of the great contemporary 
challenges for Islam and communal stability.  And whilst many in Syria say that the conflict is 
not a religious or a sectarian one, there is no doubt that religious and sectarian identities, and 
a more aggressive interpretation of Jihad adopted by militant groups fighting against the 
Syrian Government, have played a major role in moulding inter-communal attitudes.   
The Adyan foundation report goes on to outline the religious, political, social and economic 
challenges that will face Syria at the end of the war.   These include the cost of reconstruction, 
the scale of humanitarian need including provision for orphans and widows, the treating of the 
injured, and the healing of sectarian tensions, and asserts that “the Jihadists are unable to 
confront any of the aforementioned challenges.”99 The report therefore proposes that there 
should be a serious and far-reaching religious discourse, that shifts from one in which religion 
 
99 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis.  p.87 
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is used “to legitimize and sell the culture of violence, war and fighting,” to a discourse that 
“lays the foundations of a culture of peace and construction.”100  It concludes that Islam needs 
to recover its ancient traditions: 
..to repay evil with good; to spread the value of doing good; not to hold anyone 
responsible for a sin they did not commit; to show justice and equity, even with 
violators; and to be gentle and soft in overcoming crises and adversity.101 
 
I have spent time on this report because it represents a comparatively recent attempt (2015) 
to address some of the purportedly religious principles held by members of the militant 
opposition in the Syrian conflict.  It is an attempt to recover what many regard as the true 
nature of Syrian Islam, that has been for the most part, notwithstanding elements of 
governance previously discussed, an Islam of tolerance, respect, and coexistence.  Evidence 
and experience from within areas controlled by those groups help discern whether or not 
those principles have prevailed.  
2.7 Preserving pluralism 
 
The preference for a pluralistic understanding in Syrian society is well illustrated by the current 
Grand Mufti Dr. Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun, who succeeded Dr. Ahmed Kuftaro as Grand Mufti 
in 2005.  Dr. Hassoun is Sunni by identity and comes from Aleppo.  He has been deeply 
influenced by Sufi philosophy, and is a passionate advocate for inter-religious dialogue and 
understanding, and the protection of religious minorities within Syria.  On January 15, 2008, he 
spoke to the European Parliament in Germany, saying: "I am Sunni in practice, Shiite in 
allegiance. My roots are Salafi, and my purity is Sufi.“  Dr. Hassoun very much encourages the 
preservation of safe religious space for all communities. 
It has been a privilege to meet with Dr. Hassoun on many occasions.  He always speaks of the 
importance of the Christian presence as an integral part of the fabric and make-up of Syrian 
society. In fact, his statements on inter-religious matters have drawn much criticism from 
those who hold to a stricter interpretation of Islam. During a meeting in September 2016, he 
said:  
If the Prophet asked me to abandon Jesus, I wouldn’t have followed Mohammad. God 
is in my heart. People are more important than any Temple.  Religion should never be 
a cover for politics.  All human beings are brothers. We are all related in God.  If there 
is a God, we will be asked one question on the day of judgement: ‘Did you love 
 
100 From the heart of the Syrian Crisis. p.87 
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another?’  So religion must be the bridge that connects us.  Let us meet in mosques 
and churches and synagogues.  Let’s give our children flowers of love, not seeds of 
hatred, or they will ask us: ‘Why didn’t you teach us how to love so that our flowers 
will be your perfume?’  
 
In 2012, Dr. Hassoun’s son was assassinated.  At his son’s funeral, and on national television he 
forgave his son’s killers and invited them to put down their weapons and come and talk.  The 
reply he received was that they would kill him.  He said when reflecting on this: “I am Abel, not 
Cain.  I won’t carry weapons.  If they want to kill me.  So be it.”102  Dr. Hassoun is one of the 
most significant figures in Syrian Islam.  He regularly engages with Christian leaders and is 
loved and respected by many.  He is also hated by Islamists for his pluralist views and the fact 
that, like all Grand Muftis in the Arab world, he is an appointee of the Government.103   
In November 2017 a significant practical initiative to provide frameworks for teaching Islam 
that challenge ‘takfiri’ ideology was implemented by the Syrian Ministry of Awqaf, when it 
produced three volumes for use in every mosque in.104  Rooted in the principle that “the pulpit 
is a public site that has inviolability, rules and origins,” the Awqaf produced these volumes in 
the hope that the mosques may be “a beacon of science, ethics, values, education, and an 
oasis of tranquillity”, and the Friday sermon a means of “scientific, moral, social and economic 
renaissance.”105  This development will be seen by some as an authoritarian means of 
controlling the mosques, and it is true that the Introduction includes an intention to 
“strengthen the belonging to the homeland”.106  But this is a constructive response to the 
challenge of Islamist ideology, and an attempt to moderate the teaching of preachers who 
have increasingly been educated in the Wahhabi traditions in recent years.107 
 
102 Quoted during a meeting with Dr. Hassoun in Damascus in September 2016. 
103 The Grand Mufti has been accused of “threatening to send suicide bombers to the West”.  This 
follows a mistranslated speech that he gave in Arabic in 2011.  Dr. Hassoun clarified his position in Der 
Spiegel magazine in November 2011.  He said: “I didn’t threaten to send suicide bombers. I merely 
described a scenario in which it could easily emerge from the situation, and I warned against what could 
happen.  Sentences were taken out of context and given a different colouring.” 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-syrian-grand-mufti-assad-could-step-down-
after-free-elections-a-796363-2.html  
The following link contains the transcript of an interview with Dr. Hassoun, by Eva Bartlett on 2 October, 
2018: https://www.mintpressnews.com/interview-grand-mufti-ahmad-badr-al-din-hassoun-
syria/252590/   In it, Dr. Hassoun addresses criticisms made in the international media. 
104 See Appendix 3 for a detailed description. 
105 Introduction to “The General Approach of the Friday Sermons of the Syrian Arab Republic.” Ministry 
of Awqaf. 6 
106 Introduction. The General Approach.. p.7 
107 For a more detailed analysis of these documents, see Appendix 3.  
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Throughout the Arab world, the Ministries of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) are government 
ministries responsible for the endowments and affairs of the mosques.  This includes a degree 
of State control over Muslim religious affairs, and Syria is not unique in this.  Nevertheless, in 
the 1960s, the Syrian government had “displayed a striking lack of interest in the development 
of the religious bureaucracy”, thus creating a situation of indirect rule where there was no 
“centre”, and “no ‘peripheral ulama’ either, but only clerical factions with varying degrees of 
proximity to the State” (Pierret, 2013, pp. 19-20).  In 2009, Pierret wrote: “The Syrian regime 
never possessed sufficient means and religious legitimacy to set up the institutional tools that 
would have enabled it to produce a Sunni clergy that was sympathetic to the Ba’th Party’s 
ideological orientation” (Pierret, 2009, p. 82).  And so its “preferred strategy for managing the 
Sunni elite has been the co-optation of personalities who have a genuine social base” (Pierret, 
2009, p. 74).  This changed in 2008 in Syria, with an emphasis on institution building, reducing 
the influence of the religious elite and of Islamic tendencies in social sectors.  In order to 
preserve secularism, “prayer rooms in shopping-malls were closed, the myriad religious 
symbols displayed on cars were prohibited in order to curb the expression of sectarian 
identities…….wearing of the niqab was banned in universities….and women-only parks were 
reopened to men.” (Pierret, 2013, pp. 214-215).  This - and the tensions between the State and 
the Ulama that accompanied it - was the situation when the ‘Arab Spring’ erupted in 2010.    
There is no doubt that the Ministry of Awqaf, like its’ sister ministries in the Arab world, wields 
significant control on religious matters.  And the level of control is likely to continue in a post-
conflict situation that has seen so much sectarian violence.  Speaking in April 2018, the Syrian 
Minister of Religious Affairs said:  “Everywhere we work in partnership with mosques and 
churches to put an end to extremism.  In mosques, we want to explore the Qur’an in a modern 
way.  We are learning how to fight terrorism with moderate Islam.  Syria is a place where 
moderate Islam lives.  The takfiris are being defeated because the religious culture here is not 
one of extremism, but is rooted in moderate Islam.”108   
However the Ministry’s publications or the Ministry itself may be viewed, the battle against 
radicalised Islam is one that we all share, and the desire to challenge it is one that deserves 
encouragement.  In these publications, the Syrian Government is seeking, on its own terms - 
just as the Islamists seek to do on theirs -  to establish new discourses in which the plurality of 
Islam can be included whilst radicalised ideological discourses are excluded. The structures in 
 




place to do this in Syria are not ours to change, but as people of faith facing similar doctrinal 
and religious challenges, we can learn from the context, and perhaps offer to bring academic 
and practical expertise to the process. 




That religious identity has played a role within the conflict in Syria cannot be denied.  If we 
were to ignore the complex mosaic of religious identities in Syria in reflecting upon the 
conflict, we would be understating the capacity for religious identity to shape society, 
particularly one so diverse as Syria.  However, by the same token, if we overstate the role of 
religion in the conflict, we obscure the multiple social, political, economic, environmental and 
historic causal dynamics, both internal and external, that have shaped the path of the conflict 
since its inception.109 
This chapter has outlined the complex diversity of the ‘Muslim mosaic’ in Syria, and 
acknowledged and examined the long-standing presence and influence of salafi and wahhabi 
influences in some sectors of the Muslim community in Syria. The development of political 
Islam in recent decades has had a huge impact on Syria’s civil, religious and political landscape.  
Recent theological reflection within Sunni Islam as illustrated by the Abu Zeid study, has sought 
to address those elements of salafi and wahabbi interpretation that have led to violence.   
The publications produced by the Syrian Ministry of Awqaf (See Appendix 3), also show that an 
attempt is being made by the Syrian Government, within a complex Islamic landscape, to 
create a new Islamic discourse for the future on their own terms, that can include plurality in 
Islam whilst excluding radicalised religious ideological discourse.  
Given the sectarian expression of some of the violence that Syria has experienced, and the fact 
that the religiously plural society within Syria has nevertheless survived, it is to be hoped that 
such reflection can re-frame the ‘space’ within sunni thought in which the principles of 
coexistence, tolerance and mutual respect in a broad religious landscape can be re-
established.   
 
109 See: Lakitsch, M. (2018) Islam in Syria. Spotting the various dimensions of Religion in Conflict. 
https://www.academia.edu/37188821/Islam_in_the_Syrian_War_Spotting_the_Various_Dimensions_of




Study on how Islam responds to modern society and pluralism is essential to the future 
stability of intra-Islamic and inter-religious dynamics. 
Amongst the issues to be examined further is the relationship between Islam and modern 
Statehood and  how it might in the future hold religious and cultural diversity in a dialogical 
relationship without domination.  With its greater flexibility in theological discourse, 
Christianity is more able to hold complexity and diversity in positive tension, and this is a major 
contribution eastern Christianity can make to the plural communities of the modern Arab 
States with a Muslim majority.   
Notwithstanding the political complexities and multiple layers that exist within Syrian society, 
it can clearly be suggested that Syria’s social and religious make-up continues to provide the 
‘architecture’ for sustaining religious and social multiplicity and plurality.  However, the 
stability and protection of this multiplicity can only be ensured if all communities continue to 
be protected within the political framework of society, a framework that, secure within a 
secular constitution, will need to be re-imagined and re-structured to accommodate the 
religious and social demographic changes in post-conflict Syria. 
Before we examine contemporary Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, it will be informative to 
consider the cultural contexts, hierarchical structures, leadership roles and the extent to which 








This chapter considers the status of the Christian presence within the Arab world, and how 
‘being Christian’ is ‘modelled’ in a Muslim-majority society.  It examines the role that religious 
leadership has played in preserving the stability of this complex cultural and religious 
landscape of sometimes competing identities.  Finally, the chapter considers the extent to 
which ‘sectarianism’ plays a role in Syrian society.  
 
Christians are involved at all levels of Middle Eastern society (McCallum, 2012a, p. 3). This 
brings benefits, risks and vulnerability when State policies or actions diverge from religious 
principles.  Throughout the region, when States have failed to deliver economic development, 
political participation, or basic security, religious leaders have often been able to exercise a 
significant political role within their society (McCallum, 2007, p. 923),(James A Reilly, 2019, p. 
180).  Following both Arab tradition and through the Ottoman ‘millet’ system, the heads of the 
Churches continue to possess and wield considerable spiritual and temporal authority, both 
within and on behalf of their own communities, and are able to access and influence the 
political leadership of nations. This can have both positive and negative implications, especially 
as regards democratic processes both within the Church and their constituents’ political 
engagement beyond it.   
 
However, being able to exercise influence within authoritarian political systems is seen as an 
advantage for Christian communities, for it can offer security and status to faith minorities. 
This often encourages Christian leaders to engage with authoritarian States (McCallum, 2012b, 
p. 110).  It does not imply uncritical support by Christian leaders for all the policies of particular 
governments.  Rather, it enables Christian communities to be a force for good and a balance 
within society.   There can also be benefits for both State and religious institutions in their 
support of each other, especially when alternative forces threaten the social, religious, political 
and economic stability of a nation, as could be argued, has been the case in Syria.  In some 
contexts, through strategies of engagement and disengagement, the Church has been a real 
104 
 
force for change in oppressive contexts, as was the case in South America, Palestine, South 
Africa.110   
 
By contrast, Islam does not have a hierarchical structure in the way that Christianity does.   
Gathered around the umma – the community of Muslims – and without influential institutions 
such as the Vatican or the Anglican Communion, Muslims “align themselves with one of the 
main legal schools and follow the teachings of particular individuals”.  The hierarchical system 
created in Islam, and practised by Muslim countries throughout the region is for the State to 
appoint a Grand Mufti, and several mufti of cities “to supervise the quality of the imams 
(mosque leaders) under them”.  Well aware that Islam can be used as a tool for mobilising 
populations, governments often implement Islamisation policies, and fund religious 
establishments, to counteract such a possibility (McCallum, 2012b, p. 111). 
 
At times, the diversity of the Christian Churches in the Middle East has been a burden for 
Christians in the region, and historical doctrinal splits have been difficult to heal.   However, in 
recent years, there have been significant moves towards ecumenical understanding, and these 
have increased, especially in Syria during the years of conflict.  The main issues facing 
Christians in the Middle East are emigration, and political, economic and security concerns.  
These are not unique to Christians, but in Syria since the start of the conflict in 2011, it is 
estimated that over a half of the Christian population has emigrated.  In parts of Syria where 
Christians have lived since the earliest days of the Church, the very presence of Christians is 
threatened.  Yet, the indigenous Church remains deeply relevant within Syria, and the Church 
continues to have a future.  Given the demographic changes in the country because of the war, 
the future may look different, but the presence and influence of the Church will continue to 
play a significant role in Syrian society. 
 
3.2 Exploring the status of the Christian presence in the Arab world. 
 
Fiona McCallum identifies several factors that explain the continued relevance of the Churches 
in the region.  The Churches “provide and maintain the identity of the specific group, and are 
often the only organisations which include all members of the community.”  The “patriarchal 
system of governance…endorses church involvement in political and societal matters, 
 
110 For an excellent study of how Palestinian Christian liberation theologies have challenged the 
hegemony of both Jewish and Christian Zionism, see: (Kuruvilla, 2013) 
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especially through the church figurehead, the patriarch.”  Additionally, “their acceptance of a 
close relationship between Islam and the state has also had a cultural impact on the Christian 
communities”.  By accepting the role of the Islamic State, they become dhimmi (covenanted 
people) and so are allowed freedom of worship, protection by the State, and autonomy in 
religious matters.  Modern Church-State relations in the Middle East are affected both by 
government policies, and by the security that they are afforded.  Thus, the rise of Islamist 
movements which threaten the security of minority groups in the region means that Christians 
will be inclined to support the governments that secure their protection (McCallum, 2012b, pp. 
115-116) (Samir Khalil Samir, 1998).  Although Syria’s Ba’ath Government operates a system of 
secular nationalism which “promotes loyalty to the State over any other identity”, it allows 
‘freedom of personal status’ as far as religious identity is concerned, and a kind of 
reinterpretation of the millet system is in operation.111  Christian communities are run with a 
degree of autonomy as regards Church and social matters, and the Church leaders have regular 
access to State officials and branches of the Government.  State and religious leaders from the 
different faith communities (Christian and Muslim), including the President, will often gather 
to celebrate festive occasions together (McCallum, 2012b, p. 121).112 
 
Speaking of Christian political participation in the region, it is important to recognise that most 
of the issues affecting Christians affect everyone regardless of religious or ethnic identity.  
Arab States have struggled, since their independence, to address the multiple challenges facing 
the region.  Issues of socio-economic inequality, poverty, unemployment, lack of investment in 
education, health and social services, and corruption, all contribute to the challenges faced by 
citizens of those countries (McCallum, 2012a, p. 6). These challenges have been compounded 
by political and religious rivalry, war, and external military and economic intervention, and 
further exacerbated by the population explosion in the region.  Moreover, it is estimated that 
60% of the Arab population are under the age of twenty-five. 
 
McCallum identifies three models of Christian political participation in the Arab world: 
‘Individual participation’; the concept of ‘loyal citizens’; and Institutionalising identity through 
a system of ‘quotas’ (McCallum, 2012a, pp. 8-15).  Individual participation expresses how 
Christians have been deeply involved in Arab political life in the Levant since prior to the 
creation of nation States.  For example, in Syria, a Greek Orthodox schoolteacher, Michel Aflaq, 
 
111 Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic. 2012.  Article 3. 
112 For more detailed analysis see:  (McCallum, 2007)  (McCallum, 2008) (McCallum, 2010)   
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was a co-founder, with a Sunni colleague, Salah al-Din al-Bitar of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist 
Party.  The Ba’ath Party sought an inclusive vision of Arab nationalism, maintaining that 
cultural unity was more important than “religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional 
factionalism”(Dam, 2013, p. 15).  It was built on the principles of “political participation, 
economic development, Arab unity, and the liberation of Palestine”, but unfortunately in time 
became “associated with authoritarianism, corruption, wealth inequality, regional rivalries and 
military failures”(McCallum, 2012a, p. 9).  This contributed to the rise of political Islam and the 
growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country, with devastating consequences.  
Nevertheless, Christian participation within the national institutions, in Parliament and in the 
Cabinet remains, even if it is impossible for a Christian to reach the office of President.  It is 
likely in the Syrian case, that the size of the Christian community in Syria is a strong incentive 
to ensure their participation.  Notably in 2017, the Syrian Parliament elected a Christian, 
Hammoudeh Sabbagh to the role of Speaker.  
 
A second approach sees Christians as ‘loyal citizens’.  Evident where both secular and Muslim 
political and legal systems are in place, Christians are allowed participation on the basis that 
they are ‘loyal’ to the country.  In reality, there may be a fairly low level of representation, and 
not on equal terms.  Egypt is an example of this approach.  For Christians, this “does not 
appear to deliver the conditions required for their full and equal political 
participation”(McCallum, 2012a, p. 12). 
 
The third approach institutionalises the ethnic and religious distinctions within the political 
system, by allowing political participation using quotas according to the make-up of the 
country.  This system seeks to “ensure the representation of groups within society that would 
otherwise be marginalised “either by their low numbers or by their society’s traditions 
(McCallum, 2012a, p. 13). Such a system operates in Jordan, Iraq and the Palestinian 
Territories.    
 
A recent study explores the question of Christian citizenship in Muslim-majority States.  
Published in 2017, ‘Christian Citizenship in the Middle East. Divided Allegiance or Dual 
Belonging?’ considers options facing the Christian communities in the face of conflict, 
oppression and violence (M. Girma, Romocea, C., 2017).  Only one of the contributors, Issa 
Diab, lives in the Middle East, in Lebanon, and entitles his chapter, ‘A Place to Call Home. 
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Middle Eastern Christian Experience on the Intersection of Two Allegiances’.113  Diab praises the 
positive contributions made by Christians in the formation of Arab society, and in the 
‘renaissance’ of Arab culture that took place in the Levant and in Europe.  He suggests this took 
place in three stages. The first is the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries when Christians from 
the Levant studied in Europe, and established the Maronite School in Rome, which in turn 
“built a historic and cultural bridge of cooperation between Europe and the Levant” (Diab, 
2017, p. 95). The second in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the establishment of 
Christian Institutions in the Levant, and the translation of the Bible into Arabic, which “caused 
a spiritual revival in Middle Eastern Christianity” (Diab, 2017, p. 97). Finally, the end of the 
nineteenth century and the twentieth century saw the emergence of Christian thinkers who 
“played a historical role in the revival of Arab heritage and literature” (Diab, 2017, p. 98).  
Additionally, Diab observes that Arab Christians played an influential role throughout the 
twentieth century in Arab Nationalist movements, notably in Palestine, Iraq and Syria. He 
concludes that the importance of Christianity in relation to Islam lies not in numbers, but “in 
the amount of Christian authenticity lived by Christians” (Diab, 2017, p. 101), a sentiment 
expressed by many Christian leaders in the current climate. 
 
‘Christian Citizenship in the Middle East’ offers a helpful biblical analysis on how Christians 
existed as a minority in the early Church, and suggests a contrast between Greek and 
Babylonian models of citizenship that have influenced the societies in which we live.  Looking 
at the author of Daniel, in the Old Testament, Girma suggests that Daniel offers a model of 
‘constructive disruption’ within a society in which his people were persecuted.  Whilst Paul in 
the New Testament presents a model of ‘internal transformation’, in which as citizens of the 
Kingdom of God, we are ‘in the world, but not of the world’.  Girma proposes that as Christians 
we are called to live in a state of ‘critical engagement’ with the world in which we live (M. 
Girma, 2017, pp. 23-41), a proposition with which few Christians would disagree. 
 
In another chapter in the book, and speaking from a Protestant perspective, Najib Awad, a 
Syrian Christian expatriate who lives in the United States, offers a searing critique of ‘the 
fallen-ness of ecclesial prelates’ in the region generally and in Syria particularly, and a 
pessimistic outlook on the future of the Church in the region, which he partly blames on the 
indigenous Christian leadership.  He makes no secret of his bitter opposition to the Syrian 
 
113 Christian Citizenship in the Middle East. P 83-102 
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government, and his resentment of the Christian leaders for their ‘support at all costs of the 
ruling, tyrannical and corrupted regime’ (Najib George Awad, 2017). 
 
Christian leaders in the region have indeed been criticised for supporting authoritarian 
leaderships, and have been perceived to do so to protect the interests of the communities 
under their charge, and to ensure the survival of a secular, rather than sectarian basis to their 
constitutions.114  However, evidence suggests that given the extent of the suffering that their 
people have experienced in Syria, the Christian leaders who have stayed in the country, and 
who have taken a stand against militant Islamists have earned much respect amongst many of 
their people.  Nor have the Christian leaders been silent in the face of concerns about some of 
the policies and actions of their Government.  Christian leaders often meet with Government 
leaders, including the President, and regularly raise matters of concern with them.   Revd 
Harout Selimian, the President of the Armenian Evangelical Church in Syria says: “We support 
the legitimate government, and the secular constitution, but we are also a critical voice.  We 
are the ‘ph’ balance in Syrian society.”115 In this sense, being loyal citizens has enabled 
Christian leaders to be a bridge between the people and the authorities at a time when 
Christian communities have desperately needed pastoral care and physical security, and this 
position strengthens their capacity to play a part in reforming the system.   
 
I have given some attention to this book, ‘Christian Citizenship in the Middle East’, because it 
has been read and promoted in ecclesiastical circles in Britain.  It presents a western 
Protestant perspective, by mostly western contributors, on the issue of Christian citizenship in 
the Middle East, the achievements of the western Church in the Levant, and its engagement 
with the Christians of the East.  It must however be recognised that there has long existed a 
western Protestant ecclesial culture and missional hermeneutic that has been suspicious of 
Eastern Christian culture, and in some expressions has been dismissive of it.  Too often the 
voices of the Eastern Churches have been neglected in the west.   
 
Nor should we forget, or be insensitive to how western churches have at times been perceived 
to be a threat to the ethos, presence and ministry of the Eastern churches in the region.  And 
 
114 For example, on 20 April 2018, the ‘Church Times’ published an article entitled, ‘The Syrian Churches 
are in captivity to Assad’. https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2018/20-april/comment/opinion/the-
syrian-churches-are-in-captivity-to-assad.  I was in Syria at the time and discussed it with several Church 
leaders who were deeply offended by the accusation, and dismissed it as a complete misrepresentation. 
115 Revd Harout Selimian.  Speaking at a Conference on Christian-Muslim Relations, at Kanamai in Kenya 
on 23 May 2018 
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their influence has at times provoked the accusation from Muslim communities that Christians 
are shaped by, and support a western political and religious agenda.  This perception, though 
inaccurate from a political perspective, but not entirely unjustified from a structural and 
theological perspective, presents a real danger to the Christian communities in the region, and 
is one of which western Christians need to be aware.  The Protestant Churches of the east, 
themselves indigenous to the region, face a constant tension between the theological and 
spiritual heritages of the east and west, and the difference in structure between the eastern 
and western churches where western churches tend to be more “congregational and 
democratic in nature”, whilst eastern church structure tends to be more “hierarchical and 
autocratic in nature” (Najib Georg Awad, 2009, p. 288).  In 2018 and 2019, very intentional 
moves to enhance and strengthen ecumenical understanding and co-operation have been 
undertaken through the meetings of the Middle East Council of Churches and heads of 
Churches in the region.    
 
This is one of the key reasons why western theologians and leaders need to listen carefully to 
the experience of Eastern Christians of all denominations as regards Christian-Muslim 
relations.116  Georges Khodr, the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Mount Lebanon, and one of 
Lebanon’s most respected Church and spiritual leaders argues that Eastern Christians “are 
better qualified for dialogue with Muslims than Western Christians” (Hirvonen, 2013, p. 67).  
He cites the long-standing contribution of Eastern Christians to Islamic civilisation, and their 
knowledge and appreciation of Islam having lived alongside Muslims since the emergence of 
Islam in the region. 
 
In Syria, Christians are officially treated as indistinct from other members of Syrian society, but 
in reality, the government ensures that they are represented at all levels of the political 
sphere.  For this reason, like many Muslims who benefit from the secular basis of the 
Constitution, Christians are fearful of the impact that an alternative Islamist regime might have 
on their social and religious freedoms.  This fear has only been exacerbated by the brutality 








3.3 The role and influence of Leadership in the Middle Eastern context 
 
It is often said that, given traditional models of leadership in the Arab world, western-style 
‘democracy’ is not possible in the Middle Eastern context.  These models of leadership are 
deeply embedded within the leadership of Arab religious communities. So if we are to 
understand the nature of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, it is necessary to understand the 
influence that leadership plays in the engagement of each community with the other, and with 
the political authorities in their country.117  
 
Leadership within Arab Society has both cultural and religious elements.  Whilst Christian 
models of leadership have a different theological basis to those of Islam, ancient cultural 
traditions and customs continue to play a major part in determining how Christian 
communities relate to their society and those in authority.  David Grafton writes: “The 
traditional authority of the Arab Shaykh, as an either benevolent or authoritarian leader, is 
embedded deep within Arab culture”(Grafton, 2012, p. 19).  Many Arab Christians, who 
emerge from the same culture as their Muslim compatriots, share the same view of authority 
and leadership.  Thus “democratic tendencies within Arab society manifest themselves very 
differently from Western, and especially American, republican democratic institutions.  It is our 
contention,” writes Grafton, “that political society in the Arab Middle East is a reflection of the 
family, and its leadership is bound up in the cultural reference of the shaykh” (Grafton, 2012, 
p. 20). This has profound implications for the ways in which laity and clergy relate to their 
leaders, and in which Church leaders relate to those in positions of power in a country. 
 
Since earliest times, family and tribe have played a foremost role in Arab society and identity.  
This was as much the case when Arabs received the Christian revelation at Pentecost, as it was 
when Mohammad gifted Islam to the Arab world.  In this context, kinship was the “primary 
social glue” (Watt, 1968, pp. 6-9) that bound extended families, and “in which mutual 
obligations and responsibilities were held in common” (Sudworth, 2013, p. 191).  Since the rise 
of Islam, despite Christian theological challenges to Arab models of leadership, the latter have 
often prevailed, especially amongst eastern Christians, whose liturgy has been in Arabic, Syriac 
or Coptic, and who find their cultural home and identity in the Arab world. 
 
 
117 For studies on sectarianism and religious leadership in the region, see: (Henley, 2015). And other 
articles and chapters by Henley.  
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Notwithstanding the tribal context into which Mohammad was born, Muslims believe that he 
created a new tribe, which was established by the hijra, the migration of Mohammad and his 
followers from Mecca to Yathrib, (later Medina) in the year 622CE. This represented a new 
social structure in which all people held “political equality before God”, and in which God “is 
the only legislator” (Sudworth, 2013, p. 192).  As the new Muslim community settled in 
Medina, divisions arose between the followers of Islam and those of other faiths and who 
retained tribal beliefs.  So it was that distinctions developed between the dar al-Islam (the 
abode of Islam), and the dar al-kufr (the abode of unbelief), and the dar al-harb (the abode of 
war).  As Griffith notes: “not only did Muslims rule, and their Arabic language become the 
medium of public discourse, but also the public space, the cityscape, the landscape, and the 
public institutions all conspired to display the public culture of Islam in its formative period” (S. 
H. Griffith, 2008, p. 14). Early passages within the Qur’an indicate a respect for plurality, 
especially for the Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book).  As Ayoub writes: “Islam saw itself from the 
beginning as yet another expression of the Abrahamic faith and obedient submission (islam) to 
God.  This faith, moreover, was not limited to Abraham; rather, it was the faith of all the 
prophets before and after him, including Moses and Jesus” (Ayoub, 2007, p. 18).118 
 
However, the presence and the challenge of other faith communities, already present before 
Muhammad died, and the tensions they created, led to less accommodating views towards 
Christians and Jews, and the belief in the superiority and uniqueness of Islam as the final 
revelation of God to His people (Shah-Kazemi, 2006).119  It should be noted that Islam as it 
developed, was revealed and formulated in Medina, at a point when Muslims were in the 
majority, and were more critical and assertive in relation to other communities.120  Given that 
no thought was given to the successor to Muhammad, after his death, the “binding force for 
the community of believers”, became the “divinely ordered mandate of the Prophet” (as 
revealed in the Qur’an), and the sole authority of God in all matters (Sudworth, 2013, p. 193).  
 
The first few centuries of Islam were rich in philosophical and theological engagement, 
drawing upon the expertise of Jewish and Christian theologians and philosophers in the fields 
of interpretation and jurisprudence.  This was an age where Qur’anic principles were brought 
to bear in the fields of science, law, Islamic thought and politics.    Alongside this, there 
 
118 See also Q 22:17 
119 See also: (Esack, 1997) (Sachedina, 2001) (Askari, 1985)  




developed a more conservative approach to Islamic thought that followed a strict view of 
Shari’a law as based exclusively on the Qur’an and the Sunna (the sayings of the Prophet).  A 
literalistic return to this kind of Islamic jurisprudence has been at the heart of some of the 
Muslim ’reform’ movements that have developed in the last century in Egypt, Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia, which in turn have had a profound effect on recent Islamic political 
developments.121 
 
In recent decades, scholars have grappled with the interface between Christian and Muslim 
theological, cultural and religious approaches to authority, tradition, and democracy.   Kenneth 
Cragg sought within Islam and through the concepts of Shi’a martyrdom and Sufi mysticism, 
the resources to argue against the ‘will-to-power’ in Islam and the ‘possibility of divine 
restraint’ in relation to the other (Sudworth, 2013, p. 198). For Pope Benedict however, 
Christianity fuses reason and faith, whilst Islam proclaims a God who is absolutely 
transcendent.  Consequently, as Sudworth puts it: “Secular liberalism forces religion into the 
private realm, yet, paradoxically, becomes incapable of countering the very public challenge of 
religious violence that an absolutely transcendent God presents.  If there is no mediation 
between the imperative of divine law, rationality has no place and plural conceptions of the 
good become impossible” (Sudworth, 2013, p. 198). Similarly to Pope Benedict, John Milbank, 
speaking as an Anglican, states that “through its traditional character of reason”, only 
Christianity can provide the genuine platform for respect for plurality and diversity, a view 
commonly held by many Christians within Syria (Milbank, 2009, p. 277).122   
 
However, there is also plurality within Islam, and the history of the faith communities within 
Syria and other parts of the Levant clearly witness to the ability of Islam to reckon with the 
place of minority communities and plurality within society.  Salame argues that the problems 
of instituting democracy in the Middle East lie not in Islamic tradition but in cultural and 
historical contexts (Salame, 1994, p. 64),123  a suggestion often acknowledged by Arabs in the 
region.  Similarly, Egyptian sociologist Halim Barakat cites Arab authoritarianism, Zionism and 
‘western hegemony’ as the primary reasons for the lack of democracy in the Middle East, and 
that authoritarian States have appropriated Islam to justify their positions (Barakat, 1993, p. 
 
121 For an excellent summary of the contributions of key figures in the ‘Islamic Revival’ of the early 20th 
Century, Sayyid Al-Afghani, Muhammed Abduh, Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb etc; see: (A.  
Rahnema, 2005). 
122 See also: (Milbank, 2006) 
123 Quoted in (Grafton, 2012, p. 21) 
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277). So the lack of ‘democracy’ (itself a ‘western’ concept of Greek origin) reflects numerous 
internal cultural, social and religious dynamics and realities, as well as resistance to external 
political pressures.  Barakat agrees that ‘Orientalists and Islamists” alike “agree that religion 
constitutes the most significant force shaping Middle Eastern societies”, but criticises the 
“exclusive emphasis on religious texts and the projected normative order” as providing a 
“static conception” of Muslim society (Barakat, 1993, p. 119).  
 
Clearly, the significance of political thought in Islam and Christianity, the doctrine of God, the 
nature of revelation, and the fallibility of humanity, are key areas of debate, as Islam and 
Christianity consider their relationship within the context of contemporary religious diversity 
and the rise in political and religious fundamentalism.  Equally however, as Grafton argues, 
“Both Christian and Muslim expressions of political structures, economics, gender relations, 
and religious authority originate from the primal social conceptualisation and expression of the 
Arab family system” (Grafton, 2012, p. 22).  This under-studied cultural root of socio-political 
Arab life should, believes Grafton, form the basis of discussion on the role of democracy and 
leadership in the Arab Middle East.  
 
All Arab cultures operate within hierarchical structures, which are structured in a ‘patron-
client’ system. Through a ‘patron’ individuals are able to access services, benefits or people in 
positions of authority – for example the Shaykh or the Patriarch.  These patriarchal systems, in 
which ‘father’ figures wield authority and expect obedience, prevail across the Arab world in 
educational, religious and political institutions (Grafton, 2012, p. 24).    
 
Hisham Sharabi identifies four features of modern Arab political culture.  Firstly, Arabs identify 
with their family, tribe and religious community.  Secondly, these family dynamics are reflected 
within political (and sometimes religious) society.  Thirdly, society functions “in absolutes” as 
regards these family and political relationships.  And fourthly, ceremony, ritual and custom, 
rather than “spontaneity, creativity and innovation” govern society (Sharabi, 1988, p. 61).124  
All of these operate within the context of tribal solidarity – the social construct into which 
Prophet Muhammed was born, and which has deeply influenced the way in which Arab 
societies and institutions – including non-Muslim institutions - have developed. 
 
 
124 Quoted in: (Grafton, 2012, p. 25) 
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Just as under the early days of Islamic rule, local autonomies were respected as long as they 
submitted to Muhammad’s authority, so under the Ottomans, the tribal identities were 
codified.  Communities were recognised on the basis of religious confession, and “each 
community had its own specific communal laws dealing with taxation, marriage and divorce 
and inheritance” (Grafton, 2012, p. 26).   Some, such as the Maronites of Lebanon, or the 
people of Kuwait, were granted sovereign territories.  Others were assimilated into a larger 
State – the Kurds, Druze, Shi’a, as well as Armenians, Greek and Oriental Orthodox, Chaldean 
and Assyrian Christians.  Given that the concept of nationality did not really emerge in the Arab 
world until the nineteenth century, the notion of one’s family balad (Home/place of origin), 
and one’s religious affiliation was deeply rooted and remains so to many Arabs of all faiths.  
Whilst in western democracy, the concept of equal citizenship within nation States under an 
elected authority takes prime place, in Arab societies, the modern leader of the nation has 
become a parallel of the shaykh, who wields authority and respect over tribal flocks who are 
given a new corporate identity under the nation.125  
 
3.4 Religious leadership in Lebanon.  Religion and politics in the Levant. 
 
Lebanon represents an important regional dynamic in sectarian relations and religious political 
engagement.  Syria and Lebanon possess similar pluralities although they operate within 
different State structures.  Lebanon’s Constitution is confessional.  Syria’s is based on secular 
ideology.  The importance of this difference cannot be overstated.  However, the structures 
and roles of religious leadership within the two countries are similar and therefore deserve 
reflection. 
 
Henley describes religious leadership in Lebanon as “inherently ambiguous, combining two 
roles, that of spiritual authority on matters of religious doctrine and behaviour, and that of 
public spokesmen for broader religious communities”(Henley, 2016b, p. 1).126  He goes on to 
suggest that because religious leaders are selected “by elite institutions, not by popular 
mandate”, they are not representative interlocutors for the people.   Despite the fact that they 
are invested in preserving the security and well-being of their communities, and challenge 
sectarian rhetoric, Henley argues that their confessional status sustains sectarian identity, and 
that their involvement in local, national and international politics erodes trust and arouses 
 
125 For a detailed study of the Millet system, see: (Braude, 2014). 
126 See also: (Henley, 2016a) ‘Between sect and State in Lebanon. Religious leaders at the interface.’ 
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suspicions.  All leaders tread a ‘fine line’ between varied responsibilities and representative 
roles.  As Henley writes and as previously intimated, Middle Eastern religious leaders are 
“integrated into, or at least heavily invest in, the modern state order” (Henley, 2016b, p. 15).  
This provides benefits but also leads to vulnerability and the possibility of compromise - a risk 
wherever ‘Church and State’ have a close relationship. 
 
Lebanon was created in 1943 in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Second World War, partly as a place of protection for the Maronite Christian community, who 
formed the majority of the population in the Mount Lebanon region.  The region had been 
perceived by colonial occupiers as comprising a collection of divided and insular communities 
in which religious identity was the primary marker (Henley, 2015; Usama Makdisi, 2000; White, 
2011).  The independence and role of the Maronite Church in the national political structures 
sought to ensure that it could never be deemed simply a dhimmi community subject to Muslim 
rule (Henley, 2008, p. 355).  The ‘National Pact’ of 1943 requires that the President is a 
Maronite Christian, the Prime-Minister is a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament is a 
Shi’a Muslim.  This political framework seeks to ensure wide communal representation in 
government but also imposes a sectarian dynamic on the political structures and nature of 
Lebanese society.   It could however be argued that the pact successfully ended a twenty-five 
year civil war, and has sustained a fragile but economically prosperous peace ever since. 
 
Nevertheless, as far as religious identities are concerned, Henley writes: 
The foundational image of confessional representation intentionally and overtly lent 
the authority of the two religious leaders – patriarch and mufti – to the legitimation of 
the State  Yet it also created an assumption that they ‘represent’ Christians and 
Muslims (Henley, 2015, p. 157).   
 
Henley argues that religious leaders, whether Christian or Muslim, who are appointed by elite 
institutions, and who hold both religious and political roles, are unable to truly ‘represent’ 
their constituents.   The geographical boundaries established by the creation of Lebanon also 
had a serious impact on regional inter-religious dynamics, cutting across long established 
communal networks, and necessitating a realignment of institutional responsibilities and 
relations, that weakened the central religious authorities. 
 
Throughout its short history, there have been tensions in Lebanon between the communal 
wishes and needs of the people, and the policies of religious leaders who have had to consider 
their wider representational roles. During the Civil War (1975-1990), fierce tensions arose 
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between the monastic orders who supported militancy and viewed their position as a matter 
of survival, and the Patriarchal hierarchy of the Maronite Church, who urged moderation and 
reconciliation (Henley, 2008, p. 357).  This tension between the hierarchy and its constituents 
was illustrated when Pope John Paul II declared that Lebanon was ‘more than a country, it is a 
message of freedom and an example of pluralism for both East and West’ (John Paul II in 
L’Osservatore Romano, 2 October 1989, cited in Irani, 1994, p.187).   Henley notes the 
following powerful response: 
 
Before his election to the Lebanese presidency, Bashir Gemayel spoke for many 
Maronites in saying that ‘the Vatican should understand that Christians in Lebanon are 
not guinea pigs for the Christian-Islamic dialogue in the world’ (Irani, 1988, p. 
38).(Henley, 2008, p. 360). 
 
In other words, outsiders should not project onto complex societies with broad sectarian 
landscapes, dynamics that may not naturally prevail.  Henley argues that the ambiguity of 
religious leadership in combining both spiritual and political roles, whilst holding responsibility 
for places of worship and education, legal matters of personal status, and employment of 
clerics, limits their capacity to ‘represent’ ordinary people.  Nevertheless, the political 
establishment internally and internationally believe they do.  Henley admits that religious 
leaders ‘reflect a series of paradoxes that greatly complicate any facile interpretation of their 
roles’, and that ‘they have not incited sectarian hatred, and may in fact, be well placed to 
defuse sectarian tensions’ (Henley, 2016b, p. 4).  Moreover, even though religious leaders may 
not have broad popularity, they ‘have a public platform and institutional resources that can 
leverage a wide audience whether or not they are popular’ (Henley, 2016b, p. 11).  Very often, 
it is their skills in diplomacy that makes them appropriate candidates for their office, and 
therefore whether or not they truly ‘represent’ all their constituents, they are well placed to 
be voices for national unity and the common interest.  
 
As previously stated, although the status of faith leaders in Syria and Lebanon is similar, the 
political context is different.  In Syria’s ‘secular’ Constitution, ‘sectarian’ identity is only 
enshrined through the Personal Status Laws, and the fact that the President must be Muslim.  
All other offices may be held by a member of any community.  Currently, the elected Speaker 
of Parliament is Christian.  Naturally, Christian and Muslim institutional structures of religious 
authority differ.  Nevertheless, the representational role given to religious leaders in the 
political sphere,  rooted in the Ottoman millet system which allowed freedom of religious 
practise and jurisdiction, enables religious leaders to have influence at the political level –
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usually seeking (as we shall see in Chapter 4) to establish communal harmony, reconciliation 
and peaceful resolution to conflict.   Hence the role of religious leaders in Syria and in the 
Levant continues to be of importance and potential for peace-building in a post-conflict 
context.   
 
The hierarchical structure prevalent within the eastern ecclesial tradition is not one that sits 
comfortably in the western or Protestant theological or social ethic.  There has long been a 
hermeneutic of suspicion between the western and eastern churches in this respect.  Whilst 
some suspicion remains, indigenous Protestant Christians have been working hard in recent 
years to overcome it.  As noted, the nature of Eastern church leadership is rooted in ancient 
cultural and social traditions.  (For example, customs associated with meetings with Church 
leaders in the region are reminiscent of meetings with leaders in eastern tribal culture.)  It is 
notable how in many countries in the Middle East, Christian and Muslim leaders are regularly 
in attendance side by side at national events, a fact highlighted in their media.  This has been 
particularly so in government-held areas of Syria throughout the conflict, in towns and villages 
nationally. Their symbolic role, whatever the depth of their communal ‘representation’, is of 
profound importance in moderating society and ensuring respect for religious plurality.   With 
the recent increase in sectarian violence, States have been noticeably more attentive to their 
religious leadership and to symbols of religious harmony. 
 
Notwithstanding western suspicion of the eastern ecclesial leadership model, it is interesting 
how the Arab Protestant Church leadership in the region are also modelling their leadership on 
that of their eastern ecclesial counterparts.  Doing so enhances their role and presence as 
equals within the religious and political landscape, at a time when religious influence is of vital 
importance in nurturing peace, understanding, dialogue and reconciliation.  In this way, they 
become active participants in the process of seeking change at a national level.   This does not 
preclude the laity from being active participants within their communities at a local level.  It is 
common for local Christians to joke about how far removed their leaders are from common 
issues affecting the daily life of their people, but it is equally common to hear the same people 
speak with pride of their leaders in their representational role at a national level, as they seek 
to stand up for the common good and the well-being of their communities.   Whilst Henley and 
others may offer some justifiable doubt about the capacity of the religious leadership in the 
region to truly ‘represent’ their ordinary constituent, his recognition of the positive national 
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role that religious leaders can play remains equally valid, and perhaps of especial relevance 
amidst the heightened political challenges and complexities of the current time. 
 
3.5 Does ‘sectarianism’ play a role in Syrian society? 
 
It is often said that prior to the Mandate and before the rise of nationalism in the Arab world, 
ethnic and religious groups were “fairly tolerant in their attitudes towards one another,” and a 
peaceful coexistence prevailed (Dam, 2013, p. 2).  This was particularly so in Syria where most 
communities spoke Arabic.  The collapse of the Ottoman Empire had a profound impact on the 
Muslim world.  Its dismemberment “marked the end of a political, social, and religious order 
that had shaped their patterns of behaviour for 400 years” (Farouk-Alli, 2014, pp. 213-214).  
Multiple communities existed, and wherever multiple communities exist, there is a natural 
allegiance to one’s own communal grouping.  This can create a ‘sectarian’ dynamic, which, 
even if most of the time beneath the surface, can erupt for any number of reasons into 
mistrust, suspicion, conflict, and even violence.127 
 
The English Oxford Online Dictionary defines ‘sectarianism’ as “excessive attachment to a 
particular sect or party, especially in religion.”128  The word ‘excessive’ is key. Everyone is 
attached to their own family, kind or religion.  They may feel strong associations to the place 
where they live or the country of their birth.  Such normal attachment is not ‘sectarianism’.  
Certainly, the multiple communities in Syria each have such an attachment.  But when it is 
perceived that a particular group or identity is marginalised or disadvantaged in some way, 
then ‘sectarian’ tendencies can arise, and these tendencies will usually emerge from the party 
experiencing a sense of marginalisation, whether real or not.   This has been the case among 
sections of the Sunni community in Syria. 
 
The French occupation “sparked the Great Syrian revolt of 1925, which was the first mass 
movement against colonial rule in the Middle East (Farouk-Alli, 2014, pp. 213-214).  White 
argues that the whole concept of ‘minority’ only came to have meaning in the years following 
the First World War.  ‘Minorities’ became identifiable as such he says, “because they were now 
resident in states which had majorities; whereas, previously, these groups had mostly been 
living in multinational or, rather, non-national states” (White, 2011, p. 23).  John McHugo 
 
127 For a recent study of sectarianisation, see: (Hashemi, 2017) ‘Sectarianization. Mapping the new 




suggests that the Mandate period was the era when the spectre of sectarianism was 
deliberately stoked in order to ‘divide and rule’.  Such activity has often been practised in 
Africa, Asia and in the Middle East in order to promote western interests. In a narrower 
understanding of the causes of sectarianism, McHugo identifies three factors that launched 
sectarian consciousness in the region:  first the Balfour Declaration which sought to establish a 
‘Jewish home’ on Palestinian soil; second the belief that western governments sought to 
establish a Maronite dominated state in Lebanon to protect Christians at the expense of 
Muslims; and third, the sense of solidarity among Muslims when mandatory power sometimes 
excluded them (McHugo, 2015, pp. 175-176).  
 
However whilst communal identity has often been enhanced by external influences, it has 
always been present.  McHugo’s analysis underestimates the significance and importance of 
communal identity during the Ottoman period and how the changes brought about during the 
Tanzimat period in the 19th Century enhanced the status of different communities within 
Ottoman society.  Abdo writes: “The peaks and valleys of sectarian identity in Arab societies 
have always depended on the social and political context” (Abdo, 2017, p. 61).  However, 
Hashemi and Postel argue that: 
 
Viewing the region through a sectarian prism clouds rather than illuminates the 
complex realities of the region’s politics.  The current instability is more accurately 
seen as rooted in a series of developmental crises stemming from the collapse of State 
authority (Hashemi, 2017, p. 19). 
 
Meanwhile, the residual influence of the millet system continues.  The autonomy granted to 
and retained by different religious and communal groups, whilst on one level liberating 
communities to observe their own religious and social traditions, also separated them.  And 
the function of religious leaders as bridge-builders between communities and authorities could 
also separate them.   Henley, writing of the Lebanese context, states: “Even as religious leaders 
generally defuse sectarian tensions, they also function as the keepers of social boundaries 
between sects.  The sectarian personal-status courts and school systems that fall under these 
leaders’ legal remit were initially intended to provide for freedom of religion, but they have 
ended up severely restricting people’s freedom to live outside of a confessional framework” 
(Henley, 2016b, p. 17).  Additionally, in matters of trade, finance, transport, agriculture and 
industry, the millet communities excelled and dominated, thus creating further communal 
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tensions which in turn influenced the movement of Islamic reform that developed in the late 
19th and early 20th Centuries (Issawi, 2014, pp. 159-183). 
 
Sectarianism is difficult to define.  Diverse communities that have coexisted for centuries need 
not be ‘sectarian’ by nature, but can become so as perceived threats emerge within society.  
Sahner defines sectarianism as: “the activation of religious identity as one of the main 
principles of social and political life.”  Existing in diverse religiously mixed societies that coexist, 
it is “an instrument of differentiation, powering identity formation in times of peace, though 
especially in times of conflict with the social and religious ‘other’” (Sahner, 2014, p. 83).  As has 
been suggested, with the exception of major periods of unrest, prior to the Mandate period, 
communities may not have regarded themselves as ‘sectarian’ in the modern sense, but rather 
as belonging to different communal groups within society.  Older generations throughout the 
Levant commonly say: “We never used to know or care whether our neighbour was Christian 
or Muslim.” ( I have frequently heard the same said by Syrians referring to Syrian society 
before the current conflict.)  Makdisi identifies the explosive colonial encounter between the 
“Christian” West and the “Islamic” Ottoman Empire as being the point that “profoundly 
altered the meaning of religion in the multi-confessional society of Mount Lebanon because it 
emphasised sectarian identity as the only viable marker of political reform and the only 
authentic basis for political claims”, and goes on to contend that “sectarianism as an idea 
draws meaning only within a nationalist paradigm and hence that it belongs to the modern 
world” (Usama Makdisi, 2000, pp. 2,13).  
 
So a valid question to ask is: “Where do sub-state identities come from?” (Phillips, 2015, p. 
361).  Haddad, like Benjamin White, roots sectarianism in the pre-modern era.  Taking Iraq as a 
case study, he believes that the ‘myths’ of Sunni-Shi’a hostility, that were grounded in history, 
lay dormant, but were “ever ready to be reawakened and revised to suit the needs of a future 
crisis” (F. Haddad, 2011, pp. 17-20).  Meanwhile, Zubaida argues that “while sectarian divisions 
have always existed, their present form of politicisation have to be understood in terms of 
political manoeuvring by state actors and sectarian entrepreneurs” (Zubaida, 2014).  Or as 
Heyberger writes, echoing White and Makdisi: “Far from timeless, sectarianism was a 
nineteenth Century construct that was part of the process of creating nationalist identities” 
(Heyberger, 2010).  This too  is debatable.  Given the existence throughout history of multiple 
communities in the Middle East, the Arabian peninsula and Central Asia, encounters through 
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trade, movements of population, and competing interests in land and resources, it could 
equally be argued that sectarian tensions have always been present.    
 
Makdisi places the modern expression of sectarianism in the Middle East in the nineteenth 
century and in three waves.   He writes: “Intercommunal violence between Muslim and 
Christian Ottomans occurred primarily in the nineteenth century; that between Arabs and Jews 
occurred mainly in the twentieth century, and that between Sunni and Shi’a is unfolding 
before our eyes in the twenty-first century.” (Ussama Makdisi, 2017, p. 25).   Makdisi then 
identifies three inter-related factors that contributed to sectarian developments: the rise of 
ethno-religious nationalism (leading for example to the creation of a Maronite-majority State 
in Lebanon); the rise of sustained western imperialism; and the Ottoman ‘reformation’ that 
“changed the logic and definition of empire”(Ussama Makdisi, 2017, p. 27).  These are all valid 
points, but once again, they are open to debate, and to a certain extent depend on how one 
interprets the term ‘sectarian’. 
 
As far as Syria is concerned, the country’s communal make-up is some of the most diverse in 
the region. That Syria has been a place of refuge throughout history for different ethnic and 
religious communities from situations of conflict in the surrounding region has enhanced this 
fact. This communal diversity has created at times a delicate sectarian balance, but Syrians 
pride themselves on their historic coexistence, and the religious freedoms that have more or 
less prevailed within Syrian society.  Many have argued that the evolution of the Syrian conflict 
has served to amplify pre-existing communal differences and grievances (Abdo, McHugo, 
Pierret, Goldsmith), and the research undertaken here suggests that this is certainly the case.  
Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, militant groups and western politicians have blamed the 
rise of ‘sectarianism’ in Syria on political manipulations by the Assad family.  However, the 
extent to which policies prior to the conflict were deliberately ‘sectarian’ rather than simply 
providing political, social or economic advantage, is a matter of debate.  Some take a more 
pragmatic view that ‘sectarianism’ in Syria existed long before Hafez Al-Assad came to power 
in 1970.  Evidence shows that communal identity was fuelled by all parties following the 
Mandate partition of Greater Syria.129  The French preferred to ‘divide and rule’ and 
encouraged sect and religious differences (James A Reilly, 2019).  Hence, Phillips terms the 
Syrian conflict not a ‘sectarian’ one, but ‘semi-sectarian’.  Dam concludes similarly: “The fact 
 
129 I prefer the term ‘communal’ to ‘sectarian’.  I believe that the term ‘sectarian’ has been over-played 
in the Syrian discourse, and that the complex history of the communal dynamics within Syrian society 
have been under-studied and under-acknowledged. 
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that sectarianism, regionalism and tribalism were major factors in the struggle for power does 
not imply that other elements such as socio-economic and ideological factors, were not 
important too, or could be ignored” (Dam, 2013, p. 136). 
 
I suggest that ‘sectarianism’ is a western analytical framework that has problematised western 
analysis of a complex multi-layered communal plurality that has coexisted for centuries until 
recent times.  Western narratives have tended to simplify these communal relationships 
around a narrative of ‘sectarianism’ that is inadequate to express the complex plurality of 
communal dynamics.  It is a self-limiting political framework that has misunderstood the 
complex communal and religious dynamics of Syrian society.  Reacting according to this 
narrative since the early twentieth century has had disastrous consequences for these 
dynamics in the region and has helped sectarianism take root, particularly within the Sunni-
Shi’a relationship.130 
 
Certainly, ethnic ties were used in Syria to monopolise power, but as Dam writes: “In the 
period after 1970, Syrian foreign policies have as a whole been more consistent and 
continuous.  In the al-Assad era, Syria was able to develop into a major regional power in its 
own right, no longer subservient to the traditional power rivalries between other Arab 
countries in the region such as Iraq and Egypt, as had been the case in the past” (Dam, 2013, p. 
137). 
 
Syria’s economic independence prior to the conflict had been a source of pride to Syrians.  The 
country was a producer and exporter of oil.  It was self-sufficient in the production of food and 
exported high quality wheat and cotton.  The country was also the largest producer and 
 
130 This suggestion is corroborated by a 2015 report produced by the RAND corporation for the US 
Army., entitled: Sectarianism in the Middle East. Implications for the United States. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1681/RAND_RR1
681.pdf  In the summary, the following is stated: “Increasingly policy decisions are being based 
on the assumptions that the Middle East is riven by a purely dualistic sectarian war between 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, that sectarian identity is immutable, and that the underlying 
sectarian problems in the region are intractable……Our research shows that the assumptions 
behind some of these recommendations are often flawed, incomplete and misleading.  While 
sectarian identity is certainly relevant, it is often less relevant than economic, geographic, 
political and other social identities; in most cases these identities are deeply interwoven.” It 
continues: “Sectarianism is one of many competing regional identities in the Middle East,” and 
“the nature of sectarianism differs significantly by country across the Middle East.” 
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exporter of pharmaceuticals in the region, supplying all its own medicine needs, and producing 
most of its own clothing.  The education and health systems were both of a high standard, and 
free to Syria’s citizens.   It is argued however that corruption failed to enable the financial 
benefits of the economy to reach most ordinary people, and that this contributed to growing 
dissatisfaction within sections of the population.  In addition, as O’Mahony put it: “The Syrian 
Government introduced neo-liberal economic policies but tried to implement them on the 
basis of a socialist structure. The two do not mix.”131  
 
A second question is why has it been possible for ethno-sectarian/communal ties to be 
violently mobilised?  Kaufman provides a helpful analysis.  He contends that the normal order 
in any multi-ethnic environment is coexistence, but that plurality involves a permanent threat 
of violence if communities’ interests or well-being are threatened.  Kaufman suggests that 
communal ties only turn to violence if there are “ancient hatreds” between communities, if 
there is economic competition between communities, and if ethnic communities have been 
manipulated by elites in order to further their own ambitions.  Any of these, combined with 
the opportunity to create division, and the presence of fear of communal unrest within the 
population if any particular group is treated with priority, can create tensions that risk social 
instability (Kaufman, 2001). In the Syrian context, all of these conditions have prevailed.  And 
at times all elites have manipulated them: the Ottomans, The French Mandate, the politicians 
in the unstable period of the 1950s-1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood; and the Ba’ath Party – all 
have “publicised sub-state ties for short-term political gain” (Phillips, 2015, pp. 362-363).  Pinto 
for example cites the promotion of the Shi’a religious sites in Syria as a place of pilgrimage for 
Iranian, Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’a pilgrims, as a means of “legitimising Shi’a Islam in the Syrian 
religious landscape” and helping to “bolster the Islamic credentials of the Alawi community” 
(Pinto, 2017, p. 130).   It could however equally be argued that the Shi’a presence and the Shi’a 
holy sites have always been a legitimate part of Syrian society.  
 
Philipps contends that “politicised sect identity in Syria developed alongside, and interacted 
with, national identity” (Phillips, 2015, p. 363).  It is true that the Ottomans discriminated 
against Christians and Jews, that ‘minorities’ such as the Alawites and Druze were occasionally 
persecuted, and that there was a sense of difference, but discontent was rarely politicised and 
only happened (such as the anti-Christian rioting in Damascus in 1860) when group economic 
interests were perceived to be at stake, following the tanzimat that declared all religious 
 
131 Anthony O’Mahony.  In conversation, 16 January 2018.  See also:  (J.A. Reilly, 2019, pp. 150-190) 
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groups and communities to have equal rights in the Ottoman Empire (Ma'oz, 2014).  The Sayfo 
Assyrian and Armenian genocides are two very significant exceptions to this reported stability.  
Under the French Mandate (1920-1946), sect identities became politicised, to the point of 
dividing the country into statelets according to sectarian majorities.  This was contrary to the 
wishes of the people themselves, and the division did not last.  So it was that in 1946, 
Independence was granted to Syria.  
 
Nevertheless, even after independence the State of Syria remained unstable.  Between 1946 
and 1970 when Hafez al-Assad took power, there were no fewer than eight coups.  In 1963, 
the Ba’ath Party was formed, dedicated to inclusivity and political secularisation.  However, 
communal identity continued to play a major role beneath the national ‘veneer’.  The reason 
that the armed forces contained a predominance of Alawi officers was not exclusively 
‘sectarian’.  Sunnis had traditionally disdained military careers, which had offered poor 
minorities a means of social advancement.   Whilst Christians have an important presence 
within Syrian politics, much of the ‘sectarian’ dimension of Syrian politics remains rooted in the 
Sunni vs Alawi and Shi’a divide.  None of this can be explained without understanding the place 
of the Alawis in Syrian society (See section in Chapter 2.)132 or events in the past four decades. 
 
When Hafez al-Assad was appointed in 1970, he handed key government positions (Defence 
Minister, Foreign Minister and Vice-President) to Sunni allies.  Enemies referred to the 
government as an ‘Alawi regime’.  Whilst it is true that some Alawis received patronage and 
economic advancement from the government, nevertheless, Sunnis and other members of 
Syrian society all played significant roles in government and military structures.  Assad 
promoted national identity and encouraged an inclusive national identity.  Unlike in Iraq, 
where political expressions of Shi’a Islam were repressed, Hafez al-Assad “prioritised Sunni 
culture.”133 He had Alawis integrated.  (The Lebanese Shi’a leader, Musa al-Sadr, had been 
persuaded to declare Alawis ‘Twelver Shi’as’, not heretics, but true Muslims, in order for Assad 
to become President.) “With Asad at the helm,” writes Farouk-Alli, “Syria underwent a 
 
132 For further detail about the Alawis, see: (Goldsmith, 2015); (Kerr, 2015); (Winter, 2016). 
133 Shi’a Muslims were often targeted during the rule of Saddam Hussein. See for example a Refugee 
Board of Canada report entitled: Iraq. Treatment of Shi’a Muslims, particularly those in opposition, by 
Iraqi officials. (1999-2002) published online by UNHCR. 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be4d4.html.  See also, article in Smithsonian.com dated 




remarkable transformation after 1970.  Over the course of the next few decades, the country 
was refashioned from a weak and unstable state into a regional player… making Asad one of 
the most prominent leaders in the Middle East” (Farouk-Alli, 2014, p. 218). 
 
Whilst Alawis became the new ruling elite, Sunni Islam was taught in schools.  This had the 
unintended effect of strengthening sectarian beliefs, as Sunnis gained a belief in their 
superiority, and Syrians lacked education in the beliefs of the minority communities who in 
turn felt less valued. The result was a combination of “cultural empowerment but political 
disempowerment” (Phillips, 2015, pp. 365-366). Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood had 
grown in power.  Its militant wing, the ‘Fighting Vanguard’ sought a sectarian and violent 
overthrow of Assad.  From 1976, it started assassinating Alawi figures and distributing 
sectarian propaganda, especially in Hama and Aleppo.  This in turn strengthened sectarian 
beliefs amongst some Alawis.  The culmination of this in the uprising by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Hama in 1982, and the massacre and expulsion of the Muslim Brotherhood 
that followed is well documented.  Even so, Assad retained much popularity, and many Sunnis 
rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s extremist agenda.   
 
On Hafez al-Assad’s death in 2000, he was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad.  Bashar 
genuinely sought to reform the country. Both he and his younger brother married into Sunni 
families.  Politically, Bashar al-Assad removed many of his father’s old supporters, but made 
the ruling elite more Alawi-dominated.  President Assad has himself commented on the 
difficulty he faced in implementing reforms because of the influence of the ‘old guard’, and the 
bureaucracy of the government apparatus.134  His economic reforms sought to liberalise the 
economy and produce a ‘social market economy’, but substantially reduced the budgets for 
social services and the military, and had to be operated under a bureaucratic system that 
limited their effectiveness.  The management of these new economic opportunities was 
handed to government elites, many of them Alawis, opening up opportunities for corruption 
and claims of sectarian manipulation.  The reforms also had the effect of cutting subsidies at a 
time when the country faced added political, economic and environmental strains.  In 2005, 
the withdrawal from Lebanon and the international sanctions that followed were a major 
economic loss to Syria.  Between the years 2006-2010, the reception of over a million Iraqi 
refugees into Syria placed further economic and social strain upon the country.  Concurrently, 
 
134 In a meeting with President Bashar al-Assad in September, 2016, he commented that he had been 




a devastating drought in the north-east of the country resulted in the movement of over 
300,000 people into impoverished areas around Syria’s cities.135   All these factors had 
significant social, economic and sectarian implications, but “in spite of the potential for 
sectarianism to grow under Bashar al-Assad’s rule, ethnographic research, conducted in 2007-
2010 suggested that most Syrians didn’t outwardly project it” (Phillips, 2015, p. 368).   
 
According to most with whom I have spoken the demonstrations that took place in 2011 were, 
at least initially, not primarily sectarian by nature.136  There certainly was a sectarian element 
amongst some Sunni Islamists, encouraged by external players, who wished to overthrow the 
Alawite-dominated government.  But for most Syrians the demonstrations were about the 
need for political reform, and were based primarily upon economic and political discontent: 
economic discontent because of a belief that the government was failing to address the 
economic needs of the country, a failure partly resulting from the liberalisation of the 
economy; and political discontent with the country’s security apparatus and corruption within 
elements of the political elite.  There were, at least initially, moderate voices.  
 
Goldsmith writes: “Both the Damascus Spring and the fall of the Iraqi Ba’thists had raised the 
expectations of many Syrians for political change, yet both had ended in disappointment. 
Several years on, disillusionment and frustration, exacerbated by high unemployment, high 
inflation and the effects of the on-going drought, were setting in among a growing portion of 
 
135There have been claims that an inadequate response to the needs of the rural poor during the 
drought helped instigate discontent.  However, Louis Allday, who worked at the British Embassy in 2009 
disputes that this was intentional, and argues that the Syrian government was both deeply concerned, 
and offered food assistance programmes, livestock feed subsidies, agricultural subsidies, loans and 
grants.  Ultimately though, “the Syrian Government was simply overwhelmed by the scale of the 
drought (and its subsequent effects); it did not possess the ability – financial, logistical and otherwise – 
to respond adequately to it and did not receive sufficient funding from international donors to help 
account for this deficiency.” https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/09/11/want-to-know-whats-really-
going-on-in-syria-warning-itll-take-you-more-than-5-minutes/  Accessed 23 October 2017  
136 Balanche argues otherwise:  “Analysis of the revolt’s geography suggests that the country has major 
(perhaps irreconcilable) sectarian fissures, despite official denials by the regime and opposition alike. 
The demonstrations that swept Latakia, Baniyas, and Homs in 2011 occurred only in the Sunni districts 
of those cities. In the suburbs of Damascus, most Druze, Christian, Ismaili, and Alawite districts did 
not  join the protest movement, but outlying Sunni towns did. The demonstrations in Jdeidat Artouz, a 
Druze/Christian area, and Bab Touma, the capital’s main Christian quarter, were largely undertaken by 
Sunni residents. In response, the older Druze and Christian inhabitants mobilized against what they 
considered aggression by newer inhabit-ants who practiced a different religion. Meanwhile, the Sunni 
inhabitants of Douma, Deraa, and other rebellious districts around Damascus rose to defend their 
territory against regime aggression.” (Balanche, 2018, p. 5) 
127 
 
Syrian society” (Goldsmith, 2015, p. 188).137 However, Christopher Phillips adds: “..the Alawi-
Sunni division should not be overstated.  While sectarian resentment existed among some 
Sunnis towards some Alawis, and some Alawis reciprocated, it would be inaccurate to say 
these feelings were widespread and prominent across both communities... the lack of 
sectarian slogans in early protests suggests this wasn’t initially the main source of frustration” 
(Phillips, 2016, p. 48). This statement is echoed by many conversations I have had with Syrians 
who were involved initially in the demonstrations. Sectarian discourse they say only emerged 
from those with an Islamist agenda, and many demonstrators withdrew their support for the 
demonstrations when sectarian discourse and externally provoked violence became 
entrenched in the protests, at an early stage.  As the complex dynamics of the conflict have 
constantly shifted, so too have people’s understanding and opinions. 
 
In a major study published in 2018, Balanche suggests that sectarian identity, originating in the 
millet system, is rooted in Syrian society, and that “the war has compelled Syrians to cling to 
their sectarian identities more tightly, whether out of socio-economic self-interest, or simply 
to survive”, and goes on to suggest that the main factions within the conflict are divided along 
broadly sectarian lines, namely “the multi-sectarian regime zone, the Kurdish-controlled SDF 
zone, and the Sunni Arab rebel zone” (Balanche, 2018, pp. xi,xv). The influence of regional 
alliances deepened the sectarian nature of the conflict, for example the Iranian Shi’a alliance 
with the Syrian government along with Hezbollah’s commitment to protecting Shi’a religious 
sites in Syria, whilst Saudi and Gulf support for the Sunni Islamist insurgency “accelerated the 
alignment of actors along sectarian lines, pitting the ‘Shi’a crescent’ against ‘Sunni 
encirclement’” (Baczko, 2018, p. 156).(Isamil, 2011).  Baczko admits however to the stability 
and plurality that had prevailed prior to the conflict, when he writes that “the territorial 
fragmentation”, (since the beginning of the conflict), “meant the end of ethnic and sectarian 
balances previously maintained by the regime, which had co-opted allies by applying political 
and economic rather than identity criteria” (Baczko, 2018, p. 257).   
 
Nor should we exclude the important part that international politics and global intervention 
played in promoting and supporting the uprising (Phillips, 2016).  In November 2015, I 
travelled with one of Syria’s leading Internal Opposition figures from Damascus to Homs.  As 
we journeyed, he told us how in 2010, he had been contacted by a member of a militant group 
 
137 Mahmoud claims that opposition groups did not have sectarian intentions (Mahmoud, 2016). 
Meanwhile,  (Schmoller, 2016) examines the sectarian impact of the conflict in a case study amongst 
Syrian refugees in Austria. 
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in Turkey to be told: “Get ready.  The war is coming. It has all been planned.”138  Friends who 
participated in early demonstrations but quickly withdrew when they became violent, state 
that there were foreign elements within the demonstrations who were deliberately stoking 
violence.   All these factors combined to help create the events of 2011.139   
 
I believe that sectarian divisions have been overstated as a cause of conflict in Syrian society.  
Writing in 2013, Daoudy stressed the strong nationalist identity that prevailed in Iraq and Syria 
and suggested that “the myth of sectarianism” is more accurately “a battle of realpolitik over 
conflicting interests.”   Daoudy notes that whilst armed resistance have “turned to religion to 
draw strength and mobilisation,” in the rest of the country, all communities “share a fear of 
radicalism and a descent to chaos as the country follows in the dreaded footsteps of 
neighbouring Iraq.”  Daoudy continues: “The real divide is not religious or sectarian but 
geopolitical, and foreign intervention is not motivated by religious affiliations nor the 
promotion of democracy.”  Rather “Syria is being sacrificed for the sake of foreign interests.”140   
(The fear of what happened in Iraq cannot be underestimated when It comes to understanding 
Christian attitudes and allegiances in Syria.) 
 
In an article in 2014, Camille Otrakji suggests that, as in most pluralistic countries, sectarianism 
within Syrian society represents a ‘bell-shaped curve’.  At its peak – ‘moderate sectarianism’ - 
is where members of different communities feel a sense of superiority to others and may feel 
discriminated against.  This is a normal feature of society that exists to a degree in all societies.  
Those who hate other communities and/or support sectarian violence are, like anywhere else, 
a small minority, and cannot be said to ‘represent’ the Syrian reality.  Otrakji reminds us that 
Syrian society is not physically divided, but that in most towns and cities, communities live side 
by side.  He goes on to illustrate how sectarianism is a “complex construct” of six types, some 
dangerous, and others benign.  Dangerous tendencies include ‘defensive’ or ‘fear-driven’ 
sectarianism where people feel the need to stay with their own group for protection; are 
convinced of their religious superiority; have military or economic power; and jealously guard 
 
138 Journey from Damascus to Homs.  26 November 2015. 
139 For a further study of external factors that nurtured the conflict in Syria, see:  (Gowans, 2017). 
140 Daoudy, M. (2013) Sectarianism in Syria: myth and reality. www.opendemocracy.net/marwa-
daoudy/sectarianism-in-syria-myth-and-reality  (Accessed: 3 October 2018).  There are many who argue 
otherwise.  See: (Postel, 2018) Playing with fire: Trump, the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry, and the geopolitics of 
sectarianization in the Middle East. European Institute of the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Yearbook 
2018, 58-63. (Accessed 21 January 2019).  Also: Nuruzzaman, M. (2019) Contemporary Shia-Sunni 
Sectarian violence. Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations. DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199743292-
0249 (Accessed 21 January 2019).  
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their cultural tribal sectarianism.  The most dangerous sectarianism is hate-driven and 
committed to violence for perceived infringement of rights.141    
 
The diagram below comes from Otrakji’s article.  The curve is not static.  It can be heavily 
‘weighted’ in either direction, but the extent of weighting will depend on the level of ‘balance’ 




Whist arguing for less of a sectarian dynamic in Syrian society, we cannot dismiss the influence 
of existing developments.  Abdo suggests, notwithstanding the economic and political contexts 
that helped nurture sectarian division, that “without religious identification the conflicts would 
not have flared to the degree they have done today” (Abdo, 2017, p. 7).  She argues that the 
West has failed in its dealings with and interventions in the Middle East, to recognise the 
importance that religion plays in these societies.   Partly because of this, “longstanding notions 
of religious identity and sectarian affiliation have supplanted the postcolonial project of Arab 
nationalism, thereby creating the opportunity for violent extremist groups, such as ISIS and Al 
Qaeda, to fill the resulting vacuum” (Abdo, 2017, p. 6).  
 
 
141 Camille Otrakji. An American plan to divide Syria, a European plan to decentralise it, and a Russian 
dialogue conference.  Published in: http://creativesyria.com/syriapage/?p=582  November 11th, 2014.    
(Accessed: 15 January 2018)  Used with permission. 
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Nevertheless, many Syrians maintain that at the beginning of the Syrian conflict, although 
communal identity is a part of the make-up of Syrian society, it was not prioritised in social 
discourse.  The conflict however developed profoundly sectarian dimensions, with militant 
parties playing the sectarian ‘card’, often with devastating and brutal affect, in order to 
achieve their goals. Many Syrians who participated in the early demonstrations say that when 




In this chapter, we have considered the importance of religious leadership roles within Syrian 
society, and the extent to which ‘sectarianism’ plays a part in Syrian society.  Heads of 
Churches continue to hold considerable spiritual and temporal authority and play 
representative roles that affirm confessional, local, national and international identities.  These 
roles are rooted in and have been moulded by the cultural and historical context, and have 
enabled them to exercise a significant, and not uncritical, political role in society, but can also, 
by their very nature have communal implications.  Nevertheless, notwithstanding debate as to 
the extent to which religious leaders are able to ‘represent’ their constituents because of their 
privileged status and conflicting roles, eastern models of religious leadership have allowed for 
positive political participation at a national level and ensured the ‘space’ for plurality and 
diversity in political discourse, therefore having a positive impact on society, especially in times 
of tension and conflict.  In chapter 5, I will suggest that Eastern Christian leaders and 
theologians represent a modern paradigm of Antiochene tradition; that some have become 
‘modern Church Fathers’, and have the potential to create a new conceptual framework for 
political/ecclesial representation, theological dialogue and humanitarian outreach. 
 
The chapter has also considered the definition and origins of ‘sectarianism’.  What does 
‘sectarianism’ mean in a society as culturally and religiously diverse as Syria?  We have seen 
how some scholars have suggested that sectarianisation of communal identities is rooted in 
the colonial encounter between the West and the Islamic world, and the establishment of the 
modern State.  It is clear that sectarianism has broad and varied expression in different 
contexts and is rooted in diverse causes that negatively impact relationships between different 
communal groups.  I maintain that the term ‘sectarian’ is an analytical framework that has 
over-simplified and damaged our understanding of the complex communal landscape and 
interactions of Syrian and Levantine society.  And that whilst sectarian expressions of violence 
within the Syrian conflict have damaged communal relations in Syria, appreciation of plurality 
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within society has not been destroyed.  Notwithstanding the fact that communal identities 
have helped shape, and been manipulated by the conflict, it has also rearticulated and given 
new meaning to communal relationships. Many Syrians still reject ‘sectarian’ discourse, and 
wish to retain a diverse, pluralistic society, in which communal identities are respected and 
protected under a secularly-based Constitution.  Herein lies hope for the future.   
 
Having reflected on the importance and diversity of Christian and Muslim communities in 
Syria, and the factors that influence religious life in the country, it is now time to consider how 
Christian-Muslim relations have been expressed in Syria, both immediately prior to the 








With more than half the world’s population being either Christian or Muslim and with extreme 
ideologies increasing and placing profound tensions between the two faiths, an understanding 
of the political and social dimensions of Christian-Muslim encounter has never been so urgent 
(Hirvonen, 2013, p. 1).  It is often forgotten that most Christians in the Levant share the same 
culture, language and customs as their Muslim compatriots, and that through centuries of 
coexistence they are well-placed to reflect on the means and methods of Christian-Muslim 
dialogue that have been adopted in the past, that have prevailed in the present, and the 
possible impact of recent events on future engagement.  Despite the political and religious 
limitations placed on them over the centuries, and the devastating impact of recent conflicts, 
Christians have continued to be resilient and influential.  The experience of the Christian-
Muslim interface in Syria in the face of radicalism and conflict has the capacity to inform other 
contexts that are encountering these challenges. 
 
A brief account of the history of Christian-Muslim relations in the area is provided in the 
Introduction to the thesis.  In this chapter, after reflecting on more recent developments in 
Christian-Muslim dialogue, we shall explore inter-religious dynamics in Syria prior to and 
during the recent conflict through the lens of the voices of Syrians on the ground.  (Appendix 5, 
offers analysis of responses to a questionnaire).  These voices represent continuity between 
historical and contemporary interreligious relations and illustrate a variety of different 
interreligious dynamics in different contexts.  A more detailed reflection of the conflict in the 
Christian villages of Maaloula and Sadad, and in the city of Aleppo, provide varying 
perspectives on how the conflict has impacted Christian-Muslim relations.   
 
 
4.2 Some developments in dialogue. 
 
Muslims have always been the less enthusiastic interlocutors when it comes to Christian-
Muslim dialogue in the Middle East.  This is partly due to differing theological understandings 
of the status of faith, but also because of the part western Churches have played in colonialism 
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and proselytization; and because of suspicion at political policies vis a vis Israel and other areas 
of the region (Fischbach, 2015, p. 428). Until the 1970s most participants in interreligious 
dialogue were official representatives.  It wasn’t until the 1980s that the “range and depth of 
dialogue began to expand” into topics relevant to ordinary faith communities (Fischbach, 2015, 
p. 429). Following the Ta’if Agreement that ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1989 and 
established the Confessional Constitution for Lebanon, inter-faith dialogue became 
fashionable.  In 1993, the Islamic-Christian National Dialogue Committee was founded “to 
promote better mutual understanding between the country’s different religious communities” 
and to ensure the prevention of future conflict (Goddard, 2003a, p. 32). In the same decade a 
number of universities established programmes and centres for religious dialogue.  Amongst 
them was the Centre for Christian-Muslim Studies at Balamand University (founded in 1995), 
which remains an important centre in the region (Fischbach, 2015, p. 430). 
 
However, the success of these developments remains debatable.  According to participants, 
discussions have often avoided contentious theological issues.  Whilst helpful to positive 
relations, “such dialogue was unable to effectively contribute to the building of an inter-
religious community” and had limited outcomes (Fischbach, 2015, p. 431).  In 2002, the Near 
East School of Theology in Beirut, under the auspices of the Middle East Council of Churches 
set up a series of inter-religious meetings called ‘Forum of Muslim-Christian thought’. These 
conversations, honest and genuine in both approach and outcome, have included faith 
leaders, academics, and members of the public, and have continued to produce meaningful 
discussions and engagement with difficult topics.   
 
On September 12, 2006, Pope Benedict XVI delivered a lecture at Regensburg reflecting on the 
issue of religious dialogue.151  In it he quoted Byzantine Emperor Manuel Paleologos speaking 
in 1391: ‘Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things 
only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by sword the faith he preached’ (Volf, 
2010b, p. 19).  Although in the context of his lecture, Pope Benedict was contrasting different 
attitudes within the Qur’an to religious compulsion, the reaction was immediate and 
shocking.152  Demonstrations erupted all over the Muslim world, and the comments were 
 
151 For an analysis of Pope Benedict’s position regarding Christian-Muslim relations, see: (Rocco, 2017). 
152 A less widespread, but similarly unexpected and intense reaction followed an interview in February 
2008, when the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Most Revd. Dr. Rowan Williams, spoke on a Radio 4 
programme about the importance of Shari’a law for Muslims in Britain. See BBC News Website 7 Feb 
2008. ‘Sharia Law in UK is Unavoidable’:   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7232661.stm 
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condemned by political and religious leaders worldwide.  Given the heightened sensitivity 
surrounding Western intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time, the consequences could 
have been devastating for Christian-Muslim relations.   
 
Instead, on October 13, 2007, 138 Muslim scholars and theologians, representing almost every 
shade of Islamic theology and opinion (including the current Grand Mufti of Syria, Dr. Ahmad 
Badreddin Hassoun), issued ‘A Common Word between Us and You’ to Christians around the 
world.  Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad of Jordan writes: ‘Our goal was very clear.  We wanted – 
and want – to avoid a worldwide conflict between Muslims and the West.  We wanted to – and 
must – resolve our current crises…..we had honestly… only one motive: peace’ (Volf, 2010a, 
pp. 5-6).. Pope Benedict’s lecture was what triggered the initiative, but it would be naïve to 
imagine that the political and religious realities of western policies and actions in the Middle 
East were not also a motivation. 
 
Given the prevailing political and religious realities, Muslim scholarship was taking a uniquely 
reconciling initiative.  At the heart of the message were two things: the recognition that ‘whilst 
Islam and Christianity are obviously different religions – it is clear that the Two Greatest 
Commandments are an area of common ground’ (Volf, 2010a, p. 45); and a genuine concern 
that ‘Muslims and Christians together make up well over half the world’s population.   Without 
peace and justice between these two religious communities, there can be no meaningful peace 
in the world’ (Volf, 2010a, p. 28). Despite the differences between the faiths, the theological 
basis for this common ground – ‘a shared Christian-Muslim commitment to love of God and 
love of neighbour’ (P. L. Heck, 2009, p. 1) is substantial and significant.  
 
The fact that this was an initiative that came from the Muslim world is unusual.  Muslims have 
often regarded dialogue as being a western Christian initiative in which Christians have set the 
agenda. This initiative however presented a willingness to dialogue with a confidence 
strengthened by the rise in Islamism and the spread of Islam.  And the invitation was offered at 
a time when the reputation of Christianity had been profoundly damaged by the political 
actions and policies of Western governments in the Middle East; when religious identity or 
interpretation had been used as justification to engage in violence; and when secularism was 




The ‘Common Word’ document was clearly an invitation to Christian leaders to engage in 
dialogue and find a common ethic.  Since its publication the response from the Christian world 
has been cautious.  And in the current context of regional conflict and the reduced trust 
between the faith communities, genuine dialogue between the communities has proved 
difficult.  However, in the current context, the need for ‘dialogue’, mutual co-operation and 
shared humanitarian action has once again been highlighted.  The signed declaration of a 
common humanity, between Pope Francis and Dr. Ahmed Al-Tayyeb, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar 
in Abu Dhabi in February 2019 represents a hopeful step in that direction. 
 
In what follows, we shall explore how conflict has influenced the practice of Christian-Muslim 
relations in recent years and how this praxis might provide a basis on which to build for 
dialogue and co-existence in the future.   Assessing the reality of Christian-Muslim relations as 
experienced ‘on the ground’ in Syria, and being realistic about the attitudes and challenges 
that prevail, is crucial to determining how those relationships might most effectively evolve in 
a post-conflict situation.   
 
4.3 Praxis of Christian-Muslim Relations in Syria – prior to and during the 
Conflict. 
 
Christian-Muslim relations have found positive expression for centuries in Syria.  But before 
continuing, it is necessary to re-emphasise the sensitivity of raising the subject in Syria.  Some 
Syrians suggest that even to discuss Christian-Muslim relations is to impose a ‘sectarian’ 
dimension into a religious landscape that is not sectarian by nature.  Indeed, many Syrians 
reject any suggestion that the roots of the conflict lie in sectarian agendas.  Rather, sectarian 
identities have been used to fuel and define aspects of the conflict by parties who wish to 
destabilise the country.  In 2015, Hakim Khatib, of the University of Duisburg in Germany, 
writing of his research into the politicisation of Islam in Syria noted that “based on several 
interviews with Syrians for this article, they all refused calling the events in Syria a civil or a 
sectarian war.  … Therefore religion can be looked at in this context as one of the variables, an 
important one indeed, and not the sole driver for actors in the conflict” (Khatib, 2015, p. 346).  
He also acknowledges that influential salafi preachers, and Muslim Brotherhood supporters in 
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Syria have frequently used religious terms in their speeches, and that this “raises suspicion for 
other minorities and other Islamic currents within the Sunni sect” (Khatib, 2015, p. 346).153 
 
As in other parts of the Middle East, Syria has a system of religious ‘registration’, which 
“identifies which legal code applies to citizens for family matters such as marriage, children’s 
education, divorce, custody of children, burial rites and inheritance” (Jonathan Andrews, 2016, 
pp. 15-16).  This religious registration permeates society and classifies people according to 
their religious identity.  In Syria, religious registration is stated on birth certificates and 
marriage documentation, but not on identity cards.  Religious identity is restricted to Muslim, 
Christian or Jew, with all non-Jews and non-Christians being identified as Muslim.  Prior to 
2011, religious conversion was not illegal but was strongly discouraged. Throughout the 
region, conversion from Islam can have serious social consequences for individuals.  Women 
registered as Muslim were not allowed to marry non-Muslims – a restriction with which many 
citizens have expressed dissatisfaction.  There is no law against proselytising, but it is strongly 
discouraged for fear of creating inter-communal tensions.  Christian and Muslim festivals are 
recognised as public holidays, and the State is religiously tolerant (Jonathan Andrews, 2016, 
pp. 239-241).  Throughout the conflict, the principle of freedom of worship has continued, and 
although prior to the war, gatherings other than services required permission, Church 
properties have become major centres of humanitarian care for anyone affected by the 
conflict.  Whilst religious registration may be regarded as restrictive, and has the potential to 
lead to discrimination, confessionally-based personal status laws nevertheless seek to enable 
specific identities to be sustained and protected, and, in a plural society such as Syria, affirm 
the value of differing religious statuses as integral to society.  For this reason, whilst there is 
certainly scope for reform of laws surrounding religious registration, many religious leaders 
would not wish to see religious registration removed.  
 
 In modern times, the first Syrian religious leader to get involved in interreligious dialogue was 
the late Grand Mufti Ahmed Kuftaru (1915-2004).  With a classical education in Islamic 
Jurisprudence and taught by Sufi scholars, Sheikh Kuftaru was a strong advocate of interfaith 
dialogue.  Deeply influenced by Sheikh Kuftaru, Mohammad Al-Habash (b. 1962), a professor 
of Islamic sciences, joked in 2006 that Syrian Christians and Syrian Muslims are “beyond 
dialogue”, because “coexistence is well-ingrained in the Syrian tradition” (Ali-Dib, 2008, p. 98).  
 
153 Kahtib refers to Adnan Al-Aroor, a Salafi cleric from Hama, who lives in exile in Riyadh, and Zuhair 
Galem, the spokesman of Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. 
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The current Grand Mufti of Syria, Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Hassoun likewise passionately supports 
interreligious coexistence, engagement and respect, and the secularly based Constitution of 
the Syrian State, which protects all religious minorities.  Ali-Dib points out however that when 
it comes to Christian-Muslim dialogue, leaders of the two faiths often have different priorities.  
Christian leaders prioritise ‘the good’ that comes from inter-religious dialogue through minimal 
doctrinal agreements, and Christian ‘love’, whilst Muslim sheikhs tend to view dialogue as a 
process of ‘rectifying the image of Islam’, and calling for a joint approach towards opposing 
immorality and atheism (Ali-Dib, 2008, p. 95).  This difference of approach is mirrored 
everywhere and often creates difficulties for dialogue.   
 
The 20th and early years of the 21st Century have been devastating for Christian communities, 
not just in Syria, but throughout the region.   The conflicts in Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Syria; 
the rise of political Islam and of ‘Islamic State’ and of their Islamist allies, have profoundly 
affected Eastern Christian communities.  In territories controlled by Islamist fighters in Syria, 
there are few Christians left.  Of an estimated population of Christians of 10% prior to the 
conflict, it is thought that up to half have left the country.  In December 2016, Chaldean Bishop 
of Aleppo, Antoine Audo suggested that three quarters of the Christian population of Aleppo 
might have left the city by that date, leaving an estimated 40,000 Christians in the city.154  In 
May 2017, Ibrahim Nseir, Presbyterian Minister in Aleppo told me that 90% of his congregation 
had emigrated.155   Today, taking into account the emigration of Christians since the start of 
the conflict, it is believed that the percentage of Christians remaining in Syria are now around 
5-7 per cent of the population, almost all of whom are to be found in Government-held areas 
of the country.156  Those that lived in areas now under ‘rebel’ control have either left or been 
killed.  In Iraq, Christian communities have been decimated by the war and the flight from ISIS 
persecution.  Thus, one can say that “ninety years have wiped out four centuries of Christian 
resurgence” (Fargues, 1998, p. 63).     
 
Syria and Lebanon have greater religious diversity than almost anywhere else in the region.  
Prior to the Syrian conflict, all religious communities lived in comparative stability within a 
plural society.  Christians and Muslims who remain, though deeply hurt and affected, have 
remained true to this strategic vision despite a profound fracturing of trust.  Churches and 
 
154 Interview with Bishop Audo on 17 December 2016 in Damascus. 
155 Interview with Fr. Ibrahim Nseir on 26 May 2017 in Aleppo. 
156 The Edinburgh Companion to Global Christianity volume: “Christianity in North Africa and West Asia” 
(2018) quotes a 2015 figure of 6.1%.   
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mosques still stand side by side.  Christians and Muslims still share festivals both publicly and 
with friends.157 In May 2017, the Mother Superior of the Convent of Our Lady at Saidnaya told 
me: “The local Muslim community have continued to pray at the Convent and protect it 
throughout the crisis.  All people should come to Saidnaya, and thank the people (Christian and 
Muslim) for their defence and their sacrifice.”158   Despite the horrors of the conflict, local 
religious leaders continue to engage and work together, as they attempt to reconcile and serve 
their suffering communities, and the thousands of internally displaced, most of whom have 
fled ‘rebel’-controlled areas. 
 
Since the start of the conflict, opportunity for structured religious dialogue has been limited, 
and is seen as a ‘luxury’, not a priority.  However, ecumenical and inter-religious relations at a 
senior level have been positive, focussing on the need to offer practical assistance to the 
multiple communities that they serve and of which they are a part.  Christian and Muslim 
leaders in Syria are working daily on humanitarian, pastoral and reconciliation initiatives, In 
these ways, and in seeking to preserve the plural essence of Syrian society, they find 
commonality of purpose, and are having a significant impact.  In a sense, the Church leaders 
are fulfilling Bishop Audo’s wish, when he wrote prior to the conflict: “The vocation of Eastern 
Christians will be to become a bridge, or better, a model of communion between the Christian 
west and the Muslim World” (Audo, 2010c, p. 17), a view he confirmed as being as relevant 
and as important as ever when I interviewed him in December 2016.  Echoing this vision, the 
Syrian Orthodox Bishop of Qamishle, Bishop Maurice, said: “The leaders of the denominations 
are now very close.  We are called to present the face of Christ to the world, and in unity is our 
strength.”159 
 
The conflict has undoubtedly created a loss of trust between members of different religious 
communities at ‘grass roots’ level.  The significance of this should not be underestimated, 
especially where Christian communities have suffered death and destruction at the hands of 
Islamist extremists. The Salafist tendencies and extreme ideologies held by most of the 
militants have been well documented, even by those who supported their actions (Zuhur, 
2015) (Lister, 2015). Healing and the rebuilding of trust in these communities will take a long 
time, and religious leaders are already playing a significant part in striving to lay the 
 
157 Christmas has been publicly celebrated with particular enthusiasm in recent years in towns and cities 
across Syria, and especially in Aleppo and Damascus since the defeat of Islamist militants.  
158 Interview with the Mother Superior of Saidnaya Convent of Saidnaya at Saidnaya. 17 May 2017. 
159 Interview with Bishop Maurice, Syrian Orthodox Bishop of Qamishle, in Damascus. 29 May 2017. 
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foundations for that process.  But even so, there remains widespread resilience and will in 
Syrian society to preserve tolerance, mutual respect, and coexistence.   
 
After sharing the tragic story of events in the Christian town of Maaloula, which was taken 
over by radical Islamists in 2013, and where three Christians were murdered in the village, and 
a further six kidnapped and later murdered, one of the town’s priests, Fr. Nabil Wakim, said: 
“Our presence in the Middle East is a witness. This is our land and we will not leave it.”160   It is 
documented that the groups that occupied Maaloula included those designated by the 
international community as ‘moderate rebels’, fighting alongside those designated ‘terrorists’.  
Most Syrians refer to them all as ‘terrorists’, as they have all brought terror to local 
populations and uprooted peoples’ lives. Equally, many Christian leaders speak of the danger 
of the western Church’s acquiescence with western political policies in the region, and their 
impact on the rise of Islamic extremism, not just in the Middle East, but around the world.  
Rather than acquiescing with western policies, Christians in the West, says Revd Harout 
Selimian of Aleppo, “should be helping Christians in Syria to remain where they are, and to be 
light and salt within Syrian society beyond the conflict.”161  There remains a fear that even if 
extremist forces are defeated, their influence could re-emerge at a later date amongst any 
remaining and returning Syrians. 
 
The uniqueness and diversity of the Christian presence in Syria, and the depth of its historic 
roots, means that Christianity is part of the fabric of Syrian society.  This is a view shared by 
many Muslims in the country who commonly say that “without the presence of Christians, 
Syria will lose something vital to the quality and plurality of its identity.”162  Most Syrians share 
the hope that the diversity and plurality of the country can be preserved, and trust restored, so 
that Syria may once again be a beacon of religious diversity and tolerance.  Echoing many 
Muslims to whom I have spoken, a twenty-five year old Muslim man from Damascus wrote on 
15 May 2017: “I grew up in a Christian school.  I can only describe my experience as positive 
and amazingly beneficial.  I would definitely enrol my future children in a Christian school.”   A 
Muslim woman aged 25 from Lattakia wrote: “I do not believe the conflict has affected our 
relations.  I have not changed the way I interact with Christians and I will never do.  As a 
 
160 Fr. Nabil Wakim, speaking on 1 May 2017, at St. Saviour Monastery near Saida in Lebanon.  . 
161 Revd Harout Selimian, President of the Armenian Evangelical Church in Syria, speaking in Beirut 15 
May 2017 
162 Quoted in an interview with Bishop Antoine Audo. Damascus. 17 December 2016. 
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Muslim, I believe there should be this sense of positive coexistence between us.”163   Another 
Muslim man aged 52 from Aleppo wrote: “We need to return to our history and see how our 
forefathers coexisted.  No one in the West or East can lecture Syria on coexistence.  As a 
Muslim, we are ordered to be kind to all humanity and help them survive.”164 
 
In a global context in which extremist ideologies are on the rise; where there is increased 
persecution of Christians, and where tensions between Christianity and Islam in some contexts 
are perhaps at their highest level ever; an understanding of the political and social dimensions 
of Christian-Muslim dialogue and encounter has never been so urgent (Hirvonen, 2013, p. 
1).165 Sharing a common culture, language and customs with their Muslim compatriots, and 
through centuries of living alongside them, Middle Eastern Christians are well-placed to reflect 
on the means and methods of Christian-Muslim dialogue that have been adopted in the past, 
those that are effective in the present, and the possible impact of recent events on future 
engagement.   
 
Harout Selimian, President of the Armenian Evangelical Church in Syria says that the pillars of 
Christian-Muslim relations in Syria are the shared culture, music, food, history and language.  
“Syrian society has long been one of tolerance in which communities did not distinguish 
between religions, but shared the same land and resources.  This culture is what needs to be 
nurtured and recovered in order to restore peace and understanding.”166  Echoing many 
others, Syrian Orthodox Bishop Maurice says: “Ours is a long-standing culture of peace.  Before 
the war, we had no problem with Christians and Muslims.  We have been far removed from 
violence.”167  As Greek Orthodox Archimandrite Fr. Alexi Chehadeh said: “Historically, Islamic 
society in Syria is not the same as the extreme Islam that is being imported from outside.”168 
 
So what is the reality of current attitudes and inter-religious engagement in Syria, and what 
are their implications for future frameworks of Christian-Muslim coexistence and reconciliation 
amidst the conflict in the country?  How does the dynamic of the changing religious 
environment – the threat of violence, the changing demographic, the juridical emphasis in 
 
163 Response to Questionnaire online. 15 May 2017 
164 Response to Questionnaire online.  16 May 2017 
165 For example, see the report ‘Persecuted and Forgotten?’ Executive Summary Report of Aid to the 
Church in Need. 2017. 
166 As discussed in an interview with Revd Harout Selimian in Aleppo on 27 May 2017 
167 Interview with Bishop Maurice in Damascus. 29 May 2017 
168 Interview with Fr. Alexi Chehadeh in Damascus. 31 May 2017 
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Sunni Islam – impact on the way Syrians practise their faith?  Interreligious engagement in 
Syria has always been and continues to be practised at various levels – the personal and local; 
the institutional and regional; and the national. That breadth of encounter and experience has 
the potential to inform a much wider religious discourse.  For some, the encounter is purely 
cultural and social.  For others, there is a desire rooted in faith to sustain religious plurality.  
Some have had their respect for religion challenged by sectarian expressions of violence 
(Appendix 5). Religious leaders are seeking to respond to these changes in a variety of ways, 
but their voices are rarely heard or listened to outside Syria.   
 
At the local level, Christian and Muslim faith leaders have been instrumental in working 
together to initiate efforts to provide relief to local citizens, and to the Internally displaced in 
their midst.  Pastorally, they respond daily to bereavement and loss.  Often, they share the 
leadership of local community events in a highly visible way.  In some towns and villages, local 
Christian and Muslim clergy meet on a regular basis to discuss ways in which they can share in 
practical responses to the multiple needs of their people.   At local civic events, whether held 
at a mosque or Church, the Christian and Muslim clergy will almost always stand side by side as 
a visible witness to their mutual respect.  In May 2017, joined by hundreds of townspeople, I 
processed with local Greek Orthodox and Sunni Clergy down the main street of Dara’a to open 
a Community Centre, partly funded by the Greek Orthodox Church, for use of all members of 
the community in the town.169  I attended similar events in Homs, Tartous, and Aleppo, and 
joined members of GOPA-DERD as they delivered new water tanks to areas of East Aleppo 
 
169 The standard version of events that led to the uprising in Syria suggests that it began with a 
spontaneous demonstration by civilians to a brutal response by the Syrian authorities to anti-
government graffiti by a number of teenagers in the southern town of Daraa in March 2011.  The 
research of a Syrian writer living in America, Sarah Abed, however suggests that the reality is more 
complex than that.  Her article below reflects what townspeople, including local religious leaders, told 
me, when I visited the town in May 2017.  https://sarahabed.com/2017/08/15/syria-2011-a-four-
month-timeline-of-the-western-manufactured-uprising/  On 28 May 2017, I visited Daraa with a Greek 
Orthodox Archimandrite. During a meeting with the Governor of Daraa, Mohammed Khaled al-Hanous , 
he said: “Daraa was a prosperous town and a prosperous district.  We had over a thousand schools in 
the area, seven Colleges, five universities and seven public hospitals. During the years prior to 2010, 
over 50,000 people from the area went to work in the Gulf States, and this had a negative role in Daraa.  
It was also very vulnerable to insurgents because of the long and open border with Jordan. Nothing is 
true about what the media say happened here.  The demonstrations started from the Omar Mosque, 
and they started to shoot at the police and the people from there.  The Media Centre broadcast this and 
the next day they burned the media centre.  In the first days of the crisis, violent demonstrators burned 
four hundred schools. They destroyed clinics and burned thirty ambulances. Syrian history goes back 
thousands of years and we are proud of our social cohesion and the secular State. This trouble has come 




liberated in December 2016.170   In one East Aleppo district, the local Sunni Sheikh embraced 
me with the words: “Welcome. Thank God you are here. We are brothers.” 
 
The story of Qara exemplifies the coexistence that has for the most part prevailed in Syria, and 
the importance of monasteries within the religious landscape.   
 
Qara Is a village in the Qalamoun region south of Homs, in which Sunnis have lived side by side 
with Christians for centuries.  Several important Christian communities survive in this area, 
which was a place of refuge for Christians during the Mamluk battles against the Crusaders in 
the 13th Century CE.   Qara is home to two eleventh century churches, one of which was 
converted into a mosque by the Mamluks.  The local Syrian Catholic community have since 
built a modern church.   
 
One kilometre from the village is the seventh century Monastery of St. James the Persian 
inhabited by a community of monks and nuns.  Reputedly founded by Empress Helena, it is 
one of a string of monasteries that acted as places of hospitality and prayer en route to 
Jerusalem from Europe.  It surrounds a Roman tower with thick walls, for monasteries had to 
be heavily fortified against the armies that marched across the region, and the bandits who 
preyed on the travellers using the trade routes that passed through here from Europe, Asia 
and Arabia.  The monasteries were places of hospitality for travellers, and of refuge for local 
people during times of strife, no matter what their religious or communal identity.  They have 
played an important role in Christian-Muslim encounter and dialogue in the region. 
 
The monastery at Qara was in ruins when discovered by Mother Agnes Mariam de la Croix in 
1994.  With the permission of the Greek Melkite Bishop of Homs, the monastery was restored 
and a community moved in in 2000.  Between 2011 and 2013, the area was surrounded by 
60,000 Islamist fighters, and in 2013 the area and local village were occupied by ‘ISIS’.  During 
this time, the monks and nuns remained, sealing themselves inside the monastery, along with 
dozens of local Christian families who came to them for refuge.  By night Sunni villagers, risking 
death if they were caught, smuggled food for those inside.  After the village was liberated, the 
villagers worked together to restore the ancient and modern Churches in the village that had 
been badly desecrated by the occupiers.  Such stories are not unusual in Syria.  When I visited 
 




the monastery in November 2015, Hezbollah fighters were protecting the monastery and the 
area from ISIS front lines just one kilometre away.  The monastery’s protectors, all Shi’a 
Muslims, declared their respect for religious pluralism, and stated that they would give their 
lives to protect the Christian presence in the country.171    
 
Both Christian and Muslim communities have been instrumental in working alongside aid 
agencies to provide relief services to Syrian society.  The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate’s 
Department of Ecumenical Relations and Development (GOPA-DERD) is one such initiative.172  
Managing and funding dozens of charitable relief initiatives across Syria, using hundreds of 
well-qualified volunteers, the Charity manages numerous projects providing rehabilitation and 
shelter programmes, community centres to support skills development projects for IDPs, 
children’s support and education programmes, women’s empowerment projects; provision of 
water supplies; psycho-social support; small business loans and grants; and fund-raising for 
medical equipment in hospitals and clinics.   Most importantly of all, amongst the tens of 
thousands of beneficiaries, no preference or priority is given to any particular group or faith.   
And similar projects are run by most Christian denominations and faith communities, serving 
those in greatest need.173   
 
Christian and Muslim charitable initiatives on the ground play a vital role in implementing 
welfare and development projects wherever there is need.  These challenge a sectarian 
understanding of the post-conflict context and offer models and examples for restoring and 
rebuilding civil and religious society.  A contrasting interpretation is provided in a chapter 
entitled ‘Christian charities and the Ba’thist Regime in Bashar al-Asad’s Syria’. De Elvira 
discusses the increase in numbers and status of Christian charities in Syria both prior to and 
during the conflict (Elvira, 2015, pp. 92-109).  Whilst suggesting that the multiplicity of these 
charities is partly due to inter-denominational competition, Elvira acknowledges the non-
communitarian beneficiary policies amongst them.  She also argues that the privileged status 
of Christian charities in relation to Muslim organisations includes freer interaction with 
international organisations and  fewer legal restrictions.  This Elvira argues is a sign of a 
deliberately constructed “wider and deeper compromise between a ‘minority-led’ regime 
 
171 Christians in Iraq may have had a different experience with Shi’ite fighters. 
172 See: www.gopaderd.org 
173 The Syrian Orthodox Charity that is equivalent to the Greek Orthodox ‘GOPA-DERD’, is named ‘St. 
Ephrem Patriarchal Development Committee’ (EPDC), and like GOPA, operates numerous initiatives and 
projects around the country for development and relief aimed at those most affected by the conflict.  
Like GOPA, the charity is partnered with several major international charities. 
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aiming to preserve its power and a Christian minority afraid of losing its autonomy in a 
Muslim-majority country”, and represents a compromise by the Christian community in 
supporting the ‘regime’(Elvira, 2015, p. 109).  Whatever elements of truth may lie in such an 
analysis, this negative political conclusion ignores multiple other factors as regards the 
privileged status of Christian charities.  These include the non-communitarian and non-
politicisation of distribution, specialisation of services (for example for the disabled), clarity of 
administrational processes, and delivery of services. 
  
At a regional and national level, faith groups have been instrumental in helping implement the 
national Reconciliation project, a project overseen by Dr. Ali Haidar, until December 2018 
leader of the Syrian Social National (opposition) party and Minister for Reconciliation in the 
Syrian Government.   This work is based on the principle that “there is no resolution to conflict 
except a political one.  Violence will not achieve a resolution.”174  The intention is that local 
reconciliation initiatives will pave the way for a process of national dialogue.  The 
Reconciliation process is based on the following steps.175  An area is chosen in which to initiate 
direct contact with fighting groups, in order to achieve a ceasefire and the laying down of 
arms. If the fighters refuse contact, local religious leaders mediate.  The first step is to ensure 
that foreign fighters leave the area.  Syrian fighters are given the choice to continue fighting, 
or, if they have not served their required National Service, to join the Syrian Army or the 
police, in which case no action will be taken against them.  Once an agreement has been made, 
the priority is to remove weapons, maintain stability, and resume normal services of 
electricity, education and health care, which are provided free of charge.  This reconciliation 
process has resulted in ceasefires in dozens of towns and villages, with many fighters laying 
down their arms, and many others being allowed to transfer to areas under ‘rebel’ control.  
 
Faith leaders and unpaid volunteers are deeply engaged in this process.  One Sunni Sheikh with 
whom I spent a morning in Homs in 2014, was shot dead two weeks later when he approached 
a ‘rebel’ group to try to begin a dialogue.  However, despite the fact the process has been 
instrumental in bringing about an end to fighting and sieges in many areas of the country, 
including in Homs, Darraya, Mohammadiya, and Madaya, it has been strongly criticised outside 
Syria, for effectively ensuring a status quo that favours the government.  However, although 
many Syrians are pleased to see an end to fighting, many are unhappy that those whom they 
 
174 Quote by Dr. Ali Haidar, Minister for Reconciliation.  Interviewed in Damascus on 5 September 2016 
175 These steps were described by Dr. Haidar during a meeting with him in September, 2016. 
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regard as terrorists are allowed as part of the initiative to proceed freely to other areas of the 
country.  From a western perspective, this process may have flaws, and the term 
‘reconciliation’ may be inadequate to describe it.  Perhaps if the process were termed 
‘ceasefire negotiations’, it may more accurately reflect what is taking place, but the process 
has undeniably achieved positive results and saved lives on the ground.  If therefore the 
international community were to engage with Syrians inside the country, this could be one 
area where international support and expertise could be offered to assist the process of peace-
making and peace-building in such a way that leads to genuine reconciliation between 
different factions.  When I asked Dr. Haider if he would welcome engagement with experts in 
the field of reconciliation who have experience of working in other global conflicts, he warmly 
welcomed the suggestion. 
 
At a national level, senior faith leaders have been a consistent witness to Syria’s historic 
respect for plurality and diversity.  They are commonly seen together at civic and religious 
national events, and support the government of Syria and internal opposition leaders against 
violent opposition.  Echoing most faith leaders in Syria, His Holiness, the Syrian Orthodox 
Patriarch Ignatius Aphrem II says: “We are not ashamed to oppose people who kill us and 
bomb us.  We are in support of a legitimate government and we see no alternative.  If we 
stood with the West, we would have Mullahs ruling us now.  There would be no secular 
opposition. We do not want Shari’a law and theocracy.”176   In a similar vein, retired Greek 
Melkite Patriarch Gregorius III Laham says: “The world should cease arming and supporting 
people of violence, and bring all parties together in a shared political process.  Outsiders have 
no right to dictate who is or isn’t a part of that process. Who leads the country should be 
chosen by Syrians, not by external powers.  For the sake of Christianity, and for Christian-
Muslim relations worldwide, the Church should be listening to people of faith from the lands 
of their birth.”177  Others have stated that the Church’s political stance is not about supporting 
one party or another, but about protecting social and religious freedoms, and the plurality and 
diversity of the country. 
 
The Grand Mufti of Syria, Dr. Ahmad Badr Al-Din Hassoun, is one of the most moderate Muslim 
leaders in the Middle East, and a highly respected Sunni thinker in his own right.  He is 
 
176 Speaking at the Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate in Damascus on 2 September 2016.  




passionate about the plurality of Syrian society and the equal place that Muslims, Christians 
and Jews, have always had, and should continue to have, within it.  Typical of his inclusiveness 
are the words he spoke to the German Parliament in 2008, "I am Sunni in practice, Shiite in 
allegiance. My roots are Salafi, and my purity is Sufi.”   And in September 2016, he said: 
“Whether you are Buddhist, Christian, or atheist you are my brother.  We are all related to 
God, and He is a God of Love.”178   Sadly, Dr. Hassoun has been vilified by many Sunnis for his 
liberal Muslim stance towards other religious groups, his sympathies with Sufi spirituality – 
which has long played an important role in Syrian Islam - and for being, like all Grand Muftis in 
the region, an appointee of the Government. 
 
On Christmas Eve, 2017, the UK ‘Sunday Telegraph’ published an article by Bishop Antoine 
Audo, Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo.  Speaking first of the work of Caritas in Syria, of which 
Bishop Audo was President, he wrote:  
 
“I am convinced that our work changed the attitude of the Muslim majority towards 
our Christian community.  We served the poor without discrimination or fear.  This 
was new to Syria, where people tend to see a duty only to their family or tribe.  During 
the hostilities, we were at risk from the militants and safe only in government-
controlled areas, but that has eased as rebels retreat.”   
 
He continued:  
“At the start of the conflict, militants tried to pit Muslims against Christians, but they 
failed.  Our country has a rich culture and history to which Syrians are loyal, regardless 
of religion.  Syria is more than one man: this is not well understood in the West.  It is 
very important that we continue to represent Arab Christianity, to show the Muslim 
and Arab world that there are Christians with whom they can have a dialogue.  We 
must do all we can to stay and maintain our presence, but Christians in Syria have lost 
confidence that they can have security and stability.  That is what they will pray for this 
Christmas.” 
 
Bishop Audo’s statement is a true reflection of what many Syrians passionately affirm: “Our 
country has a rich culture and history to which Syrians are loyal, regardless of religion.” But as 
we shall see when considering the results of a Questionnaire, the impact of the conflict on 
inter-religious relations varies according to different contexts and the degree to which the 
conflict has affected communities.  The occupation of the village of Maaloula by Islamist 
forces, and its aftermath, offers an insight, even whilst villagers emphasise that what 
happened was not ‘sectarian’, but politically and ideologically motivated, of how inter-religious 
 
178 The Grand Mufti of Syria, Dr. Ahmad Badr al Hassoun, speaking at his home in September 2016. 
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attitudes have been impacted by violence, and how the impact of this changing religious 




Maaloula lies in the Qalamoun region, where Christianity settled early in the Christian era.  
‘Maaloula’ means ‘the entrance’, which refers to the narrow pass at the foot of which the 
village sits, and that features in the story of St. Thecla, a disciple of St. Paul who lived and died 
here and whose shrine is a place of pilgrimage for both Christians and Muslims.  There is 
evidence of human habitation for the last 10,000 years.  Situated dramatically against a rocky 
escarpment 60kms north of Damascus, this small Christian town has been a place of pilgrimage 
for centuries, and is one of the few places remaining in the world where Aramaic, the language 
of Jesus, has survived as a spoken, rural dialect.  
 
The village has a majority population of Antiochene Greek Orthodox and Melkite Greek 
Catholic Christians, (who use the Arab language in their oriental Byzantine liturgy), living 
alongside a minority Muslim community.  Apart from a few periods of tension, particularly in 
the nineteenth century, the Christian and Muslim communities have lived side by side for 
centuries.  The village’s isolation until recent decades is one reason that the community 
resisted Arabisation and Islamisation, thus preserving its western Aramaic linguistic heritage 
for so long.  Maaloula used to be home to about 15,000 people some decades ago, but in 
2004, the Syrian Bureau of Statistics gave the full-time number of residents as 2762.179  
However, this number increased dramatically during the summer holidays, when families from 
Damascus would come to stay in the village. 
 
Tradition describes how St. Thecla, a first century disciple of St. Paul, who vowed to devote her 
life to Christ, fled persecution and found refuge in Maaloula. Thecla was widely venerated in 
the early Church, and in the Eastern Churches continues to be regarded as a role model for 
women.180  Prior to the conflict, pilgrims from all over the world climbed the steps above St. 
Thecla Convent to visit her tomb in the cave where she resided.  In September 2016, I returned 
to the shrine.  Picking through rubble in the desecrated convent, past smashed mosaics, and 
 
179 http://www.cbssyr.org/new%20web%20site/General_census/census_2004/NH/TAB03-17-2004.h 




the burnt-out Church, I climbed to the cave, to find the shrine blackened by fire – icons stolen 
or destroyed, and the altar smashed by the militants who had occupied Maaloula in 2013.  
Visiting again in May 2017, the Convent was already in an advanced state of restoration.  By 
September 2017, the restoration was almost complete. 
 
On a cliff overlooking the town of Maaloula stands the Melkite Greek Catholic Monastery of St. 
Sergius (Mar Sarkis).  Built on the site of a pagan shrine, and with a marble altar that predates 
Christianity, parts of the Church date to the 4th Century.  Some of the wood in the walls of the 
Church has been carbon-dated to over 2000 years old.  The monastery also contained unique 
Byzantine icons which were either stolen or destroyed during the Monastery’s occupation and 
use as a Headquarters by Jabhat al Nusra.  As with the Convent of St. Thecla in the valley 
below, pilgrims used to come from all over the world to visit this church, but during the 
occupation of Maaloula by the Islamists, the Monastery was occupied as a headquarters by the 
fighters, from which snipers would fire on the villagers below.  (On 17 September 2013 a local 
farmer was shot dead from this monastery whilst collecting water from the village spring in the 
centre of the village.) The Church was badly desecrated and damaged in battle.  Since the 
liberation of the town in April 2014 by the Syrian Army, the Monastery has been fully restored.  
A leader of the local Christian community, Abdo Haddad has been instrumental in negotiating 
the return from Lebanon of some of the items that had been “looted and smuggled by the 
traitors”.181 The monastery is once again being looked after by a local priest, Fr. Abdullah, and 
a ‘family’ of staff who welcome guests, maintain the monastery, and tend the fields.   
 
Maaloula’s history has always been fragile.  Situated in a remote area of the Qalamoun, the 
village sits at the head of a fertile valley.  Farming is the main local industry, and Maaloula is 
known for the quality of its produce.  Pichon records the hypothesis that the Christians of 
Maaloula are descendants of a nomadic tribe who originated in Mesopotamia north of the 
Euphrates, and fled the Muslim invasion.  Some settled in the ante-Lebanon range, and others 
in the Hauran region in southern Syria.  However, this hypothesis has not been proved, and 
Christian monasteries already existed in the town prior to the Muslim conquest.  Whatever 
their true origins, the area’s inhabitants are known for their courage, and from the earliest 
years of the Muslim conquest, local Christians resisted Islamisation (Pichon, 2010).182 
 
 
181 Email Correspondence with Abdo Haddad, 2 September 2017 




One of the most famous features of Maaloula’s cultural history is the celebration of the Feast 
of the Holy Cross which takes place on 14 September each year.  The feast commemorates the 
finding of the ‘true Cross’ in Jerusalem in the fourth century, by Empress Helena, mother of 
Emperor Constantine.  Tradition states that she ordered fires to be lit on high mountains 
across the region, to mark a signal until it reached the Emperor.  The night before the 
celebration, bonfires are lit on the summit of both mountains north and south of the town to 
mark the start of the feast.  For centuries, and continuing to the present day, thousands of 
people gather to mark the occasion.  Two other important celebrations in Maaloula are the 
Greek Orthodox Feast of St. Thecla on 27 September, and the Greek Catholic (Melkite) 
celebration of the Feast of St. Sergius on 7 October.  In celebrating these feasts, authentic 
Eastern Christian traditions are preserved, and remain of global religious and historic 
significance.   
  
During Ottoman times, owing to the economic disadvantages faced by dhimmis, limitations in 
transport links, the riots of 1850 and 1860, and the political instability of the French Mandate, 
the village saw a steady decline in its population, with families moving to the growing and 
developing cities of Damascus or Beirut, or as far afield as South America. However, from the 
second half of the nineteenth century onwards, an increasing number of visitors: European 
academics, orientalists, travellers and pilgrims, were drawn by the unique religious, cultural, 
anthropological and linguistic heritage of the village, and helped raise awareness of the 
village’s historical and religious significance.  For despite its relative proximity to Damascus, its 
uniqueness had been preserved by its’ geographic isolation.  After independence, the fortunes 
of the village improved further as villagers were able to articulate the unique Aramaic and 
Eastern Christian identity of the community, in the context of a nationalist vision that sought 
to include and celebrate the multiple identities that existed historically within Syrian society 
(Pichon, 2010). 
 
The years 1831 to 1860 were tense for the region, and have not been forgotten.  In 1831, the 
Egyptian army, supported by western powers, conquered the Ottoman Province of Syria.  In 
1840, the Ottoman Pasha reconquered the area, but unrest and violence continued.  These 
years coincided with the period of Ottoman tanzimat reforms that lifted economic restrictions 
on dhimmi populations, and re-framed the millet system to allow legal protection and a degree 
of independence in religious and social law, to minority groups.  But it also reduced the power 
and economic freedom of local land-owners, creating resentment and political discontent. The 
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reforms were intended to improve life for non-Turk subjects, enhance civil liberties, liberate 
economic policies, and grant more equality of status to non-Muslim citizens, but the process of 
economic and political modernisation was seen by many Muslims as an example of excessive 
foreign influence in the region.  It also served to centralise power, and included an unpopular 
general conscription into the Ottoman army, which could be waived by the payment of an 
exemption tax. Ironically, given the professional status of many non-Muslim citizens of the 
Ottoman Empire, further resentments developed as it was often these who could afford to pay 
for exemption. The Qalamoun region was one area in which bandits, and rebels opposed to 
the reforms, operated.183 
 
In 1850, the Shi’ite governor of Baalbeck, Muhammad Harfouch, rebelled against the Ottoman 
government, and his rebels took refuge in the vicinity of Maaloula.   Pichon notes that: “It 
seems that the inhabitants of Maaloula had no participation in the events, refrained from 
aiding the rebels and collaborated effectively with Mustafa Pacha, “ (the Ottoman 
governor).184  But in the belief that St. Sergius Convent had given refuge to the rebels, Ottoman 
soldiers nevertheless attacked both convents, raped a number of women, and slit the throat of 
twenty-two villagers.  The Greek Orthodox Bishop of Maaloula was reportedly one of those 
killed.  Further unrest (and massacres of Christians) that took place in Damascus and Aleppo in 
1860 added to the communal memory of Maaloula, and helped precipitate further emigration 
from the village, particularly to the Christian quarters of the Old City of Damascus.  
 
Maaloula also featured in the ‘Great Revolt’ by Syrian nationalists against the French Mandate 
in 1925185.  The Christian communities in Maaloula -particularly the Greek Catholics -  faced a 
difficult dilemma in that they had been protected by the French, and did not wish to 
participate in the uprising.   When nearby Nebek became a centre for militant groups, the 
militants demanded assistance from the village in order to fight the Mandate authorities.  The 
people of Maaloula refused, and were attacked.  Churches were set alight, and in October 
1925, a battle took place between residents and the militant groups for two days, whist the 
women hid in caves above the village.  Amongst the defenders, only two were killed, whilst the 
attackers suffered many casualties.   A siege followed through the winter, with the French 
authorities providing support to the village, but was finally called off, following agreements 
between the French occupiers and the militant fighters.  Maaloula’s appeal to the French 
 
183 Pichon, Frederic. (2010) Kindle version.  Location 2501. 
184 Pichon, Frederic. (2010) Kindle version.  Location 2525.   My translation. 
185 Pichon, Frederic. (2010) Kindle version.   Location 4174-4390 
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authorities in this period adds complexity to the historic understanding of communal 
dynamics, and the loyalties of different Christian communities.  As Pichon notes (my 
translation of the original French): “History has shown that except for rare exceptions, Catholic 
populations were the only ones to support the French Mandate, whilst Orthodox and Muslims 
opposed them.”186  Indeed, it was reported by “Sisters of the Holy Heart” that during the siege, 
some Orthodox and Muslims left the village, and in 1926, (as was to be the case ninety years 
later), a number of Muslim villagers joined the attackers. 
 
These experiences in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Maaloula, illustrate the complexity 
and sensitivity of communal loyalties, and the fact that tensions that arise at different times 
and underlie the plurality of the context are both inter-religious and ecumenical.  And when 
they do find expression, they often do so for political rather than religious or sectarian 
reasons. 
 
Notwithstanding the positive coexistence that was re-established between the communities in 
subsequent years, historical memory has established a lasting concern amongst Maaloula’s 
residents of the possibility of communal tension that could evolve into sectarian violence.  The 
events of 2013 brought that memory to the fore, to the extent that most villagers are reluctant 
to allow the return of fellow citizens who supported the ‘rebels,’ on the basis that they worry 
that their hatred will only remain dormant until another opportunity to resort to violence 
appears. 
 
The story of the occupation of Maaloula by multiple Islamist factions, and its subsequent 
liberation, offers a poignant ‘window’ into the damage that has been done to the multiple 
communities in Syria during the course of the conflict.  As Abdo Haddad says, “Our souls are 
fractured”.  This fracturing reflects the pain of the challenge presented to the coexistence and 
trust that had for so long prevailed for the most part in Maaloula, and in Syria itself.  In 
Maaloula, the most traumatic fact for the Christian community is that – reopening communal 
wounds and memories from past events - some local members of the Muslim community 
provided arms and fighters to the terrorist groups and participated in the looting of homes, the 
desecration of shrines, and the killing of residents.  Yet, like so many others throughout Syria, 
Abdo stresses that he does not see this as a conflict between Christians and Muslims, but 
 
186 Pichon, Frederic. (2010) Kindle version.  Location 4366.  
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rather as a defence of Syria itself, and the coexistence, plurality and diversity which has been 
at the heart of the nation for generations.    
 
Having visited Maaloula several times prior to the conflict, it was deeply poignant to visit the 
town several times between 2015 and 2018 after its occupation by terrorists and subsequent 
liberation.  In May 2017 I was privileged to meet a group of refugees from the village at St. 
Saviour’s Monastery not far from Sidon in Lebanon, and a few days later, to attend a moving 
memorial service in Lebanon, to six young men who had been kidnapped in 2013, but whose 
bodies were only found in 2016, and formally identified by DNA samples in 2017.  In the 
Church were several hundred refugees from Maaloula, the pain of their experiences and their 
loss and exile deeply etched on their face. 
 
The militants first occupied the northern lands of Maaloula in December 2012.  On 8 February 
2013 they occupied the spectacularly located 4 Star Safir Hotel overlooking the town, making it 
their headquarters.  This had been a beautiful and much-loved hotel in which I had stayed 
twice prior to the conflict.  But today it stands in ruins.   
 
The first major attack occurred on 4 September 2013, when a suicide-bomber exploded a 
massive car-bomb at the entrance gate to the town, killing several soldiers at the checkpoint.   
This was followed by co-ordinated attacks against Syrian army positions near the town.  As a 
local farmer, and other witnesses said: 
 
The fighters included people from the Free Syrian Army, the Al Farouq Brigades, Ahfad 
al Rasul, Jabhat al Nusra, Jaish al Islam, Ahrar al Sham, Jabhat Islammiya, Palestinian 
Hamas fighters (Jabhat Tahreer al-Qalamoun),  and Jabhat al Ruhr Qalomoun.  
Amongst them were fighters from Libya, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Uyghur 
Turkic Chinese as well as Syrians.187   
 
Abdo Haddad stresses: “We must emphasise that the so-called ‘moderate’ ‘Free Syrian Army’ 
were major partners in all of these.  There was no distinguishing between the ‘moderate’ 
groups and the extremist factions.”  On 7 September 2013, the militants broke into the town 
and entered the home of Antoinette and her brother Anton.  Antoinette is still suffering from 
her injuries, and her grief is deep.  She still lives in the small house that changed her life, and it 
was there that she told us how she, her brother Anton, her elderly and sick father, her aunt, 
 
187 Interview with refugees from Maaloula.  At St. Saviour Monastery, Lebanon. 1 May 2017 
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and her brother-in-law and nephew, Serkis and Mikhael, hearing the shouts of ‘Allahu Akhbar’ 
from terrorists as they broke down the door and entered the courtyard, hid in the small cave 
at the back of the house that acts as a store room.  On being called out and told they would be 
safe, Anton, Serkis and Mikhael went to talk to the fighters.  Once they were out, the terrorists 
nevertheless fired into the home, wounding Antoinette in her hiding place.  Terrified and 
injured, Antoinette heard what followed.  “The terrorists demanded that Anton recite the 
Shehadeh. Anton’s reply was: ‘I was born Christian and I will die Christian.’” They shot him 
dead, and Serkis and Mikhael were each murdered as they too refused to convert.  It wasn’t 
until four hours later that local Defence Fighters were able to rescue Antoinette and her 
surviving family from the home.188 
 
A few days later on 7th of September six young men were kidnapped.  What is particularly 
difficult for the Christian community in Maaloula to forgive is the fact that “four of the six 
young men were kidnapped by their Sunni neighbours who were working with the terrorists. 
And then they were executed by the Maaloula Muslim Leader Emad Diab and his 
local gang.”189  Their bodies were finally discovered in 2016.    
 
Most of the residents of the village escaped on 7 September via sewers out of the village, 
leaving local Defence volunteers.  The following weeks and months saw a long and difficult 
battle between the Maaloula Defence force, with the Syrian Army and Hezbollah, and the 
terrorist factions to recapture the town – a battle that cost the lives of over 200 Syrian Army 
soldiers.  During this time, the terrorists “brought in looting gangs to the town.  They wrote on 
the doors of houses either ‘This is a Muslim house’, or, on Christian homes, ‘We will slaughter 
you.’”190  By the time Maaloula was recaptured, “ninety homes were destroyed; no church was 
left intact.  The terrorists dug up graves and desecrated bodies.  They destroyed farms, and cut 
down fruit trees.”191 
 
On 2 December 2013, Jabhat-al-Nusra kidnapped thirteen Greek Orthodox Nuns from the 
Convent of St. Thekla.  They were held for three months in various locations, finally ending up 
in Yabroud, before negotiations involving the Qatari, Lebanese and Syrian governments 
resulted in their release on 9 March 2014, in exchange for 150 women detained in prisons in 
 
188 Interview with Antoinette in her home in Maaloula.  3 September 2016 
189 Abdo Haddad writing in an email correspondence dated 2 September 2017 
190 Interview with refugee from Maaloula.  1 May 2017 
191 Sarkis Raiham, a local farmer, speaking at St. Saviour Monastery, Lebanon on 1 May 2017. 
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Syria.  At the time of writing, the nuns were living in safety in another Greek Orthodox 
monastery in Syria, awaiting the completion of restoration work on the Convent of St. 
Thekla.192 
 
On 14 April 2014, the town of Maaloula was finally recaptured, but its shrines and a large 
majority of homes in the Old Town were very badly damaged.   A year later, a statue of the 
Virgin Mary, introduced by the ‘Syrian Trust’, a charity presided over by the First Lady of Syria, 
Asma Assad, was placed on one of the rocky pinnacles overlooking the town to replace the one 
that had been destroyed by the Islamist fighters.  Since then, substantial works of restoration 
have taken place at both the shrines – Mar Thecla and Mar Sarkis – as well as local Churches, 
and local homes.193  The villagers who have remained and those who have returned are keen 
to see the town returned to its former glory, and for most of its residents to return.  At the end 
of 2014, there were 1400 people in Maaloula.  In 2017, there were just 800 people in the 
town.  Those who could return but haven’t are reluctant primarily for economic reasons.  The 
town still lacks an adequate transport system, and much infrastructure has yet to be fully 
restored.  In May 2017, there was still fear that terrorists who had not been completely 
expelled from the Qalamoun region, might return and attempt to attack the village again.  But 
once they were defeated in the area, it was hoped that the rate of return would increase.194   
 
Many citizens of Maaloula are keen to stress the historic coexistence in Maaloula, and resist a 
sectarian narrative. Rather, what happened is seen as politically motivated, with an external 
religious agenda – namely that of those who adhere to Salafist and Wahhabi ideology.  For 
most, the deepest hurt is that some of the residents of Maaloula assisted the terrorists. As one 
resident put it bluntly: “This is not about Christianity versus Islam, but about patriots versus 
betrayers of the country.”   
 
Mr. George Reihan from Maaloula said: “We spent hundreds of years living together without a 
problem. It was only after residents of the village went to live and work in Qatar and Saudi 
 
192 The following article from ‘Al Monitor’, dated 11 March 2014, details the negotiations leading up to 
the release of the nuns. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/03/syria-nuns-maaloula-
released.html 
193 See also:  https://www.sott.net/article/331705-Eva-Bartlett-Overcoming-savagery-treachery-
Maaloulas-heroic-defenders-fight-for-the-future.   In this article, Eva Bartlett recounts her visit to 
Maaloula ,and interviews with a few of the same figures mentioned here. 
194 Discussions with refugees from Maaloula at St. Saviour Monastery, Lebanon, 1 May 2017. 
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Arabia, and returned with sectarian tendencies that tensions developed.”195  Fr. Fadi Barkil, 
also from Maaloula, spoke similarly. His own brother was kidnapped, but freed after a ransom 
was paid.  Another young member of the family was however killed in the conflict.  This had a 
huge emotional impact on the whole family.  He says:  
 
Before the war started, Muslims and Christians were united together.  We shared our 
celebrations and our family events.  It is the war that has caused the separation and 
severely damaged relationships.  But we still thank God for our lives.  We are told to 
love our enemies.  We are ready to do that, but on the human side, there must be 
justice. Christianity started in the Middle East and we hope it will continue for many 
years.  But we need people to return.  We need help to rebuild the homes and the 
shrines.   In Lebanon and Syria, Christians are learning and teaching what it means to 
be disciples.  Christians in the West should join us in that discipleship.196 
 
In Maaloula, someone wishing to remain anonymous gave a more nuanced account that 
suggests a complex process of developing communal distrust in recent decades.   
 
In Maaloula we had good social relationships until the 1980s.  Then it began to 
diminish and Muslims distanced themselves.  Initially there was tension between 
Islamists and the Government, with Christians in the middle.  At first, Muslims didn’t 
want to displace the Christians but wanted to be in charge of the town.  But later, a 
fanatical dimension developed amongst some residents.  Christians and Muslims had 
always been careful not to hurt each other.   We shared life in most fields and in 
joyous and sad occasions.  But we were always conscious of differences and were 
afraid to speak about them. There were good relationships on the surface, but they 
couldn’t go deeper. A lot of foreign hands contributed to this weak point in Syrian 
society.  They drove a sectarian wedge between Sunni and Alawite, and later with the 
Christians.  The beginning of healing will be addressing some of these problems.  But 
we cannot address them until the end of the war.  Up until now, about 300 families 
have returned.  Of these, about 20 are Muslim, but otherwise it is forbidden for the 
Muslims to return.  It is too complicated and we are too afraid.  But we will have to 
deal with it.”   And in a comment typically courageous of local Syrian Christian 
communities, the speaker added: “Despite the very bad situation, we are here by the 
grace of God.  Maybe we need it to shake us and wake us up; to think about our 
problems, and to use this experience to learn for the future.197 
 
A further historical insight was added by a member of the Maaloula Council.  “Our problem 
began with the Ottoman occupation.  Many of the villages in this area were Christian, but 
when there was drought, the Ottoman authorities refused to help the Christians unless they 
 
195 Mr. George Reihan speaking with other Maaloula refugees at St. Saviour Monastery, Lebanon. 1 May 
2017 
196 Interview with Fr. Fadi Bakil.  Zahle, Lebanon.  2 May 2017 
197 Interview in Maaloula.  16 May 2017 
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became Muslim.  Many converted.”  This comment reflects an ambiguous attitude towards the 
Ottoman era held by many Christians, who regarded it, despite its longevity, as a period of 
‘occupation’.  Echoing everyone else I spoke to, he continued:  
 
For us, 1946-1982 was a good period.  It was the rise of the Ikhwan (The Muslim 
Brotherhood) that started the deterioration.  Many Syrians also went to Saudi Arabia 
and converted to Wahhabi ideology.  Since the 1980s, there has been a changing mood 
between Christians and Muslims. We started having criticism about the Church bells 
ringing, about the cross on the hill, and the lighting of fires on the Feast of Mariam.  
The extremists waited for their moment.  When the terrorists came, some local people 
chose to work with them. There were Saudis, Turks, Afghanis amongst them, and local 
people received many Ryals (Saudi currency) to work with them.  Before the war, I 
worked at a clinic in a neighbouring village.  The Muslims would come to me for 
treatment, and many chose to support the Syrian army.  Maaloula was a centre for 
education, health care, and for some of the finest traditional industry in Syria.  Some 
people no longer trust the Muslims and say they cannot return.  They fear that they 
will wait again for the right moment to try to do the same thing.  We don’t know what 
to do.198   
 
The importance of the Ottoman era as far as Christian-Muslim relationships are concerned are 
often referred to in conversations, and hint at underlying historical communal tensions.  A 
resident of Maaloula who wished to remain anonymous said:  
 
Our problem in Maaloula and in neighbouring Christian villages began with the 
Ottoman occupation.  Difficult circumstances forced some Christians to become 
Muslim.  I think we are living in a very significant period.  Events since the start of the 
‘Arab Spring’ are as important as the fall of Constantinople in the sixteenth century.  If 
terrorist groups succeed here in Syria, then maybe they will succeed in Europe.   The 
Syrian army is preventing this from happening.  Maybe, our Syrian martyrs are dying to 
protect Europe.199 
 
A leading elder of the community, echoing a theme repeated by many Christians in Syria – 
bewilderment at the collusion of western Christians with those threatening Syria’s plurality, 
and awareness of possible consequences said:  
 
What are the western churches doing supporting the terrorists? I am warning you.  
This extreme ideology will come to the west.  I have no problems with Muslims.  We 
lived with them for years.  But there are two faces.  Once the flow of money started to 
come from the Gulf to the terrorist factions, even some of the young men I taught 
became more and more extremist.  A little before the crisis, we noticed that two 
schools in the village started to wear uniforms from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  When the 
 
198 Interview in Maaloula with Dr. Joseph Saadeh, Local Councillor and Dentist. 14 May 2017 
199 Interview in Maaloula.  14 May 2017 
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crisis started, some civilians suddenly became militants, and even wrote ‘No religion 
but Islam,’ and ‘we will come back and slaughter you’ on our doors.200  
 
A local Christian shop-keeper made a similar point:  
 
We are good people and we deal with people in good faith.  Many Christians bring 
Muslims to work with them – and many Muslims want to work with the Christians, 
because they know they will be treated fairly.  Maaloula was attacked one hundred 
years ago by Muslims.  They have done so again.  And we fear that if they come back, 
they will wait for the right time and do so again.201 
 
Everyone I have spoken to in and from Maaloula believes that events there represent a lesson 
for the wider world.  The documented collusion of western nations with the forces that 
destroyed Maaloula and threatened the cohesion of Syrian society, and the silence of western 
Christian communities in the face of the persecution of Christians by extremists in Syria, has 
not been lost on both Christian and Muslim Syrians who value the pluralist tradition of the 
country.202  Fr Nabil Wakim, Superior of St. Saviour’s Monastery in Lebanon says:  
 
Jesus told us to always tell the truth.  If the west doesn’t tell the truth, and stand by 
the Christians of the East, it will be the beginning of the end for Christianity in the 
West.  Christians there are contributing to the persecution of the Churches in the East, 
but instead, they should be supporting us.203  
 
 
200 Interview with a village elder in Maaloula. 20 September 2017 
201 Interview with a shopkeeper in Maaloula. 15 May 2017 
202 In a House of Lords Debate on Syria on 20 September, 2017, Baroness Caroline Cox asked what types 
of assistance the British Government provided to the Syrian opposition between 2015 and 2017.  Lord 
Ahmad, Minister of State for the Commonwealth replied: “Through the cross-government Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) for Syria the UK is supporting those groups opposed to Daesh and 
Assad as well as Syrian civilians and their communities. This support to the moderate opposition has 
included political support and non-lethal equipment. In terms of equipment, we have provided 
communications, medical and logistics equipment. We have also provided equipment to protect against 
chemical weapons attack. For security reasons we do not disclose the names of groups supported. The 
UK does not supply weapons to anybody in Syria. The value of the CSSF for Syria is £69 million in the 
current financial year, was £64 million in 2016-17, and £66 million in 2015-16.ody in Syria. The value of 
the CSSF for Syria is £69 million in the current financial year, was £64 million in 2016-17, and £66 million 
in 2015-16.”  On 14 December 2017, in response to a tabled Parliamentary Question (HL4196) 
concerning support to armed opposition groups in Syria, Lord Ahmad replied: “In partnership with other 
donor countries Her Majesty’s Government provides a range of support to Syrians to help save lives, 
bolster civil society, counter extremism, promote human rights and accountability, and lay the 
foundations for a more peaceful future.  This financial year, we have allocated over £60 million through 
the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF).  Of this, £10 million has gone to armed opposition groups, 
in the form of non-lethal assistance and lifesaving support, helping them protect civilians from the 
threats of both the Assad regime and extremists.” 
203 Fr. Nabil Wakim.  Speaking at St. Saviour’s Monastery, Lebanon.   1 May 2017 
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 In Maaloula, a local shopkeeper added: “Christians are taught to love one another.  Where is 
the support of western Christians for us here?  If this continues, what happened here in 
Maaloula will happen in Europe.”204 
 
But the Christians of Maaloula are not depending on external support, and are adamant that it 
is up to Syrians inside Syria to determine their own future.  Fr. Tawfiq, the Melkite Parish Priest 
of St. George’s Church in Maaloula says: “Theologically, we are fighting a battle with the forces 
of evil.  We will learn for the future.  As Christians, we have a major part to play in making Syria 
a better society and restoring hope and trust, and we have a lot to offer.  We will be true, frank 
and strong in belief.”205  Many are keen to stress that they do not see this as a sectarian issue.  
Abdo Haddad, a leading figure in the Maaloula community said:  
 
Whether we are Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Alwaite, Orthodox, Catholic, we are all Syrians.  
Christians have a key part to play in the future of the country so long as we recognise 
that we are Syrians first.  This is not a civil war, but rather a war against our country by 
foreign invaders. Fundamentalist Islam is not a religion.  It is a political ideology.  It is 
not Christianity against Islam.  It is our government and President who hold our 
country together.  Without them, minorities will be driven out. 206 
 
Despite the pain of what has happened, and the fear of what the future could hold, the people 
of Maaloula exhibit a remarkable degree of resilience, and a determination to ensure that 
Maaloula will once again be the place of peace, hope and faith that it has represented for so 
many generations.  The Head of the Maaloula Council, says:  
 
What we need is a period when Truth can be told followed by a process of 
reconciliation.  The conflict has caused great tensions.  We want to overcome them, 
and ensure that we can all live with equal rights and free from any extremist 
ideology.207   
 
The speed with which restoration work of homes and churches has been undertaken, even 
whilst the war continued in other parts of the country, is witness to the will of the people to 
survive and flourish, and of the symbolic cultural and religious importance that Maaloula holds 
in the country as a whole. 
 
 
204 Maaloula Shopkeeper.   Speaking in Maaloula on 15 May 2017. 
205 Fr. Tawfiz, Priest of St. George’s Melkite Greek Catholic Church, Maaloula.  16 May 2017. 
206 Abdo Haddad, speaking to a British delegation in Beirut. 29 April 2017 
207 Conversation with Head of Maaloula Council.  Maaloula. 15 May 2017. 
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4.5 Aleppo.   
 
Whilst Ma’aloula provides a ‘window’ into the inter-communal context within a rural Christian 
village in Syria, the city of Aleppo offers an insight into the urban context, and how the 
multiple communities within the city, influenced by the city’s importance as a centre of trade, 
have evolved and related through different historical periods and under numerous internal 
and external influences.    This account focusses on the impact of the recent conflict on 
communal relations.208 
 
Before the conflict, the journey to Aleppo was an easy four-hour journey north from 
Damascus, along the main highway through Homs and Hama.  However, during the conflict, 
the journey was much more difficult and dangerous, involving a diversion that extended the 
journey-time by at least three hours.  The highway between Homs and Aleppo passed through 
territory occupied by multiple militant groups, controlled mainly by the notorious Jabhat al-
Nusra faction, an Al-Qaeda affiliate.  The alternative route was only marginally less dangerous, 
following a narrow corridor between territory controlled by ISIS on one side, and Jabhat al-
Nusra on the other.  For six years, this was the only means by which the city of Aleppo – just 
under 2 million people – could be supplied with food, medical supplies, and fuel.  
 
To reach Aleppo required a turning east from Homs, past the town of Al-Salamiyeh, (a centre 
for Ismaili Islam and the burial place of the father of the current Aga Khan). Politically, Al-
Salamiyeh was an early centre for the 2011 demonstrations, but allegiances remained loyal to 
the government, when, for over four years, the town was regularly attacked by surrounding 
Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS forces battling the government for control of the only route available 
through which the city of Aleppo could receive supplies.  In one of the deserted towns in this 
area, we saw graffiti insulting a local Saudi Sheikh who had preached Wahhabi ideology and 
encouraged the town to rise up against the government.  Many Syrian Sunnis are resentful of 
the role that extremist Islamic ideologies have played in destabilising the country. 
 
The road continues about sixty miles eastwards along the main road to Al-Raqqah, to the 
Ithriyah junction, just short of what was then ISIS-controlled territory, where a further road 
heads north across the desert to Khanasser.  This journey was one of the most dangerous in 
Syria, and had regularly been attacked both by ISIS and Jihadist groups, who occupied large 
 
208 A brief history of Aleppo in Appendix 4 contextualises the city’s communal landscape. 
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swathes of territory either side of the highway.  Buildings and villages along the way had been 
destroyed, and both sides of the highway were littered with the burnt-out remains of vehicles 
– cars, buses, lorries -  that had been shelled or ambushed by the militants.  The road’s 
vulnerability was enhanced by the fact that it passes through flat, open desert.  From 
Khanasser, another site of many battles, the route to Aleppo continues along the western edge 
of Lake Jabboul (the other side of which was ISIS territory), and finally along the notorious 
‘Castello Road’, which was under constant attack by multiple ‘rebel’ factions, into Aleppo.  For 
six years, this route remained the only means of access for the 1.8 million inhabitants of 
government-held West Aleppo, who were in effect under siege from the ISIS and Jihadist 
factions that surrounded them.  
 
It was along this road that I travelled twice during the ‘rebel’ occupation of East Aleppo, and 
thrice after the city had been liberated. On two of those occasions, vehicles were attacked 
within hours of our passing by. 
 
The journey took nine hours from Damascus, when in September 2016, I led the first British 
delegation to visit Aleppo since 2012 – a delegation that included three Peers from the House 
of Lords, Baroness Cox, Lord Hylton, and Anglican Bishop, Rt.Revd Michael Nazir-Ali.  En-route, 
we stopped at a check-point in Homs for refreshments, and talked with the soldiers there.  The 
following day, a car bomb exploded at the same checkpoint, killing all the soldiers and over 
forty civilians in their cars as they waited to pass.  It was one of four car-bombs that exploded 
in different cities in Syria that day, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries, but 
which went unreported in the western media.  Such attacks committed by militant groups in 
government-controlled areas of Syria on an almost daily basis were rarely reported in the 
western media.   
 
Arriving in Aleppo was a surprise.  Passing through the destroyed remnants of areas of the city 
that had been recaptured from ‘rebel’ groups, and at times with banks of dirt and buses 
thrown on their sides to protect passing vehicles from the possibility of sniper fire, one 
suddenly entered government-controlled West Aleppo, where 1.8 million people live.  In the 
space of a hundred metres, one passed from streets of destroyed buildings, into a vibrant, 
busy city.  Shops and cafes were open and operating.  People and vehicles filled the streets 
going about their daily business.  The world had been given the impression of a destroyed city, 
and indeed much of it was, but the reality of daily life for the majority of the city’s population 
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in the western part of the city, which was under constant attack by militant groups, was rarely 
mentioned in the media.  Here, people of all communities, living together, were able to get on 
with their lives, notwithstanding that no area of the city was safe from the constant shelling 
and gunfire that was randomly directed hourly into busy neighbourhoods.   
 
According to the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics and the Aleppo City Council, prior to the 
conflict, the population of Aleppo was just over 2.3 million in 2005.  The current population is 
estimated to be about 1.8 million, although this figure is changing as civilians are returning in 
significant numbers to the city.   Prior to the conflict, the city consisted of roughly 80% Sunni 
Muslims, 12% Christians (of whom about 30% are Armenian), 7-10% Kurd, and the remainder 
being other minority groups.  Aleppo saw a huge influx of Armenian refugees during the 1915 
Armenian genocide in Turkey, and again in 1923, following the withdrawal of French troops 
from Cilicia.209   
 
When the demonstrations started in Syria in 2011, most people in Aleppo remained supportive 
of the Syrian government.  It wasn’t until 22 July 2012 that eastern areas of the city were 
occupied by thousands of ‘rebel’ insurgents. Soon afterwards, they were joined by thousands 
more jihadists comprising many different nationalities.  Thus began the battle for East Aleppo 
that lasted until December 2016, and that displaced, killed and injured, tens of thousands of 
people. 
 
In the light of the suffering inflicted upon the city, this study seeks to understand how the 
conflict has impacted inter-communal relations in Aleppo, and how religious communities are 
responding to the trauma experienced by the city’s citizens.   
 
In September 2016, a group of British Church and political figures that I was leading arrived in 
Aleppo as guests of the Armenian Evangelical Church in the city to a banquet held to celebrate 
our visit.  Armenians have been present in Aleppo for centuries.  During the Ottoman period, 
many Armenians moved to Aleppo from Eastern Anatolia to take advantage of its economic 
opportunities, and by the sixteenth century, Armenians were helping to run the silk trade with 




209 For a brief history of Aleppo, See Appendix 4. 
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As the first foreign group to visit Aleppo during the battle for the city, over 250 Armenian 
Christians had gathered in a restaurant to welcome us.  A classical string quintet played music 
as we ate, accompanied by the sound of explosions and gunfire.  At one point I remarked to 
the person next to me, “That was close.”  He replied, “Of course, we are only three hundred 
and fifty metres from the frontline.”  The dinner continued.  Everyone there had been 
experiencing constant shelling and sniping from the ‘rebel’ groups for four years.  It had 
become a kind of ‘normality’.  On one day alone during our visit in September 2016, the 
University of Aleppo was hit by four shells killing a number of staff and students, and we were 
prevented from visiting some churches in the city due to shelling in the vicinity by ‘rebel’ 
factions in the east of the city.   Our Armenian hosts were hospitable and welcoming, but 
urged us to challenge the Christian community at home, asking why the West was supporting 
Islamist groups that were targeting and threatening the existence of the Christian community, 
not just in Aleppo, but in Syria as well - a question repeatedly asked by both Christians and 
Muslims on all of my visits to Syria. 
 
Haroutoun Selimien, the President of the Armenian Evangelical Church in Syria, remarked in 
April 2017 that despite the profound suffering for all communities, the war had had some 
positive impact for the Christian community in Syria.  He said:  
 
“Our survival has given us a strong character, and has taught us patience and what it 
means to hope.  We are having to learn what it means to live out our Christian faith 
and to tolerate others.  Regarding Christian-Muslim relations, we continue to live in 
harmony despite the crisis, and there is no discrimination in our schools.  Sometimes, 
some become fanatical.  But whether they are Christian or Muslim, that is dangerous.  
We always talk together.   But our dialogue is not a religious dialogue.  It is a dialogue 
of life.”  
 
Speaking of the role of the Church, he added,  
 
“As Christians, Jews or Muslims, we share the same culture, and in Syria we have a 
culture based on tolerance. We share the same land, the same history, the same 
resources.  It is on these bases that we succeeded in living together.  We need to build 
on that and ensure that that knowledge and experience is shared with the next 
generation.  The Church will assume its responsibilities to be light and salt within 
Syrian society beyond the conflict.  All the eleven Christian denominations in Syria 
have the same word and same story on this….we are an integral part of Syrian society.  
Most Muslims who have remained in Syria have a different vision from those who left. 
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They see their destiny tied to Christians. Indeed, many beg us not to leave.  The Church 
worldwide should be supporting Christians to stay, not to leave.”210  
  
This message echoes many conversations held with other Church leaders in Syria, and with 
ordinary Syrians from different religious communities.  The closeness of the relationship with 
the Muslim leadership in Aleppo was confirmed when prior to our departure, twelve senior 
Muslim leaders from the city joined a service at the Armenian Evangelical Church in the city.  
At a meeting with them afterwards, the Sheikhs affirmed their respect for the Christian 
communities, their abhorrence of Wahhabi ideology, and their support for the Syrian 
government. 
 
In December 2016, I was invited to join Vanessa Beeley, an independent investigative 
journalist, and Jan Oberg, a Danish peace researcher and Chairman of the Transnational 
Foundation for Peace and Future Research, based in Sweden, in Aleppo.211  I had no idea at the 
time that I would be in Aleppo at the historic moment when East Aleppo would be retaken by 
the Syrian government from the Islamist groups that had occupied it since 2012.  I travelled 
independently from Damascus to Aleppo in a taxi.  The western media narrative for many 
months had been of the Syrian government attacking and besieging innocent civilians in 
Aleppo.  Realities on the ground challenged that narrative.  Rarely was it mentioned or shown 
that all the areas of the city under government-control were under constant attack from 
‘rebel’ shells and snipers, with schools, hospitals, colleges, churches and busy streets being 
regularly targeted, with the loss of many civilian lives.  Nevertheless, in government-controlled 
areas, people were free to go about their daily business.  Cafes, shops, businesses were open.  
The streets were busy.  People continued to attend churches and mosques.   
 
My first night of this visit was the night of the final battle to defeat the fighters in the east of 
the city.  Staying on the 19th floor of the only major hotel to have stayed open during the 
course of the conflict, I had a view across the city and of the battle as it happened.  I was told 
that that the day before the final bombardment, several thousand civilians had been able to 
leave the area, and that it was mostly fighters who remained in the vicinity.  The following 
 
210 Quotes taken from Interviews with Haroutein Selimian in Beirut on 29 April 2017, and in Aleppo in 
May 2017. 
211 Vanessa Beeley is an independent Journalist who has visited Syria several times during the conflict; 
travelling extensively in the country, and speaking to thousands of ordinary people on the ground, 
including highly significant locations.  Her findings are painstakingly researched, and she has spent much 
time in East and West Aleppo researching the events that took place in the city.  Some of her many 
articles, including eye-witness accounts, can be found on her website: www.thewallwillfall.org. 
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evening, it was declared that the city had been “completely liberated”, and the city erupted 
into celebrations.  The streets were filled with thousands of people cheering and letting off 
fireworks, sounding car horns and flying the Syrian flag.  One taxi-driver that we hailed down 
was in tears of joy behind the steering wheel, and said, “Thank God, thank God, the killing will 
end now.”  For the first time in four years that night, there was no sound of shelling or gun 
battles in the city.  A few days later, thousands of Syrians from all communities celebrated 
together as a huge Christmas tree was lit in the city, and for the first time in four years, 
Christmas was publicly celebrated.  
 
On December 13th, Vanessa, Jan and I were the first foreigners to visit areas of East Aleppo just 
hours after the last snipers had been cleared from the district.  We joined Fares Shehabi, an 
independent MP for Aleppo and Chairman of Aleppo’s Chamber of Commerce, in visits to the 
Sheikh Jarrar Industrial Estate on the edge of Aleppo; and to Aleppo’s Old City, the Citadel and 
the Umayyad Mosque.  
 
The destruction of Aleppo’s industrial cities has been little mentioned in writings about the 
conflict.  Sheikh Najjar Industrial City was one of Syria’s main centres of production.212  Prior to 
the conflict, it contained over a thousand working factories and had a further two hundred 
under construction.  After the Industrial Estate’s occupation first by ISIS, and then by the ‘Free 
Syrian Army’ in 2012, 675 factories were dismantled; their equipment taken to Turkey, and 
then the factories destroyed.  Fares Shehabi’s own Olive Oil factory was stripped and used as 
an ISIS headquarters.  When the area was taken back by the Syrian government, Mr. Shehabi 
used his factory as a school for local and internally displaced children, with over a thousand 
children attending the school in three shifts.  Some of the children are orphaned.  In almost all 
places that the Jihadists occupied, they used school buildings as headquarters for militant 
factions, centres for weapons storage or local courts, and forbad education.  
 
On 14 December, we took a taxi, without official accompaniment, to visit the main registration 
centre for internally displaced persons at Jibrin, where all civilians fleeing from East Aleppo 
were being received. No international media were present.    The displaced persons were 
being registered for humanitarian reasons and being given access to services, before being free 
to leave either for relatives if they had them, or to reception centres where accommodation, 
 
212 See:  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-economy-insight/hard-choices-for-
syrian-industrialists-in-ruins-of-aleppo-idUSKCN1C71B8   (Accessed: 16 August 2018) 
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food and other services were provided.  In the previous two weeks 95000 refugees had been 
registered, but it was estimated that a further 10,000 had not been registered.  There were 
thousands of people there who had arrived within the last couple of days.   
 
The centre was well organised.  Syrian Red Crescent tents offered information about social 
welfare facilities available, and free medical attention.  Ambulances were on hand to transport 
emergency patients direct to hospital.  Free food was being distributed by the Syrian Red 
Crescent and the Syrian Army, and a convoy of Russian lorries was providing aid.  On site, a 
Russian field hospital offered immediate medical treatment.  The sense of relief among the 
thousands of refugees was palpable.  All were keen to talk and said the same thing - that they 
had been living in fear.  They reported that the fighters had been telling everyone that the 
Syrian Army would kill anyone who fled to the west, but they themselves had killed many who 
tried to leave – men, women and children.  One woman broke down in tears when she told 
how one of her sons was killed by the ‘rebels’ a few days previously, and another kidnapped.  
They had also killed individuals who showed signs of supporting the government.  The refugees 
said that the ‘rebels’ told them that only those who supported them are true ‘Muslims’, and 
that everyone else are ‘infidels’ and deserved to die.  They told us they had been given very 
little food; that aid that reached the area was often refused to them or sold at exorbitant 
prices.  Likewise, most of them had been given no medical treatment. (A doctor who had been 
working with refugees from East Aleppo for weeks had told me the previous evening that in an 
area recently liberated, a warehouse filled with brand new internationally branded medicines 
provided by western charities had been discovered.)   
 
Most of the displaced said that they had had members of their families killed by the militants 
and spoke of widespread murder, torture, rape and kidnap by the jihadists.  They said if 
anyone left their homes, their properties and belongings were confiscated and stolen.  One old 
man in a wheelchair who was being given free treatment in the Russian field hospital said he 
had been given no treatment for three years despite asking, and cried: “Thank God we are 
free.  We now have food.  We can now live our lives. God bless the Syrian Army.”  All were 
visibly profoundly relieved, and happy to be free.  One woman said: “This is heaven compared 
to what we have been living.”   Everything that I have seen and heard in Aleppo; from civilians 
in East and West from all communities, and from talking with doctors, faith communities, and 
with soldiers, and witnessing and risking bombardments on both sides, convinces me that the 
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reports in the western media have at best misrepresented realities on the ground during the 
conflict in Aleppo. 
 
After the events of December 2016, the international media went silent on Aleppo.  The U.N. 
reported that of the 135,000 people who emerged from ‘rebel’-occupied areas in the weeks 
prior to the city’s liberation, 115,000 fled to the comparative safety of government-controlled 
areas of the city, where they were provided with food, accommodation and medical 
assistance.  The remaining 20,000, which included the fighters, were transported in safety to 
Idlib.  No media sought to speak with the citizens of East Aleppo about their experiences, 
despite the fact that they were now accessible and eager to share the realities of what life had 
been like under the control of the militants in the east of the city.213  
 
In May, 2017, I returned to Aleppo as a guest of the Greek Orthodox Church to visit some of 
the projects run by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Department of Economic Relief and 
Development, (GOPA-DERD) in the city.  ‘GOPA-DERD’ was set up in 1994 “with the purpose of 
serving the other, regardless of his religion, race or colour”.214 It is the largest charitable 
organisation in Syria after the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, with thirteen offices in towns and 
cities throughout the country.  The organisation manages numerous projects in support of 
local communities, particularly those in most need.  It has thousands of volunteers - highly 
 
213 Mainstream media and social media have played a crucial role in influencing public opinion about the 
Syrian conflict.  International mainstream media have depended almost entirely for their information 
upon sources from within ‘rebel’ controlled areas, who have a clear and fixed agenda.  Reports from 
these areas have rarely been able to be independently verified, and yet have usually been accepted and 
quoted uncritically by news networks, government bodies and NGOs.  Another source very regularly 
quoted and uncritically accepted by international news agencies and by government departments has 
been the ‘Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.’  This ‘observatory’ is run from a house in Coventry UK, 
by a Syrian, Rami Abdurrahman, who left Syria over fifteen years ago, and who, according to people who 
knew him in Lattakia, has long hated the Syrian government.  His networks in Syria are all from areas 
controlled by the militants, who have been provided by international agencies and governments with 
sophisticated media facilities. As Zeian Karam wrote in 19 October, 2013: “Almost every opposition-held 
neighbourhood now has a media centre complete with high-definition cameras, satellite connections 
and software for secure uploading, many of them funded by Gulf Arab supporters. Syrian video activists 
regularly receive training from NGOs, with funds from abroad.” 
(https://globalnews.ca/news/912375/social-medias-role-in-the-syrian-civil-war/ )   
By contrast, daily attacks and atrocities committed by jihadist groups on government-held areas have 
rarely been reported, and the opinion of ordinary Syrians in these areas rarely sought, quoted, or given 
credence. However, numerous attempts have been made to discredit, vilify, and alienate voices that 
have presented a narrative different to that which mainstream media has sought to convey.   
See: (Herrero-Jimenez, 2018). Accessed on Academia.edu. 16 July 2018. 
 




qualified staff with multiple expertise.  Programmes include health and education projects, 
distribution of welfare, psycho-social programmes for those affected by conflict, shelter 
programmes aimed at restoring schools, hospitals and homes, water provision programmes, 
vocational training programmes, community based organisations programme working with 
local organisations and associations to implement approved local projects, and small grants 
programmes.  It includes initiatives throughout Syria for providing safe, child-friendly spaces 
for play, education, and psycho-social welfare, especially for those most traumatised children.   
 
It was inspiring to visit some of these projects in Aleppo, particularly in the devastated eastern 
part of the city.  Staff are chosen according to expertise, not according to faith.  And most 
beneficiaries are Muslim.  Returning to East Aleppo five months after the liberation of the city, 
streets were coming to life and rubble had already been cleared from the streets of many 
districts.  The area around the Citadel had been cleared and families were gathering in pride to 
visit this great symbol of the city.  Infrastructure was already being restored.  One of the 
projects that I visited was the provision of large water storage units to districts in East Aleppo 
devastated by the conflict.  As I approached one community centre in East Aleppo where 
people were returning to their homes, and being assessed for their needs, the local Sunni 
mukhtar greeted me with a hug and declared: “Welcome. You are my brother.”   We visited a 
hospital where GOPA-DERD has helped provide a kidney dialysis unit.  One wing of the hospital 
had been destroyed by a ‘rebel’ rocket attack.  In other centres in East Aleppo, volunteers 
were training residents in vocational training projects – hair dressing, clothes making, baking, 
leather working, carpentry to name but a few.  Those being trained were being paid for their 
work,  women and children being the main beneficiaries. 
 
The situation for the churches in Aleppo continues to be difficult.  No figures are available, but 
estimates suggest that 50% of the Christian population have left the city.  The figure could be 
higher.  This raises serious challenges for the life and work of the community.  Church buildings 
have been destroyed in ‘rebel’ attacks.  Church families have lost homes and loved ones.  
Economic hardship, only increased by sanctions, make it near impossible for churches to raise 
funds for their own maintenance, let alone offer the most basic needs and provision of water, 
food and shelter to its congregations.  Nevertheless, the Church endeavours to do so.  For 
example, the Presbyterian Church in Aleppo, like its sister churches continues its ministry 
through schools, “99% of whose pupils are Muslim”.  “There is no evangelism, but we work 
hard to teach our pupils the principles of tolerance and acceptance,” Revd brahim.  The two 
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schools run by the Church between them serve over 600 students.  They have both been 
damaged by jihadist attacks, and there is a need for new computers, new transport, and new 
playgrounds.  Revd Ibrahim was adamant that the Church worldwide should assist the Church 
in Syria to enable it to remain, and to sustain and strengthen its work and pastoral care and 
ministry. 
 
I asked Revd Ibrahim about the role of Christian-Muslim relations in the country.  He replied:  
It is the responsibility of religious leaders to ensure good Christian-Muslim relations.  
Keeping Christians secure is the responsibility of Muslims.  And protecting Islam from 
Islamophobia is the responsibility of Christians.  Islam of the Levant is not the Islam of 
the Gulf.  Islam has to face Wahhabism, and Christians must not despair, but be 
honest.  We fear democracy because it will bring immature people to authority.  
Before speaking about democracy, we have to educate people about what democracy 
means, and choose leaders on the basis of their qualification.  Keeping the political 
system that we have is an assurance of preserving Syrian society.   Any change that 
brings fanatical Islam will be a catastrophe for the country.  The Government 
understands the uniqueness of the minorities and gives us freedom to practise our 
faith.  But leaving politics aside, the Church should support the churches here in order 
to help us to continue our ministry and presence.215 
 
Despite the many challenges facing all communities in Aleppo, the faith communities continue 
to do what they can to serve the people, no matter what their religious or communal identity.  
There are signs of hope.  In December 2017, the people of Aleppo once again joined in city-
wide celebrations – both to mark the first anniversary of what most Syrians regard as the 
liberation of the city, but also as Muslims and Christians together to celebrate Christmas, a 
celebration that has been denied wherever ‘rebel’ factions have upheld their sectarian rule. 
 
In December, 2017, the Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo, Antoine Audo, wrote an article in the 
Sunday Telegraph.  He wrote: 
 
For the first time since the Syrian conflict began, this year you can see Christmas trees 
in Aleppo.  There are lights in homes and in front of churches.  It is a sign of hope.  
Daily life has improved in some respects.  Food and medicine are available, though 
very expensive.  The Christian area in west Aleppo was relatively undamaged, but East 
Aleppo, where rebels were once in control, is in ruins, and 30,000 children are without 
a father. 
 
I was shocked at the devastation to east Aleppo.  I met people living in miserable 
conditions, and I could see the hardship and poverty.   Aleppo was once a vibrant city 
where communities flourished, seeing this was horrifying.  The poorest and most 
 
215 Interview with Revd Ibrahim Nseir, minister of the Presyterian Church in Aleppo. 26 May 2017 
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vulnerable were left behind.  Many of the older people I meet tell me that they don’t 
have children or relatives anymore, everyone has gone.   
 
I have just stepped down after six years as president of Caritas Syria, which sends 25 
aid workers to east Aleppo every day.  I am convinced that our work changed the 
attitude of the Muslim majority towards our Christian community.  We served the 
poor without discrimination or fear.  This was new to Syria, where people tend to see a 
duty only to their family or tribe.  During the hostilities, we were at risk from the 
militants and safe only in government-controlled areas, but that has eased as rebels 
retreat.  However, west Aleppo will never be the same.   Before the war, the majority 
of Syria’s 1.5 to 2 million Christians were in Aleppo, but nationally about half have left, 
and in this city, the proportion is higher.  In buildings where one family might have 
been Muslim and the rest Christian, it is now the other way round. 
 
At the start of the conflict, militants tried to pit Muslims against Christians, but they 
failed.  Our country has a rich culture and history to which Syrians are loyal, regardless 
of religion.  Syrian is more than one man: this is not well understood in the West. 
 
It is very important that we continue to represent Arab Christianity, to show the 
Muslim and Arab world that there are Christians with whom they can have a dialogue.  
We must do all we can to stay and maintain our presence, but Christians in Syria have 
lost confidence that they can have security and stability.  That is what we will pray for 
this Christmas.216 
 
Also in December 2017, the Baptist Evangelical Church in Aleppo, known as the ‘Living hope for 
family ministry’, wrote a newsletter to supporters at a UK Medical charity called ‘PRIME’.   The 
letter speaks of how ‘Aleppo was bombarded daily between 100-350 mortars and rockets and 
shells. The Christian community was targeted heavily; resulting in thousands of them fleeing 
Syria as refugees to neighbour countries or outside of the continent and many other thousands 
were displaced into other safe cities in Syria as IDPs. ‘  Yet, despite the suffering, the ‘lack of 
tapped water, no electricity, no net connection, lack of fuel and very limited 
transportation….malnutrition’ and ‘lack of education’, the Church ‘played an essential role in 
Aleppo and in Syria in general’.”217 
 
Haroutoun Selimian,Minister of the Bethel Armenian Evangelical Church in Aleppo, wrote a 
positive assessment in his Christmas 2017 letter:  
 
Yesterday, the 22nd of December, 2017, the joy of Christmas pervaded the hearts of 
the Aleppians, since it coincided with the one year anniversary of the liberation of 
Aleppo.  In fact, we cannot forget what was happening in Aleppo: the rockets that 
 
216 Article by Bishop Antoine Audo, Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo. Published in the UK Sunday Telepraph, 
24 December 2017. 




were falling on us, the houses of unarmed people; the streets; the hospitals; the 
churches and the mosques … we find it hard to describe all the atrocities we have been 
through ... Each of us has endless stories, describing the suffering of our loved ones in 
the past years ...  
  
The Armenian Protestant and Christian Churches in Aleppo and the inhabitants of 
Aleppo, prayed together... At the end, God responded to our prayers. He gave us the 
biggest gift we could have dreamed of - the cease-fire agreement between the Syrian 
Arab army and the armed forces who occupied 60% of the lands in Aleppo.  
  
When the army officially declared Aleppo a city free of militants, for us, it was a gift 
from heaven ... It was a liberation. This is why we remember with joy the memory of 
the birth of our city and the beginning of a time of peace, which we hope will last 
forever.  
  
We also extend our gratitude to every brave soldier in our army, to every citizen who 
took up arms, joined the army to defend families and restore peace. We pay homage 
to our brave martyrs, who died while protecting the people of the city ... We salute all 
the inhabitants of Aleppo, who have suffered the weight of the years of war with 
patience and heroism. They stayed in their city and refused to leave, insisting  on 
hoping for a better tomorrow ...  
 
 We also applaud all parties who were misled by oppressors, but eventually returned 
to homeland through various reconciliations. Aleppo needs us all in order to recover, 
and we encourage all our children to play their role in the process of restoring and 
reconstructing the destroyed buildings and houses…. We should also help injured 
people physically, mentally and spiritually.   
 
Syria is recovering. God has promised us this peace and the preservation of all the 
people of our city with good and peace.218 
 
It is clear that despite the devastating impact of the war in Aleppo, the considerable 
destruction of infrastructure and neighbourhoods in the east of the city, and the departure of 
so many of their constituents, religious communities, with the help of certain international 
charities, are playing a significant role in providing welfare and rebuilding society in the city. 
This outreach is also having a positive impact on Christian-Muslim relations and restoring trust 
amongst those who are benefitting from these ministries. 
 
It is also clear that centuries of religious and cultural plurality will not be destroyed by a few 
years of conflict. Christmas 2018 was celebrated in Aleppo with even more vigour than the 
previous year, and restoration and rebuilding work across the city continued at a rapid pace. 
 
218 Christmas letter 2017, of Revd Haroutoun Selimian. Armenian Evangelical Bethel Church, Aleppo. No. 
6. December 2017 
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Despite the trauma and violence, it is clear that hope will triumph and in time, the city and its 
people will recover.   
 
4.6 Sadad.   
 
In May 2018, en route from Deir Ezzor to Mar Mousa monastery, through territory recently 
liberated from ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra control, I visited the village of Sadad.  Sadad is an 
ancient Christian village, sixty kilometres south east of Homs, which is thought to be the 
‘Zedad’ mentioned in Numbers 24:8 and Ezekiel 47:15 as part of the north eastern boundary of 
Canaan.  It is one of a group of predominantly Syriac Orthodox Christian villages in the area 
where, like Maaloula, Aramaic is still spoken.   Welcomed by Suleiman Khalil, the Mayor of the 
village, I was told that I was the first foreign priest to visit Sadad since the start of the war.  
When the local Syriac Orthodox priest was called and told that an English priest had come to 
visit, he arrived with a beaming smile, and would not let go of my hand as we toured the 
village and Churches.   
 
Suleiman Khalil is an inspiring figure.  He returned to Sadad in 2009,  having lived in the United 
States for nine years, and was elected Mayor shortly after the beginning of the war in 2011.   
Interestingly he relates how in 2011, “we saw Islamists arriving with weapons in Homs.  They 
were inciting people against non-Muslims.”219  Despite the temptation to leave at that time, he 
determined to stay to serve his village. 
 
Prior to the war, Sadad was a village of 15,000 people, but by 2013, the population was 2000, 
as residents fled before advancing Islamist fighters.220  Situated on the edge of the desert, but 
close to the Homs highway, Sadad had long been a trading centre for the Bedouin.   The village 
has fourteen Churches of different denominations, some of them containing historic frescoes 
desecrated during the jihadist occupation.  Suleiman Khalil proudly recalls how ecumenical 
relations have always been good but have been brought even closer by the village’s war-time 
experiences. 
 
In 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra and FSA fighters took control of the town for a week. Suleiman Khalil 
stresses that Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda affiliated group labelled a terrorist organisation by 
 
219 Interview with Suleiman Khalil at Sadad. 2 May 2018 
220 https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-christians-race-across-war-torn-syria-defend-besieged-town-sadad-
1528105.   See also:  https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/syria-massacre-christians-sadad   
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the international community, was operating (as at Maaloula and Saidnaya) alongside the Free 
Syrian Army, which the international community labels a ‘moderate rebel’ group.   He says: “Is 
a Nusra gun better than an FSA gun?  They are all the same.  There are no moderates.”221   
During the occupation, churches were desecrated, houses and stores destroyed, and forty-five 
Christian villagers were killed, several of them tortured to death, and some bodies thrown into 
a well.  Following a call from the Mayor, Christians and Muslims from neighbouring villages 
joined the Syrian Army in the battle.  Sixteen villagers were killed fighting alongside the army – 
ten of them Muslim, six of them Christian.   Suleiman emphasises that local Muslims had 
always lived happily alongside their Christian compatriots, and that their support continued 
throughout the years in which Sadad remained at the frontline of the conflict. 
 
In November 2015, Sadad was once again attacked, this time by ISIS, after ISIS captured the 
nearby town of Mahin, five miles away.  Almost two hundred Christian fighters from all over 
Syria arrived to defend the village and were joined by Muslims from the Syrian Army and the 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party.  When ISIS had captured the town of Qaryatayn, near Sadad, 
they had declared that they “would kill all the Christians in Sadad”.222  Remembering what had 
happened a year before in Mosul, and in 2013 in Maaloula, the Syriac Christians of Sadad were 
determined to defend their town.  So with the help of Christian fighters from all over Syria, 
local Christian and Muslim fighters fought off the ISIS offensive, and became a symbol of 
Christian resistance to Islamist terrorism.  It was the first Christian village to successfully fight 
off ISIS.    
 
Western media have occasionally referred to ‘Christian militia’ in Syria ‘supporting Assad’.   
Using such terminology in a way that has negative connotations is unfair and misleading.223   In 
the context of brutal conflict in which sectarian identity has been used to promote hatred and 
division, it is understandable, and in this case positive, that local Christian populations would 
wish to support a fellow Christian community that is under existential threat.   Christian 
‘militia’ in Syrian communities are simply local residents who take up arms in order to support 
the regular army against the threat of militant jihadists.  In several cases, fighting alongside 
 
221 Interview.  2 May 2018.  
222 Quoted by Fr. Luka Awad of the Catholic Diocese of Homs in: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-
christians-race-across-war-torn-syria-defend-besieged-town-sadad-1528105 
223 For example, see this CNN Report of 4 February 2013, entitled: ‘Christian militia standing behind 
Assad’. (Accessed 23 July 2018) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQIrSR6tKJg  
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Muslim residents, they have been instrumental in the defence and liberation of their 
communities from terrorist occupation.  
 
Walking through the streets of Sadad, signs of conflict remain.  Buildings show the scars of 
battle, and though Churches have been restored, their frescoes have been desecrated.  Walls 
in the village display pictures of those martyred during the various battles.  But the village is 
peaceful.  Sadly, only 3000 of the original 15,000 inhabitants remain.  The Mayor is trying hard 
to encourage residents to return, but until the country is more stable and employment 
prospects have improved, many will stay away.  And the longer people remain abroad, the less 
likely they are to return.   Nevertheless, the community tries to remain upbeat.  Suleiman tells 
how the community is pulling together, and how its experiences have strengthened the sense 
of determination.   He has started a Quail egg project, and already owns several hundred birds.  
He says:  
 
We wish to put the years of war behind us and to restart our life. I encourage everyone 
who has suffered in the war to get back to nature, to grow vegetables or chickens, and 
to start small-scale income-generating projects.  The more people get involved, the 
more we can stop people from leaving.  Sadly, we have lost the emigration war, but we 
still have hope that those who are here will recover their roots, and others will return. 
But sanctions are affecting us badly.  It is difficult to get the machinery we need.  
Nevertheless, we are rebuilding and developing projects.224  
 
I asked Suleiman: “What is your message to the West?”  He replied:  
 
Be careful.  As Eastern Christians we have paid the price of your policies.  It is behind 
us now.  But what we experienced here will come to Europe.  The attitude of the West 
is shameful.  We have been fighting terrorism and extremism, and you have been 
supporting extremism.  There are many types of Islam, and if you wanted to find 
moderate Islam, then come to Syria.  It is not the same as Saudi or Iranian Islam.  In 
Syria, we have eighteen different religions, and there was never a difference between 
them.  Now the extremists have left, we are working to recover our good relations.  
Our faith is very important to us.  We are staying faithful.  If we get back to the 
spiritual life, our community will recover. 
 
As I walked through Sadad, arm in arm with the local priest, villagers waved and smiled.  I was 
told it was encouraging for them to see a foreign priest paying an informal visit – a sign they 
said, that things were changing.  For me too, Sadad is a symbol of hope, courage and 
perseverance.  The villagers, deeply traumatised by a war that no-one wanted and from which 
 
224 Interview with Suleiman Khalil.  Sadad. Syria. 2 May 2018. 
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they long to emerge, are allowing the best values of their faith to drive their vision and 
determination to move forward.  In practical ways that enhance community, the people of 
Sadad, with the help of their Mayor and religious leaders, are an inspiring example of a 
community seeking to restore the social and religious balance of a society that has been 




It is hoped that these few case studies and eye-witness accounts of different contexts in the 
midst of the conflict, combined with the questionnaire analysis in Appendix 5 provide a helpful 
insight into the complex and evolving dynamics of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria.   All the 
research undertaken confirms that inter-religious relations in Syria are complex and multi-
layered, yet, whilst answers to the questions posed in the questionnaire vary, a degree of 
consistency emerges.  Although the way that different communities identify themselves and 
relate to each other is nuanced, and notwithstanding that religious and political contexts in 
different periods of history have created a complex ontology in Christian-Muslim relations 
which has at times led to communal violence, nevertheless it is clear, on the surface at least, 
that over many years, Christians and Muslims have coexisted with a degree of tolerance and 
engagement that has long been a source of pride to many Syrians.  As Patriarch Ignatius 
Aphrem of the Syriac Orthodox Church said at a meeting in Damascus in April 2018:  
 
Christians and Muslims lived together for 1500 years with occasional difficulties, but 
with mutual respect.  This is not a civil war.  Some Syrians were used by outsiders to 
rise against each other.  We were not a perfect country, and we still do not have a 
perfect regime.  We still need reforms, but we never imagined that these reforms 
would come at such a high price. 
 
Echoing many Christians and Muslims I have spoken to, he continued: “In our daily lives, we 
never recognised each other based on religious affiliation.  Religion was a private matter.” 
 
There is sadness amongst both Christians and Muslims that relationships have been negatively 
impacted by the conflict, and there is a notable, almost apologetic criticality, amongst some 
Muslim respondents about those who have interpreted religion in a way that has led to and 
promoted sectarian violence.  Responses to the questionnaire and in multiple interviews, 
suggest that whilst trust between communities has been damaged by the conflict - particularly 
by the violence of Islamist factions towards any who do not support their ideology – there is a 
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widespread will and desire to restore the sense of plurality and mutual respect for which 
Syrian society has been known for much of its history.  Perhaps because of the respect for 
religious faith and identity embedded in Syrian society, most seem to recognise the value of a 
secular constitution which respects, values and protects all communal identities.  Most are 
adamant that the conflict is not religious by nature or origin, but accept that sadly religion has 
been used to stoke sectarian conflict for political goals.   Given that religious identity plays an 
important role within the make-up of Syria’s plural society, the inclusion of faith communities 
and faith leaders in processes that seek reconciliation and the re-framing of Syrian society in 
the post-conflict context will be vital.  Religion is a crucial factor in the cohabitation of the 
public sphere.  In Syria, religious leaders and communities have played a crucial role in the 
provision of humanitarian care for all, pastoral care of communities, cease-fire negotiations, 
and restoring inter-communal stability. Any non-recognition of this fact in any peace-building 
processes could be damaging to the process. 
 
There is clearly evidence that communal tensions have always been present to a degree, but 
there is debate as to the extent to which communalism influenced the conflict.  Class-based 
and rural-urban variations in levels of communal integration affect that dynamic.  Any process 
of reconciliation and restoration of trust will take time, but since many believe that respect for 
plurality and diversity is built in to Syrian identity and way of life, many remain hopeful that 
reconciliation – in the long term -  is possible.  Others however fear that trust has been 
damaged irrevocably.  Syrian Christians witnessed what happened in Iraq, and received over 
330,000 Christian refugees from the brutal sectarian violence there.  They have witnessed 
brutal sectarian violence committed by Islamist groups against Christians and other minority 
groups during the Syrian conflict.  However much Islamists claim to consider the interests of all 
Syrians, there has been no evidence of this in the conflict.  As stated in a 2015 article: 
 
The treatment of minorities under Islamist parties remains an open question and 
claims of good will may mask different realities.  Even the most liberal exponents of 
the Muslim Brotherhood have taken special care never to describe their Syria as 
‘secular’, but only ‘civil’, with the broader explicit goal of an ‘Islamic state’ still affirmed 
(Farha, 2015, p. 185). 
 
No wonder most Christians have supported the secular government which has protected their 




When one is talking about such a diverse society, and reflecting on the experience of a whole 
nation that has differing geographic, socio-economic contexts, it is difficult to make general 
statements.  However, I believe we can conclude that, notwithstanding the significant 
challenges of recent decades, the rise of religious extremism and sectarianism in the region, 
and the fracturing of trust that the recent conflict has provoked, Syria has been a society in 
which coexistence between multiple communities has largely prevailed and has been valued in 
order to preserve the pluralist identity of the nation and the protection of all communities 
within it.  The way in which these realities have been held in tension have laid the foundations 
for the restoration of religious coexistence and mutual respect, even in the face of the violence 
and fracture that has taken place.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that whilst communal tensions have always existed within 
Syria and have been used by both internal and external forces in the country to stoke division 
and violence for the purposes of political change, sectarianism has been overstated as a cause 
of the conflict in Syrian society.  As Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Samer Al-Qabbani, Director of the 
Damascus Endowments of the Awqaf stated at a meeting in Damascus in April 2018:  
 
In Syria, we had a Christian Prime-Minister who was much loved, and a Christian 
Minister of Religious Affairs in a Muslim-Majority country.  The Speaker of Parliament 
is also a Christian, and all the religious leaders meet together regularly.  When His 
Holiness, the Patriarch speaks, he speaks on behalf of Christians and Muslims.  One of 
the aims of the war was to create a sectarian conflict.    
 
Clearly, cordial relationships between religious leaders do not automatically imply the same 
amongst ‘lay’ citizens, but this public dynamic is illustrative of the interreligious culture in 
Syria.  Undoubtedly, political and economic dissatisfaction and wider geopolitical factors all 
contributed to the descent into violence in the country, and most Syrians that I have spoken 
with have repeatedly stressed that religious identity is not important when it comes to 
personal relationships, and that the conflict is not and never was a religious one.   
 
Nevertheless, without question, the war has changed the character and religious geography of 
Syria.  With so many millions of Sunnis having left the country, there may be an increased 
percentage of other religious communities existing within the country.  How will those 
communities reframe their relationship with one another?  As Syrians have experienced the 
violent consequences of an exclusivist juridical interpretation of the Qur’an, will there be a 
reconstruction of Sunni religious thought that is more easily able to accommodate diversity?  If 
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sunni Syrians who have supported exclusive ideologies return, how will they be able to find 
space within a society that affirms religious plurality, and amongst a population that 
profoundly fears the threat of intercommunal violence?    
 
How Sunni Islam engages with the modern world, and with religious plurality, is an on-going 
debate that has been taking place for the last century and that affects Muslims – and 
Christians – everywhere, but some resolution is going to be required if a peaceful balance is to 
be achieved in the region.  Additionally, if there is a belief that majority status provides a ‘right 
to rule’, then if there were ever Sunni rule, would it be able to establish a pluralising space 
within the country to allow genuine freedom of religious expression?  Most Syrians that I have 
met fear that this could not be guaranteed, and that Sunni rule would mean the disappearance 
of the Christian presence – as has happened in parts of Iraq - and of the freedom of religious 
space for minority groups.  Part of the difficulty for Sunni Islam is that there Is no Sunni central 
authority – other than that created after the development of nation states – namely the 
institution of the ’Grand Mufti’.  Hence the importance of the Grand Mufti in the Syrian Islamic 
discourse.   
 
In the midst of this changing dynamic, we must not forget the tension between Sunni and 
Shi’a, the provocation of which has opened a multiplicity of conflicts in the region and has seen 
an increase in Shi’a influence in several States, namely Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Syria.  This 
dynamic, and the regional influence of Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran and their respective 
allies has certainly been used as a provocateur in the Syrian conflict (Vali Nasr, 2007).  It is 
widely acknowledged that the Syrian conflict at the very least became a proxy war.  Indeed, 
many believe that internal discontent was  provoked in order to become a proxy war to 
implement external interests.225  
 
Nevertheless, the resilience of the Syrian people is well illustrated in the lives of those who 
have remained in Syria, and in those who have returned to their homes.  The speed of 
rebuilding of homes and restoring of infrastructure in places like Homs, Aleppo, or Maaloula, 
has been remarkable.  Even amidst scenes of destruction, a sense of ‘normal’ life began 
returning to streets that only months before were deserted battlegrounds.  And significant 
 
225 For studies exploring these factors see:(Phillips, 2016); (Davidson, 2016). 
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numbers of people began returning to their homes comparatively soon after areas had been 
cleared of militants.226 
  
Syrian society is complex, multi-layered, and culturally, religiously and socially diverse. The 
severity of the conflict has caused profound suffering and loss to every member of the Syrian 
population.  The level of violence perpetrated against different communal groups  
in the name of religion has deeply affected many people’s attitudes towards extreme Islamist 
ideology, and they fear its ascendency.   But as we have seen, most refuse to allow this 
sectarian agenda to affect everyday relationships and have a deep desire to restore peace and 
mutual respect, though it will take a long time for trust to be restored, and pain to heal.  
Religious leaders are already playing a key role in seeking peace and striving to be bridges of 
reconciliation and have done so throughout the conflict. 
 
It is precisely this history of plurality and diversity, and the desire of most people to preserve 
these qualities, that makes Syria potentially a model for Christian-Muslim engagement in the 
face of conflict and beyond.    Recognising the historic coexistence of Christian and Muslim 
communities in the Levant in general and in Syria in particular, and writing from a Christian 
perspective, it is instructive to reflect on models and dynamics of Eastern Christian 
engagement, for it is Eastern Christians who have lived alongside the Muslim majority for so 
many centuries.   And it is in learning from this dynamic and the Eastern Christian contribution 
to it, that we may find a key to peaceful coexistence in the future.  It is to consideration of 
these matters that we now turn. 
  
 
226 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40460126   Syria war: Almost 500,000 refugees 
return in 2017 – UN.   Also: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-47260450/the-syrians-returning-
home-after-years-of-fleeing-war?fbclid=IwAR0QzxFn62kJfQkH33hpkUOtO0KuDDpYI-









The previous chapters have contextualised, historically and contemporaneously, the Christian 
and Muslim presence and dynamic within Syria.   
 
This chapter will examine some uniquely Eastern Christian approaches to the Christian-Muslim 
interface in the region, in the light of past and present cultural and religious contexts, and of 
the trauma inflicted by the Syrian and other regional conflicts.  The regional and local political, 
economic, religious and social developments of the last century have all impacted upon every 
aspect of Syrian society.  This chapter will consider, through the lens of a number of key 
Christian theologians in the Antiochene paradigm,  how the Christian community has 
responded to those forces, bringing distinctly Syrian ideas and thought into the discourse.  The 
rise of Islamism and political Islam in recent decades has eroded the level of dialogue that took 
place between Christianity and Islam in the early centuries of the Islamic era until the 
twentieth century.  There has consequently been a shift in Christian self-identity amongst 
some Arab Christian denominations in the Middle Eastern milieu to a more assertive self-
definition and a less accommodating engagement with Islam.  At the same time, Christian 
communities continue, out of their own ecclesial and mystical traditions, to make a positive 
contribution to political religious discourse amidst the complexity of the multiple internal and 
external forces which affect them.  As O’Mahony writes: 
 
Samir Khalil Samir of the Pontifical Oriental Institute asserts that Middle Eastern 
Christianity is significant due to its cultural richness, its pride in apostolic origins that 
go back to the beginning of Christianity, its rejection of the term ‘minority,’ and its 
understanding of its vocation as a unifying bridge between cultures, civilizations and 
religions, both East and West (A. O'Mahony, 2018, p. 66).227 
 
This uniquely eastern ecclesial paradigm is important, not just because it represents 12 
percent of the global Christian population (A. O'Mahony, 2018, p. 61).  It includes Greek, 
 
227 See: Samir, K,S,.2003. Role culturel des chretiens dans le monde arabe. Beirut : Cahiers de l’Orient 
Chretien.  Beirut.  
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Byzantine, Syriac and Latin traditions that create a longstanding plurality that affirms the 
diversity of Arab culture.  This plurality goes back to the early Arab Church Fathers who 
debated both amongst themselves, and with emergent Islam.  The interlocutors that follow 
show that the paradigm of dialogue and diversity both ecumenically and inter-religiously 
follows a continuous and on-going tradition for Eastern Christianity until the present day. The 
Patristic tradition is a living one. This identity of eastern ecclesial and Islamic plurality is one 
that contemporary western theologians have struggled to embrace, preferring a more unified 
perception of the Arab paradigm. Indeed, in recent decades Arab identity has become 
increasingly contested through the lens of different cultures.  Yet, plural Antiochene, Eastern 
Christianity has an ancient lineage, which, crucially, sustains a tradition of diversity in Syria, 
evident in all the religious communities, and which has been under-studied and under-
recognised in wider discourse. 
 
In this chapter, brief reflections on the contribution to the field of Christian-Muslim 
engagement in the region, of Eastern Orthodox Bishop Georges Khodr and Jesuit Fr. Paolo 
Dall’Oglio reveal the influence and relevance of eastern spirituality in inter-religious dialogue in 
the Middle East.  Notwithstanding the controversy that surrounded him, the uniqueness of Fr. 
Paolo was that he represented a western ecclesial theological discourse that entered into a 
depth of living conversation with Eastern Christian identity that is rare in western discourse.  
Further discussion of the contributions of Melkite Patriarch Gregorius Laham, Melkite Bishop 
of Aleppo Jean-Clement Jeanbart, Chaldean Bishop Antoine Audo, and the Syriac-Orthodox 
Patriarch Mor Ignatius Aphrem consider the complex social and interreligious dynamic for the 
eastern churches, particularly during the conflict.  Finally, I examine the complex influence and 
place of the Protestant churches within the same dynamic.  Understanding these Christian 
relationships is essential to understanding the wider communal context and the role that the 
Christian communities play in Syrian society and within the political sphere.  
 
In recent years, most religious leaders in Syria have spoken both privately and publicly of the 
need for reform in Syrian society, but have argued that reform should not be imposed from 
outside.  Given the secular basis of the constitution, and the degree of independence granted 
by the Personal Status Laws, religious leaders have been able to rely on their own communal 
resources to make a difference in society.  Christians are more able to contribute to wider 
society in a State in which communal groups have equal status.  This non-sectarian vision of 
Statehood is different to that of Islam, and represents one of the key contributions that the 
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Christian community can make to the preservation of diversity, plurality and respect within 
Syrian society. The Christian vision of Statehood cannot control the State, but it can, by means 
of a dialogical relationship with the State and with other communities, seek to ensure that no 
one community is dominant.  One of the fears for Christians and other minority communities 
in Syria, is the possible creation of a Sunni State.  This is a critical dilemma in aspirations for 
‘democracy’ within Syria.  Given the communal balance in Syrian society, ‘democratic’ ideals 
suggest that the sunni majority should be in power, but would a sunni government follow a 
democratic system of governance?  Christians currently play a key role in balancing the 
complexity of the communal dimensions of Syrian society, and seeking to ensure that no one 
communal group is overly dominant.  This role is rendered even more significant by the impact 
of wider religious and geo-political contexts on Christian attitudes towards the current and 
future trajectory of interreligious and political trends. 
 
5.2 Early engagement with Islam 
 
From the earliest days of the emergence of Islam, local Christians began to ‘take on the 
outward trappings’ of the culture of Islam, and, through the adoption of Arabic as their 
liturgical and theological language in the first half of the eighth century C.E,  were able to 
undertake a distinctive theological and philosophical discourse with their Muslim interlocutors.  
This combined Greek philosophy with a distinctively oriental theological and philosophical 
understanding (S. Griffith, 2001, pp. 9,16).   
 
The existence of a specifically eastern discourse with Islam has long been under-recognised 
and under-studied in the west.  Until recently, much study of the history of the Church in the 
East has been approached from a largely western perspective. It is only in recent decades, and 
thanks to the work of such scholars as Sebastian Brock, Kenneth Cragg, Sidney Griffith, Hugh 
Goddard, David Thomas, Anthony O’Mahony and Erica Hunter; and their engagement with 
Middle-Eastern Christian and Muslim scholars, that the specifically eastern theological dynamic 
throughout the history of the Church in the Middle East, has come to the attention of scholars 
in the West.228 
 
 
228 In the UK, the Centre for Eastern Christian Studies at Heythrop College, London University (which 
sadly closed in 2018), and the Living Stones organisation with its annual journal 
(www.livingstonesonline.org.uk), have also contributed to this growing scholarship on Eastern 
Christianity.   
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One of the earliest and most influential Syrian Christian theologians whose spirituality and 
theology was rooted in the Eastern context was John of Damascus (ca 676-749). Born into a 
prominent devout Christian family, his father held high public office under the Caliph of 
Damascus, and prior to his ordination, John himself is said to have been an administrator to 
the Caliph (Akbari, 2009, p. 204).  Educated under a monk named Cosmas, John was tutored in 
theology, became a monk at the Mar Saba Monastery in the Judean Desert, and in response to 
the Christological controversies raging in the early Church, and to the challenges of the Islamic 
movement, produced one of the greatest theological works in the history of Christianity – ‘The 
Fount of Knowledge’. 229  John was one of the staunchest defenders of the Chalcedonian cause 
in the East, and of the veneration of icons.  Writing in Greek, his works were being translated 
into Arabic by the tenth century (S. Griffith, 2001, p. 21), and his contributions to Eastern 
Christianity embraced law, theology, philosophy and music.  His liturgy is still being used in 
Eastern Christendom. 
 
Following John of Damascus, Theodore Abu Qurra (ca750-820) was the first Christian 
theologian to write in Arabic.   Like John of Damascus he defended the veneration of icons, 
responded to the doctrinal challenges of Islam and “promoted the dogmas of the ‘six 
Councils’” which were to become the touchstone for Chalcedonian orthodoxy (S. Griffith, 
2001, pp. 38-39).230,231 
 
In the 12th Century, Paul of Antioch, a Greek Melkite Bishop of Sidon, corresponded with the 
great Muslim thinker Ibn Taymiyya in a letter notable for the way it sought to engage with 
contemporary Muslim thought.  The writings of Ibn Taymiyya remain very influential in 
contemporary Islam, and are used as a foundation for salafi and Wahhabi theology.  In the 
early Islamic era, Patriarch Timothy 1 (d.823) an East Syrian Patriarch engaged in a famous 
debate in Arabic with the Caliph al-Mahdi in Baghdad in 781, in which detailed discussion took 
place on the role of biblical prophets.  Whilst concluding with a positive assessment of 
 
229 See Chase, F. (transl.) (2015)  Saint John of Damascus.  Writings. Exfontibus.Co. (pp v-xxxviii) 
230 See also:  Lamoreaux, J. (transl.) (2005) Theodore Abu Qurrah Provo, Utah:. Brigham Young University 
Press. 
231 Other Christian writers who engaged in early discourse with Islam in Arabic include Theodore Bar 
Koni, an apologist of the Church of the East, who lived circa eighth Century; Ibrahim al-Tabarani, a 
Melkite of the ninth Century who argued against the prophethood of Muhammad and the divine 
authorship of the Qur’an;  Abd al-Masih al-Kindi, an East Syrian in the early ninth century, who was 
equally dismissive of the status of Muhammad on moral grounds; ‘Amra b.Matta, an East Syrian of the 
eleventh century who wrote the first Arab Christian encyclopaedia; Ibn al-‘Ibri (d.1286), a Syrian bishop 
who wrote a history of Islam from a Christian perspective. 
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Muhammad, Timothy nevertheless denied his prophethood.  All these encounters affirm the 
quality and breadth of early debate between Islam and Christianity; the knowledge that 
scholars had of each other’s faith, and the importance of this dialogue for Christian-Muslim 
relations in the Arab world (Samir K Samir, 2001, pp. 75-106).232  This dialogue took a number 
of forms: the use of letters; summaries of doctrine; dialogical accounts of encounter in a 
question and answer format; and open debate.  The last of these may have “provided the basis 
for many of the literary compositions written in Arabic and Syria during the early Islamic 
period” (S. H. Griffith, 2008, p. 103). 
 
What is clear is that this dialogue was not a one-sided affair.  And whilst Christians sought to 
translate Aristotelian Greek thought into Arabic and Syriac to better explain their confessional 
formulas and ecclesial identity, many Muslims found themselves adopting elements of 
Hellenism into the intellectual framework of Islam (S. H. Griffith, 2008, p. 158). 
 
5.3 The 20th Century and beyond.   
 
The 20th Century saw a wave of political developments that have profoundly influenced 
Christian-Muslim relations in the region.   The end of the Ottoman Empire; the carving up of 
the Middle East between French and British control in 1916; the creation of the nation states 
which in turn affected the communal balance of their residents; the development of political 
Islam; the establishment of the State of Israel and the subsequent Israeli/Palestinian conflict; 
the Civil War in Lebanon; the Iranian revolution; the invasion of Iraq; the events of the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’ – have all contributed to the strengthening of shari’a-based political Islam, 
and the weakening of the Christian communities in the region. 
 
The work of Christian scholars during the 20th Century and into the 21st Century, has been 
instrumental in sustaining dialogue and providing a framework for strengthening and 
developing Christian-Muslim relations in an increasingly tense and fractured political and 
religious context.  The work of a number of eastern theologians will be introduced here, who 
have been active and influential participants in the contemporary development of Christian 
religious and political thought, especially as it relates to Christian-Muslim coexistence in Syria 
and Lebanon in recent times.  They are: Georges Khodr, (b.1923), Greek Orthodox 
Metropolitan of Mount Lebanon; former Greek Melkite Patriarch Gregorios III Laham (b.1933); 
 
232 A work that outlines the contribution of several other Middle Eastern theologians is: (Noble, 2014).   
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Archbishop Jeanbart of Aleppo (b.1943);  Syrian Orthodox Patriarch Ignatius II Aphrem 
(b.1965); Antoine Audo (b.1946), Chaldaean Catholic Bishop of Aleppo; and Paolo Dall’Oglio 
(b.1954), Jesuit Priest and founder of the community at Deir Mar Mousa, who was kidnapped 
in Raqqa in 2013, and whose fate is unknown.  I will then consider the place of Protestant 
influence in the Middle East inter-religious dynamic.  Thus, considering a broad perspective of 
responses from across the ecumenical landscape in Syria, I hope to present a picture of 
commonalities that are faced and what we may learn from the various approaches in which 
the eastern Churches address them.  
 
Western understanding of the Christian-Muslim dynamic is indebted to the work of Louis 
Massignon (1883-1962), a Greek Melkite priest, who was instrumental in raising the profile of 
Christian-Muslim dialogue within the Catholic Church, and is believed to have made a decisive 
contribution to the Vatican II document, ‘Nostra Aetate’.233  As Paolo Dall’Oglio writes: “Louis 
Massignon is more than a teacher.  He is a source of inspiration and an intercessor for my 
spiritual growth and my mission in the Islamic world”(Dall'Oglio, 2008, p. 329).  His influence 
however went far beyond Catholicism.  The Shiite scholar Ali Shariati (1933-1977) who played 
a role in the revival of religious thought in Iran in 1979, studied with him.234   Massignon was 
particularly aware of the hardening of doctrinal thought in Salafist circles, and the entry into 
politics of modern Islamism, particularly in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, initially in 
Egypt, but also in Syria and other parts of the Middle East (Anthony O'Mahony, 2015, p. 243).  
Theologically, he viewed Christianity and Islam through the lens of the martyred Muslim mystic 
Al-Hallaj (857-922), seeing in him a parallel with Jesus (Anthony O'Mahony, 2015, p. 235).  He 
regarded suffering as a fundamental window into the nature and mystery of God, expressed 
both in Islam and Christianity; and that our response to suffering is one of hospitality, mutual 
compassion, and commitment to ‘the other’ – the stranger.   
 
Massignon regarded Abraham, the founder of the Abrahamic faiths, as the model of this 
hospitality. Through mystical engagement with each other, (Massignon was also influenced by 
the spirituality of Charles de Foucauld), Massignon understood Islam as a mediator of Grace, 
and a “providential guardian of the Holy Places”.  He sought to communicate this vision 
“through scholarly work, and through the sodality of prayer (badaliya)” (Anthony O'Mahony, 
2015, p. 238).  He saw in Islam “a providential role, a charisma of Islam and therefore of its 
 
233 See: (Krokus, 2012) (Anthony O'Mahony, 2015) (Krokus, 2017) 
234 See:(A Rahnema, 2013)  Shariati was a charismatic teacher who sought to blend Islam and Marxism, 
and profoundly influenced the development of Iranian political Islam. 
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Prophet in the coming of the Kingdom of God”, that is “in no way separate or separable from 
the role of Christ in the salvation of each man and woman” (Dall'Oglio, 2008, p. 332). In turn, 
he believed that the Syriac Catholic rite, rooted in eastern tradition, could help explain Islamic 
thought to the West.  Furthermore, he believed that “the healing of divisions between eastern 
and western Christians, and of the antagonism and warfare between Islam and Christianity 
during one and a half millennia could flow from a spiritual experience of God, practised and 
lived by believers open to dialogical encounter with the other” (Hugh-Donovan, 2014, p. 476).   
 
Massignon’s contribution was not just spiritual and theological.  He also played a significant 
role in the political administration of North Africa and Syria, arguing for a greater role for the 
Arabic language, and the emancipation of Islam within modernity.  Throughout his life, 
Massignon’s practise of contemplation and engagement with people was rooted in the belief 
that God loves all equally, and that through ‘sacred hospitality’, we could encounter the divine 
in the ‘Other’ (Sudworth, 2014, p. 458).  This spiritual approach would receive a more than 
sympathetic ‘audience’ in Eastern Christianity, whose origins are deeply intertwined with the 
spirituality of the desert, and its encounter with the Arab world. 
 
A further influential writer who stresses the importance of the Antiochene paradigm in 
Christian-Muslim relations is the French Orthodox lay theologian Olivier Clement (1921-2009). 
For Clement, “relationality is part of the mystery of God, and constitutes the vocation of the 
created being” (Hugh-Donovan, 2016, p. 123).  Clement cites the work of Massignon and Khodr 
as illustrating the unique eastern Christian contribution to the Christian-Muslim dynamic.  
However, he warns of two faces of Islam of which Christianity needs to be aware when 
engaging in dialogue.   These are represented by the respective writings of Mohammed Talbi 
(1921-2017), who regards pluralism as an essential characteristic of all religions, and Tariq 
Ramadan (b.1962), who regards the west as hostile to Islam and desires an Islamisation of the 
west.  As Hugh-Donovan writes: 
 
Talbi engages and takes interest in European thought and Christianity, for Ramadan, 





Eastern Christianity has had to engage with Islam for centuries in a way that western Christians 
have not.235  It was only in the 20th Century and following Vatican II that the importance of this 
inter-religious dynamic and eastern Christianity’s contribution to it was recognised.  For this 
reason, John Paul II, deeply aware of the divide between western and eastern Christianity, 
declared that the universal Church “needs to learn to breathe with ‘two lungs’” (A O'Mahony, 
2009).  But more than this, given the complex contemporary dynamics within Islam as it 
grapples with the rise of political Islamism, increased Sunni-Shi’a tensions, and how it engages 
with the modern world, the on-going presence and engagement of the diverse Christian 
presence presents a challenge and opportunity for dialogue and discernment, especially for 
strengthening the political, communal and religious space in which all communities can 
continue to coexist and flourish in the post-conflict context. 
 
Syria is central to this Eastern Christian dynamic.  Home to each of the three Antiochene 
Patriarchates, it also became home to many Assyrian Christians, and a major centre for the 
Armenian community following the Armenian genocide in 1915.  As a result of the Iraq war 
and the Syrian conflict, many Christians have emigrated, but the plural nature and resilience of 
Eastern Christianity in Syria remains strong. And its historic and contemporary ecclesial and 
theological contribution to interreligious relations make it potentially a vital resource for the 
future.  
 
5.4 Georges Khodr  (b. 1923) 
 
Of all contemporary Eastern theologians who have explored Christian-Muslim relations and 
dialogue, and who have played a transformative role in Orthodoxy in Lebanon and Syria, 
perhaps the most influential has been Georges Khodr, the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of 
Mount Lebanon.  Over the space of fifty years, he has written countless articles (mostly in 
Arabic), in which he “rekindles and reawakens the Christian theological flames of the early 
centuries that present the primordial and the simple Christian message of divine love” 
(Avakian, 2012a, p. 39).  His writings are rooted in the Patristic heritage of the Eastern Church, 
and influenced by the mystical theology of the early Fathers, in whom he finds a theology in 
which the relationship of Christians and Muslims is enhanced and enriched by a common 
understanding of the ‘Other’.  For oriental Christianity, the Church Fathers represent a 
 
235 For a reflection on how Orthodoxy has encountered Islam in recent decades, see: (Sharp, 2014) 
Modern Encounters with Islam and the Impact on Orthodox Thought, Identity and Action. 
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foundation for Christian faith and understanding because they are closest to the teachings of 
the apostles, and because they “bring spirituality and theology together” in a way that allows 
for the Divine Mystery to be revealed to and within all of humanity (Avakian, 2012a, p. 66). 
Avakian writes: 
 
The notion of divine mystery and the unknowability of God, the pneumatological 
paradigm, the importance of human response to divine love and grace, through which 
the divine image would be actualized, Khodr’s anthropological and universalist 
position, according to which, it is the whole of humanity that together form the divine 
image, his insistence on ‘secularization’, all these elements together contribute for a 
Christian theology that has a genuine potential to meet the Other, not only for the 
sake of meeting or accepting the Other, but for the sake of a genuine maturity in 
Christian faith and for self-knowing (Avakian, 2017, pp. 182-183). 
 
As the Christian denomination in the region with the most numerous adherents, the Greek 
Orthodox contribution to Christian-Muslim relations in the region is important.  Deeply rooted 
in the Byzantine tradition, the Eastern Orthodox Church was deeply impacted by the advent of 
the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of the millet system, which, despite its limitations 
allowed a certain flourishing of the Christian communities.  Roussos attributes the 
“outstanding economic and social record of the Christian minorities” in the nineteenth century 
to “their participation in expanding sectors of the economy, the foreign protection they 
enjoyed, their favourable situation following various reforms in the Ottoman Empire and 
Egypt, their Western education, and the help they acquired from their co-religionists outside 
the region”(Roussos, 2010, p. 108).  Following the collapse of the Ottoman State however, the 
Eastern Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch had to renegotiate its status in a context that was 
overwhelmingly Muslim.  This involved celebrating and affirming its indigenous Arab identity 
and promoting secular nationalism in order to secure equal status with Muslims.   
 
The identity of the Eastern Orthodox community in Syria is complex.  It forms part of the 
Eastern Orthodox world and sees itself as indigenous to the Arab world. (Since the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the Eastern Orthodox Church in Syria has had an Arab Patriarch 
unlike the other Patriarchates in Jerusalem, Alexandria and Constantinople, whose senior 
clergy have all been Greek nationals.)  More numerous in Syria than in Lebanon, the Eastern 
Orthodox have “walked a thin line between Arab-Syrian nationalism, and Lebanon’s 
uniqueness as a place where East and West could meet on an equal footing” (Roussos, 2010, p. 
114). Having previously sought to indigenise its theological contribution within the culture of 
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the Arab world in order to establish its eastern identity, it is an identity that is once again being 
contested and debated in the light of the rise of political Islam and Islamic extremism. 
 
In the 1940s, Georges Khodr was instrumental in developing an ‘Orthodox Youth Movement’ 
which sought a move away from ethnic Orthodoxy and a renaissance of the Greek Orthodox 
Church through its spiritual life.  The movement set up educational centres throughout 
Lebanon and Syria, and these helped in the formation of a new generation of clergy and 
religious leaders.  It also led to a resurgence in monasticism and to the establishment of new 
centres of theological study.  Most notably Balamand University in Lebanon, founded in 1988 
by Patriarch Ignatius IV Hazim, has become a leading educational institution in the Middle East.   
 
Khodr was born in Tripoli, Lebanon in 1923.  His childhood and youth were spent in an Islamic 
quarter of the city, an experience that came to symbolise for him the ‘coming out’ of the 
Christian communities from their ghettoes in the Arab world, into full participation in the life 
of their countries (Avakian, 2012b, p. 103).  Khodr believed that Christians should be fully a 
part of the Islamic World with equal rights and dignity and that they should know their 
compatriots through a deep relationship with and participation in their life and faith.  
 
The basis of Khodr’s apophatic theology, (following Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the 
Areopagite, and Maximus the Confessor) is the “impossibility of describing the essence of 
God”, which remains an “incomprehensible mystery” (Avakian, 2012a, p. 41).  In one of his 
most influential articles, Khodr writes: “If obedience to the Master means following him 
wherever we find traces of his presence, we have an obligation to investigate the authentic 
spiritual life of non-Christians” (G. Khodr, 1971, pp. 118-119).  Thus, starting with the Mystery 
of God as Creator, the mystery of God in Christ, and God as Spirit, Khodr explores the 
implications for God’s and our relationship with all humanity, one of the most significant of 
which allows for the possibility of the hiddenness of Christ within other faiths.  (Here, Khodr 
echoes Karl Rahner’s Transcendental Theology.)  Khodr maintains that the only name given to 
God is “Love” (1 John 4:8), and if so, then it is love that expresses the divine work in Christ and 
in relation to the “Other” (Avakian, 2012a, pp. 43-44).  “Love,” he states, is “the Cradle of 
Faith.”236  Moreover, echoing Maximus the Confessor, he speaks of the “deification” of 
humanity, through this Divine Love, bringing humanity into union with the divine and so 
 
236 This is the title of an article by Khodr. “Al-Mahabbah Matrahan Liliman” (Love: A Cradle of Faith) An-
nahar. 15.05.1999.  Quoted in Avakian: The Mystery of Divine Love. P.50 
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breaking down the barriers that exist in humanity.  For him, echoing again the early Fathers of 
the East, faith, spiritual experience and transformation take priority over reason (Avakian, 
2012b, p. 109). 
 
At the core of Khodr’s theology lies a reflection on what he calls the ‘Economy of the Spirit’.  It 
is this ‘economy of the Spirit’ which makes the presence of Christ possible and the living of 
authentic spiritual lives “possible for all human beings, regardless of any religious restrictions” 
(Avakian, 2012b, p. 121).  He writes: “The Spirit operates and applies His energies in 
accordance with His own economy and we could, from this angle, regard the non-Christian 
religions as points where His inspiration is at work” (G. Khodr, 1971, pp. 125-126). If that is so, 
then Christ cannot be “owned” by some people and not by others, and we have a duty to 
discern Christ in others. 
 
Avakian identifies five major themes that resonate through Khodr’s position on interreligious 
dialogue and relations (Avakian, 2017).  First, the human being is made in the image of God 
and therefore all human beings are of infinite value.  Second, the work of the Holy Spirit 
cannot be confined to the boundaries of the church and Christians cannot claim exclusive 
ownership of the Truth.  Thirdly, the Word is present in every existing thing and the creative 
energy of God is revealed in his people.   Fourthly, we cannot know the full mystery of God, 
but can only encounter him through spiritual prayer and reflection.  Lastly, the final 
consummation will involve the removal of all ugliness and wickedness and salvation for all.  
The Church is called to be the sign of God’s love for all his people.    Alongside this, Khodr 
believes that “only within a secularized state Christianity might have the potential of an actual 
existence and coexistence with other religions” (Avakian, 2017, p. 193).  For only under a civil 
rule deprived of all exclusivist inclination, can sectarian prejudice be overcome. 
 
Khodr criticises western theology for its exclusive dogmatism, and believes Eastern 
Christianity’s mystical approach to theology represents a truer reflection of Christian theology 
and spirituality.  “We are called to be Christians, not Crusaders”, he writes (G. Khodr, 1981, p. 
176).  Often, he uses a methodology in theological dialogue that takes steps towards Islam.  
For example, in order to facilitate understanding with Muslim scholars on the subject of 
Incarnation, he says “Christ is our Qur’an”.237   Khodr urges a “new type of religious 
 
237 Khodr, G (1987) Al-Kalimah wal-jasad (The Word and the Flesh) An-nahar. 29.03.1987.   Quoted in 




conversation… not those so-called ideological conversations limited to concepts and doctrines 
where none regarded and addressed his partner in reality, but genuine dialogues, from one 
open-hearted person to another”.  For, he writes: “we may be outsiders to one another in 
dogma, but none are outsiders to humanity and to the God with whom we have to do” (G. 
Khodr, 1981, pp. 163-164).  For Khodr, the pervasiveness of western thought and civilisation is 
spiritually destructive, since the West tends “to consider man as the centre of the universe” 
(M. G. Khodr, 2016, p. 97). However, eastern spirituality, particularly that of the desert with its 
spirituality of detachment and pursuit of truth, is the place where the spiritual life can become 
“incarnate in history as a movement, ready to be transmitted by utilizing the instruments of 
knowledge, even politics itself” in the service of humanity (M. G. Khodr, 2016, p. 97).  Khodr 
believes that whilst “European societies are faltering because they have fallen into the sin of 
the builders of the tower of Babel,” eastern culture and spirituality have the capacity to “help 
Europe to transcend itself” and to be spiritually renewed in the service of humanity (M. G. 
Khodr, 2016, p. 103). 
 
Khodr’s theology and writings have both theological and political relevance, especially for 
Christianity’s engagement in the Middle East.  As regards Lebanon particularly, with its 
confessional constitution, he has often been critical of the Orthodox Church’s willingness to 
step back from political engagement and decision-making processes, believing that Christians 
need to be actively engaged within society and community-development.  He believes that the 
confessional status of the Lebanese Constitution pitches religious groups against each other, 
resulting in each bidding for power and influence over the other.238  Rather, he believes, faith 
communities should work together for the freedom, equality and needs of all people.  This 
approach, rooted in the riches of Eastern Patristic theology, and “in a theological-philosophical 
language that is neither alien nor exclusive to any of the followers of the two religions” clearly 
has continuing relevance in the region, and could continue to be helpful for Christian-Muslim 
relations in post-conflict Syria (Avakian, 2012a, p. 67). 
 
In December 2017, I had the privilege of meeting with Bishop Khodr at his home in Lebanon.  
He was deeply reflective and not optimistic about the current prospects for the development 
of interreligious relations and dialogue.  Echoing others with whom I have spoken, he was 
disappointed at the lack of depth in Christian-Muslim dialogue in recent years.  One of the 
 
238 For a helpful exploration of this issue, see: (Fischbach, 2015) Interfaith Dialogue in Lebanon:  Between 
a Power Balancing Act and Theological Encounters. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,  
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reasons he suggests is that “contemporary Islam is complete in itself.  All contemporary Islamic 
thoughts are justifications of the truth of Islam”.  Additionally, “many Muslims feel deeply and 
profoundly that the West is orientated against them.”  Speaking from decades of engagement 
with and reflection on the subject, Khodr continued with a message that I believe is both 
challenging and has lasting relevance:  
 
We as Christians are not courageous enough to face this reality.  We are not hopeful 
enough to see that sometime Islam could evolve in a way that could make itself more 
engaged in human destiny and the suffering of humanity.  I feel that Christians too are 
still rooted in hierarchies, priesthood, and old allegiances of theology.  We lack a real 
theology of engagement with the world.  The situation is very difficult.  Many Muslims 
and many Christians forget that God is not thought; God is love.  It is our duty as 
Christians to reveal the love of God in our dealings with others and with the world.  
This is what we can teach our Muslim friends.  If we look back to the Christians in the 
first century, we can rediscover something of our faith.  They were not concerned with 
politics.  They were mixed with the population keeping the faith. They lived the gospel.   
To be witnesses of the gospel in our daily lives -  this is the way forward.239 
 
 
Khodr’s spiritual and theological legacy and influence remains strong in Eastern Christian 
circles in Lebanon and Syria.  Presented with the level of sectarian violence unleashed during 
the Syrian and Iraq conflicts, his theology looks even more challenging, and some may say 
unrealistic, especially as many Christian communities wish to strengthen their sense of 
Christian identity.  And yet, it is recognition of the diversity that Khodr’s theology embraces 
that makes his contribution of lasting relevance to the religious landscape in the region. 
 
5.5  A Melkite Contribution:  Patriarch Gregorios III Laham (b.1933) and  
Jean-Clement Jeanbart  (b.1943) 
 
The ‘Melkite’ Greek Catholic Church is the Catholic counterpart of the Eastern Orthodox 
Patriarchate of Antiochate.240  ‘Melkite’ refers to the Syriac and Arabic word for ‘King’, 
reflecting the Church’s acceptance of the Council of Chalcedon (451) as promoted by the 
Byzantine Emperor.  The Greek Catholic Church Is the largest Catholic community in Syria, 
which, though in communion with Rome since the sixteenth century, has had an uninterrupted 
line of Catholic Patriarchs since 1724.   It was given legal recognition by the Ottoman 
government in 1848, when it moved its Patriarchate from Lebanon to Damascus.   
 
 
239 Interview with Bishop Georges Khodr.  Broumanna, Lebanon. 1 December 2017.   
240 See: (Galadza, 2010) (Robertson, 1990, pp. 98-101) (A O'Mahony, 2018, pp. 271-284) 
192 
 
The Melkite Church, as one of the most influential of the oriental churches in the region, has 
the potential to offer a uniquely eastern contribution to Catholic spirituality and theology, 
though the dominance of western Catholic influence within the Church continues to create 
tensions between its eastern and western expressions of ecclesiology and theology.  An 
example of this tension is illustrated in Rome’s response to the improving relationship 
between the Greek Melkite and Orthodox Churches in Syria, Galadza writes that  
 
Melkites and Orthodox have come to develop extremely good relations, in part 
because of shared difficulties with Islam and the absence of ethno-national issues 
dividing them… In 1975, the Melkite Synod requested permission from the Vatican to 
inaugurate ‘double communion’ (with Rome and the Orthodox), but it was denied.  An 
official bilateral dialogue with the Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch was inaugurated in 
1995, and that same year saw the most pioneering event of contemporary East-West 
ecumenism in the ‘Zoghby-Khodr’ initiative: Bishop Zoghby signed a declaration 
stating: ‘I believe in everything taught by the Eastern Orthodox Church, and I am in 
communion with the Bishop of Rome within the limits recognized by the Holy Fathers 
of the East during the first millennium and before the separation.’  Georges Khodr, the 
influential Orthodox Metropolitan of Byblos and Batroun officially declared: ‘I consider 
this profession of faith by Bishop Elias Zoghby to create the necessary and sufficient 
conditions to establish the unity of the Orthodox Churches with Rome.’  Rome has 
refused to sanction this initiative”(Galadza, 2010, pp. 312-313). 
 
Of all the Churches in the Middle East, the Greek Melkite Church has been the most involved in 
Christian-Muslim dialogue.  The former Patriarch Gregorios III Laham (Greek Melkite Patriarch 
from 2000-2017) was a strong advocate for Christian-Muslim dialogue and stressed the 
indigenous roots of the eastern Christian community.  These roots he said gave a uniqueness 
to the Christian presence and a responsibility to eastern Christians to remain.  Patriarch 
Gregorios wrote:  
 
Emigration is certainly a natural right for people everywhere, but emigration from the 
Middle East is something different, because the Middle East is the cradle of 
Christianity. Eastern Christians incarnate this Christian presence in the cradle of 
Christianity….Jesus is an Eastern citizen, a compatriot of mine, since I am an Easterner.  
If Christians emigrate, it is as though Christ were leaving his country and homeland.241   
 
In his many articles, sermons and speeches, Patriarch Gregorios regularly called upon Muslims 
and Christians, as fellow Arabs with a common heritage, to work together to relieve suffering 
and improve society, and sought to relate Christian theology in a Muslim context and establish 
 
241 Patriarch Gregorius III Laham ( 2017) ‘On the occasion of the Feast of the Nativity 2016. ‘Christ was 
born in Palestine: Christianity was born in Syria.’ In I am with you always. Vol. IV. Pastoral Letters of 
Patriarch Gregorios III from 2013-2017. Fairfax. USA: Eastern Christian Publications. 265 
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commonality of principles.  The “mission, role and service” of eastern Christians he wrote, is to 
be the “real manifestation of Christ God, Lover of mankind”.242    In 2013, Patriarch Gregorios 
summarised what he called ‘The Challenges facing Arab Christians” in the Middle East, for a 
Conference bearing that title hosted by King Abdullah of Jordan in Amman in 2013.  The list 
that Patriarch Gregorius compiled can be viewed in Appendix 7. 
 
Archbishop Jean-Clement Jeanbart  was born in 1943 and ordained in 1968.  He succeeded  
Neophytos Edelby as Greek Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo in 1995.  Throughout his ministry, 
Archbishop Jeanbart has affirmed the importance of Christian-Muslim dialogue and co-
existence in Syria.  He says:  
 
Before the war clergy and sheikhs treated each other without difference or distinction.  
We had very good relations.  But the war has created some barriers.  Nevertheless, we 
intend to restore harmony, and religious leaders are trying hard to be an example.243   
 
Living in Aleppo throughout the conflict, Jeanbart has been an outspoken critic of western 
support for militant groups.  In 2015, he pleaded with the British Government to “stop 
investing in jihadis and mercenaries who are killing anyone who is saying anything about 
freedom, citizenship, religious liberty and democracy.”244 
 
An examination of some of Jeanbart’s writings and reflections adds a helpful Syrian 
perspective on Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, both prior to, and since the start of the 
Syrian conflict. 
 
During a Conference in Abu Dhabi on 10 March 2008, Jeanbart opened his speech by 
remarking to the assembled delegates:  
 
In truth, our sacred books, our religious thought, our moral laws, our arab culture, our 
shared hope and our common belonging to the same nation all indicate that there is 
 
242 Patriarch Gregorius III Laham (2017) ‘On the occasion of the Nativity 2013. In  I am with you always. 
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243 Interview with Archbishop Jeanbart.  Aleppo. 29 April 2018.  It is sad that critics of Syrian Church 
leaders outside the country sometimes see their efforts at modelling religious harmony in the midst of 
the conflict as politically motivated.  Such a view does not give sufficient credit to the longstanding 
nature of inter-religious relationships in Syria and the inter-religious ‘culture’ of the country.  See also a 






woven a solid canvas for the strengthening of harmony, fraternal friendliness and 
friendship that exists between nationals of our countries in this part of the world.245   
 
This sentiment echoes the writings of George Khodr, and of many other eastern clergy, who 
rightly emphasise the indigenous roots of the Christian community and the cultural heritage 
and history that they share with their Muslim compatriots.   Jeanbart continued by 
acknowledging that the presence of numerous conflicts in the region might challenge this 
statement, but declared that developments in civilisation, science, encounters between 
cultures and communication were bound to create confusion and tension in the face of 
ignorance, but that these would nevertheless “erase ignorance and activate the spirit of 
openness between humans from one place and across countries and continents”.  They have 
the capacity to enrich culture and understanding of one another and of the world around us.  
The Orient should be “proud to have been the cradle of religions and the nursery of all that 
these religions have given to humanity, such as moral values and well-anchored social rules, 
which facilitate common life between men and women”.   Moreover, “religious feeling” is 
“rooted in contemporary Arab society” and “allows the citizen to develop his personality and 
to quickly reach human and social fulfilment”, inspiring respect of the other.  It therefore has 
the capacity to improve relations in society and “develop the climate necessary for a peaceful 
and evolving human life”.  For Jeanbart, the true expression of religion is practise of the 
virtues, the most important of which he identifies as diligence in work, sincerity, faithfulness, 
generosity, forgiveness, reconciliation and love.  When religion does not practise these, he 
says, it is failing.   
 
For Jeanbart, morality and religion are inseparable.  Respect for and acceptance of the other, 
moral integrity and good dealings with others, are integral to both Christianity and Islam.  And 
these are the roots that Middle Eastern society needs to recover, helping to construct a society 
that is “socially coherent” and in which people respect each other, and in which individual and 
corporate human rights prevail.  Jeanbart cites both the gospels and the Qur’an and Hadith to 
affirm the importance of both Christians and Muslims working together to achieve these aims.  
 
As previously mentioned, Christian leaders in Syria have been criticised by some for ‘siding’ 
with the Syrian Government.  Such a view underestimates the influence of the historic role of 
 
245 ‘Le discours religieux qui éclaire et la rencontre civilisatrice entre les peuples.’  Speech in Abu Dhabi, 
10 March 2008.  All quotes regarding this speech are my translation from a typed copy in French given 
to me by Archbishop Jeanbart on 23 April 2018, which itself is his translation from the original Arabic. 
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religious leadership that prevailed in Ottoman society, and the social, cultural and religious 
complexity of the contemporary context in which religious leaders play an important 
representative and intermediary role, and sometimes act as a ‘critical voice’ between their 
communities and the political leadership of the State.  In his speech in Abu Dhabi Jeanbart 
offers a helpful comment on this:  
 
Our Christian membership may seem to some to align us with membership of a party 
or a group that imposes on us a specific way of life and perhaps even a specific political 
commitment. This may appear to others as an obstacle or hindrance that would 
prevent us from fully integrating into our Arab societies. The truth is very different.  
 
It is true that Christianity dictates precise and clear religious duties, which are part of 
our commitment to life, and it also demands of us specific moral values that we realize 
in our daily relations with others. It is also true that the fact of being Christian 
distinguishes us in society when we adhere to Christianity with seriousness and 
sincerity. It neither allows us to abandon others, nor does it allow us to distance 
ourselves from social action, from national service, or from devoting ourselves to 
acting in the fringes of popular movements. It does not forbid us from joining national 
parties that are working for the good of the country and are fighting for its progress 
and prosperity, unless these movements or parties are atheists and fight religion and 
who, by refusing the participation of believers, exclude them. 
 
Jeanbart concludes:  
In our country our situation presents us with numerous favourable opportunities for 
establishing constructive and good relations with our fellow citizens, and those with 
whom we work in multiple contexts: cultural, scientific, social, political, artistic, and 
economic.  Every day and every moment, we meet and exchange with them.   It is a 
reality that we cannot escape and which at the same time is our Mission and our way 
to please Almighty God. Our common life with Muslims is a dominant aspect of our 
Christian life in this region of the world, which is dear to us.  Thus it always 
preoccupies us, in our thoughts and our actions.246 
 
Echoing a tendency identified by other church leaders in the region, Jeanbart acknowledges 
that theological dialogue on key Christian doctrines remains difficult.   The Divinity, 
Resurrection and Lordship of Christ are all “beyond dialogue” he suggests.  However, 
theological dialogue might be possible on the Unity of God, the sanctity of Mary, and of Jesus 
as Master and Prophet.  Jeanbart writes: 
 
Both from a Christian point of view and from a Muslim point of view, dialogue remains 
in the present circumstances limited to the sphere of social and humanitarian Affairs. 
 
246 For further discussion on the relationship of religious leadership to the State in the Middle East, see 
Henley (2015)  ‘Remaking the Mosaic. Religious leaders and secular borders in the colonial Levant,’ and 
(2016) ‘Religious Authority and Sectarianism in Lebanon.’ 
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This dialogue, even if it is limited is always cordial and remains beneficial in a mixed 
and plural society.247 
 
Despite the limits of dialogue, Jeanbart advocates interreligious dialogue on matters relevant 
to social and ethical values, as a means to deepening conversation: 
 
 It is useful to have a dialogue at the individual level.  Personalized and sustained 
friendship at the individual and group level is likely to lead to community dialogue at a 
later stage. To go in the opposite direction would risk difficulties caused by the 
constraints of sectarian pressure often present within Muslim communities.  An 
enlightened tolerance, avoiding key principles, can with time, develop the good 
disposition of listening essential to a true useful and constructive dialogue.  In any 
case, cordiality is a ‘must’, and is the gateway to good relations.248 
 
As Jeanbart frequently cites, and as I have witnessed on numerous occasions in Syria, 
relationships between most Christian and Muslim leaders remain good, and in the public 
sphere religious leaders seek to model a relationship of trust and confidence before a society 
where relationships and trust have been fractured by the conflict.    Reflecting on the common 
history, and on the social and economic life which Muslims and Christians share in Syria he 
writes that this relationship extends beyond the leaders:  
 
The language of the most enlightened laymen among our fellow Muslims draws from 
this friendly terminology. Good will on both sides allows a serene conviviality and a 
comfortable neighbourhood. Christians and Moslems from the city of Aleppo, for 
example, who have known each other for a long time and whose ancestors have lived 
together for centuries, come together and nurture feelings of mutual trust and friendly 
respect.249 
 
In a document predating the Syrian conflict and entitled ‘Musulmans et Chretiens. Convivialite 
et dialogue’, Jeanbart poignantly notes: 
 
'Peace' remains the fertile ground for the growth of mutual trust, which is 
indispensable for any loyal dialogue and sincere friendship between men of good will. 
We are currently witnessing an obvious tendency towards openness and listening 
among many Muslims. Never in the history of the Middle Eastern Church have we 
been able to see so many Islamo-Christian encounters and so many budding 
friendships between the religious leaders of the two sides. 
 
247 Commentary on a section entitled ‘Inter-religious Dialogue’ in an unpublished paper entitled ‘The 
plight of Christians in the Middle East’. 9 January 2015.  Translated from a document in French. 
248 Taken from of an unpublished document written in French by Archbishop Jeanbart in 2009 and 
entitled: ‘Avec L’Islam: Un dialogue humain et social.’ 





This vision was clearly expressed in another speech Archbishop Jeanbart made to a 
distinguished gathering at an Iftar meal at the Episcopal House in Aleppo on 14 September 
2009.  The gathering included the Governor of Aleppo, the Grand Mufti of Aleppo, and 
Christian and Muslim leaders, and the paragraph offers an insight into the representative and 
leadership role that the religious leaders play in Syrian society, in affirming the plural values 
that most religious leaders in Syria hope to sustain.  
 
May each one of us do this for the progress of our national community, so that it can 
offer its members a dignified and peaceful human life, and to the different local 
denominations the serenity, allowing them to slowly wander to others, to meet and 
establish, among themselves, bonds of deep friendship and feelings of solidarity aimed 
at the building of an evolving society, both united and plural, where each believer can 
enjoy all his rights and where each individual is aware of the duties imposed on them 
by their belonging to this dear country of ours.250 
 
However, the war has hugely impacted society, and inter-religious relations have been 
strained.  In 2015, in a speech in New York, Archbishop Jeanbart said: 
 
For decades Syrian Christians lived peacefully in a society alongside a Muslim majority 
which was tolerant. […] This is no longer the case. Syrian Christians are disoriented by 
the implosion of a way of life that was quiet and safe. They are afraid to leave their 
houses, they avoid going out of their cities or villages, or do so only to move to other 
regions where they hope to find a safe refuge. In dangerous zones like Aleppo and 
villages close to Turkey, what terrorizes the population more than the fighting and the 
bombing, are the kidnappings, the snipers, car-bombs, the shelling and the looting… all 
this culminating in the manifestation of ISIS. Christians are victims of a war of 
destruction led by a certain nations taking advantage of unrest. These foreign 
elements have promoted a brother vs brother war. They have injected arms, money 
and tens of thousands of fighters, jihadists, fundamentalists, foreigners and 
mercenaries, recruited from many different countries.251 
 
In a Pastoral letter on 25 March, 2018, Archbishop Jeanbart recalled how even his residence, 
bishopric and Cathedral had been repeatedly targeted during the occupation of East Aleppo by 
militant groups.  But more seriously, speaking at a Conference a few months earlier, he said: 
 
The prosperity which Aleppo enjoyed and which placed her among the most important 
cities of this region has lost its aura.  The innumerable attacks which have destroyed its 
 
250 Translated from an unpublished copy of the speech in French, given to me by Archbishop Jeanbart. 
251 Talk delivered at Edward Cardinal Egan Catholic Center at New York University, on April 28, 2015.  
Published as: ‘Syrian Christians are caught between Civil War and Islamist terrorism’, in Christians in the 
Muslim World. 11 June 2015  
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factories and its flourishing industry, its infrastructure and social and administrative 
institutions, its commercial area and its legendary souks, its ancient homes, it schools, 
and its hospitals have reduced the city to misery and its population to extreme 
poverty.  Through the destruction of this city, Syria has lost one of its main sources of 
economic growth and social improvement…. Aleppo was not alone to suffer, many 
other cities in the country have been the target of a similar dreadful disaster.252 
 
In 2015, Jeanbart spoke of the role of the Church as follows:   
 
Since the beginning of this senseless war, the Church – while encouraging the regime 
to enact the reforms desired by the majority of citizens – has called for an end to 
armed conflict, has called for negotiations to achieve a political solution to this crisis. 
The Assembly of Bishops of my country, along with the Pope, has not ceased to call 
believers to prayer, the fighters to lay down their arms, and nations to cease military 
interference.253   
 
And in an interesting reflection on the causes of this disaster, and in response to criticism that 
Christian leaders failed to support the ‘rebels’, the Archbishop wrote: 
 
We cannot see anywhere, in all these events, evidence of a revolution or a search for 
betterment and the improving of the life of the citizens of this country.  Rather, we ask 
ourselves every day, is this revolution really a movement of Syrian citizens looking for 
freedom and democracy and a better life, or is it not a devastating invasion of our 
land, more terrible than the invasion of the Huns in the 5th Century and the Tartars in 
the Middle Ages?   This pretence of a revolution for liberty and betterment does not 
care about the life of the people it purports to serve, nor about the security of its 
inhabitants, nor about their subsistence nor the future of their children.  …..Some 
opponents wonder how it is that religious leaders and bishops are not the first ones to 
support the rebels, but the facts are evident.  In everything we have seen that this 
uprising has nothing to do with freedom and democracy. If it were the case, it is 
undeniable that the Church would have been the first to become an ally of the unrest 
and the leader of those asking for substantial reforms in political governance and in 
the administration of public goods, beginning with the suppression of dictatorship 
followed by a democratic passage of power. What Christians want for the short term 
and for the future, is to arrive at a non-confessional and pluralistic political system 
enabling each citizen, whatever his religious beliefs, to live in peace in his country and 
to participate in public life, with all the duties and rights which real citizenship 
requires.254 
 
In another document entitled ‘The plight of Christians in the Middle East’ dated 9 January 
2015, Jeanbart makes clear that inter-religious tensions have been heightened by Salafist 
 
252 These paragraphs are copied from the script of an unpublished talk that Archbishop Jeanbart gave on 
5 December 2017, handed to me by the Archbishop. 
253 Talk in New York. 28 April, 2015. 
254  From the script of an unpublished talk that Archbishop Jeanbart gave on 5 December 2017. 
Translated from French. 
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tendencies that have infiltrated the country over recent decades, and that the majority of 
Syrian Muslims have always respected Christians.  Jeanbart believes Christian-Muslim tensions 
in Syria have been heightened by Islamic influences imported from outside the region that are 
not representative of Syrian religious traditions. 
 
In the face of the economic and social hardships created by the war, Jeanbart, like other 
Church leaders, has continued to place a high priority on the continuing provision of education, 
medical welfare, skills training, housing assistance, and basic food provision to those in 
greatest need.  And in March 2018, following the return of tens of thousands of internally 
displaced people to their homes in Aleppo after the liberation of the city in December 2016, 
Jeanbart was able to offer a more positive assessment.  In doing so, he refers to the 
humanitarian and charitable projects with which his Church is engaged.  He wrote: 
 
Now, with the freeing of Aleppo, we see signs of hope rising on the horizon.  Better 
security and the reopening of public services give some tranquillity to our faithful.  
There is now water and electricity in the homes.  Slowly, economic life has begun and 
the most valiant are finding work.  We are very happy to see the young people who 
have been prepared in our professional schools find work.  “To Build and Stay”, our 
association for local development has been able to renovate 800 apartments and 
some 50 workshops and stores which had been damaged by rockets.  Our Solidarity 
Fund has made 200 loans so far in order to help our young people begin their own 
projects enabling them to live and advance with pride.255 
 
However, despite these positive developments, emigration of Christians remains a major 
concern.  A large percentage of Christians in Aleppo left the city during the years of the conflict 
for fear of their lives.256  Others have left because of the economic hardship caused by the loss 
of work, the destruction of industries, and the impact of sanctions. Jeanbart, along with other 
Christian leaders, has appealed to the West to assist the Churches of the east to enable their 
people to return or stay.  Funds have been set up to support Christians in travel expenses to 
return to Aleppo, and in the rebuilding and renovation damaged homes.  
 
 
255 Easter Letter from Jean-Clement Jeanbart to his congregations. 25 March 2018. The ‘Build and Stay’ 
fund “allows workers – carpenters, plumbers, teachers, lawyers, craftsmen and others – to re-establish 
themselves professionally, to buy the equipment and supplies they need to get started again; to rebuild 
the city of Aleppo and their own lives.”    
256 There are no official figures for the numbers of Christians who have left the city. Figures vary 
according to denomination.  For example, some denominations report emigration in the region of 50%.  




The emigration of Christians from the region has been a concern shared by both Muslims and 
Christians for many years now.257  It remains a growing concern for the well-being and stability 
of the historically plural and diverse nature, framework and shape of Levantine society.  Girling 
identifies four factors for the emigration of Christians that has afflicted the region in recent 
decades:  
 
(1) Interventions of external state to alter local governments, as has happened in Iraq, 
Libya, and Syria; (2) disinclination by the numerically largest religious tradition in the 
region – Sunni Islam – to help sustain societies capable of plurality; (3) a lack of 
overarching vision and willingness to cooperate among churches to secure their 
presence; and (4) migration in search of a better life and employment.258 
 
In December 2017, Jeanbart quoted an article published on 29 January 2002, by the Lebanese 
Newspaper, An-Nahar, in which Saudi Prince Talal Bin Abdulaziz al Saud declared that the 
emigration of Christians  
 
will result in long term effects in the future of our Arab world… The Arab Christians 
formed one of the pillars of both old and modern Arab construction… Their survival…is 
to prevent draining an important section of the creative, scientific, cultural and 
intellectual potential of the Arab world.  They are also keen elements of economic 
power in trade, industry, finance, professional specialization and workmanship.  In 
short, if the emigration of Arab Christians continues, it will be a deep blow pointed to 
the core of our future.259 
 
Such a view has been expressed by both Muslim and Christian leaders and citizens at most 
meetings I have attended with faith, civic and community leaders in towns and cities across 
Syria during the last few years.   The importance of the Christian presence, and condemnation 
of sectarian violence has always featured in conversation.  
 
As the war approaches an end in Syria, Archbishop Jeanbart is keen to encourage and enable 
Christians to remain in the country, and to repair the relationship of trust between Christian 
and Muslim communities. He also holds that Christians have a major role to play in the 
restoration of political and religious stability in Syria. 
 
257 For a helpful article on the issue of emigration of Christian Arabs from the region, although focussed 
on Christian emigration from Palestine, see: (Sabella, 1998) See also the Chapter on ‘Emigration’ in: (J. 
Andrews, 2018) The Church in Disorienting Times.  Leading Prophetically through Adversity.  
258 Girling,K. (2018) Displaced Populations. In. Ross, K.,Tadros,M.,Johnson,T.M. (eds.) Christianity in 
North Africa and West Asia. 427-438 





To ensure political stability, it is essential that Christian leaders, both lay and religious, 
are given a voice and presence at the negotiating table. Christians can act as bridge-
builders between Shiites and Sunnis, and they can help develop a political system that 
ensures the rights of all citizens.260 
 
He appeals to Christians outside Syria to support the Christians of the land to stay, not to 
leave.  Asked what he would say to Christians in Europe who have been critical of Christian 
leaders in Syria, he replied:  
 
Jesus told us that the truth shall set us free.  One of the most important principles of 
Christianity is truth, and it is a duty of all Christian believers to understand what is 
true.  It is a huge injustice to judge others when you do not have all the knowledge or 
the facts to understand the truth.  So do not judge us, but come and see for 
yourselves, and find out the truth of what we have been through here. The soil of Syria 
is blessed and holy, because it is mixed with the blood of many martyrs who were 
faithful to God.261  
 
All churches in Syria undertake projects to encourage members of their congregations who 
have remained to stay, and to enable those who have left, to return.  In February 2019, John 
Pontifex of Aid to the Church in Need UK, wrote an article describing the support that the 
Catholic Charity is giving to Christian communities in Homs to assist the return of Christian 
families who fled  during the occupation of the Christian Quarter of the Old City by Islamist 
groups.  He wrote: 
 
An action plan to enable thousands of Christians to return to their homes in the Syrian 
city of Homs was agreed in a house-repair scheme involving Church leaders and a 
leading Catholic charity. 
At the meeting in Homs, the leaders of five Church communities signed the Homs 
Reconstruction Committee agreement, in which Catholic charity Aid to the Church in 
Need will repair 300 homes as part of  the first stage of the plan. 
In the second phase, a further 980 homes are due to be rebuilt – 80 from the Melkite 
Greek Catholic community, 600 Greek Orthodox and 300 belonging to Syriac Orthodox 
families. ACN will support part of the project. 
Highlighting the significance of the agreement, ACN Middle East projects coordinator 
Father Andrzej Halemba said: “The agreement is one of the most critical steps forward 
in the recovery of the Christian community in Homs.  The commitment to rebuild so 
 
260 Talk in New York. 28 April, 2015. 
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many homes offers the light of hope for people desperate to return to the city that is 
one of the most important for Christians in the whole of Syria.” 
Since the crisis in Syria began in 2011, ACN has completed 750 projects involving 150 
partners.  With more than 12,500 homes destroyed in Homs and 37,500 badly 
damaged, many Christians have been living in displacement in the nearby Valley of the 
Christians for up to seven years.  At the height of the conflict in 2014, there were less 
than 100 Christians remaining in Homs Old City and targeted attacks by Islamist 
extremists forced nearly 250,000 to leave.262 
 
The many projects undertaken by Christian denominations to support local communities 
across Syria are a vital contribution to preserving the Christian presence and the plural 
religious landscape in Syria.  
 
5.6 His Holiness Mor Ignatius Aphrem II.  Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church       (b. 1965) 
 
The Syriac Orthodox Church is part of the Oriental Orthodox family of Churches and traces its 
roots to the apostolic ministry in Antioch.263  The Oriental Orthodox family includes the Syriac 
Orthodox Church, the Malankara Orthodox Church in South India, the Coptic Orthodox, 
Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Churches, and the Armenian Apostolic Church with the Holy 
See of Etchmiadzin.  They share full Communion with each other, each have their own Pope, 
Patriarch or Catholicos, and reject Chalcedon.  Following the Council of Chalcedon (451CE), the 
Oriental Churches were isolated from Roman and Byzantine Christianity.  
 
The Syriac Orthodox Church has a rich history and liturgical tradition.  Situated originally in 
Antioch, the See was forced to move in the 6th century owing to persecution. In the 13th 
Century it settled at the monastery of Deir al-Hananyo, otherwise known as Deir ul-Zafaran in 
Mardin in Eastern Turkey, where the Patriarchate remained until 1933.  Following the Sayfo 
massacres and further political and religious instability in eastern Turkey, the Patriarchate 
moved to Homs, and then in 1959 to Damascus.  Today, Damascus is the headquarters for the 
global Syriac Orthodox family, one of the most significant eastern Christian communities.   In 
the early centuries of the Christian era, Edessa played a significant role in the development of 
Syriac liturgy and literature and in the translation of the Bible, but since the end of the 
 
262 https://acnuk.org/news/stria-house-repair-plan-offers-fresh-hopes-to-christians/  20 February 2019. 
(Accessed: 26 February 2019) 
263  See: (Shemunkasho, 2018)  Oriental Orthodox. In: Christianity in North Africa and West Asia. 247-
258.  See also:  www.syriacpatriarchate.org  Accessed: 1 August 2018 
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Ottoman Empire, Syria has become an important centre for the Syriac and Armenian Christian 
communities. 
 
In 1995, it was reported that there were 89,000 Syrian Orthodox in Syria, representing about 
10% of the Christian population.264  Due to political instability and religious persecutions in the 
region, the Syriac Orthodox Church has declined in the Middle East, but grown significantly 
elsewhere, particularly Europe, Lebanon and America.  Patriarch Aphrem was born in Qamishle 
in Syria and studied in Lebanon and Egypt.  From 1996 until his election as Patriarch, he served 
as an Archbishop in the United States, and was instrumental in international ecumenical 
initiatives.   Amidst the conflict, the Syriac Orthodox presence in Syria has remained influential 
and significant in its work.  The Patriarchal Headquarters at Maaret Saidnaya continues to train 
clergy from all over the world.  Reflecting the Church’s worldwide emphasis on education and 
ministry amongst young people, a new University was opened by the Syrian Orthodox Church 
in Saidnaya in 2018.  The humanitarian charitable work of the Church in the midst of the 
conflict through the St. Ephrem Patriarchal Development Committee, operates throughout 
Syria and is benefiting tens of thousands of people.265  Meanwhile, Patriarch Aphrem’s 
representative role as religious leader both nationally and internationally is significant and 
effective.   And it is in this role that his many speeches offer a window into a Syrian Christian 
response to the contemporary context and to Christian-Muslim relations in the country.  
 
The importance of the indigenous presence of Christians in the Middle East is often stressed by 
both Christians and Muslims in Syria.  For many Syrians, the loss of a Christian presence would 
signal a devastating blow to the plurality and diversity that has been a feature of Syrian society 
for centuries, and would risk opening the gates to the domination of extreme political and 
religious ideologies in the national arena.   In a lecture in 2015, entitled, ‘Do Muslims need 
Christians in the Middle East?’, Patriarch Aphrem reminded the audience that in the early 
years of Islam, many Christians who were tired of being persecuted by their co-religionists “for 
refusing to accept the Christological definitions of the Council of Chalcedon”, welcomed 
Muslims “as liberators”.  Subsequently Christians were employed during the Umayyad and 
Abbassid caliphates to run state affairs.266  Ever since, Christians have played a leading role in 
 
264 See Chart. Page 250. 
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the fields of philosophy, education and science in the Arab world.  They have also contributed 
to the establishment of political parties, including the Ba’ath Party.  Patriarch Aphrem 
continues:  
“I believe that Muslims need Christians to challenge themselves to live in a pluralistic 
and multi-religious society where they can affirm their religious identity without being 
afraid of the other….. Living together should be conceived by Muslims and Christians 
alike as a divine vision and plan.  We Christians believe that God has placed us in the 
region with the mission of spreading love, tolerance and enlightenment.” 
 
The Syriac community however has been subject to extreme persecutions.  During the Sayfo 
massacres of 1915 that coincided with the Armenian genocide, it is estimated that over 
500,000 Syriacs were murdered, ostensibly for ‘interfering’ in the politics of the Ottoman 
Empire.   Extreme atrocities were perpetrated against Syriac Christians, crimes that have been 
largely ignored outside the region.   But recent massacres by ISIS of Syriac Christians in Iraq and 
Syria have reignited awareness of this history.  The kidnap on 22 April 2013  of two Aleppo 
Archbishops, Syrian Orthodox Archbishop Mar Yohanna Gregorios Ibrahim and Greek 
Orthodox Archbishop Paul Yazigi, has also had a profound impact on the Christian 
communities. (At a meeting of Christian and Muslim religious and civic leaders at the Syriac 
Orthodox Patriarchate in Aleppo on 18 April 2018, a picture of Archbishop Ibrahim was 
carefully placed on his empty chair in the centre of the audience of hall).  In response to the 
increased rise in sectarianism both in Syria and across the Middle East, Patriarch Aphrem says:  
 
Fanaticism and religious extremism should not be allowed to spread in the region.  It 
should be made known to all that Christians will not abandon their faith or alter their 
way of living because of the ideology of individuals and groups to whom moderation is 
foreign and tolerance is alien.  We will continue to live in peace with the millions of 
peace loving Muslims, Jews and other religious groups in the Middle East.  As 
Christians, our mission is to spread love, peace and harmony in the world. 
 
Building a culture of peace should be a common goal for all of us in order to prepare a 
better future for generations to come.  In so doing, we need to draw on lessons learnt 
from our past experiences…..Furthermore, the most adequate assurance for Christians 
to remain in the Middle East is a strong secular government where all citizens are 
equal and where Christians do not feel that they are treated as second or even third 
class citizens.  The international community, no matter how sincere they are in their 
concern for Christians in the Middle East, will not be able to protect them.  Migration, 
on the other hand, is not the solution for Christians.  They need to be encouraged to 
stay in their homeland.  Nonetheless, they can only do that when there is a strong 
secular government that is able to protect all citizens regardless of their religion or 
ethnicity.   
 
Building bridges with Muslim societies is highly needed; joint initiatives to promote 
common values such as respect of human beings and human rights should be 
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organised.  These initiatives should aim at developing ways to combat religious 
extremism on the one hand and secularization of the society and its moral structure on 
the other hand.   
 
Islamic religious leaders are specifically urged to distance themselves from narrow 
interpretations of Koranic text and to promote moderate teachings which encourage 
tolerance and acceptance of the other.267 
 
Patriarch Aphrem has been a strong critic of western support for militant groups.  Speaking at 
the launch of a Report on Religious Freedom at the House of Commons in London on 24 
November, 2016, he said:  
 
It is very important to identify who our persecutor is.  Indeed the report on freedom of 
religion suggested that the persecution of Christians in Syria is done by both State and 
non-State groups alike.  We do not see it as such.  The Syrian government has always 
been supportive of Christians.  In Syria, violence against Christians is inflicted by the 
terrorist groups, including ISIS and Al-Nusra Front (Al-Qaeda), who desire to wipe us 
out of Syria.  It is not the government, or any official state authority that is committing 
violent attacks against Syrians.  In Syria, all discrimination and persecution that the 
Christians are currently suffering from, are carried out by the terrorist groups, some of 
which are internationally recognised as ‘moderate opposition’. 
 
He continued: 
We urge all authorities not to adopt the ‘wrong reading’ of the situation and not to 
commit the fatal mistake of ‘justifying the wrongdoer’.  This will turn against us all. 
 
As Christians, we believe in non-violence; therefore we encourage dialogue, especially 
among religious leaders of all groups.  Interfaith dialogue is not an option.  It is a 
necessity.  Moreover, we appeal to the consciences of the Western leaders and the 
media: It is time you stand up for freedom; especially religious freedom of Christians 
and all minorities fighting for survival in their home countries.   This could be done by: 
- Stopping the flow of arms to terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq under the claim of 
supporting moderate opposition. 
- Creating a safe haven for Christians in Iraq. 
- Supporting national armies in Iraq and Syria in order to eliminate terrorism. 
- Supporting a strong government in Syria, that is able to protect all the citizens 
alike, where all are based on the principle of citizenship with equal rights and 
obligations. 
- Adopting a peaceful resolution that ensures that national dialogue and 
reconciliation among conflicting groups is the way to reach peace in these 
countries. 
- Humanitarian efforts to the displaced, including emergency aid for displaced 
people and refugees in neighbouring countries.268 
 
267 Talk entitled: “Observations on Muslim-Christian relations in the Middle East”, delivered at Yerevan 
State University, Armenia, on 13 October, 2014.  http://syriacpatriarchate.org/2015/01/observations-
muslim-christian-relations-middle-east/  Accessed: 1 August 2018. 
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This talk represented a direct challenge and rebuke to British policy, and as one who was 
present at the event, the lukewarm response of the British politicians, Church leaders and 
representatives of NGO’s in attendance, was noticeable.   Patriarch Aphrem has consistently 
called for an end to all violence, and peaceful, diplomatic solutions to conflict.  In the 
promotion of peace, Christians do and should play an integral part.  Speaking in Berlin in 2017, 
he said: 
 
The International Community bears a good part of the responsibility for the conflicts 
and wars in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq.  Some countries continue to 
stand on the wrong side of this war.  Some international and regional powers are still 
supporting terrorist organisations with funds and arms. 
 
A political solution for the conflicts in the Middle East ought to be the prime concern 
of the International Community, which should commit itself to peace through 
negotiation and diplomacy, for the sake of ending the violence….…. In addition, the 
International Community should work to secure the return of refugees to their homes 
and lands where they can live in dignity and enjoy basic human rights… 
 
At the end, we should keep in mind that violence and religion do not go together.  
Christians are invaluable peacemakers without whom the Middle East would certainly 
fall into the hands of extremism and fundamentalism. It is the responsibility of all of us 
to ensure that Christians remain in their countries.  And that religious fanaticism and 
terrorism of all kinds is dismantled in all its forms, especially getting rid of the 
ideologies that are the cause and the basis for terrorism.269 
 
These statements encourage the restoration of peaceful coexistence, and the establishment of 
a society in which all live in equality and freedom.  Along with most Christian leaders in the 
region, Patriarch Aphrem affirms diversity and plurality as an integral part of Middle Eastern 
society.  And like other religious leaders, Patriarch Aphrem believes that religious leaders 
continue to have an important role to play in the region.  At an International Conference in 
Athens in 2017, Patriarch Aphrem identified five areas of ‘common concern’ which he said 
“require common action and firm commitment by religious leaders”.  These are: protecting 
life, affirming diversity, rejecting extremism, overcoming violence, and striving for peace with 
justice.270   
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At a Conference for World Mission and Evangelism in Tanzania in 2018, Patriarch Aphrem 
summarised his position as follows:  
 
- Our presence is a necessity not only for Christianity to continue in the land where 
it was born, but also for the people of the area.  Christians have always been an 
essential element of reconciliation and bridge building among different ethnic and 
religious components in the region. 
- We need to bring hope to our people that they still have a future in their 
homeland by tending to their needs, both in terms of security and financial help. 
For that, all churches in Syria have been actively engaged in relief efforts as well as 
in development projects to create job opportunities for our people.  
- Interreligious dialogue on the academic level alone is not sufficient; we need to 
initiate joint activities such as workshops, seminars and camps among Muslim and 
Christian young people. 
- We need the support of our brothers and sisters throughout the world in two main 
areas: in terms of advocacy and development. 
- Christians can only survive under secular governments where they could be 
treated based on the principle of citizenship with equal rights and obligations.271 
 
Two weeks after speaking these words, a group of which I was a part met with Patriarch 
Aphrem in Damascus.   He said to us: 
 
Your presence here is an indication of your love for us and your desire to seek the 
truth.  God loves all people and our duty as Syrian Christians is to express that love in 
our country.  Syriac Christians have always been children of martyrdom.  We are a 
Church of martyrs.  We were never an established or State Church.  But we have faith 
and perseverance, and we will continue to be witnesses of God’s love and presence in 
this place, whatever it costs us.  We need the Church worldwide to help enable the 
local Church to fulfil that mission in this place. 272 
 
 
Syriac Orthodox St. Ephrem Patriarchal Development Committee.  (EPDC) 
 
In terms of eastern Christian approaches to Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, the impact of 
the humanitarian work of the eastern Churches for the people of Syria, irrespective of ethnic 
or religious identity, especially during the war, cannot be overstated.  Mention has already 
been made of the Greek Orthodox charitable work of ‘GOPA-DERD’, the largest NGO in Syria 
 
271 Keynote Address at Conference of World Mission and Evangelism.  13 March 2018.  Arusha, Tanzania. 
http://syriacpatriarchate.org/2018/03/keynote-at-the-conference-of-world-mission-and-evangelism-
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after the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.  Almost every Christian denomination in Syria is 
undertaking humanitarian work, between them serving millions of the most vulnerable people 
wherever in the country they are able to operate.  Church charities can only operate in 
government-controlled areas of the country.  However, they have been quick to identify needs 
and implement humanitarian projects in areas liberated from militant control, as soon as these 
areas become safe.  This has facilitated the return of internally displaced and refugees to areas 
that remain habitable.  By virtue of the human demographic, the vast majority of beneficiaries 
are Muslim, and no distinction or prejudice is made in who is entitled to care.   
 
The Syrian Orthodox Humanitarian work is operated through the ‘St. Ephrem Patriarchal 
Development Committee’ (EPDC), which focusses on development and relief for those living in 
poverty.   Qualified volunteers operate in their respective fields.  In May 2018, I was a guest of 
EPDC volunteers in Deir Ezzor.  Since the liberation of the city in November 2017 from four 
years of ISIS siege, the EPDC has been running projects in the city amongst some of the tens of 
thousands of internally displaced civilians from the surrounding areas.  There are clinics 
specialising in women’s and children’s needs, educational projects, and welfare projects in the 
internally displaced camps.   Prior to the war, Deir Ezzor was a mixed city of Christians and 
Muslims.  During the occupation and siege by ISIS, most of the Christians left and some were 
killed.  St. Mary’s Syriac Orthodox Cathedral is now in ruins and I was told that only one 
Christian remains resident in the city.  But as one resident put it: “Before the war, we always 
had a good relationship and there was trust and tolerance between the Christian and Muslim 
communities.”   Which is why EPDC volunteers from all over Syria have been warmly 
welcomed in the city and their projects are well attended.  Fear remains however amongst 
both Muslims and Christians that ISIS will return, and that some extremists sympathetic to ISIS 
remain hidden among the population.   
 
Projects that EPDC operate include humanitarian assistance for those in most urgent need; a 
variety of medical services through a network of qualified doctors and nurses; psycho-social 
support for children traumatised by the war; educational programmes; grants in certain 
circumstances to enable students to continue their education; vocational training for women, 
men, young people in skills ranging from needlework, hairdressers, maintenance of computers, 
household and electrical appliances, languages and administrational work; creation of job 
opportunities; urgent financial aid projects to those whose lives are at risk from terrorist attack 
or abduction, particularly children and women; capacity building projects, and peace-building 
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initiatives in local communities.  Operating on the basis that every human being is a child of 
God and deserves respect, the ‘EPDC’ seeks to “make peace a part of everything we do”, to 
“distribute resources in ways that minimise conflict” and “to advocate for all activities that will 
lead to a more peaceful world.”273   
 
The women’s clinic that we visited in Deir Ezzor was treating 80-100 patients a day.  The 
children’s clinic was treating up to 50 children a day.  Doctors and nurses also told us that 
malnutrition is the most common ailment amongst children, but that most are psychologically 
damaged by the war. Availability of drugs, particularly costly drugs for major illnesses such as 
cancer is profoundly impacted by international sanctions.  
 
In the educational project for displaced children, which families access voluntarily, five classes 
with about 30 children in each class were operating simultaneously. Classes included reading, 
writing, drawing, poetry, theatre, dance.  The project had had to establish three shifts during 
the day to accommodate demand.  As we left, a new shift was about to start, and dozens of 
children were waiting excitedly outside to begin their classes.  
 
Such projects are replicated in dozens of towns, villages and cities across Syria by churches and 
faith communities, working in partnership with local and international charities.  Of course, the 
humanitarian initiatives of all the faith communities combined are insufficient to meet the 
scale of need, but they are and will be an essential part of the process of rebuilding the 
country, and in the long and difficult process of healing and reconciliation that needs to take 
place in the years ahead, but which already lay a foundation for the recovery of trust and 
improved interaction between communities.  As yet, these initiatives have been under-
recognised and under-supported by the international community. 
 
5.7 Antoine Audo  (b. 1946) 
 
Antoine Audo SJ, is Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo.  The Chaldean Church is of Syriac culture and 
tradition in full communion with Rome.  It emerged from the Church of the East due to a 
schism over succession in 1552 and continues to use the Syriac liturgy, and Arabic in certain 
urban areas.  Relations between the See of Rome and the Churches of the East have improved 
considerably since Vatican II, though relations between the Chaldean Church and the Assyrian 
 
273  ‘Our values’ page in http://www.epdc-syria.org/index.php 
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Church remain strained.274  The Chaldean Church, whilst being Catholic, remains a truly 
indigenous and eastern Christian expression of the Church in Syria.  Through Audo, the Syriac 
culture in this expression of the ‘Antiochene paradigm’ is in dialogue with the Arabic culture 
and Islamic religion. 
 
Born in Aleppo in 1946, Audo became Jesuit in 1969 and was ordained priest in 1979.  
Following studies in Damascus, Paris and Rome, he has held teaching posts at the Universite 
Satin-Joseph in Beirut and at the Universite Satin-Esprit in Kaslik.  Both the Jesuit and Carmelite 
order (which has a historic presence in Aleppo and Baghdad),  have had a strong presence in 
the Middle East and have contributed to the emergence of a distinct Eastern Catholic tradition.   
Reflecting a common concern for both Christians and Muslims in the region, Audo has been 
“very concerned in his work to identify the relation between religious tradition and modernity” 
and “about the plurality of religious expression as a continuing element of Christianity and the 
Islamic tradition” (Anthony O'Mahony, 2017, pp. 181-182). 
 
Like Khodr, Audo’s theology and spirituality is deeply rooted in the Patristic tradition.  Audo 
reminds us that Eastern spirituality embraces a variety of traditions emerging from the schools 
of Antioch, Alexandria and Constantinople, and includes Armenian, Coptic and Syriac traditions 
(Audo, 2010b, p. 29).  Quoting Isaac of Ninevah, a great 7th Century eastern mystic, he 
concludes that “Love is the source of all that is good. It is God, Christ par excellence.  Whoever 
has found Love will ‘eat’ and ‘drink’ Christ” (Audo, 2010b, p. 32).  Referring to John of 
Dalyatha, an 8th Century mystic living in the area currently bordering Iraq and Turkey, Audo 
posits the view that, because of its Semitic roots, eastern spirituality is “more poetic and 
symbolic than philosophical and rational” (Audo, 2010b, p. 39).  Its result is a desire to be 
united in God and His Will, which is the vocation of all Christians.  
 
In another article exploring eastern Christian identity, and making connections between 
eastern mysticism and modernity, Audo compares two “visionary and prophetic spiritual 
figures”: Monsignor Neophyte Edelby (920-1995) and Fr. Afif Osseirane (1919-1988).   Each of 
them were rooted in Arab Muslim culture and lived through the independence of their 
countries, the creation of the State of Israel, and the Lebanese Civil War.  Both were fluent in 
Arabic and conversant with Islam. According to Audo, Edelby was a sage, and Osseirane a 
prophet.  Edelby’s way of life is described as a constant following of the virtue of moussayara, 
 
274 See: (Girling, 2012). 
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which might best described as ‘walking with’ – a “feeling of profound, complete, concrete 
charity towards everyone, as brothers and sisters in humanity.”  It is “an attitude of welcome, 
of patience, of balance”, and is therefore expressed in “harmony, moderation and serenity” 
(Audo, 2010a, p. 23).   Consecrated a bishop in 1962, and Syrian by origin, Edelby played an 
active part in Vatican II, helping to bridge the gap between the Catholic and eastern Churches 
(Audo, 2010a, p. 26). 
 
By contrast, Fr. Osseirane, who came from Lebanon, was a convert from Shi’ite Islam who 
became a priest.  He maintained a deep loyalty to his home, family and to Islam, and as a result 
enjoyed the respect of both Christians and Muslims.  His life, rooted in prayer and devotion, 
was deeply influenced by Charles de Foucauld.  We are told that Fr. Osseirane influenced many 
Muslims around him, “but without any tendency to proselytism or fanaticism, as many 
Muslims who were close to him have borne witness” (Audo, 2010a, p. 28). 
 
From these two figures, Audo draws the conclusion that Christians are called to witness in a 
Muslim environment “through their prayer life and an attitude of adoration”, which can 
transform them into icons.   Audo writes: “Dialogue between reason and faith, communion 
respecting difference, a flight from violence in order to affirm trust in oneself and in others, 
these are demands which challenge our intellect as Christians and Muslims in search of peace 
and justice” (Audo, 2010a, p. 29). 
 
Audo acknowledges that this dialogue is not easy.  In an interview in December 2016, he 
stated: 
Christians accept plurality.  We cannot reflect on our shared existence in Syria without 
dialogue, but this is often more difficult for Islam, which finds it difficult to enter 
dialogue at a critical and historical level, and often, dialogue will consist simply of 
affirmative speech. Islam in the Middle East cannot get away from the struggle with 
modernity, and faces a problem with the idea of secularism, as this attacks something 
very deep within Muslim thought.  But there is a difference between public and private 
speech, since many Muslims recognise that without Christians, Syria will lose both its 
quality of life, and its unique identity. 275 
 
In summary, Audo affirms the importance of the identity of Eastern Christians.  This identity is 
rooted in the Middle Eastern world and is communitarian in spirit, hospitable, and exists within 
the Muslim world, but too often becomes inward and distrustful of others.  He states that 
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Christians should engage politically, socially and culturally both with Christians and Muslims, 
and that the inter-religious encounter that takes place daily, should develop into deeper 
dialogue that is lived out and respectful of the other.  Notwithstanding the risk of a tendency 
to activism in this approach, the spiritual traditions of the East have the capacity to inspire and 
deepen spiritual engagement and understanding with Islam (Audo, 2010a, p. 35).  Audo 
continues: “A re-reading of the contribution of eastern Christians to the development of Arab 
and Muslim civilisation allows us to envisage ways of openness, trust and conversion.”  Most 
importantly, eastern Christians have “opened up spaces within the fabric of Muslim-Arab 
culture, spaces of freedom and communication between faith and reason”, and are uniquely 
placed, in a context where Arab Muslims feel threatened in the face of modernity and 
globalisation, to enable dialogue with Muslims, and with them, “to create paths to the 
universal” (Audo, 2010a, pp. 36-37).  “Finally,” writes Audo, “true Islam must understand that 
it will not be able to modernise itself without there being peace with Christians.  This road to 
peace will lead it to be liberated from all its complexes of fear of the other.”   The vocation of 
eastern Christians is therefore “to become a bridge, or better, a model of communion between 
the Christian west and the Muslim world” (Audo, 2010a, p. 38).   
 
If there is anything positive to come out of the traumatic events of recent history in the Middle 
East, it is that they have led to a reassessment of the interreligious relationship.   Notable in 
this respect was the international inter-faith meeting on ‘Human Fraternity’ that took place in 
Abu Dhabi on 3-5 February, 2019.   The result of this was a joint declaration signed by Pope 
Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Cairo, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Tayyeb, and endorsed by 
Christian and Muslim leaders from throughout the region, entitled: ‘A Document on Human 
Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together’.  This declaration potentially goes beyond the 
‘Common Word’ declaration of 2007 in affirming the importance and value of our common 
humanity, states:  
 
In the name of God ……. Al-Azhar al-Sharif and the Muslims of the East and West, 
together with the Catholic Church and the Catholics of the East and West, declare the 
adoption of a culture of dialogue as the path; mutual cooperation as the code of 
conduct; reciprocal understanding as the method and standard. 
We, who believe in God and in the final meeting with Him and His judgment, on the 
basis of our religious and moral responsibility, and through this Document, call upon 
ourselves, upon the leaders of the world as well as the architects of international 
policy and world economy, to work strenuously to spread the culture of tolerance and 
of living together in peace; to intervene at the earliest opportunity to stop the 
shedding of innocent blood and bring an end to wars, conflicts, environmental decay 
and the moral and cultural decline that the world is presently experiencing. 
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We call upon intellectuals, philosophers, religious figures, artists, media professionals 
and men and women of culture in every part of the world, to rediscover the values of 
peace, justice, goodness, beauty, human fraternity and coexistence in order to confirm 
the importance of these values as anchors of salvation for all, and to promote them 
everywhere.276 
 
The document goes on to stress the nature of dialogue: 
Dialogue, understanding and the widespread promotion of a culture of tolerance, 
acceptance of others and of living together peacefully would contribute significantly to 
reducing many economic, social, political and environmental problems that weigh so 
heavily on a large part of humanity; 
- Dialogue among believers means coming together in the vast space of spiritual, 
human and shared social values and, from here, transmitting the highest moral virtues 
that religions aim for. It also means avoiding unproductive discussions;  
- The protection of places of worship – synagogues, churches and mosques – is a duty 
guaranteed by religions, human values, laws and international agreements. Every 
attempt to attack places of worship or threaten them by violent assaults, bombings or 
destruction, is a deviation from the teachings of religions as well as a clear violation of 
international law; 
 
It is clear from this initiative, and from examples of inter-religious engagement in Syria, 
Lebanon and Egypt, that some significant figures within Islam are seeking to rethink the 
position of Islam in relation to Christianity and the political situation in the Middle East, 
fulfilling the hope that Christians can be a bridge to peace and reconciliation. Many religious 
leaders of the region are echoing this direction.  For the trauma  of the conflict in Syria, and 
Iraq, has been a regional trauma.  And out of that trauma has emerged a desire to construct 
different types of relational discourse, and ‘push back’ against sectarian dynamics. 
 
 
5.8 Fr. Paolo Dall’Oglio. SJ  ( b. 1954. d. ?  ) 
 
In the field of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria in recent years, few have been more 
influential or controversial, than Paolo Dall’Oglio, an Italian Jesuit priest who founded the 
Community of Al-Khalil at Mar Musa Monastery, a community rooted in the Syriac Catholic 
tradition.  Deir Mar Musa al-Habashi (The Monastery of St. Moses the Syrian) lies in the cleft of 
a mountain in the desert east of Nebek, 80 kms north of Damascus.   The monastery itself is 
believed to date from the 6th Century but had lain in ruins for centuries, before Paolo visited it 
in 1982.  Paolo was ordained a priest in the Syrian Catholic rite in 1984, having received a 
 
276 http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/2019/outside/documents/papa-
francesco_20190204_documento-fratellanza-umana.html  (Accessed: 26 February, 2019) 
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degree in Arabic language and Islamic Studies.  The PhD that he was awarded in 1989 was 
entitled ‘About Hope in Islam’.   
 
In 1992, Paolo founded the mixed ecumenical community of ‘Al-Khalil’ (the friend of God) at 
Mar Musa, and dedicated his life to restoring the Monastery and establishing a centre for 
Muslim-Christian dialogue.   Following the restoration of the monastery in the 1990s (including 
the Church with its beautiful 11th or 12th Century frescoes), the Monastery became a centre for 
Christian-Muslim encounter and hospitality; a place where Christians and Muslims from all 
over the world would meet together and learn from each other.  Paolo identified something 
crucial within Syrian Christianity – that monasticism in its Christian sense is deeply Syrian, and 
is an eastern religious tradition with which Islam has been familiar from its earliest days.  It 
therefore offers a distinctly eastern Christian platform for inter-religious dialogue and 
engagement, with which eastern religious culture can relate.    
 
Paolo was a critic of the Syrian Government, and was expelled from Syria in 2012, but returned 
to the country and was kidnapped by ‘Islamic State’ fighters in Raqqa on 29 July 2013, whilst 
apparently trying to act as a negotiator between opposing groups of Islamist and ‘Islamic State’ 
fighters.  Rumours have circulated that he was executed shortly afterwards, but though these 
rumours are believed to be credible, they are unverified.277   
 
I stayed at Mar Mousa twice prior to the conflict.  The many foreign visitors present reflected 
the fame both of the monastery and of its founder.  The services, conducted in Arabic and 
Syriac, included elements of Islamic and specifically sufi influence.  The monastery represents a 
good example of monastic revival in the eastern tradition, which has been taking place in 
recent decades in Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Egypt.  It is an “ecclesial expression of the Syrian 
Catholic Church”, following the eastern Catholic tradition, deeply influenced by the eremitical 
tradition of Charles de Foucauld and the religious ideas of Louis Massignon, and seeking to 
reinvigorate the Christian encounter with Islam in a form with which Islam has been familiar 
since its emergence in the 7th Century (Anthony O'Mahony, 2013, p. 236).   
 
This depth with which Paolo, emerging from a western ecclesial tradition embedded the 
community in the eastern ecclesial Arab landscape and entered into dialogue with Islam is 
 
277 Fr. Paolo recounts his own story and experiences in: (De Montjou, 2006) Mar Moussa. Un monastere, 
un homme, un desert.  
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almost unique.   At the heart of this experiment in Christian-Muslim encounter was the liturgy, 
which was performed in both Syriac and Arabic.   As Dall’Oglio writes:   
 
“The cultural and religious intention of the monastery was to find and rediscover some 
essential aspects of ancient monasticism in the region.  The re-founding of the 
community is due to the conviction that this monasticism is one which early Islam 
knew, frequented, respected and protected ever since the seventh century.”278  
(Dall'Oglio, 2009, p. 25).    
 
For Paulo, deeply influenced by Massignon, the monastery sought to become a place of 
genuine encounter between Islam and Christianity; an encounter linking both spirituality and 
politics.  This link, which represented a unique contribution in the Syrian ecclesial context, he 
believed was found in two concepts:  that of “ta’arruf” or “getting to know each other”, 
“through knowledge, experiential understanding and unconditional love”(Ali-Dib, 2008, p. 
107); and through “baddaliya” (mystical substitution). These could be achieved through an 
inculturated hospitality, theological dialogue (in the language of Arabic), through solidarity 
with the Muslim community, through ecumenical worship and mystical communion.   At an 
event held in Beirut in 2018 to commemorate Fr. Paolo’s work, Fr. Salim Daccashe, a Jesuit 
Rector in the United States said:  
 
The great question for Paolo Dall'Oglio ….. was: What does Islam tell Christians? By the 
same token: Towards what does Christianity lead? Following Charles de Foucauld and 
Louis Massignon, his two great spiritual masters, Paolo thought that the Muslim 
religion, by the mystery it posed for Christians, pushed the Church towards greater 
radicalism in the imitation of Christ, towards more humility, spirit of acceptance and 
service.279 
 
Striving to put these principles into practice, the community has been instrumental in the 
fields of interreligious dialogue and community service since its founding.  It was not however 
always easy.  The first planned interreligious conference was cancelled by Syria’s Catholic 
authorities, and it was the then Grand Mufti, Kuftaru who persuaded Fr. Paolo to persist.  Even 
then, Paolo “found it difficult to recruit speakers, either Christian or Muslim,” and those that 
did attend in 2006 repeatedly “strayed into international politics” (Ali-Dib, 2008, p. 109).  A 
critique of his pastoral and interreligious engagement might be that in an attempt to be true to 
 
278 My translation of the original in French. 
279 http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Fr-Dall'Oglio,-the-extreme-sacrifice-of-a-radical-witness-of-Christ-
to-build-bridges-towards-Islam-45440.html   Accessed: 1 January 2019. 
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‘orthodoxy’, he prioritised Sunni Islam over other expressions of Islam.280 Could it be suggested 
that, despite the depth of his engagement, like other westerners, he struggled to adequately 
grapple with the plurality of Islamic expression?  These difficulties illustrate the complex 
challenges and limitations of trying to undertake successful inter-faith conversations in Syria, 
and elsewhere.  
 
Since the start of the conflict, when few have been able to visit, the members of the 
monastery have continued their lives of prayer, even in the absence of Paolo, and have 
focussed on community service, especially amongst the internally displaced in the area.281  
 
In May 2018, I revisited Mar Mousa and spent a night at the monastery.  A few members of the 
community had remained at the monastery throughout the time that the area was occupied 
by militant groups, and workers had also stayed to protect the monastery.  The members of 
the community were reticent about talking about what happened during that time, but 
acknowledged that when militant fighters visited the monastery, it was a difficult experience.  
Speaking of the role of the monastery, one of the members said: 
 
After what happened in this country, the Church should be showing people the love of 
Christ more than at any time before.  As Christians, we have a responsibility to explain 
that this conflict is not about Islam.  Christians and Muslims have always lived 
together, though not always perfectly.   Many Muslims tried to help the Christians and 
protect them in this area.  If the Church is to operate, we have to give a good witness 
and be positive.  Today there is a separation between the hierarchy of the Church and 
the people.  Many young people are fed up with doctrine and theories and high level 
spiritual goals.  We are living life on the ground, and the whole society has been deeply 
damaged.  There is also fear.  Many people, Christians and Muslims are afraid of the 
power of the mosque.  Many people say: ‘I am afraid that my friend of today is going 
to be my enemy of tomorrow’.  And there is a growing disillusionment especially 
among young people with religion and Churches and hierarchies.  There is a need for 
spiritual transformation in both Christianity and Islam. We want to continue to be a 
place of hospitality and a place of dialogue.  But we have realised that dialogue can 
sometimes be not only painful but very costly indeed.282  
 
 
280 This echoes Massignon’s work who critiqued Shi’ite and Alawi Islam and prioritised Sunni Islam.  See 
also: (Anthony O'Mahony, 2015) Louis Massignon: A French Catholic encounter with Islam and the 
Middle East. 
281 A complementary discussion on ‘kinship’ between Christian and Muslim worship can be found in: 
(Laing, 2013) ‘ A provocation to mission: Constance Padwick’s study of Muslim devotion.’  
282 Interview at Mar Mousa Monastery. 3 May 2018.  These views echo similar comments made by 
Christian laity and leaders in other parts of Syria .   See also a video of one of my interviews at Mar 
Mousa, May 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ewd6SNNy2M  
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The experience and popularity of Mar Mousa as a place of inter-religious encounter, 
particularly prior to the conflict suggests that the Christian monastic model of hospitality which 
is well established in Syria, provides a safe ‘space’ for dialogue in religion and politics.  How 
Mar Mousa meets that challenge in the light of the changed post-conflict social, cultural and 
religious demographic in Syria, in a spirit of reconciliation and service, and without the 
leadership of Paolo, will require careful discernment in partnership with members of all 
communities. 
 
5.9  The Protestant and Evangelical Churches 
 
Thus far, emphasis has been on the contribution of the Orthodox and Eastern churches to the 
interreligious dynamic.  Though numerically small compared to other ecclesial groups, the 
contribution of Arab Protestant and Evangelical Churches to religious discourse in the Middle 
East should not be underestimated.  Protestant and Evangelical Arab Christians have been 
termed a “double minority” - a “numerical minority within a Muslim majority”, and “a minority 
within a Christian minority”(Raheb, 2018, p. 269).  Nevertheless, their contribution to religious 
discourse, education and health provision, economic and political participation are significant.  
According to the most recently available figures, Protestant and Evangelical Christians number 
only about 0.3% of the population (Siriani, 2018, p. 103).   As we shall see, there has historically 
been a problematic relationship between the Protestant Churches of the Middle East and 
those of the Eastern and Orthodox traditions.  Questions of identity arise at the interface 
between Eastern Christian and reformed western tradition.  However, ecumenical relations 
have much improved in recent years. 
 
The Protestant presence in the Middle East dates to the early nineteenth century, the first 
Protestant congregation being formed in Beirut by the ‘American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions’ in 1827. By the second half of the eighteenth century more Protestant 
churches were established throughout Lebanon and Syria.  In 1920 the National Evangelical 
Synod of Syria and Lebanon was formed (Raheb, 2018, p. 259).  For all churches, the term 
‘evangelical’ is an adjective describing the Christian ministry of proclamation – something to 
which all Christians are called.   However, in Germany in the nineteenth century, the term 
became associated with Protestantism in Europe, and has become widely used as a noun to 
denote those who follow this tradition (Wahba, 2018, p. 285).  Wahba summarises the 




The Evangelical tradition was introduced to the region by Anglican, Lutheran and 
Presbyterian missions from the late eighteenth century.  By the mid-nineteenth 
century the Presbyterian presence was the most dominant, and this continued until 
the mid-twentieth century, when other Evangelical communities, such as Baptists and 
Pentecostals, started to flourish in the region.  The early Anglican and Presbyterian 
missionaries initially sought to reach out to the larger Muslim population.  They faced 
significant challenges and so turned to the Christian communities, which were largely 
Orthodox.  By the mid-twentieth century the presence of various Evangelical 
communities alongside the dominant Orthodox churches was very much in place.  At 
first, many Evangelical churches adopted the worship style, theology and 
organisational structures of the Western churches from which the missionaries came.  
However the shift to indigenous forms of worship, theology and administrative 
systems was quickly realised.  After all, North African and West Asian Christians have a 
long history of Christian tradition, and they are very much aware of it.  Today, there 
are more contemporary Christian songs and lyrics in Arabic than in any other 
language” (Wahba, 2018, p. 286). 
 
The National Evangelical Synod of Lebanon and Syria and Lebanon is a member of the 
Fellowship of Middle East Evangelical Churches (FMEEC), the Middle East Council of Churches 
(MECC), the World Council of Churches (WCC), and the World Communion of Reformed 
Churches (WCRC) (Raheb, 2018, p. 259).   
 
The ministry of the Protestant and Evangelical Churches in the Middle East has been significant 
and influential in three key areas: the preaching of the gospel through teaching, translation of 
the scriptures, and use of media including social media and broadcasting channels such as SAT-
7;  in education, both through the many Evangelical schools that operate throughout the 
region, and through educational and theological Institutions such as the American University, 
the Near East School of Theology, and the Arab Baptist Theological Seminary, all in Beirut; and 
through the provision of social services, such as the Lebanese Society for Educational and 
Social Development (LSESD), whose work includes the provision of humanitarian aid and 
educational support to Syrian refugees in Lebanon.   
 
A further ministry has emerged within the context of the conflict in Syria – initiatives in which 
churches seek to train their members, particularly young people, to be ambassadors of 
respect, reconciliation and peace-building.  The ministry of the ‘Awareness Foundation’ is one 
such initiative.   Founded as a charity in London in 2003 by Church of England Syrian priest, Fr. 
Nadim Nassar, the ‘Awareness Foundation’ has in recent years established two ecumenical 
educational programmes for children and young people that have been successfully piloted in 
Syria and Iraq – the ‘Little Heroes’ programme for children, and the ‘Ambassadors for Peace’ 
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programme for young adults.  The foundation website page for the ‘Ambassadors for Peace’ 
programme describes it thus:  
 
Ambassadors for Peace is an ecumenical education programme for young Middle 
Eastern men and women enabling them to build bridges of mutual respect and 
understanding in their diverse communities. In this way they can contribute to the 
healing and strengthening of the fabric of society…Through this programme, we 
support Christian presence in the Middle East by encouraging Christians to play a full 
role in the wider community as an indigenous part of society. In addition to building 
bridges between the Christian denominations, the Ambassadors learn how to repair 
relationships and rebuilding trust with neighbours of other faiths.283 
 
Each of these ministries confirm the importance and positive influence of the indigenous 
Protestant and Evangelical presence within the ecumenical and inter-religious context in the 
Middle East, despite their comparatively small numbers.  Nevertheless, there have always 
been ecumenical and interreligious tensions between the Protestant and Evangelical Churches 
and the Oriental and Orthodox denominations. Some Orthodox perceive ‘western’ Christians 
to have a history of ‘stealing’ Orthodox Christians into the Protestant and Evangelical fold, and 
in recent years, there has been concern that in some cases, evangelical activity, particularly 
amongst Muslims, has been linked to the provision of humanitarian aid (See (Ferris, 2005); 
(Clarke, 2007); (James, 2011); (Kraft, 2017). This concern in the Middle Eastern context is partly 
rooted in a historic culture of suspicion towards Protestant and Evangelical ministries which, 
by virtue of their ecclesial associations, have often been perceived as having a ‘western’ 
cultural, social and political allegiance.   
 
Reflecting on the post ‘Arab Spring’ context, a study entitled ‘Christian Citizenship in the 
Middle East. Divided Allegiance or Dual Belonging?’ added a helpful contribution to this debate 
from a Protestant perspective (M. Girma, 2017).  The study explored the dichotomy between 
the concept of citizenship rooted in ‘historical situatedness’, and the concept of citizenship 
that by virtue of religious identity demands responsibilities transcending ‘situatedness’.  In the 
Introduction, Romocea writes: “Throughout the history of the Arab Region, Middle Eastern 
Christians, inspired by the teachings of the scriptures, have lived at the intersection of two 
allegiances: allegiance to their Christian mission, and allegiance to their Middle Eastern 
citizenship” (M. Girma, 2017, p. 19).  This, argue the writers, has political implications, and 
means that ultimately Christian values and morals must form the basis for any Christian vision 
 
283 https://www.awareness-foundation.com/ambassadors   
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of citizenship, which must be “built on the basis of rights, responsibilities and human dignity 
over and above the particular interests of states” (M. Girma, 2017, pp. 20-21).  This clearly 
presents Christian communities and their leaders with particular challenges within their 
political and religious contexts. 
 
In 2006, Dr. George Sabra, Principal of the Near East School of Theology in Beirut, wrote an 
important article confronting this issue.  Entitled ‘Two ways of being a Christian in the Muslim 
context of the Middle East’ (Sabra, 2006), Dr. Sabra discusses the dilemma of being Christian in 
a predominantly Islamic context.  He suggests that there have been broadly two ways in which 
Christians have responded to this reality.  The first he sums up in the phrase, “Avoid 
estrangement with Muslims at all costs”, which results he suggests in an openness to the 
Islamic context, and a desire to find common ground for sustaining coexistence.  The second 
he sums up in the phrase, “Save Middle Eastern Christianity at all costs”, an approach that 
affirms the distinctiveness of Christianity in relation to Islam and seeks to preserve Christian 
freedom and identity (Sabra, 2006, p. 44).  These two responses to Islam have only been 
possible he says because there is a third ‘player’, and that is the ‘western’ factor.  Sabra 
reminds us that ‘western’ influence is nothing new.   Even in the time of Jesus, Middle Eastern 
society was influenced by Greek philosophy and language, and since the fifth century, the 
eastern churches have been divided by the Byzantine Christological controversies.   
 
Helpfully, Dr. Sabra describes these two positions, designating the first with the title ‘Arab 
Christian’, and the second ‘Eastern Christian’.  The first underlines the sense of self-identity 
with Arab culture, history and Islamic civilisation, whilst the second does not limit Middle 
Eastern Christianity to an Arab identity, and underlines “a critical distance from Islam and 
Islamic culture and tradition” (Sabra, 2006, p. 46).   
 
The ‘Arab Christian’ position, which has tended to prevail until recent times and has been 
associated with the Oriental and Orthodox Church positions discussed in this study, has 
supported Arab nationalism and tended towards an anti-Ottoman, anti-Western, and anti-
Zionist position.  For example, it was a Greek Orthodox Syrian Christian, Michel Aflaq (1912-
1989) who helped found the Ba’ath Party in Syria, and a Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christian, 
Antun Sa’adeh (1904-1949) who founded the Syrian National Socialist Party.   Dr. Sabra 
identifies Bishop Georges Khodr, who describes Eastern Christianity as being “outside the 
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West, not only doctrinally but also politically and civilizationally” (Sabra, 2006, p. 47),284 as 
being a leading defender of the ‘Arab Christian’ position. 
 
The ‘Eastern Christian’ position, which has tended to come to the fore in recent years and 
particularly amongst the Protestant churches, holds to the “freedom and integrity of the 
Christian existence in the Middle East”.  It emphasises Christianity’s distinctiveness in the face 
of Arab and Islamic identity, and there is “a sense of identification and continuity with the 
West”, which means that East and West are not in conflict with one another, and that ‘Eastern 
Christians’ are more ‘at home’ in the worldwide Christian family.  One of the most significant 
proponents of this position was Dr. Charles Malek (1906-1987), a Lebanese academic and 
philosopher (Sabra, 2006, p. 48).  He stressed that the relationship between East and West is 
historic, not imported, and that western civilizations have left a lasting “imprint” on eastern 
Mediterranean culture and history.  This pro-western attitude is reflected in sympathy towards 
western politics, a connection with the ‘West’ that has led to ecumenical and interreligious 
tensions, and to suspicion of those who hold to this ‘Eastern Christian’ position.  However, at 
the same time, a majority of Eastern Christians are Arab by ethnic identity and are proud of 
being so.  Most Eastern Christians grapple daily with the complexity of possessing multiple 
identities and remaining true to their religious identity in their historical, cultural and religious 
contexts.  
 
Sabra points out that the ‘Arab Christian’ position prevailed for most of the twentieth century, 
but at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the rise of Islamism has challenged this 
position.  He writes: “Those Christians who have engaged in and promoted Christian-Muslim 
dialogue in the last three decades or so have, by their own admission, suffered great 
disappointment and frustration.  The Islamist fundamentalist resurgence is like a huge wave 
that has engulfed the results of the old dialogue and set the clock back many years” (Sabra, 
2006, p. 51).  These words, written five years before the start of the conflict in Syria, echo 
comments made by several interlocutors during the course of this research, who have 
identified practical engagement and cooperation for the benefit of Syrian society as a whole, 
as being more important, pressing and productive than theological dialogue. 
 
 
284 Quoting from: Khodr, G. (1981) Al-masihiyya al-arabiyya wa al-gharb, In Al-masihiyyun al-arab: 
dirasat wa-munaqashat. Ed. Elias Khoury.  Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Abhath al-Arabiyya.106 
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Bearing these factors in mind highlights the need for an authentic Arab/Eastern Christian 
contextual theology in defining the vital place and role of Arab/Eastern Christians within the 
Middle Eastern cultural, religious and political context.    The two ‘ways’ of Christian self -
identification are both present in Syria and represent different lenses through which the 
Christian communities see themselves.  Nor are they mutually exclusive.  As Sabra says, both 
outlooks have “some truth” and therefore remain part of the dilemma of being Christian in the 
Muslim context.   
 
That dilemma reflects for Protestant Christians what might be termed a ‘cultural 
disorientation’ between western and eastern Christian identities, despite the fact that 
Christianity has eastern roots.  A Jesuit scholar of Coptic origin, Fadel Sidarouss, argues that as 
a Church with eastern origins, western Christianity inherited an ‘alterity’ which enabled a 
natural dialogue with other philosophies and with modernity.  However, for centuries, having 
adopted a Christian culture,  the western church has not, like the eastern church, had to 
engage with a different ‘other’ in its midst.  Thus, “when they enter into relationship with an 
other – we think here of Islam – they do so in an apologetic and defensive rather than 
dialogical manner” (A. O'Mahony, 2018, p. 70).285  By contrast, the eastern church has existed 
for centuries within plurality, in ways the western church struggles to inculturate.  This ability 
to engage with the ’other’ at many levels gives Eastern Christianity a natural capacity to build 
bridges.286  This suggests that there is room for synthesis in Sabra’s helpful analysis. 
 
Given the fragile situation for Christians throughout the Middle East, and in some parts of the 
region, an existential threat to Christian communities, there have been considerable efforts to 
improve ecumenical relations in recent years.  The positive contribution of all ecclesial 
denominations to the societies in which they live is mutually recognised.  However, there 
remain long-standing theological and ecclesial tensions between the Eastern churches and 
those of Protestant origin that are difficult to resolve.  Without question, as we have seen in 
the above discussion, the western churches are bearers of westernised ecclesial structures and 
theological traditions, some of which sit uncomfortably with those of Eastern Christianity.  The 
latter’s Patristic traditions and spirituality of the desert with their emphasis on hospitality and 
 
285 See also: Siadarouss, F., 2008. Pour une Theologie contextuelle dans l’Orient Arabe contemporain. 
Quo Vadis, Theologia Orientalis ? Actes du Colloque Theologie Orientale: contenu et importance. Textes 
et etudes sur l’Orient Chretien, No.6. CEDRAC. Beirut : Université Saint Joseph.pp 215-237 
286 For a helpful collection of essays on these matters, see: (Ellis, 2018).’Secular Nationalism and 
Citizenship in Muslim countries. Arab Christians in the Levant.’ 
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engagement with alterity (as discussed in the sections on Khodr and Dall’Oglio)  offer rich 
resources for interreligious dialogue in the Middle Eastern context.  This tension represents a 
dilemma for Protestants indigenous to the Middle East whose origins lie within that cultural, 
historical and social framework.  The Protestant churches stand in an ambiguous position, on 
the one hand existing apart from western society and in an eastern culture, whilst on the other 
standing at the confluence of western theology and philosophy.  This means that they can 
become alienated from Arab culture and from Eastern Christianity.  As carriers of western 
ecclesiology within an eastern ecclesial context, they possess, to coin a phrase first used by 
Anthony O’Mahony,  a “self-alienating ecclesiology” which creates a natural ecclesial tension in 
both theology and structure with other churches in the region, that is felt by clergy and laity 
alike.287  This ambiguity is illustrated in the self-presentation of many Protestant Church 
leaders in the Middle East, who, when in company with Eastern Church leaders and at formal 
events, often adopt ‘Patriarchal’- like  traditions in dress and custom in an apparent attempt to 
affirm their equality of status.   
 
Protestant Christianity, with its emphasis on Incarnational theology brings huge benefits to the 
region in the fields of education and social welfare.  Eastern Christianity, with its Trinitarian 
theological roots and affinity to mysticism is gifted in reflecting relationality amidst plurality 
and complexity, and depth of spirituality in the midst of struggle.  In recent years, the Eastern 
Churches have also made significant strides in the fields of monasticism, theological training 
and Christian education.  The two wings of Christianity and their theological approaches are of 
course related to each other, and each brings strengths that could enhance and complement 
the other.  What blessings could be wrought if the two wings saw each other not in 
competition with each other, but each bringing vital and complementary contributions to the 
Christian presence in the region.  
 
This tension requires further study for the sake of all Christian communities in the region and 
for clarity in the interreligious relationship.  This thesis proposes that in the history of eastern 
theology and spirituality, and in the history of Eastern Christianity’s engagement with Islam lie 
significant resources for engaging with the complex interreligious dynamics that currently 
prevail in the region, and perhaps for the strengthening of the ecumenical dynamic in the 
region as well.  After all, the cultural and spiritual roots of global Christianity are to be found in 
 
287 The phrase “self-alienating ecclesiology” was used by Anthony O’Mahony in an informal discussion 
around this aspect of the study. 
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the region.  And a rediscovery of these resources enhances their potential application in a 
western context, as awareness of Islam is increasing, and as the danger of radicalisation linked 
to conflicts in the region, is being felt globally. 
 
Despite issues of conflict, and theological and ecclesial tensions , relations between religious 
leaders remain good.  Ecumenical meetings and conferences are regular.  For example, each 
year the Institute for Middle East Studies holds an International Conference at the Arab Baptist 
Theological Seminary in Beirut which brings together leading religious figures from around the 
region and from all Christian denominations to address key issues facing the churches in the 
region.   
 
In April 2018, I met with Dr. Riad Jarjour, a Syrian Protestant Christian who was Chairman of 
the Middle East Council of Churches between 1994 and 2003.  He identified four key 
challenges currently facing the Churches in Syria: the unity of the Church; the emigration of 
Christians; the Church’s ability to face religious extremism; and the challenge of religious and 
communal co-existence after the war.  In all of these he said, the Protestant churches have an 
important role to play, and because of their historic relationships with the western churches, 
have the potential to be voices that could be heard in the west.   The Middle East Council of 
Churches could also play a role as a platform for Christian witness beyond the region, but its 
inability in previous years to find a united voice has been a source of disappointment and 
sadness, and affected its capacity to witness effectively to the challenges with which the 
people of the region were confronted.288   
 
However, as previously stated are signs of renewed ecumenism.  It is remarkable that the 
newly elected General Secretary of the Middle East Council of Churches is a woman, Dr. 
Souraya Bechealany.  During the winter of 2018, Dr. Bechealany undertook a series of 
meetings with the Heads of the different denominations represented in Middle East Council of 
Churches.  These meetings sought to address some of the complex issues addressing Christian 
communities in the region, and concluded that unity of purpose and mutual acceptance is vital 
for the survival and prospering of the Christian presence in the face of the many challenges 
that the Churches face.  And at Christmas 2018, the Middle East Council of Churches launched 
an educational initiative – a series of twelve short documentary films entitled ‘Bridges to 
Bethlehem’. Filmed in six countries (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, UAE, Egypt and Iraq), the series 
 
288 Meeting with Dr. Riad Jarjour.  Damascus. 23 April 2018. 
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represented “churches from all four ecclesiastical families of the Council — the Orthodox, 
Eastern Orthodox, Catholic and Evangelical families.” Distributed globally on social media the 
films showcased “the rich diversity of tradition surrounding the celebration of the coming of 
the Christ child across the Middle East” – a diversity of which many Christians around the 
world have until recently been unaware. 289   Increased global awareness of this Christian 
presence and its rich diversity will surely help ensure its survival, improve its relational 
dynamic, and strengthen the positive role that it can play in the causes of reconciliation and 
the restoration of peace in the region.  
 
Echoing other Church leaders with whom I have spoken, Ibrahim Nseir, the Presbyterian 
Minister in Aleppo  speaking in an interview with independent journalist Vanessa Beeley on 31 
December 2018, said:  
 
We must re-prioritise our schedule, our agenda, and make sure that it is not only 
political, but that we address all issues – religious, educational, health care. We must 
rethink our priorities to ensure a future of peace and stability.  At the end I believe 
strongly that all the negative consequences of this terrible war will be transformed 
into positive consequences if we address them in the right way.  Out of adversity are 
born the greatest opportunities for the future of Syria and humanity.290 
 
Despite all the suffering, the division and the pain that the recent conflict has caused, such a 




This chapter has examined the historical and contemporary encounter between Christianity 
and Islam, noting that from its earliest days, Islam engaged with Christian theology and 
philosophy.   Massignon believed that Islam could be a ‘mediator’ of divine grace, and that the 
hospitality of the desert (badaliya) represents a model for encounter and dialogue.  This 
profoundly influenced the thought and ministry of Paolo dal’Oglio and the monastic 
community that he established at Mar Mousa in the hills above Nebek as a place of Christian-
Muslim dialogue, rooted in ta’arruf – deep engagement with ‘the other’- in Syria.   
 
 
289 https://en-gb.facebook.com/MiddleEastCouncilofChurches/   Accessed: 2 January 2019   
290 https://21stcenturywire.com/2019/01/02/syria-the-western-rogue-states-must-confess-their-crimes-
against-humanity-and-be-held-accountable/  Accessed: 2 January 2019 
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In recent decades, eastern theologians have explored these themes.  Bishop Khodr in Lebanon 
has led the way in developing an indigenous theology of Christian- Muslim dialogue.  At the 
heart of his theology, rooted in the Patristic tradition, is the pneumatological paradigm which 
understands the creative Word of God to be present in all things, and the human being in the 
divine image.  Thus we are called to be channels of the grace and love of the Holy Spirit, and to 
recognise the divine that is in the ‘other’, which renders inter-religious dialogue an imperative.  
Bishop Audo states that dialogue is none other than the work of the Kingdom, and that our 
vocation as Christians is to be a bridge.  Echoing Khodr, Audo affirms the global importance of 
eastern Christians, both as the descendants of the first Christians, and for their experience as 
fellow citizens with the Muslim community since its founding.  Jeanbart and Aphrem likewise 
stress the importance of Eastern Christianity as located within the cradle of religions, and as 
rooted in Arab culture, for modelling the Christian-Muslim dynamic.  Some of these Church 
leaders have become akin to modern ‘Church Fathers’, echoing the Patristic writers and 
providing modern context to the deep wells of cultures and traditions that make up the 
Antiochene paradigm. For all these leaders, Eastern Christianity play a vital role in working 
with other each other and with other faith communities in peace-building, reconciliation and 
meeting the pastoral, spiritual and humanitarian needs of the people.  As such, global 
Christianity needs to rediscover the importance of the Antiochene Christianity which offers an 
inherent paradigm of engaging with alterity, and particularly with Islam, that western society 
lacks. This is of crucial importance as that encounter becomes ever more complex. 
 
Space does not allow a detailed analysis of the contributions of these interlocutors.  I believe 
their words are self-explanatory and summarise well the vision and different perspectives of 
the key issues facing interreligious dynamics. They also offer a potential platform for 
enhancing religious peacebuilding and future study. 
  
Despite the diversity of the Christian landscape in Syria illustrated and represented in this 
chapter (Catholic, Orthodox, Oriental and Protestant), and the shift in self-identification (Arab 
Christian vs Eastern Christian as identified by Sabra) that some Christian communities have 
been making in recent years in relation to the wider religious and political context, there is 
significant commonality in the issues and possible responses that different Church 
communities identify.  This chapter has highlighted the various ways in which Christians from 
these diverse traditions have grappled both with their eastern identity and theological origins, 
and the unique challenges of the contemporary regional context.  There remains a 
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commitment to the preservation and improvement of interreligious relationships, but given 
the level of suffering and destruction experienced within Syria, and the fragmentation of 
society, priority has been given to the humanitarian response, and the restoration of positive 
relationships.  Certainly, awareness of and pride in eastern Christian identity has been 
heightened in recent years by events in the region, but Arab identity itself in relation to 
religion has become contested given the rise in militant Islam.   
 
All Christian denominations agree that the dynamic engagement between Christianity and 
Islam in the early centuries had a lasting, mixed and evolving influence on the relationship 
between the two communities.   A further re-reading of the Christian contribution to the 
development of Arab and Muslim civilisation will help understanding of the intrinsic 
indigenous roots of Christianity that pre-date Islam within the region.  For the Orthodox and 
Oriental Churches, the monastic movement, the spirituality of the desert (and particularly the 
theme of hospitality that emerges from it), and Patristic theology offer a key to reconnecting 
with the spirituality and culture within which early Christianity engaged with Islam, and to 
challenging the exclusivity of the militant Islam that has come to dominate some elements of 
recent Islamic resurgence, and the ideology of most of the militant factions in the Syrian 
conflict.  Similarly, a recovery of the recognition of Arab plurality in both religion and culture, 
and Eastern Christianity’s capacity to engage with that plurality offers further potential for 
grappling with the post-conflict context in Syria and the changed communal dynamics.  This 
could be an important focus for future study and dialogue.   However, most Christian and 
Muslim leaders regard theological dialogue in the midst of conflict and the immediate post-
conflict context as a ‘luxury’ that is outweighed by the immediate overwhelming humanitarian 
and pastoral needs of traumatised communities.  Nevertheless, such dialogue will be a 
necessary part, not only of the healing process, but of establishing stability in Syrian society. 
 
Notwithstanding ecumenical theological tensions, the unity of the Churches in cooperating 
with their Muslim counterparts on a practical and relational level enhances the ability of the 
religious communities to model reconciliation and rebuild trust where it has been fractured.   
All faith leaders spoken to in the course of this research have stressed the importance of 
cooperation in the field of humanitarian work and reconciliation between communities.  To a 
degree this has already been evident in local contexts on the ground in Syria particularly in the 




However, amongst Christians and many Muslims, there is a real fear that the rise of Islamism, 
even though its most violent expressions are being defeated, might lie dormant in loyal 
adherents until the next opportunity arises to assert itself.   This fear alone is a cause of 
continued emigration, and will be a challenge to overcoming barriers of trust between 
communities.291   It is likely that security policies in post-conflict Syria will by necessity be 
taking this risk into account.  
 
In Chapter three, issues of leadership and a perceived disconnect between the interests and 
views of religious leaders and lay people have been discussed, with religious leaders being 
perceived as being too closely aligned with political leadership.  Religious leaders have 
certainly played an important leadership role during the conflict, most taking a critical stance 
against violence and radical ideology, being involved in local and national reconciliation 
initiatives, and advocating for the preservation of Syria’s secular constitution and the religious 
and ethnic mosaic of Syrian society.   In the context of a society that has experienced conflict 
which has had a notably sectarian dimension, religious leaders can and should play a central 
role in the process of reconciliation as bridge-builders and peace-makers.  And the need to 
rebuild Syrian society, which will include the necessity of political dialogue and reform, will 
require continuing prophetic leadership.  George Sabra suggests that Christian engagement 
with politics in the Middle East context should shift from an understanding that focusses on 
challenging forms and methods of political action and control, to seeking a re-definition of the 
meaning of the word ‘politics’ that is relevant to every aspect of people’s daily lives, much 
according to the model of Jesus’ ‘political’ engagement.292 The ability to be simultaneously 
critical, prophetic, and constructively engaging with those in power, in order to help play a 
transformative role in society, represents an ongoing challenge for the churches.293 
  
Furthermore, the issue of disillusionment amongst many young people with established 
religion as a whole has also emerged.  Whilst many Syrians express pride in the secular 
constitution and wish to preserve it, atheism is not a state of being with which Levantine 
culture is familiar.   Religious identity is a part of Middle Eastern culture and society.  Cynicism 
 
291 The fear of continued or future sectarian prejudice and violence in Syria is one of the stated reasons 
why some refugees do not wish to return the country. 
292 Sabra, G. (1993) “Al-Kaneesah wal-Syyasah.” (‘The Church and Politics“) In: Resalat al-Kaneesah 2, 5-
10.    Quoted in: Awad, N.G. (2012) And freedom became a public square. Zurich,Berlin: Lit Verlag.151-
155 
293 The Jesuit Statement on Syria issued on 7 June 2011 offers one model of how this might be achieved. 
https://zenit.org/articles/statement-of-jesuits-in-syria/  (Accessed: 18 April 2019)  
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and disillusionment with religious institutions and matters of faith amongst the young is a 
matter of concern for religious leaders of all persuasions, but could be viewed as an 
understandable reaction to the level of violence experienced and suffered, and will need to be 
handled with sensitivity and understanding by religious leaders and ordinary members of all 
communities.   
 
Despite the conflict, ecumenical tensions, and the serious impact of emigration, the 
humanitarian work that the Churches undertakes reaches throughout Syria and touches 
people of all religious and ethnic backgrounds.  Despite its complexity, the Christian presence 
in Syria, though seriously weakened, remains a dynamic, diverse, influential and vital part of 
Syrian society.   Its engagement at all levels of society and with all communities, 
notwithstanding its’ historic and necessarily ambiguous relationship to the State, represents a 
positive foundation for learning from the conflict, and helping the country move forward 
positively in restoring trust within society, reconciling fractured communities, overcoming 
sectarian fears and prejudice through constructive models of interreligious dialogue, 
encouraging and nurturing frameworks for political dialogue and developing shared 
responsibility in civic society.  Plurality and difference define Syria.  This plurality represents 
both a challenge and a resource for the future.  Whatever the future holds, it is hoped that the 
political space that emerges will be a dialogical one which the secular and diverse religious 







In this thesis, I have contextualised and introduced the complex breadth of the religious 
landscape in contemporary Syria, and have explored how the historic relationship between 
diverse expressions of Christianity and Islam has influenced, and been impacted by the 
conflict.  I have examined how their interactions historically and contemporaneously have 
helped mould complex social, political and communal dynamics.  And I have considered 
cultural traditions of religious leadership in relation to the political landscape, and whether or 
not the term ‘sectarian’ is adequate to describe the complexity of the communal relational 
landscape.  Finally, I have considered Eastern Christian responses to the Christian-Muslim 
dynamic, and posit that the Antiochene paradigm of Eastern Christianity, rooted in plurality, 
offers an established and culturally sensitive theological framework for understanding 
Christian-Muslim relations and engaging in dialogue.   
 
Whilst there has been a growing body of helpful research undertaken about the Syrian conflict 
itself, the faith-resourced, non-political focus of this study has been under-researched.  
Material relating specifically to the interface between Christianity and Islam in the country is 
extremely limited.  With substantial qualitative research having been undertaken in 
government-held areas during the conflict, this study is an original and relevant contribution to 
understanding the religious dynamics prior to and during the recent conflict.  And it adds 
significantly to studies of Christianity in the Middle East referred to in the Bibliography. 
 
Practical challenges faced in undertaking fieldwork research inside Syria have been described, 
and the cultural, social, political and religious sensitivities required in engaging with people 
traumatised by and involved in the conflict, have been taken into account.  I have been 
allowed a remarkable degree of access to a wide cross-section of people and places in parts of 
the country under government control, including areas in conflict, often without official 
accompaniment.   But I have not risked accessing areas under the control of militant groups 
opposed to the Syrian government.   Whilst the conflict has formed the backdrop for much of 
this research, it has not been within the scope or intention of this work to examine in detail 
the political, social or economic factors surrounding the conflict.  The Bibliography points to 




Whilst other research projects have been undertaken during the conflict ‘on the ground’ in 
areas under militant control (Baczko, 2018; Lister, 2015), I am not aware of any research 
having taken place during the conflict in government-held territory, where the majority of the 
Syrian population inside Syria, including the majority of the internally displaced, were residing 
(Balanche, 2018, p. 15).  This work therefore, both as a resource on the historic and 
contemporary religious dynamic, and as a ‘snapshot’ from within government-held territory in 
Syria during the conflict, represents an original contribution to an understanding of the Syrian 
context both before and during this period.   
 
As in all complex conflict situations, there are other perspectives. The voices recorded here 
cannot of course claim to represent all Syrians, or all Syrian Christians, but they do represent a 
significant constituency of Syrians from different communities. This study therefore offers a 
range of perspectives from the faith dimension of Syrian society that cannot be ignored if one 
is to understand the dynamic complexity and breadth of the Syrian context, and if we are to 
discern possible solutions for the restoration and renewal of post-conflict Syrian society.  In 
the conclusion of a work published in 2018 by the Centre for Syrian Studies at St. Andrews 
University, (a Centre that has consistently prioritised the accounts of Syrian external 
opposition groups) Imady and Hinnebusch admit that “The Syrian Uprising has significantly 
challenged some of our most basic assumptions about states and society in the Middle East”, 
and call for “new, and innovative, scholarly approaches to the Syrian Uprising” (R. I. 
Hinnebusch, O., 2018, p. 335).   Whilst this study is not about the Syrian Uprising, and whether 
or not the reader agrees with all its findings, the subject of this study, namely the place and 
role of the diverse religious communities in Syrian society, cannot be excluded from 
consideration when seeking to understand the wider context of events in the country.  It is 
precisely in strengthening an understanding of that context, that this study makes a significant 
contribution.  
 
So what are the main conclusions of this research? 
 
The study has shown that Syria is a plural society in which multiple expressions of both 
Christianity and Islam have coexisted within certain parameters for centuries.  However, the 
religious, social and cultural dynamics of Syrian society are complex and multi-layered, and 
vary across different historical, political, social and geographical contexts.  During the conflict, 
Christian and Muslim leaders in areas remaining under Government control and in areas 
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restored to Government authority, have maintained a good degree of interaction and co-
operation, particularly in modelling and being a visible witness of mutual tolerance and respect 
in the public arena, and in assisting processes of reconciliation and peace-building, in a context 
that has seen extreme violence and human suffering.  This interreligious dynamic is 
increasingly echoed across the region.294 
 
This study has considered the plurality of Sunni Islam in Syria ranging from a minority who 
follow wahhabi ideology, to the many Sunnis who support a secular-based Constitution.  Some 
of the roots of the recent conflict are to be found within Islam itself. Tensions such as the 
sectarianisation of the space between Sunni and Shi’a have been long-lasting but have 
increased in recent decades and represent a real threat to regional communal stability.   
 
The study is placed within the context of an on-going and constantly evolving violent conflict in 
which multiple factions, both domestic and foreign, representing differing political, ideological 
and sectarian interests, have fractured the nation and been supported by conflicting 
international strategic alliances. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have died and almost half 
the population has been displaced.   
 
The study has necessarily placed the subject within its broader context. The importance of the 
changing geopolitical dynamics in the region due to recent conflicts, and particularly the 
increased influence of Russia , Iran, and China have been mentioned.   Multiple external 
factors have helped lay the foundations for the instability that erupted into the devastating 
conflict, and added to the strengthening of communal identity.  They include: the colonial 
imposition of the nation states; the rise of political Islam in the 20th Century, (particularly in 
Syria under the Ikhwan, the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’); the tension between ‘secular’ nationalism 
and Islamism; the growing influence of Salafi and Wahhabi tendencies in Sunni preaching that 
followed the return of thousands of Syrians from studying and working in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf in the latter decades of the twentieth century; the Iranian revolution; the US invasion of 
Iraq and its fallout; the so-called Arab spring;  the failure of economic reform within Syria for 
multiple reasons; and the changing geopolitical dynamics between nations. For all these 
 
294 For example, in Egypt, Coptic Pope Tawadros II and the Grand Mufti of Al-Azhar have played a major 
stabilising role during political unrest.  And in February 2019 In Abu Dhabi,  Pope Francis and Grand 
Imam of Al-Azhar, Dr. Ahmad Al-Tayyib issued a joint declaration on Human Fraternity and World Peace. 
https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2019-02/pope-francis-uae-declaration-with-al-azhar-
grand-imam.html  (Accessed: 15 April 2019) 
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reasons the Awqaf  and the State have increasingly sought to curb the influence of radicalised 
groups and more rigid Islamic ideologies.  
 
The future of the Islamic landscape in Syria is difficult to predict.  The emigration of millions of 
Syrians is likely to produce a different religious landscape once the conflict ends.  Although 
many will return, many others will not.  Will the numeric balance between Sunnis, Shi’as and 
Christians, change?  Will the more juridical approach within Sunni Islam allow for ‘secular’ 
space and expression within Syrian society?  Will Syria’s alliance with Russia, Iran and Lebanon 
increase the influence of Shi’a Islam in Syria, and how will this impact the interreligious, 
particularly the Sunni-Shi’a, dynamic?295  Without question, Shi’a influence in the region has 
grown in recent years, particularly since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and the fact that 
the Syrian alliance with Russia and Iran has prevailed in the conflict means that the influence 
of that presence will increase.  This likelihood has implications for both religious and 
geopolitical dynamics in the region.  Whatever dynamics emerge, Sunni Islam needs to re-
frame its religious thought in a way that relates to and embraces communal diversity, 
especially as Syrians who fled the conflict return.296  How will the different communities 
negotiate these changed dynamics?  Acknowledging the fear that violence is an existential 
threat, especially after such a violent conflict, they will need the wise assistance of community 
and faith leaders to do so successfully and peacefully.  After all, whilst having primarily political 
roots, religious and communal identity has certainly informed the conflict.  
 
The future role and identity of Islam in Syrian society, and its relationship with modern 
Statehood will be crucial to the nature and stability of the society that emerges in the years to 
come.  The importance and plurality of Islam within Syrian society has been under-researched 
and its significance underestimated.  The extent to which contemporary and particularly 
juridical expressions of Sunni Islam are able to sustain the space in which religious pluralism 
and freedom of religious practise and expression are maintained, will determine future levels 
of communal trust and the survival of religious plurality in Syria.  Therefore, study of and 
engagement with these issues within Islam are essential to assisting an emerging 
understanding for the future. 
 
 
295 https://syriacpatriarchate.org/2018/11/meeting-with-a-russian-delegation-damascus/  (Accessed: 15 
April 2019) 
296 See note 288 on UAE Declaration. 
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Meanwhile, it is estimated that 50% of Syria’s Christians or more have left the country since 
the beginning of the war.  How many will return?  What impact will this have on Syrian society, 
and on its plural nature and Constitution?  It is almost impossible to predict the answers to 
these questions at present, but remembering the catastrophic impact of events in 
neighbouring Iraq, they will be necessary dimensions to research in the future.   
 
This study has considered at some length the Christian contribution to the religious space 
within the Syrian context.  Since the birth of Christianity in the region, this has been significant.  
The breadth of the Christian presence has been both an enrichment and a burden to society, 
with meaningful ecumenical engagement sometimes remaining a challenge.  Aspects of 
Christian practice in Syria have sought to make a major contribution to the interreligious 
dynamic.  The monastic expression of Antiochene theological and spiritual traditions has 
represented a particular point of connection and engagement with Islamic practice and belief, 
as evidenced at Mar Mousa and Qara. 
 
Meanwhile, led by the religious leadership, one of the most effective means of engagement 
during the conflict has been that of humanitarian and peace-building work.  Some feel that the 
trauma of conflict has rendered theological dialogue a “luxury”.  However, given the trauma to 
society; the impact of radicalisation on attitudes to religion; the depth of the damage to 
interreligious trust; the need for societal, community and individual healing; and the need for 
the international community to learn from what has happened in Syria and the wider region, it 
will be vital to restore a process of theological engagement and reflection to address complex 
religious issues.  Of particular importance will be the ability of Islam to embrace plurality.  
Radicalisation of Muslim identities and the increase of ideological violence gives new urgency 
to the need for theological dialogue. 
 
In addition to exploring Eastern Christian religious thought on contemporary interreligious 
engagement, Appendix 5, (the Questionnaire Analysis) provides responses from mostly Muslim 
interlocutors to questions about that dynamic.  For the most part they confirm the assertion 
that Syria’s broad religious landscape is largely one of coexistence, but vary in their responses 
as to how interreligious relationships have been affected by the conflict.  For a small minority, 
the affect has been significant.  The majority spoke of some impact whilst some spoke of no 
impact at all.   Some Muslim respondents recognised the need to recover recognition of 
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plurality in Islam.  All concluded that peace is desirable and that healing can only begin when 
the conflict was ended.  
 
Christianity has an enormous contribution to make to this discourse.  The breadth of the 
Christian presence distinguishes Christianity in Syria and enhances the character of religious 
pluralism that so many Syrians wish to preserve. The shared culture and experience of the 
Eastern Churches makes them a powerful resource for the worldwide Church in discerning and 
developing future models of Christian-Muslim engagement.  The ecumenical ‘Antiochene 
paradigm,‘ rooted in cultural, theological and historical frameworks familiar to both Islam and 
Christianity, and holding an important position within the wider ecclesial and political context 
has been neglected by the worldwide Church for too long. This study rearticulates that 
paradigm within a global Christian context, and explores the nature of the indigenous 
Protestant place within it. The Antiochene Patristic theological and spiritual approaches to 
interreligious dynamics, given contemporary voice by modern theologians and Church leaders, 
some of whom have become contemporary ‘Church Fathers’, have a much more important 
role to play in interreligious engagement than has hitherto been recognised. 
 
Christianity’s global and cross-cultural reach has enabled the Church to be a ‘bridge’ between 
Syria and the international community.  However, for Christian leaders, it has been very 
difficult to position themselves in a highly charged conflict.  This study has shown that the 
relationship between Church and State Is more nuanced than has sometimes been suggested.  
It is rooted in Arab cultural traditions and Ottoman political structures and represents an 
important and necessary ‘bridge’, advisory potential, and corrective to the State.  This study 
thus provides a window on the inter-communal nature of Syrian society that has hitherto been 
given little meaningful attention. 
 
Christianity has the potential for bringing a helpful political, social, religious and cultural 
contribution, because it encourages cultural complexity and diversity and the equal 
distribution of resources, in a way that radicalised political Islam does not. Would a Sunni State 
not also be a dominant State? Could it ever be ‘democratic’?  Is there a conflict between what 
might be called the ‘right to rule’ and the need for pluralising ‘space’ within society?  Christians 
have always wanted reforms that sustain a balanced, modern State that rejects sectarianism.  
They cannot control the State but they have understood its fragility and can help nurture 
equality, and a system that is not antagonistic towards plurality.  Post-conflict Syria will need 
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to find a way of dealing with this complexity and the multiplicity of identities.  Christian 
communities elsewhere have played a major role in reconciliation initiatives and in helping to 
re-write State Constitutions in post-conflict or trauma situations, precisely because of this 
strength within Christianity.  The potential dangers to the plural nature of Syrian society shown 
in the conflict, have evoked an even deeper awareness for many, of the value of religious 
diversity.  This has been expressed in the heightened significance given to shared religious 
celebrations across Syria  during the conflict, especially in areas liberated from militant control.  
 
Christians are facing major challenges, some of which they share with Syrians of other faiths.  
First is Christian emigration due to multiple factors including conflict, the rise of radical 
Islamism, economic hardship and political insecurity.297  These raise challenges for plurality in 
Syrian society and the survival of Christian institutions.  Second are ecumenical tensions which 
continue to need attention.  Third are interreligious tensions which as we have seen, have 
increased during the conflict, despite the underlying desire to preserve Syria’s tradition of 
plurality, diversity, tolerance and respect.  What will coexistence ‘look’ like in post-conflict 
Syria in the changed religious, cultural, and social circumstances?   Notwithstanding these 
challenges, Christianity survives in Syria and continues to play an important role in society.  In a 
post-conflict context, the Christian teachings of forgiveness, hope, love, and peace, have the 
potential to be a prophetic witness to the need for and the implementation of dialogue, 
engagement, reconciliation and peace-building.   Many Church leaders are already striving to 
fulfil those responsibilities. 
 
This thesis has covered a subject, with fieldwork evidence, about which little has previously 
been written, namely the nature of Christian-Muslim relations inside Syria prior to and during 
the course of the Syrian conflict.  The importance of the Eastern Christian landscape in this 
respect cannot be overstated.  There has always been a lacuna in this area of scholarship 
which this study seeks to address.  Its intention is to provide context and insight for further 
study and reflection. Despite the complexity of, and the trauma experienced by, the Syrian 
conflict, or perhaps because of the complexity and severity of recent events, the resilience of 
the religious communities and the survival of the interreligious dynamic in Syria, provide a 
crucially relevant ‘case-study’ in exploring and understanding models of interreligious 
tolerance and engagement in the face of conflict.  Whilst much scholarship is exploring the 
 
297 See: Interim Report: ‘Bishop of Truro’s Independent Review for the Foreign Secretary of FCO support 
for persecuted Christians’.  Published 2 May 2019. 
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political implications of the Syrian crisis, understanding the religious dynamic in Syria is crucial 
to understanding the social and political context and will be essential to the healing of post-
conflict Syrian society.    
 
Further opportunities for understanding the interreligious dynamic might include: an appraisal 
of models of engagement, dialogue and religious peace-building that have been practised in 
Syria; the specifically Eastern Christian (Antiochene)  theological contributions that can be 
made to theological dialogue and religious practise; religious representation in the political 
landscape; and the implementation of reconciliation initiatives during the conflict, and how 
these might be developed, improved upon and expanded in the future.    
 
Given the global rise of religious nationalism, the experience of the religious communities in 
Syria in facing religious and sectarian radicalism and violence whilst preserving the secular 
‘space’ within Syrian society, has much to teach Christians and Muslims in other parts of the 
world (A. O'Mahony, 2018).  Additionally, the tensions between the 
Iranian/Russian/Syrian/Hezbollah alliance versus the Saudi/Israel/US/UK/Europe supported 
elements within Syrian society inevitably have an influence on the Sunni/Shi’a interface. The 
level of influence that Russia has had upon the trajectory of the conflict has been considered.   
One can validly ask if the renewal of Russian religious identity (both Christian and Muslim) 
might feed into the Syrian context, and whether or not this has influenced Russian policy in the 
country (Cousins, 2013).298 
 
Whilst many scholars have lamented the lack of interlocutors for political conversation within 
Syrian civil society (R. I. Hinnebusch, O., 2018), this study shows that faith leaders play an 
important ‘bridging’ role between civic society and those in power.  Their participation in any 
dialogue post-conflict will be vital.  This thesis contends that western narratives have over-
simplified the communal framework of Syrian and Middle Eastern society.  Imposing a 
narrative of ‘sectarianism’ underestimates the complex history and multiple layers of 
communal relationships, and has helped fracture and perpetuate misunderstandings of the 
nature of Syrian society and its relational dynamics, which religious communities are better 
able to manage than imagined.  The survival of plurality within Syrian society despite the 
severity of the trauma inflicted upon it suggests the truth of this proposal. 
 
 
298 For a major report on Russian influence in the region, see: (Centre for Mediterranean, 2019). 
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Many religious leaders and lay volunteers were involved in the ‘reconciliation’ initiatives that 
were undertaken in Syria during the conflict.  These sought to end fighting and re-establish 
plurality in areas of conflict.  Widely critiqued by foreign observers, whatever weaknesses 
these processes may have entailed, they successfully achieved their goal in dozens of towns 
and cities across Syria. Whilst it is up to Syrians to decide upon and implement their future, 
many religious leaders are open to harnessing the expertise of those in the fields of 
reconciliation and peace-building, to assist in creating effective processes that help 
communities to re-integrate with each other and achieve a lasting peace.  
 
Religious leaders and members of faith communities should play a proactive role in the path of 
peace and justice, and in political, social economic and religious spheres.  They acknowledge 
the importance of ecumenical and interreligious understanding and respect, and renewed 
commitment to and a re-framing of dialogue and co-operation in the service of all 
communities. In this, Syrian Christians play a vital role.  They are not just a ‘minority’, but are a 
vital and dynamic part of Syrian society who are able to hold a crucial ‘space’ for religious, 
social and communal identity for all communal groups within Syrian society.  
 
Christianity and Islam are diverse and long-established traditions in Syria.  Their historical 
precedent of coexistence and their theological, social and political frameworks present for 
Christian theological thought on religion and politics, an opportunity to discern new 
frameworks for understanding and engaging `mosaic’ societies.  Contemporary Syria has 
always offered, and even during the conflict, continued to offer, a cutting-edge context for 
Christian theological and political thought for Muslim-Christian relations; not just in Syria, but 
more widely in the Middle East and beyond. This research provides new understanding of the 
contemporary and historic praxis of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria.  Additionally, by 
articulating the importance of Antiochene Christian ecclesial and theological influences on 
interreligious dynamics, the thesis points towards future frameworks for interreligious 
dialogue, coexistence and reconciliation. 
 
In summary, combining open fieldwork with critical historical and Christian theological 
reflection, this research makes an original and significant contribution to understanding the 
diverse religious landscape and multi-layered Christian-Muslim relations in Syria, in a way that 
has not previously been attempted.   Providing insights into interreligious praxis prior to the 
conflict and in its midst; the study contributes to an understanding of the effects of conflict on 
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interreligious relationships. This has significant implications for understanding, developing, and 
applying frameworks of Christian-Muslim coexistence and reconciliation, not just in Syria, but 
also regionally – in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey, and wherever Christianity 
encounters Islam.  At a time when Islam is grappling with how to reconcile its own thought and 
principles with the social, ethical and cross-cultural challenges of the modern world, and when 
religious extremism is a growing phenomenon globally, the need for interreligious 
understanding and dialogue, particularly between Christianity and Islam, has never been 
greater. 
 
Syria has been through one of the most violent conflicts the world has seen in recent decades, 
and the interreligious dynamic has survived.  It is bruised and damaged, but it has survived.   
Until now, the interreligious context in Syria has been insufficiently understood and studied.  
This research offers a clearer understanding of that dynamic and glimpses of hope amidst the 
tragedy.  And in a reframing of Eastern Christianity’s ecclesial, theological and spiritual 
traditions, lies the potential for discerning new frameworks of religious and political 
relationship and engagement wherein plurality may be embraced and sustained, and long-
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The Oriental Orthodox churches (Syriac, Malankara Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopian, Eritrean and 
Armenian Orthodox Churches) have their roots in the Middle East and India, and regard 
themselves as having apostolic origin.  In full communion with each other, the churches 
emerged in their current form through their rejection of the Chalcedonian definition of the 
nature of Christ, and their preservation of eastern forms of liturgy, language, theology and 
structure.  They distanced themselves from the Byzantine empire, and experienced 
persecution from the west.  Classical Syriac remains the liturgical language of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church, which continues to have a significant presence across Syria, particularly, in 
Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Qamishle and Hassakeh.  However, it is estimated that 
approximately half of the Syriac Christian community in Syria have emigrated during the 
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war.299  Due to the emigration of Christians from Syria and Iraq, the Syriac Orthodox Church 
now has growing congregations across Europe, North America and Australasia.   
 
During the course of my research, I was a guest of the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate on several 
occasions, and visited destroyed Syriac churches in Deir Ezzor and Homs, as well as Syriac 
communities in other parts of the country, and the worldwide headquarters of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church at Ma’aret Saidnaya, where the theological seminary continues to train 
priests from around the world, and where a new Syriac University (the ‘Antioch University) was 
opened in September 2018.  Nurturing secular and religious education is seen as a primary 
ministry within the contemporary Syriac Orthodox Church.  The abduction of Archbishop Mor 
Gregorios Yohanna Ibrahim, the Syriac Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo, along with Bishop 
Boulos Yazigi of the Eastern Orthodox Church on 22 April, 2013, continues to affect the 
attitude of the Christian communities in Syria towards the conflict, and their sense of self-
identity as a church that has inspired generations through its perseverance amidst 
persecution.  Despite the impact of emigration, the Syriac Orthodox Church is determined to 
maintain a significant and influential presence and Syria, and this is evidenced through the on-
going development of its monasteries, churches and educational institutions (Bailey, 2010; 
Brock, 2010; Hunter, 2014; Shemunkasho, 2018).300  The current Patriarch of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church, His Holiness Mor Ignatius Ephrem II, is much loved by his worldwide flock, 
and has been an influential voice for preserving the plurality and diversity of Syria, and 




The Eastern Orthodox Church encompasses the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, 
Antioch and Jerusalem.  It regards itself as representing the true descendants of the early 
Church and its’ theology and faith is rooted in the Bible and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan 
creed, as defined within the first seven councils of the early Church, in which the Church of 
Antioch played an important part.  Accepting the formula of the dual nature of Christ agreed at 
the Council of Chalcedon in 451CE, the Eastern Orthodox are sometimes termed 
‘Chalcedonian’.  The oft-used term ‘Greek Orthodox’ is misleading since it implies deeper ties 
to Greece than are actually present in all its autonomous expressions.   
 
299 This was the estimate given by His Holiness Patriarch Mor Ignatius Ephrem II, during a visit to London 
on 28 October 2018. 




The Patriarchate of Antioch has faced several schisms over the centuries, including the debates 
over the Chalcedonian definitions which led to the creation of the Oriental Orthodox churches.   
The Eastern Orthodox have had close engagement with Islam over the centuries, and whilst 
Greek still dominates the patriarchates of Alexandria and Jerusalem, the Orthodox Church of 
Antioch perceives itself, and is perceived by Muslims as an Arab Church, whose liturgy is 
Arabic.  The Eastern Orthodox have played a significant role in the development of Christian-
Muslim understanding. The Church has always been committed to religious and cultural 
plurality and diversity, and is the largest denomination numerically in Syria. The current 
Eastern Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch is His Beatitude John X Yazigi. (Bailey, 2010; Roussos, 




The Eastern Catholic churches are a complex ecclesial and cultural reality in Syria and the 
Middle East.  The Latin Catholic church, whose presence in the region goes back to the Middle 
Ages, is joined by six eastern Catholic churches, namely the Maronite, Melkite (Greek Catholic), 
Armenian Catholic, Chaldean Catholic, Coptic Catholic and Syrian Catholic churches.  Many of 
these eastern expressions of the Catholic church, though they are related to Rome and have 
adopted some traditions from the Roman Catholic church, have their roots in the Orthodox 
tradition, and cherish their eastern identity.  Although numerically smaller than their Orthodox 
counterparts, the Catholic churches represent a significant and influential minority in the 
region.   
 
In Syria, the Greek Melkite Catholic and Armenian Catholic churches together represent the 
most numerous Christian denominations, but both have seen a serious decline in numbers due 
to emigration during the conflict.  The Greek Melkite Church, which has strongly protected its’ 
eastern religious identity, has been particularly influential, along with the Eastern Orthodox, in 
the sphere of Christian-Muslim dialogue, with the now retired Patriarch Gregorius III Laham 
devoting much attention to this ministry.  Since June 2017, the Patriarch of the Greek Melkite 
Church has been His Holiness Joseph Absi.  
 
 
301 See Appendix 8 for a speech by Patriarch John X, presented in December 2018, summarising his 
position on this subject. 
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The Chaldean Catholic church emerged in the sixteenth century over a leadership dispute.   It 
follows the East Syriac liturgy and is small in number in Syria but more numerous in Iraq where 
the Patriarchate is located.   The Syriac Catholic church emerged in the eighteenth century 
from the Syrian Orthodox Church, but prides itself in its apostolic heritage.  Both Syriac and 
Arabic are used in the liturgy.  In Syria, Syriac Catholics are most numerous in Aleppo and 
eastern Syria, where the church manages many educational institutions.  The Armenian 
Catholic church has its origins amongst those Armenians who supported the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451.  The church suffered grievously during the genocide that followed World 
War 1.  As a minority community, the Armenian Catholic, Orthodox and Evangelical churches 
share good relations and collaborate closely, as I have witnessed when visiting their 
communities in Kessab and Aleppo.  In Syria, the Armenian Catholic community are most 





The Protestant Churches are numerically small in Syria and in the region, but due to their 
commitment to the building of educational, health and social welfare institutions, their 
influence is significant.  Their presence in the region goes back to the American missionary 
movements during the first half of the nineteenth century, the first Protestant congregation in 
the Middle East being formed in Beirut in 1827 (Raheb, 2018, p. 256).  In the Middle East, the 
Protestant churches, including the Anglican, Lutheran and Presbyterian denominations, are all 
titled ‘evangelical’.  However, the ‘mainstream’ Protestant churches are to be distinguished 
from independent evangelical Protestant groups that were part of a wave of evangelical 
missionary activity in the twentieth century that established new independent evangelical 
churches, some of which sought to convert non-Christians and members of the indigenous 
eastern churches to their fold.  This has been a source of tension, not only amongst Protestant 
denominations, but between Protestant and eastern churches, particularly as eastern churches 
tend not to distinguish between different Protestant denominations.   In Syria there is a very 
small Anglican presence (based solely in Damascus, but overseen by and part of the Anglican 
Diocese of Jerusalem), a modest Lutheran presence, and several established Presbyterian 
churches in different parts of the country.  They are all members of the National Evangelical 
Synod of Syria and Lebanon and the Middle East Council of Churches.  There also exist a range 
of independent, autonomous evangelical churches that are not a part of the Middle East 




Raheb describes the Protestants in the region as a ‘double minority’ (Raheb, 2018, p. 269).  
Numerically, they are a minority within a Muslim majority.  But as Protestants, they are also a 
Christian minority.  Nevertheless, although the roots of the Protestant churches lie in 
nineteenth century missionary activity, the Protestant churches are indigenous Arab 
communities who use Arabic for liturgy and worship.  The western origin of the denominations 
can be a challenge within the Middle Eastern context and particularly as regards perception in 
relation to eastern Christians, but the Protestant churches meet this challenge by developing 
contextual theologies, and placing a high priority on theological education, and ecumenical 
and inter-religious dialogue.   
 
The mainstream Protestant churches come under the Fellowship of the Middle East 
Evangelical Churches (FMEEC).  This organisation brings together fifteen reformed, Lutheran 
and episcopal churches from Algeria to Iran and from Syria and the Gulf to Sudan.  In recent 
years, this Fellowship, in response to the aforementioned challenges, has played a major role 
in strengthening theological education, deepening ecumenical dialogue with all the churches in 
the region, and encouraging inter-religious dialogue (Bailey, 2010; Raheb, 2018).  
 
Assyrian Church of the East 
 
This is one of the oldest Christian communities in the world, tracing its origins to St. Thomas.  
Its field of influence stretched across Mesopotamia, from Syria to Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, and 
even according to some historians as far as China.   Between the sixth and thirteenth century, 
the Church of the East was a major missionary church that was known for its scholarly activity, 
and its study of Greek philosophy.  From the fourteenth century onwards, the Church of the 
East was virtually wiped out during the Mughal invasions, and suffered successive persecutions 
in subsequent centuries, including a genocide during the First World War.  Today, Syria is 
home to a small number of Assyrian churches particularly in the North East of the country, 
where they have suffered further persecution from ISIS and Islamist militant factions.  The 
recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria have therefore further reduced the number of Assyrian 
Christians through emigration.  The liturgy, which dates to the fourth century, is conducted in 
Aramaic, the eastern dialect of classical Syriac.  The Catholicos-Patriarch, His Holiness Mar 




Christian communities in Syria.  Population in 1995. 
 
Though out of date, and not in itself definitive, this table provides some indication of the make-
up of the Christian communities in the country prior to the conflict.   
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Christian affiliation in Syria; Number of adherents of each Church in Syria in 1995  
Greek Orthodox  503,000 Latin Catholic   11,100 
Maronite     28,000 Protestant   20,100 
Melkite    111,800  Syrian Catholic   22,400 
Chaldean       6,700  Assyrian (Church of the East) 16,800 
Armenian Apostolic  111,800 Armenian Catholic  24,600 
Syrian Orthodox    89,400 
TOTAL:    945,600    Percentage of Population  6.4%302 
 
Christian communities  in Syria. Population in 2015 
 
The following figures are found in Ross,K.,Tadros, M.,Johnson,M., (Eds) (2018) Christianity in 
North Africa and West Africa. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  p.103.  They are based 
on figures published in:  Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo (eds.) (2017) World Christian 
Database Leiden. Boston: Brill    The figures will already be out of date.  Comparison with the 
table above combined with factors that have affected Christian numbers since, suggest that the 
data in both tables is unreliable, but is useful for indicative purposes. 
 
Tradition   Population  Percentage of overall population 
Anglicans   4,600   0 
Independents   4,600   0 
Orthodox   714,000  1.9% 
Protestants   33,500   0.2% 
Catholics   386,000  2.1% 
Evangelicals`   11,400   0.1% 
Pentecostals   22,800   0.1% 
TOTAL    1,136,000  6.1% 
 
302 Compiled by Y. Courbage and P. Fargues.  Chretiens et Juifs dans l’Islam arabe et turc.  And by N.H. 
Horner.   Taken from :  Fargues, P, (1998)  The Arab Christians of the Middle East, A Demographic 
Perspective. In Ed. Pacini, A. Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, The Challenge of the Future. 




Appendix 2.                                                                                                  
Expressions of Islam. 
 
The Shi’a ‘Twelvers’. 
 
These make up the largest Shi’a group, and form the majority of the populations in Iraq, Iran 
and Southern Lebanon, and Bahrain (Tomass, 2016, p. 70). They assert the legitimacy of a 
succession of twelve imams, starting with Ali, and finishing with Muhammad al-Mahdi (869-
940).  The Ismaili are an off-shoot of this group who dissented on aspects of Shi’a theology and 
succession. The Druze are a further dissenting group, and the Alawites too emerged from the 
Twelvers, but developed a distinctive theology and structure.  
The Twelvers follow closely the religious practice of the Sunna.  Fasting and pilgrimage, and 
the honouring of the Imams are essential to their devotion.  Like other Muslims the place of 
Qur’an, Hadith and consensus (ijma) are central to law-making.  The key difference with the 
Sunna is that the Imam’s deduction (qiyas) of the sunna is regarded as infallible.  His role is “to 
rule over the Islamic community, to explain the religious sciences and the law, and to be a 
spiritual guide to lead the people to an understanding of the inner meaning of things” 
(Tomass, 2016, p. 71). He is appointed by the previous imam.  The Twelvers believe that the 
identity of the twelfth Imam, ( the “Mahdi” ) has been hidden by God, and will be revealed at 
the Day of Judgement, when he comes with Jesus “to end tyranny and injustice” (Tomass, 
2016, p. 71). 
Some of these beliefs are held to be heretical by some Sunni Muslims.  Nevertheless, Syria 
contains a number of important Shia shrines.. 
Ismailiyya 
 
The Ismailis are a Shi’a group, named after those who believe that Ismail, the son of the sixth 
imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, held the right to succession after his death in 765.  Though his brother 
Musa became Imam, when his line ended with the death of the twelfth Imam in 874, some 
Ismailis claimed that Ismail had never died and that he would reappear as Mahdi (Tomass, 
2016, p. 72). The Ismailis were a secret movement that sought revolt against the Abbasid State 
and the Sunna.  In 899, the Ismaili leader in North Africa, Ubayd Allah, declared himself al-
Mahdi, and in 909 as Caliph until his death in 934.  The ‘Fatimid Caliphate’ that he founded 
ruled North Africa and the Middle East until 1171.  The Fatimid Caliphate had a significant 
influence in the Muslim world, at its height stretching across the whole of North Africa and 
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Arabia and across to Syria and Iran, and were responsible for the building of the Al-Azhar 
mosque in Cairo.  Nevertheless, the challenge of the Sunni majority in their realms who 
despised their theology, and the loss of credibility by the self-‘deification’ by Caliph al-Hakim 
(996-1021) hastened their decline.   After his death, his military officers became rulers of the 
State, and the last of these, Salah al-Din, finally abolished the Ismaili Fatimid State in 1171 and 
“proclaimed the return of Sunni Islam as the religion of the state in Egypt” (Tomass, 2016, p. 
73). 
The Ismaili state was dominated by hostility with the Sunni majority.  Killings and counter-
killings were common.  Ismailis kept their faith secret, and would publicly murder civic figures 
who opposed them.  Thus they earned the nickname ‘Al-Hashishiyya’ - ‘Assassins’.   
The Ismaili caliphate moved from Persia to British India, and continues today in the person of 
Shah Karim Aga Khan.  Small communities exist all over the world, and some remain in Syria.  
They distinguish between external and inner aspect of religion, the truths of which are to be 
found in unchangeable laws and scriptures.  They believe that history progresses through 
seven eras, each inaugurated by a prophet, which thus far have included Adam, Noah, 
Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. The final prophet it is believed will reveal all Truth 
and sit in judgement over humanity.   
The Druze 
 
The Druze sect derives from Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Darazi (d.1020), a Turkish Ismaili 
preacher from Bukhara who “gained favour in the court of the sixth Fatimid Caliph, al-Hakim bi 
Amr Allah (985-1021)”(Tomass, 2016, p. 81).  Al-Hakim was known for occasional persecution 
of Christians and Jews and forced conversions to Islam (Walker, 2012, pp. 205-214).  In 1020, 
al-Darazi declared Al-Hakim’s divinity, which caused riots and his own (al-Darazi’s) 
disappearance.  In the years following his death, the group was organised into a sect distinct 
from the Ismaili community, and, as a result of persecution, fled to the mountains of Southern 
Syria, where they remain a closed sect until today in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.  The 
Druze believe in the reincarnation of souls (for those who hold to Druze beliefs) until 
perfection is reached. They do not allow intermarriage with members of other sects and keep 
their belief systems and their communities separate from others.  They are regarded as 
‘infidels’ (along with Ismaili and the Alawi) by many Sunni theologians.  A majority of Druze in 
Syria live in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and in the Hauran plains at the foot of the 
Golan Heights.  They also live in Lebanon. The Druze have primarily supported the Syrian 
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Government, but have had to remain politically cautious given that many of them either live 
under Israeli rule, or in areas under the control of anti-government militants. 
The Sufiyya 
 
The spirituality of the Sufi movement has played an influential part in the spread of Islam and 
its doctrines and practices have influenced Muslim thought and expression in Syria and 
throughout the region. In the twentieth century however, pressure from the rational thinking 
of the west, the rising trend of Islamic fundamentalism, the juridical emphasis of Sunni Islam, 
and the secularisation of Syrian society, saw a decline in the Sufi brotherhoods.  In 1925, 
Turkey banned Sufi activities, and some families emigrated to Syria, where Sufism had been a 
feature of both urban and rural Syrian society.  Despite the decline, in the later twentieth 
century, increasing interest in oriental mysticism in the west saw a revival of Sufi activities.303 
(Prior to the conflict, performances of the ‘Whirling Dervishes’ were a popular tourist 
attraction in the restaurants of Damascus and Aleppo, and were presented as a significant part 
of Syrian Muslim heritage.)   
The heartland for religious Sufism in Syria was Aleppo (Pinto, 2016, p. 201).  Other significant 
Sufi families lived in Hama and Damascus, and during the Ottoman period, members of their 
families became established merchants, administrators and politicians.  
 The origins of Sufism are thought to lie between the eighth and tenth centuries C.E.  It 
emerged as an ascetic movement that rejected material pursuits and sought satisfaction, not 
simply in the observance of religious ritual, but in surrender to God.   The origins of the name 
are disputed, and include reference to the following Arabic words: ‘suffa’ meaning the stone 
seats on which the group of followers slept in the Prophet’s mosque; ‘saff’ meaning the line of 
prayer; ‘safi’ meaning purity; or ‘suf’ which means ‘wool’.  The Sufi wears a garment of wool to 
distinguish himself as an ascetic – a practice of early Christian monks in Syria and 
Mesopotamia prior to the rise of Islam.  The word could also derive from the Greek word 
‘Sophia’ for wisdom.   Sufi practices are rooted in eliminating the distractions of the self.  This 
is achieved through breathing techniques, the chanting of the name of God, reciting poetry, 
listening to music and dancing.   For the Sufi, the ecstasy that can result is being absorbed into 
the very nature of God.  Some orders of Sufism practice more extreme forms of ritual 
practices.  One such practice is the darb al-shish. This practice, of piercing parts of the body 
 
303 Weismann, I. Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel – A Contemporary Overview. 
www.ou.edu/mideast/additional%20pages%20-%20non-category/sufism%20in%20syriawebpage.htm  
Accessed 20 January 2018 
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with skewers- or other practices such as eating glass, walking on fire, stabbing oneself – 
without there being any evidence of harm, are regarded as miraculous acts (karamat) which 
seek to prove advancement along the mystical path.304    There is debate between Muslim 
groups about whether or not these practices can truly be viewed as Islamic.  Some regard 
them as heretical.  
 There are many well-known Sufi writers.  One of the most famous is Abu Hamid al-Ghazali 
(d.1111) from Iran.  In his most celebrated work Revival of Religious Sciences (Ihya’ ‘ulum ad-
din) al-Ghazali “synthesised Muslim theology and mystical internal knowledge” and argued 
that Islamic doctrine and practice could lead the way to the realms of higher mysticism 
(Tomass, 2016, p. 87).  Perhaps the most influential Sufi was the Andalusian Ibn al-Arabi (1165-
1240) who travelled in the Middle East and settled in Damascus.  Al-Arabi taught that we 
should submit totally to the will of God and that Islamic law is a path to achieve that goal.  
Central to Sufi practice is the guidance of an elder.  Sufism is thus divided into different orders, 
each of which have their own history, rules, hierarchy and spiritual practices.  The orders have 
survived, and Sufism and “broader doctrinal trends” have tended to be supported by the 
Syrian Government, partly, claims Pierret, because they “prevent personalisation of religious 
leadership” and so represent less of a threat to State control (Pierret, 2013, p. 101). But in 
recent years, Sufism has been under increasing persecution from extreme Sunni groups, and 
its shrines have been attacked and destroyed in ISIS-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria. 
The Naqshbandi brotherhood is the most active in Syria.  It combines orthodoxy with a socio-
political orientation, branches of which are to be found all over the country.305  The 
Naqshbandis have been criticised for being closely associated with the Syrian government, but 
this relationship can be understood as a means of being able to influence political leadership.  
Writing in a personal blog article, Vladimir Akmedov writes that: “In general, the Sufis get 
along with the government and to some extent represent the official political Islam.”306 They 
are close to the government partly because they withdrew from active politics and focussed on 
being a “religious, doctrinal and intellectual movement.”   
Two important Sufi figures in the field of Syrian Islam are Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Kuftaro (1915-
2004) and Dr. Muhammad Sa’id Al-Bouti (1929-2013). 
 
304 For a study of these practices in Syrian Sufism, see: (Pinto, 2016) 
305 Weismann, I. Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel – A Contemporary Overview. 
www.ou.edu/mideast/additional%20pages%20-%20non-category/sufism%20in%20syriawebpage.htm  





Dr. Kuftaro, an ethnic Kurd, was one of the most prominent representatives of the Naqshbandi 
religious establishment in Syria. He received a strict Sufi education, was a popular religious 
broadcaster, and was rewarded for his support for the government by being appointed Grand 
Mufti in 1964 (Pierret, 2013, pp. 48-49).  Kuftaro created a network of educational and 
religious and welfare centres, and was a strong advocate of Inter-religious dialogue and 
women’s rights, as well as teaching a modern form of Sufism rooted in the Qur’an and Shari’a, 
that sought to engage with social affairs.  He affirmed the need to interpret Islam in relation to 
the present.  In an article published before Kuftaro’s death in 2005, Itzchak Weissmann of the 
University of Haifa declares:  
On the other hand, Kuftaro and his associates are keen to demonstrate to the Salafis 
that the Sufis’ inner search of God has not diverted them from active participation in 
Jihad.307 
 
But the ‘jihad’ of which Weissmann speaks is a re-framing of the term, that is rooted in Ijtihad 
(individual reasoning) and is contrary to the juridical emphasis of taqlid (imitation) as espoused 
by salafi ideology.  (We shall examine this crucial concept of Jihad and its profound impact on 
the Syrian conflict later in the Chapter). 
Dr. Muhammad Sa’id Al-Bouti, another ethnic Kurd, was “considered to be one of the most 
famous contemporary scholars in Syria.”308  An immensely popular Sufi leader, he was a 
broadcaster and professor at Damascus University (Christmann, 1998).  Al-Bouti was “fiercely 
hostile to the Salafi doctrine that was permeating the Damascus branch of the Muslim 
Brothers” (Pierret, 2013, p. 79).  He was opposed to political Islam and supported the 
government against the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Indeed, the violence of the 
clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood ‘fighting Vanguards’ and the government in the 
1970s and 1980s inspired him “to approach the phenomenon from his scholarly and 
intellectual position”.  The result was his book Jihad in Islam, How do we understand it? How 
do we practice it?” which was published in 1993 in Arabic and in English in 2006 (Buti, 2006).  
Al-Bouti supported but re-framed the concept of Jihad declaring that the violent actions of the 
 
307 Weismann, I. Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel – A Contemporary Overview. 
www.ou.edu/mideast/additional%20pages%20-%20non-category/sufism%20in%20syriawebpage.htm  
Accessed 20 January 2018. 
308 Research Co-ordinator, Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zeid.  (2015) From the heart of the Syrian Crisis.  A 
Report on Islamic Discourse between a culture of War and the establishment of a culture of peace.  
Adyan Foundation. P.41 
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Jihadists are nothing less than a revolt against the general principles of Islam, and was a critic 
of the protests at the beginning of the Syrian conflict.  Unfortunately, Al-Bouti was seen to be 
too close to the government and to the Presidency for his writings and his views to be taken 
seriously by the Jihadists.  In 2013, he was killed by an explosion whilst teaching at the Iman 
Mosque in the centre of Damascus. 
Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Badraddin Hassoun, who succeeded Dr. Kuftaro in 2005 as ‘Grand Mufti’ of 
Syria, is another Sunni scholar trained in the Shafi’i school of Islamic Jurisprudence, who is 
influenced by Sufi theology. The Shafi’i school acknowledges five sources of jurisprudence: the 
Qur’an, the Hadith, (the sayings associated with the Prophet), the Ijma (the consensus of 
Muhammad’s companions); Ijtihad (reasoning where consensus cannot be found); and qiyas, 
which is a process of deductive analogy between the hadith and the Qur’an.  Dr. Hassoun, 
whose father was also a sheikh from Aleppo is well known for his encouragement of inter-
religious dialogue and passionate support for plurality, diversity, and religious freedom in 
Syrian society.  In a meeting with him in 2017, he said:  
“I am not just for Muslims, but serve everyone whatever faith or none.  To Christians I 
say, ‘If you are a Christian, hold onto the message of Christ, because it is from Allah. If 
you are a Muslim, hold onto the Prophet, because he is a universal messenger.  If you 
are a Jew, you worship Allah.  If you are an atheist, you are a brother.  When I go to a 
Church or a Mosque, I go to see one God.  We are all sons and daughters of Adam and 





Sunnis make up about 80% of the world’s Muslim population, and are the majority of the 
population of Syria.  In all the Arab world, only in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain are 
they a minority.   Like all faith groups, Sunnis are diverse in their practice, belief and 
adherence.  In Syria, they range from those who hold to a Wahhabi ideology to those who live 
predominantly secular lives whilst remaining faithful to their religious identity.   
Sunni identity developed in response to Shi’a allegiance to Muhammad’s daughter Fatima, and 
his cousin Ali as the hereditary leaders of the Muslim community.  For the Shi’a, the refusal of 
the newly formed Islamic community to accept their leadership meant that both the Umayyad 
and the Abbasid caliphates were illegitimate.  The Sunni however, saw the leadership of the 
Islamic community as residing in those who observed the teachings of the Qur’an and the 
 
309 Meeting with Dr. Hassoun, Grand Mufti of Syria in Damascus.  28 November 2017. 
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Hadith, and who were endorsed by the religious authorities.  Those who followed them 
became known as the Ahl al-Sunna.  They accepted the first four caliphs as rightful successors 
to the Prophet Muhammad. 
The Qur’an, Hadith (Sayings) and Ijtihad (Interpretation) are the foundation of Muslim law on 
all things to do with daily life.  The science of these religious laws is fiqh (Jurisprudence).  In 
Islamic law, four schools of jurisprudence and interpretation are accepted, based on the 
teachings of four scholars of the first three centuries of the Islamic faith:  the Hanafi; Maliki, 
Shafi and Hanbali schools.  Each of these are represented in Syria, with the more conservative 
Hanbali school playing a significant role amongst the urban ulama.  However, most Syrian 
clerics follow Ash’ari-Maturidi theology which emphasises tawhid (the oneness of God) and ilm 
al-Kalam (the science of discourse) – which might be termed ‘moderate rationalism’.  The fact 
that a majority of Sunnis in Syria follow this more rational approach to Islam, is one of the 
reasons that respect for minorities and a willingness to accept a secular State has prevailed in 
Syria for so long.   However, the influence of salafi trends within Sunni Islam in Syria during the 
last century cannot be overstated.   
The Ministry of Religious Affairs in Syria (Awqaf), an Authority of Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments in Syria, officially administers religious institutions.  However, not desiring to be 
under Government control, many local ulama have set up independent religious institutions.  
Simultaneously, the Ba’ath Party has sought to allow religious institutions a degree of freedom, 
partly to limit their influence at a State level, but also “not to antagonise certain 
neighbourhoods” (Pierret, 2013, p. 42).   This independence though has ironically allowed the 
more conservative trends within Syrian Islam to develop, and so foster hostile attitudes 
towards the secularity of the Syrian constitution – a hostility enhanced by the significant 
Islamic influences from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.  
Wahhabism 
 
Wahhabism has been an increasingly important and growing phenomenon throughout the 
Arab world in recent decades, and its ideology, characterised by religious intolerance and 
political authoritarianism,  lies at the root of many of the actions and ‘beliefs’ of the so-called 
‘Islamic State’.   As Patrick Cockburn writes, this movement has been “taking over mainstream 
Sunni Islam.  In one country after another Saudi Arabia is putting up the money for the training 
of preachers and the building of mosques”(Cockburn, 2014, p. 6).  This was particularly true in 
Syria in the years leading up to 2011, when as previously mentioned, many Syrians spent time 
working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; were influenced by the Wahhabi doctrines that were 
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espoused in the mosques there, and were sharing those doctrines on their return home.  Given 
the economic disparity in the country; corruption and political suppression in civic and 
government departments; and resentment at the imbalance of power in Syria, such 
conservative and extreme Sunni teachings found willing audiences amongst some Syrians who 
felt politically and economically disenfranchised. 
Wahhabism takes its name from the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-
1792), an eighteenth century religious scholar who sought a return to what he believed to be 
the ‘pure’ practices of Islam.  Following Ibn Taymiyya’s emphasis upon Islam as obedience to 
the rules espoused in the Qur’an and the Hadith, Wahhabism urges Muslims to follow these 
rules literally, and denounces any belief or practice that violates the Islamic understanding of 
monotheism as heresy.  Such heretics are to be regarded as infidels and apostates, and 
beheading is advocated as the punishment.   There is no religious hierarchy in Wahhabism, and 
therefore every Muslim has the right “to attribute unbelief (takfir) to potential infidels or 
apostates and to fight them” (Tomass, 2016, p. 89).  This goes some way towards explaining 
the widespread brutality of the actions of the ‘Islamic State’ group in Syria.  Furthermore, it 
becomes incumbent upon every ‘faithful’ Muslim to practice jihad against those who do not 
accept Wahhabi doctrine.  Wahhabi doctrine also forbids any form of innovation (bida), and 
only interpretation (ijtihad) that specifically agrees with the Qur’an and the Hadith is allowed.  
Upon meeting with the ruler of the House of Saud, Muhammad Ibn Saud (d.1765), the two 
men agreed that religious authority should remain with the house of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 
whilst temporal authority should rest with House of Ibn Saud.   Following the House of Saud’s 
conquests of Mecca, Medina, southern Iraq and Syria in the early 19th Century, Wahhabi 
doctrine was imposed upon the regions.  Regarding any form of shrine as idolatrous, many 
Muslim and Christian shrines have been destroyed wherever Wahhabi doctrine has prevailed.  
The pace of this destruction has been hastened in recent years, particularly in Mecca, where 
buildings dating from the time of Prophet Mohammed have been destroyed in order to 
prevent the possibility of ‘idolatrous’ associations. The destruction of churches, shrines and 
mosques, has likewise been a feature of ‘Islamic State’ violence in Syria.  
After a period of defeat in the 19th Century at the hands of the Hashimid Clan, Saudi rule, with 
British support, was established once again in 1927.  Today, Wahhabi influence has spread 
throughout the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, as foreign workers in Saudi Arabia are 
obliged to send their children to Saudi schools that teach Wahhabi doctrine.  These in turn 
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return to their countries influenced by their teachings.  Wahhabism is the underlying ideology 







Syrian Ministry of Awqaf.  Publications for combatting extremism. 
 
 
In November 2017 a significant practical initiative to provide frameworks for teaching Islam 
that challenge ‘takfiri’ ideology was implemented by the Syrian Ministry of Awqaf, when it 
produced three volumes for use in every mosque in.  Two introductory volumes consider “The 
Intellectual and Ideological basics of combating the Extremism and Takfiri terrorism and so-
called the Political Islam”.  Using Qur’anic references and Hadith and a strongly critical 
rhetorical style, these volumes challenge Wahhabi ideology, and the political Islam of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  The third volume offers a systematic framework for teaching Islam and 
challenging extremism in every mosque in the country.310  Rooted in the principle that “the 
pulpit is a public site that has inviolability, rules and origins,” the Awqaf produced these 
volumes in the hope that the mosques may be “a beacon of science, ethics, values, education, 
and an oasis of tranquillity”, and the Friday sermon a means of “scientific, moral, social and 
economic renaissance.”311  This development will be seen by some as an authoritarian means 
of controlling the mosques, and it is true that the Introduction includes an intention to 
“strengthen the belonging to the homeland”.312  But this is a constructive response to the 
challenge of extremist ideology, and an attempt to moderate the teaching of preachers who 
have increasingly been educated in the Wahhabi traditions in recent years. 
The Ministry of Waqf declares that terrorism and extremism are a global problem, and that 
understanding their origins and beliefs are vital to confronting them.  Indeed, according to the 
Ministry, “any efforts to confront ISIS and other kinds of terrorism and religious extremism 
that do not study the Syrian case and interact with it are going to be insufficient and short-
sighted”. Therefore, the Ministry of Awqaf sees its responses, which seek to identify “the 
 
310 Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Awqaf. (2017) The Intellectual and Ideological basics of combating 
the extremism and takfiri terrorism and so-called the Political Islam. Vols 1 &2   Damascus 
Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Awqaf (2017)  The general approach of the Friday sermons in the 
mosques of the Syrian Arab Republic.  The whole modern religious speech.  The pulpit is a public site that 
has inviolability, rules and origins. Damascus 
311 Introduction to “The General Approach of the Friday Sermons of the Syrian Arab Republic.” Ministry 
of Awqaf. 6 
312 Introduction. The General Approach.. p.7 
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ideological and legislative real and true roots of terrorism and religious extremism” and 
counter their effects in the Syrian context, as being of international relevance.313 
The strategy outlined by the Ministry includes: 
- Developing a charter of religious speech 
- Publishing a document “that sets missions and standards of choosing people 
responsible for religious rites and duties.” 
- Publishing a “legislative approach” to confronting religious extremism and ideology. 
- Launching training and qualifying courses about jurisprudence for all scholars and 
preachers. 
- Nurturing moderate religious media to challenge extremist religious channels 
- Launching a project “for developing religious education curricula in all universities, 
institutes and schools. 
- Launching a project for developing “youth religious speech (future preachers)”. 
- Launching a project for “interpreting the Qur’an in a modern and advanced way to 
confront the basic principles of the extremist ideology”.314 
As a foundational framework for teaching in the mosques, the Syrian Ministry of Awqaf has 
adopted what it terms “Important pillars in the Reform and Development of Religious Speech”.  
In the volume entitled “The General Approach of the Friday Sermons in the Mosques of the 
Syrian Arab Republic”, the Awqaf identifies seventeen “pillars” or principles to be adopted in 
all preaching in Syrian mosques, each justified by Qur’anic or Hadith quotations.  They are, (as 
quoted in the volume): 
1. Analysis rather than indoctrination. 
2. Belonging to Islam does not conflict with belonging to the homeland. (Citizenship) 
3. Non-separation between rituals and intentions. 
4. Transfer of the religious text does not conflict with the mind. 
5. Focus on the moral aspect of the call to Islam. 
6. Depth in understanding the texts and not flattening the mind. 
7. We must understand life so that we can apply the Qur’an. 
8. Dependence on the biography of the Prophet peace be upon him in the interpretation 
of texts. 
9. Drop text on reality. (Applying texts to real life). 
10. Moderation alone is not enough. 
11. The method of dialogue with opponents of opinion. 
12. The Imams of the doctrines left us jurisprudential judgements and did not leave any 
sects for us. 
13. Arabism and Islam are an identity that cannot be renounced. 
14. Correct the concepts and terms. 
15. Religion is not the cause of extremism but the distance from religion. 
 
313 Syrian Ministry of Awqaf. (2017) “The Strategy of Confronting ISIS terrorist extremist ideology and 
draining its resources.” Unpublished document received during meeting with the Minister of Awqaf, 
Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Abdul Sattar Al-Sayyed, Damascus. 15 April 2018. 
314 The Syrian Ministry of Endowments. (Waqf) (2017) The Strategy of confronting ISIS terrorist extremist 
ideology and draining its resources. 
268 
 
16. The pulpit is a public site that has its rules and controls and it is not a personal 
property of anyone. 
17. Youth are the wealth of the homeland.315 
After establishing and explaining these frameworks, the volume identifies guidelines for 
preachers which include; emphasising respect and tolerance for others, ensuring appropriate 
qualifications and adequate preparation for preaching, respect for human rights, concern for 
social issues, abiding by religious traditions, avoiding political judgements and comment, 
supporting humanitarian events, continuing training, and abiding by Ministerial circulars.   
There follows a list of thirty “Duties and Tasks of Friday Khateebs in Mosques”, which include 
requirements of behaviour, education, opposing extremism, and upholding national unity. 316  
The rest of the volume presents a range of suggestions for sermon themes, on matters relating 
to faith, morality, social cohesion, science, education, culture, health, environment, religion, 
and national events, providing Qur’anic and Hadith supporting references, to cover annual, 
monthly, weekly, daily and spontaneous programmes for preaching.  
Further to the establishment of the programme, the Ministry seeks to implement these ‘pillars’ 
by establishing religious youth groups, developing a Shari’a curriculum that includes modern 
interpretation of the Qur’an, establishing an approach to women’s organisation, developing 
the use of religious media, drawing on the resources of the National Institute for the 
qualification of preachers and Imams, and the University of the Levant for Islamic and Arab 






315 Ministry of Awqaf, (2017)  The General Approach of the Friday Sermons in the Mosques of the Syrian 
Arab Republic. 18-46 




A brief history of Aleppo 
 
Aleppo is one of the oldest cities in the world, and was always an important city 
geographically, politically and economically.  Human habitation has been recorded in the area 
“from at least the 5th millennium BC” (Mansel, 2016, p. 1).  Throughout history, the town’s 
position between Europe, Mesopotamia, Asia and Arabia, has meant that it has been a trading 
centre for empires, and a place of prosperity since ancient times.  During the Middle Ages, it 
was a hub for the Silk route, and records reveal that the city traded in goods from as far afield 
as Britain and China.  In the 13th Century, Syria was ruled by the Mamluks from Egypt, but 
when the Ottomans conquered the area in 1516, the people of Aleppo, “exasperated by 
Mamluk over-taxation and lawlessness”, welcomed the Ottoman conquest, and when a 
rebellion broke out in 1520 in Damascus against Ottoman rule, the people of Aleppo remained 
loyal to the Ottomans (Mansel, 2016, p. 3). 
 
During the Ottoman Empire, Aleppo was a cultural and economic hub.  Then, as now, it was 
home to multiple communities – Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Jews.  One of the ways in which 
the Ottomans managed to keep foreign allies was to “incorporate different peoples and 
religions in its administrative and financial structures” (Mansel, 2016, p. 7).  Syrian Ulamas or 
religious authorities regarded the Ottoman Sultan as foreign, but nevertheless, local kadis 
(judges) and sheikhs generally went to Constantinople for training.  From the 16th century 
onwards, Ottoman architecture – khans, mosques and fountains – were to be found all over 
the city, adding to the diverse Umayyad , Ayyubid and Mamluk buildings for which the city is 
famous.  As Mansel writes: “By 1600 there were fifty-three khans and fifty-six souks in Aleppo” 
(Mansel, 2016, p. 12).  These were the most extensive in the Middle East and stretched for 
twelve kilometres.   So whilst Aleppo remained an Arabic-speaking city, with a Muslim 
majority, it also became a cosmopolitan, international city hosting merchants and consulates 
from all over Europe and the Middle East, and pilgrims heading to Jerusalem. 
 
In religious terms, Aleppo included communities of Christians and Jews as well as Muslims. In 
the 17th Century, the Jewish population numbered about 5000, living in their own quarter.  
Whilst communities lived in their own vicinities and close to their places of worship, Aleppo 
was known for its coexistence, and there were rarely incidents of violence. Dress regulations 
270 
 
helped to identify members of different communities.  Non-Muslims were required to wear 
dark colours, whilst bright colours were reserved for Muslims (Mansel, 2016, p. 27).  But 
properties could be sold easily. Churches could be renovated and built, and clergy could dress 
according to their tradition. Islamic courts at the time “accepted the oath of a Christian on the 
Gospels, and of a Jew on the Torah” (Mansel, 2016, p. 27). 
 
The arrival and presence of the Catholic Church did however create ecumenical tensions.  
Catholic missionary orders – Franciscans, Capucins, Jesuits, Carmelites, and others – arrived in 
the 16th and 17th centuries.  The target of their missions was not the Muslims, but the 
Orthodox.  The missionaries were possibly partly encouraged in this regard by the long-
standing allegiance of the Maronites in Lebanon to the Pope.  And in 1649, not long after their 
arrival, the King of France, “without informing his ally the Ottoman Sultan”, “took all Catholics 
in the Empire under his protection” (Mansel, 2016, p. 32).  By the early 18th century, many 
Orthodox Christians in Aleppo had become Catholic, creating a lasting tension between 
Catholic and Orthodox leaders in the region.  
 
Aleppo declined during the 17th and 18th centuries.  Reasons included power struggles between 
Janissaries, (shopkeepers and artisans who had been soldiers and claimed to still be so, in 
return for tax privileges) and the ashraf (nobles of the city who claimed descent from the 
Prophet); tax riots; and attacks by Kurds on the trade route between Aleppo and the port of 
Iskenderun.  An earthquake in 1822, and increasing religious tensions, enhanced by Ottoman 
defeats and European interference, added to the decline (Mansel, 2016, p. 39).  
 
In 1831, Mohammed Ali Pasha, governor of Egypt occupied Syria.  International pressure 
forced the Egyptians to withdraw in 1840.   During this time, the people of Aleppo remained 
loyal to the Ottomans, whose reforms (tanzimat), which had begun in 1839, increased the 
prosperity of non-Muslim citizens. In 1849, Greek Catholics were formally recognised by 
Constantinople. The tensions that this created were soon to erupt. 
 
On 17 October, 1850, “communal rioting wracked the city of Aleppo in northern Syria. The 
total number of those killed in the violence directed against the city's prosperous Christian 
minority was not large. Yet, the fact that the riots had occurred at all was a demonstration of 
the fragility of the city's social and political order” (Masters, 1990, p. 3).  During two days of 
violence in the Christian quarters, churches were attacked, Christians were killed and homes 
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were looted by Muslim crowds.  The unrest was quelled by the governor acceding to some of 
the rioters’ demands.  However, the situation remained tense.  Troops arrived from 
Constantinople, and Bedouin tribes who supported the rioters arrived to confront the 
authorities.  When a report reached the Ottomans that their troops had been killed – a report 
that proved to be untrue – the Ottomans responded.   Bruce Masters writes:  
 
On November 5, the Ottomans, supplied with new British artillery, began to shell the 
center of the insurgency, the quarters of Bab al-Nayrab, Banqusa, and Qarliq. 
Following the bombardment, a house-to-house battle ensued. By November 8, the 
Ottomans had prevailed and Consul William Werry could report: ‘I avail of it to 
acquaint Y. E. that the sultan's government has been re-established here, but not 
without a severe conflict between the military forces here and the insurgents, who 
have been entirely subjugated, and the Quarters they inhabited have been destroyed 
and burnt, perfect tranquility exists in every part of the city.’ The cost in lives lost had 
been heavy to both the Ottoman army and the insurgents, but the authority of the 
Ottoman state had been restored.' (Masters, 1990, p. 7) 
 
Scholars have recently argued that the sectarian violence that occurred was a crisis of the 
Ottoman Empire’s incorporation into the modern economic system, in which the Empire’s 
economic system was subordinated to the European system, which created advantages for 
minority communities and a shift in power that heightened communal tensions (Masters, 
1990, pp. 9-20). 
 
Following the crisis, order was restored.  Victims of the revolt were compensated, and some 
notables who had joined it were banished. Churches were given money for restoration.  The 
Governor made a point of supporting and attending local Christian-run events (Mansel, 2016, 
p. 41).  In Aleppo at least, the Ottomans were regarded as protectors of the minority 
communities, and when the 1860 riots took place in Damascus, Aleppo was comparatively 
calm.  Prosperity returned to the city, and religious tensions were defused.  French 
connections were strengthened, and by the end of the 19th century, the city had become 
modernised. 
 
The Ottoman Empire’s alliance during the First World war with Germany and Austria was to 
secure its downfall.  Arab nationalist leaders were condemned and hanged, engendering 
hatred for the Ottomans.  Although Aleppo escaped the fighting, the city could not escape the 
Ottoman destruction of the Armenians.  With the help of Arab forces, the British Army started 
a revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East.  Damascus fell on 1 October 1918, and 
on 25 and 26 October that year, Ottoman forces left Aleppo.  The French Mandate that 
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followed (according to the Sykes-Picot division of the Middle East, secretly agreed in 1916) 
established Damascus as Syria’s capital, and the centre of administrative institutions.  This 
subordination of Aleppo to Damascus created tensions and divided loyalties, made worse by 
the fact that new post-war frontiers cut off Aleppo from the city’s previous economic 
hinterlands in Turkey and Iraq.   Aleppo’s sympathies lay more with the Turks than with the 
French.  This also created a communal tension, between Muslims who disliked the French 
Mandate, and Christians, who preferred the protection that the Mandate offered them.  This 
of course added to the longstanding perception amongst some Muslims that Christians in Syria 
support and are supported by the west – a perception that has at times had significant 
implications for inter-communal relations. 
 
Nevertheless, Aleppo remained a multi-denominational city.  Mansel records that in 1930, “out 
of a population  of around 220,000, approximately 52% were Muslim, 16% Christian (mainly 
Catholics but excluding Armenians), 4% Jewish and perhaps 28% Armenian – many still living in 
refugee camps on the edge of the city” (Mansel, 2016, p. 51). 
 
Following the end of the French Mandate and the establishment of Syrian Independence on 1 
January 1944, most Syrians united behind the new administration.  Unfortunately, the first 
anti-Jewish riots were sparked by the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.  Most Jews left 
Aleppo at this time, but not all to Israel.  Many emigrated to Europe and America.   
 
In the post-independence period, the people of Aleppo continued to feel that the city was 
under-represented in the Syrian Parliament.  But nevertheless, Aleppo flourished.  The city was 
able to build on its historical, cultural and religious heritage, and religious and social cohesion 
was restored.  In 1993, the Syrian and German Governments signed the Project for the 
Restoration of the Old City of Aleppo, which had been listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site 
in 1986.  The city also continued to be an economic ‘powerhouse’ for the Syrian Republic and 






Syrian perspectives on Christian-Muslim relations -  a Questionnaire analysis 
 
The methodology in undertaking this research has included eyewitness visits to multiple 
locations in Syria, informal interviews, and an invitation to respond to a written questionnaire.  
I have tried by various means to ascertain the opinion and experience of ordinary Syrians 
across the communal spectrum of Christian-Muslim relations.   
 
 All my visits during the war have been in government-controlled areas, or areas recently 
recovered from ‘rebel’ control, since it was impossible for foreigners to travel safely within 
‘rebel’-controlled areas, all of which were controlled by extremist Islamist factions.    Any 
attempt to travel in those areas would involve a very high risk of kidnap and death. It was 
estimated at the time of writing that roughly 75% of Syrians who lived inside the country, 
whatever their political persuasion, were in government-controlled areas, and therefore the 
sample, though small, could be considered to be representative to a degree of Syrian society.  
Whilst voices from within ‘rebel’-held areas are necessarily excluded, nevertheless, I have 
spoken with many internally displaced persons from those areas representing different age 
and communal groups.  Many who have fled areas under ‘rebel’ control speak of people being 
at risk of execution if they oppose the ideology of the occupiers in those areas.  Therefore, 
views gauged from those areas may be less reliable and less varied than those received from 
government-controlled areas, where people, contrary to popular belief outside Syria, are much 
less restrained about expressing their views than is sometimes suggested. 
  
As part of understanding the methodology used in this study, it is necessary to distinguish 
between interviews and the questionnaire. Informal interviews were undertaken with religious 
leaders or others, either individually, or on a few occasions in the company of members of a 
delegation.  These took the form of conversations, which flowed naturally in various directions 
that were relevant to the subject.  I tried to followed a Naturalist approach, believing that 
these encounters enable us to access "authentic accounts of subjective experience." 317 These 
 
317 Note:   Silverman, D. (2014) Interpreting Qualitative Data. Los Angeles, London New Delhi, Singapore, 
Washington DC.: Sage. P. 178  Silverman writes: “Naturalist interviewers want to access the subject 
behind the person given the role of interview respondent.  Their particular concern is with lived 
experience.  Emotions are treated as central to such experience. “  In 1970, Denzin offered three reasons 
for this preference: 1. “It allows respondents to use their ‘unique ways of defining the world’. 2. It 
assumes that no fixed sequence of questions is suitable to all respondents. 3. It allows respondents to 
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conversations were not recorded in their entirety, but involved occasional note-taking, from 
which quotations have been taken.  They have taken place in Damascus, Maaloula, Saidnaya, 
Homs, Aleppo and Lattakia.  Undertaken with a range of people from different backgrounds, 
these interviews have sought to further establish, through an interpretivist approach, an 
understanding of the ontological status of Christian-Muslim relations in the country from 
informed figures, who reflected a variety of opinion, insight and experience.  
 
The questionnaire process was different.  Firstly, I created four questions, that sought to 
encourage open and honest responses.  The questionnaire used was the same for all 
participants, identified only by faith, gender, age and location.  Their identity will remain 
confidential. Responses have been written in both Arabic and English, with reliable translations 
being offered by someone who understands the importance of accurate translation.  A 
questionnaire allows the approach to be focussed, though on a few occasions, it has been part 
of a wider interview.  The questionnaire has been administered by me alone, directly or online. 
I have not needed an interpreter with me, because many Syrians speak reasonably good 
English.  On the few occasions where English language has been difficult, I have had, with the 
consent of the interviewee, someone with me who can interpret. The fact that each 
interviewee brings their experience, social, cultural and religious perspective to the 
questionnaire allows a diversity of voices to be recorded.  Responses have reflected that 
diversity, as the analysis of the questionnaire shows, and this adds authenticity to the study as 
a whole. Those who responded were keen to do so. Whatever their different responses were, 
they all felt that the subject was of importance.   
 
In the introduction to the questionnaire, I described who I am and the purpose of the study.  
The introduction emphasised that the identity of respondents would not be requested or 
revealed.   The only information sought of the respondents were sex, age, religious affiliation, 
and the town in which the respondent lives.  How I would choose respondents to the 
questionnaire was initially unknown.  My intended approach was to discern upon meeting 
people, who might be open to responding to a questionnaire before broaching the subject.  
That discernment would depend upon the openness and confidence of the interviewee, and 
 
‘raise important issues not contained in the schedule.”  From Denzin, D. (1970) The Research Act in 
Sociology, London: Butterworth.  Quoted in page 179 of Silverman (2014)  Silverman also points out 
that” taking ‘emotions’ as self-evidently present in what people say can lead to analytic laziness,” and 
possible distortions in self-presentation depending on the influence of experience and intentions 
conveyed. Silverman (2014:181)  Hence, I have chosen to use a variety of approaches in the overall 
study and in the questioning. 
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the sensitivity of the context.  As it was, I need not have worried.  Early in my visit to Syria in 
May 2017, I was invited to join an informal English conversation class, with a variety of male 
and female students of different age-groups and different backgrounds.  When I mentioned 
the questionnaire, they were all keen to participate, and took copies for their friends.  
Subsequently, one of them posted the questionnaire online, and a number of responses were 
received by that medium.   
 
The questionnaire consists of four fixed questions. Remembering that discussing inter-religious 
relations can be interpreted by some as imposing a sectarian agenda in a context where to do 
so can offend, framing of the questions required sensitive consideration, and 
acknowledgement of that reality.  In addition to risking a sectarian interpretation of raising this 
subject, some may feel that it is insensitive and inappropriate to be exploring this subject in 
the midst of a war in which millions have suffered and died, and in which sectarian identities 
have been used to provoke violence.  I am sympathetic to these feelings, though as has been 
explained, this study is intended to be a positive exploration of the subject in order to better 
understand the realities in Syria, and how they might inform a positive approach both in Syria 
and elsewhere in the future. 
   
Forty people, 18 male and 22 female, from a cross-section of religious communities, age-
groups and locations within Syria, responded to the questionnaire.  The four questions asked 
of each one were: 1. Are inter-religious relations important for you?  Do you think, from your 
own faith tradition, Christian-Muslim relations are important?  2. In what ways was Christian-
Muslim coexistence visible prior to the conflict.  Please describe in your own words. 3. In what 
ways has the conflict affected Christian-Muslim relations locally?  In what ways have the 
communities continued to live and work together through the conflict?  4.  Do you think each 
faith community needs to restore trust and maintain positive co-existence and respect?  If so, 
what do you think needs to be done to enable this to happen?  Do you think this is an 
important part of what it means to be Christian/Muslim?    Their responses are analysed using 
a descriptive-interpretive approach.  Even in this comparatively small ‘sample’ base, the 
responses to the questionnaire offer an overall picture of themes that can be ‘coded’ and 
analysed in a variety of ways.318 
 
318 A ‘grounded’ approach allows for the construction of a theory using the analysis of data, as 
introduced by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, and elaborated further by Glaser in 1978, and by Strauss and 
Corbin in 1990 and subsequent years.  In this process, themes are identified and differentiated, in ways 




Below is a table that identifies the age range, sex, and religious affiliation of the participants.  It 
is interesting that marginally more females (22) responded than males (18).  Early concerns 
had been that women may be reluctant to respond.  This concern perhaps reflected an 
external preconception about Arab societies that had been imposed on the context.  The 
reality that women showed more enthusiasm in responding than men is indicative of the 
nature of Syrian society and the fact that women in Syria play an important role in Syrian 
society and are generally well educated.  It could also indicate that since the beginning of the 
war, there are substantially more women in the country than men.  This is partly due to the 
fact that many are in the army, or have been killed in the fighting, whilst many more have left 
the country, not necessarily for political reasons, but often for economic reasons, or a desire 
amongst some to avoid military service.    
 
 Total 23-29 30-39 40-55 80+ Muslim Christian 
Male 18 6 6 5 1 15 3 
Female 22 8 11 3  21 1 
 
 
When we come to religious affiliation of the participants, of the forty respondents, only four 
were Christian.  This is an accurate representation in percentage terms of the religious make-
up of the country.  Of the thirty-six Muslims who responded, twenty-one were women, and 
fifteen were men.  This may have been a surprising statistic, but for the reasons outlined 
above.  Interestingly, of all the Muslims, only one self-identified as a Shi’a.  This could be 
because all the others were indeed of Sunni origin, but could also be because of a reluctance 
to provide a ‘sectarian’ designation.  One young man from Damascus, in the box for religious 
designation declared himself to be ‘Atheist’, though his subsequent responses showed him to 
be of Muslim background.  Whilst many Syrians may identify themselves as ‘secular’, it is highly 
unusual for someone in the region to self-identify as ‘atheist’.  This particular respondent was 
vehement in his response, speaking of the “religious bigotry” that dwelt in Syrian society 
beneath the surface, and declared that the “hidden hatred” that existed in each community 
had come to the fore in the conflict. Notwithstanding whatever personal reasons he may have 
had for such a response, the fact of his response reveals this to be one of the complexities and 
ambiguities that exists in Syria that cannot be ignored, even if it is not commonly declared.  
 




The same respondent continued to affirm the need for continued co-existence, but on a 
practical, humanitarian level, rather than a religious one, rooted in mutual respect.     
 
Another young male from Damascus identified himself as ‘Syrian’.  This is very common in 
Syria, where many people will prioritise their national identity above their religious identity, 
and where loyalty to nation before ethnic or religious affiliation is often perceived as a means 
of reducing the dangers of sectarian identification.  This is well illustrated by a friend who lived 
in Aleppo throughout the years of conflict in the city, who wrote at Christmas 2017, “I am not 
Christian, I am Syrian.” The aforementioned respondent from Damascus continued: “In Syria, 
there is no difference between the faith groups.  We are one people joined by love to each 
other.”  He continued: “I have a Christian friend who was with me during national service.  
Only his name told me he was Christian.”  Syrians of all communities have often said to me 
that they only know the religious identity of their close friends or neighbours because of their 
names, but that this has never affected their relationships.  This is echoed in another 55 years 
old Muslim respondent who wrote: “First of all, we are Syrians regardless of sect.”  It is 
common in a conflict situation to want to emphasise commonalities, though I would suggest 
that this desire to do so amongst so many Syrians represents more than simply an aversion to 
naming sectarian difference, but rather is embedded within the ethos of Syrian society.   
  
Though putting national identity above communal identity is clearly a matter of public pride 
for most Syrians, and is often genuinely affirmed, it is not necessarily always the case on a 
personal or communal level.  When one speaks to individuals, most will naturally speak of their 
own community as ‘us’, but the ‘other’ as ‘they’, and when doing so, will often reveal a degree 
of prejudice, criticism or fear.  It is a common feature of human existence that people will 
identify first with those who are of the same family, tribe, faith or community, and this is 
especially the case in societies such as Syria’s, which are made up of multiple, plural ethnic and 
religious communities.  This, along with the historic factors discussed in the section on 
‘Sectarianism’, is why I prefer the term ‘communal’ to ‘sectarian’ when speaking of Syrian 
society, and believe that the ‘sectarian’ label has been overplayed in order to enhance political 
agendas and narratives. 
 
In age terms, there was an equitable spread of respondents between the ages of 23 and 55, 
with the majority in their thirties, and one respondent in his eighties.  This too is a fairly 
accurate representation of the Syrian demographic.  Of those in their thirties who responded, 
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the majority were women, possibly because most men of that age would likely be in the army.   
The majority of respondents were from Damascus, three were from Aleppo, one from Daraa, 
two from Hama, and one from Lattakia, and one Syrian responded online from Saudi Arabia.  
Reflecting the findings of the informal interviews, responses to the questionnaire indicated 
subtly different experiences or views according to location, and 
revealed an interesting variety of attitudes. It is interesting that one female respondent in her 
thirties from Damascus returned a blank questionnaire.  There could be any number of reasons 
why this was the case.  She may have considered the subject too sensitive.  Discussing the 
subject at all may have offended her.  She may have been suspicious as to how the information 
would be used.  The fact that she returned the questionnaire, even though blank, was a 
statement in itself, but it is impossible to determine exactly what that statement might be.   
 
Question 1:  Are inter-religious relations important to you?  Do you think, from your own faith 
tradition, Christian-Muslim relations are important?  
 
Few respondents offered any significant reply to question 1 other than a simple ‘yes’.  The 
majority were keen to provide a fuller answer to question 2, the answers to which indicated a 
very strong affirmative response to question 1.  In conversation with some of the students 
before handing out the questionnaire, it was clearly self-evident to them that inter-religious 
relations were not only important, but a fact of life within Syria, both prior to the conflict and 
in the midst of it, and an important dimension of both the Christian and the Muslim traditions 
as far as they were concerned.   This was reflected in all my conversations and interviews 
throughout Syria, and is visibly evident in the way of life in the towns and cities of the country, 
where for generations, Christians and Muslims have lived, worked, socialised and on special 
occasions even prayed, side by side.  There is a distinction however between active inter-
religious relations, and the more common phenomenon of striving to ensure community 
cohesion.   The evidence from interviews and questionnaires, is that to a degree, both prevail 
within Syrian society.  Syrians will commonly share each others’ festivals.  They will even pray 
together on special occasions.  And a degree of dialogue has in the past taken place between 
Church leaders, though this has not always been easy.   On the other hand, Christians and 
Muslims in Syria share their daily lives together.  They have co-existed on many human, social 
and practical levels.  Both principles of inter-religious relations and community cohesion have 




Question 2:  In what ways was Christian-Muslim co-existence visible prior to the conflict? 
 
That there was Christian-Muslim co-existence prior to the conflict was unanimous.  A Christian 
woman from Damascus wrote: “There was no problem socially before the conflict.  We had 
peaceful co-existence and shared our festivals.”  An Ismaili Shi’a from Salamieh in Hama 
province wrote: “We never thought religion would be a problem.  In Deir Ezzor, Christians, 
Kurds and Muslims were integrated and had free practice of religion.”  A 54 year old Christian 
male wrote of “long term co-existence”, and that “the country is for all”.  A young Muslim, 
echoing other respondents said: “We used to share festivities, and all our joys and sorrows.”   
A female Muslim in her thirties wrote: “At university, I was not influenced in my dealings with 
others by their faith.  I had a girlfriend who didn’t wear a headscarf, and only found out online 
that she was Christian.  That didn’t change our relationship.”   
 
This reference illustrates how in Syria, most women, particularly in town and urban 
environments have freedom of choice as far as their dress is concerned, with Muslim women 
free not to wear a hijab if that was their choice.   Prior to the conflict, it was not unusual for 
the streets of Damascus or Aleppo to be likened to the streets of Paris, for the freedom, 
variety and style of women’s dress. Prior to 2011, I remember this being a source of mild 
disapproval for some more conservative Muslim friends, and was indeed a source of 
disapproval for strict, traditional Muslims, and conservative Sheikhs who increasingly from the 
1950s onwards taught salafi  and Wahhabi inspired moral principles.  For many women in Syria 
however, this freedom of dress is one of pride, and many women have spoken of their fears 
for the freedom of women, should the strict conservative practices promoted by the ‘rebels’ 
prevail in their society.  Do these responses indicate that religious identity was ignored in order 
to preserve co-existence?  I think there may be an element of this.  It is common for Syrians to 
say: “Religion never mattered in our society.”  And on a relational and social level, this appears 
to have been true.   
 
Another male Muslim in his thirties wrote a more nuanced comment: “We had excellent co-
existence before the conflict.  Interaction could be limited to each community or in certain 
areas, but when in university, work or clubs, relationships happen naturally and beautifully.  
Being a Muslim defines my identity, but Islam Instructs us to be kind to non-Muslims. I don’t 
differentiate according to faith.”  Another young Muslim woman aged 24 wrote: “I don’t care 
about religions. I respect all people for their humanity.  I was very happy to share Christian 
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festivals and to live in a Christian neighbourhood.  We loved each other a lot.”  Similarly, a 
young man wrote: “I am a Muslim who grew up in a Christian school.  My experience was 
always good.”  Supporting friends of other faiths at festival time is often mentioned by Syrians 
of all faiths.  Christmas particularly, is a time when Christians and Muslims celebrate together 
in the streets.  Christmas trees are lit in towns and cities throughout the country, and people 
from all communities play in bands and sing carols together.  In December 2016, following the 
liberation of Aleppo, the Christmas tree lighting in the city was an occasion of a huge 
outpouring of joy in the city, and since then, Christmas tree lighting ceremonies have been 
celebrated with great enthusiasm in towns and cities throughout Syria.   
 
All three respondents from Aleppo spoke of the importance of Christian-Muslim relations in 
the city’s history.  A 39 year old Muslim male from Aleppo writes: “We lived together as 
friends, colleagues, neighbours for hundreds of years.  Christians are a part of Syrian society.”  
A 52 year old Muslim man from Aleppo also writes: “We used always to live together.  Religion 
was a personal issue.  I went to a Christian school and so did all my brothers and sisters.  Near 
my village is a Christian village where all the people came to greet on our holy days.  We do 
business together, play games together.  I do not choose my friends because of their religion.  
We used to live without a problem for 2000 years.  I put full responsibility on western policy 
and media for the deterioration in Christian-Muslim relations.”    
 
The theme of studying together and common social life is echoed in most of the response to 
the questionnaire, and in numerous conversations had with Syrians around the country.  It is 
also visibly evident.  Visiting schools and universities in Syria, one is struck by the diversity of 
the students.   Sunni, Shi’a, Christian, Alawi, Kurd, Druze can all be found in the same class.  
Not only that, but because Syria has for so many years been a place of refuge, one will also find 
Iraqi and Palestinians students mingling with the others.  The same is true when visiting 
restaurants and cafes.  Syrians are proud of the fact that the plurality of the country is more 
visibly evident in the streets and Institutions than almost any other country in the region. 
 
A question might be asked here as to how to define religious coexistence?  Has religious 
identity been ignored in order to peacefully co-exist?  Or have there been concerted efforts to 
build interreligious relations?   To a certain extent, both may be true.  Certainly faith leaders 
have made significant efforts to model Christian-Muslim relations, and to deepen 
understanding and mutual awareness of each other’s faiths. Dialogue has taken place at a 
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senior level. And more importantly, Christians and Muslims have been seen to co-operate in 
offering care and welfare to citizens who have lost home and loved ones.  Responses to 
interviews and the questionnaire would suggest however that on a private and personal level 
for most ordinary people, there is felt to be little need or desire to deeply understand the 
religion of the other. Religious belief is regarded as a private matter, and is treated with 
respect.  However, the sharing of key festivals between Christians and Muslims is 
commonplace.  This is one of the key features of the plurality of Syrian society of which Syrians 
are proud.  
 
This was put quite strongly by a young Muslim woman from Damascus. “We are more than 
brothers.  We pray together.  Christians are my brothers.  We feel unity in spirit and there is no 
difference.  We respect each other and there is no difference.”  This emphasis on unity is often 
stressed amongst Syrians, no matter what their religious or communal background.  It might 
be said that it is often affirmed even more strongly in the face of the violence that the country 
has experienced.  For the majority of Syrians that one speaks to inside the country have no 
desire for the religious and ethnic plurality and diversity for which the country is famous, to be 
threatened.   There is a deep fear amongst Christians and many Muslims in Syria, of the 
sectarian damage that extremist Islamist ideology can do to communities and the plural 
identity of the nation as a whole. 
 
Question 3.  In what ways has the conflict affected Christian-Muslim relations locally?  In what 
ways have the communities continued to live and work together through the conflict? 
 
This question produced by far the most substantial, varied and interesting responses from the 
participants, and also an interesting degree of vehemence in some of the replies.  This 
vehemence may have been due to the sensitivity of the question, and the reluctance in Syria to 
even engage in a discourse that might be interpreted as ‘sectarian’, especially as sectarian and 
religious identity has been used, especially by extremist terrorist groups to promote and effect 
such intolerable levels of violence during the war.  However, sensitivity to the concept of 
sectarianism in Syria has long been present.  As Nikolaos Van Dam writes when discussing the 
concept of sectarianism in Syria: “When it comes to loyalties or allegiances, quite different 
factors can play an equally or sometimes more important role, such as ideology, social class, 
inter-generational conflict, personal ambitions and opportunism.”.  He continues: “Perception 
was not less important than intention, as it could create a sectarian dynamic that could not 
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easily be undone.”(Dam, 2017, pp. 18-19)  The history of Syria proves this point, and has 
caused deep fear and reluctance to engage in any discussion that might even be perceived to 
have a ‘sectarian’ agenda.  Hence the sensitivity with which this study has had to be 
approached, and the misinterpretation and suspicion of intention, to which it could be, and to 
a few, was subject. 
 
The responses to this question enabled at least one quantitative form of analysis to be 
undertaken, that is extremely informative.  The responses will be explored in further detail 
shortly, but one aspect of the responses could be categorised in tabular form.  This was 
whether the respondents felt that the conflict has had a serious impact on inter-religious co-
existence in Syria, ‘some’ impact on religious co-existence, or no impact at all.  The results are 
as follows: 
 
To what extent has the conflict impacted Christian-Muslim co-existence in Syria? 
 
 Serious impact on 
co-existence 
Some impact on  
co-existence 
No impact at all on 
level of co-
existence 
Christian male  2 1 
Christian female  1  
Muslim male 3 9 2 
Muslim female 1 14 7 
Total 4 26 10 
 
It is notable, and some would be surprised, that only four people (10% of the respondents)  
stated that the conflict has had a ‘serious’ impact on co-existence.  And that none of these 
were Christian.  Might this partly reflect the fact that the Christians who responded were all 
from Damascus?  Would people from Christian villages or towns that were destroyed by 
militants, and where Christians were targeted have responded differently?  In villages and 
towns where some of the Muslim inhabitants took sides with the militants, there is an 
understandable fear about allowing members of those families to return, and anxiety about 
the lasting influence of Islamist ideology beyond the end of the war.  Christians throughout 
Syria often emphasise that this is an aspect of modern Islam of which the world needs to be 
aware, and which represents a threat to peace everywhere.  At the same time, many regard 
this not as a specifically religious issue, but rather an ideological and political one, and 
acknowledge for example that Muslims who do not hold to an extreme Salafist or Wahhabi 
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ideology have also been targeted.  It could also be argued that if Syrian society tended not to 
be based on religious identity prior to the conflict, (partly because of a fear of increasing the 
risk of sectarian unrest) then it might be claimed that the impact of the conflict on co-
existence may not have been significant.   
 
The responses of those who identified a serious impact are instructive.  One was the self-
declared atheist who spoke of the “religious bigotry….dwelling in society”.  He even declared 
that this “hidden bigotry has come to the fore.  I would say in the majority.”  This is a response 
that cannot be ignored.   Some academics have argued that there was a latent sectarianism in 
Syrian society which, once released, made the violence and fracturing of Syrian society 
inevitable.  The research undertaken for this project suggests that there is truth in this, but 
that what was perceived to be sectarian disenfranchisement rested in sections of Syrian 
society who valued their religious identity over and above the identity of the whole.  A young 
Muslim woman who acknowledged that “relationships were good in work or study” prior to 
the conflict, added, “but generally Christians do not want to mix their personal relationships 
and are more likely to enclose on themselves.”  This is common to all minority communities in 
any context.  She continued: “The crisis has had a big effect.  In offering social services, 
communities prefer their own followers.  The majority of Christians have stood by the 
Government and defended them.  This has led to a division between the supporters and 
opponents of the regime.  Relationships will be very difficult for those who have stood by 
injustice and because Christians have stood by the regime.” 
 
This was one of the few responses that included a clear political statement, and shows that the 
sample was not of like-minded participants.   Her comment about communities ‘preferring’ 
their own, is true on a certain level, and is also a natural feature of plural societies.  Yet, in the 
many welfare initiatives that I have witnessed, run by Church communities in Syria during the 
last few years, it is precisely their treatment of all recipients equally no matter what their 
religious or communal identity, that has inspired and touched the communities in which they 
have served.  This respondent’s final statement: “Islam is my existence and my identity,”  has 
been a cry of Sunni Islamists for decades in Syria, who have been opposed to the secular 
constitution of the Syrian State. 
 
A similar response was received from a thirty-one year old Muslim from Daraa.  He wrote of 
Christians as ”our partners” and acknowledged that “though there is not wide co-operation, 
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there is mutual respect”.  Nevertheless, he was scathing about the attitudes of some during 
the conflict “who celebrate when someone is killed because they belong to the opposition are 
criminals.  I refuse to be glad when a shell lands on anyone.  Moderate Muslims are sad about 
death on all sides.  Some moderate Christians however put a ‘like’ on Facebook when an 
opposition Muslim is killed.  This is the worst criminality I can imagine.  We are going to have 
to work together.  We should come down with an iron fist on sheikhs or priests who do not 
want to see coexistence.  See on the media the degree of sectarian behaviours that have 
happened.  Priests and sheikhs are to blame.”   This is an interesting allocation of blame upon 
religious leaders.   
 
Finally, a young Muslim from Damascus wrote a nuanced account: “I am a Muslim who grew 
up in a Christian school.  My experience was always positive.  But the war has impacted very 
badly.  Fear has been planted in the hearts of Christians and minorities, particularly in 
Damascus.  The sectarian actions of the opposition have increased these fears.  Before the 
crisis there was a good relationship.  Our dentist was a Christian and we were friends.  Now 
she is much more cautious, and we only have a business relationship.  There is a need to 
restore trust, and to redefine ourselves and our identity as Syrians.  If you look at the map of 
the conflict, it is closely related to the sectarian make-up of the country.”   And in a final 
comment, he writes: “Islam can offer good values for society.”  The theme of trust is widely 
reflected, both in the responses received to the questionnaire, and in conversations that I have 
had with many Syrians around the country.  The desire and the will to restore good 
relationships is widespread, but these responses illustrate that trust between communities has 
been sorely eroded during the years of the conflict. 
 
It is interesting that 25% of respondents stated that the conflict has had “no impact” on 
Christian-Muslim relationships, and that these remain good.  Is it also significant that the 
majority of these responses were from women?  Is that reflective of the stronger tendency for 
peace-making in women?  On the evidence of the majority of responses, can one say that the 
conflict has had “no impact” on relationships?  However this may be interpreted, this is a 
significant result that cannot be dismissed or ignored.  For it is true that when one discusses 
the subject, this is the response given by many individuals.  The reasons for this may be many.  
There is a degree of insistence in some of the responses that perhaps reflects the widespread 
desire amongst most Syrians to preserve the country’s plurality and diversity.  For example, a 
fifty-five year old Muslim woman wrote: “Everything is fantastic.  We should continue to 
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encourage co-existence and tolerance.  I am Syrian first.  My religion Is something between me 
and my God.”    A younger woman wrote: “There is no difference in the relationship between 
faiths.  There is an indirect impact of lack of trust, but generally the situation is good and even 
the crisis has made us share our sorrows.”  Those respondents who declared ‘no impact’, 
tended to be those who recognised a mutuality in the suffering.  A 44 year-old Muslim man 
wrote: “There is no discrimination between Christians and Muslims in day to day relationships. 
The Christian-Muslim relationship has even been affected positively.  The Church has been 
distributing food in Ramadan to all people regardless of religion.  Trust has not been affected 
for those in educated society.  There is mutual respect.  It is external parties who are trying to 
create problems, especially through media.  Religious leaders work to increase harmony and to 
create joint charitable activities.  I am proud to be Muslim and to co-exist with others.”   
 
The man who identified himself simply as ‘Syrian’, wrote that “in Syria, there is no difference 
between faith groups.  We are one people joined by love to each other.  Nothing has changed.  
Many Christians and Muslims drink coffee together.  Some Churches give help to everyone.”    
The self-identification as ‘Syrian’ reflects a common reluctance amongst Syrians to 
differentiate along sectarian lines.  A young woman from Damascus wrote: “We are more than 
brothers.  We pray together.  Christians are my brothers.  We feel unity in spirit and there is no 
difference.  Being a Muslim woman, I have to respect others no matter what their background.  
There is no difference.  It is the media that tries to spread lies.”   A further response from a 
young woman in Damascus offers an interesting defence of the Muslim faith: “Nothing has 
changed.  But I prefer not to have a relationship outside my religion.  Being a Muslim woman 
obliges me to defend the rights of my family, and requires the best of manners.  There is a 
pledge between us and the dhimmis that we should not harm them.  Our religion is a religion 
of manners.”  One wonders to what extent, deep concern and embarrassment (even shame?) 
that so much extreme violence has been perpetrated in the name of Islam, might have 
influenced such adamant claims that there is ‘no difference’ between Christians and Muslims?  
Might there be a desire amongst some to avoid any language that might be construed as being 
‘sectarian’?  If so,  it would be natural to say that all is well.  Notwithstanding that, cynicism 
should not prevent us from being open to the possibility that the interlocutors really mean 
what they say. 
 
An apologetic defence of Islam features in a number of the responses.  For example, another 
young woman from Damascus writes: “Islam is a religion of care and generosity In which 
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Christians are valued.  We work together and share friendships.”  And then, she continues: 
“Muslims in general had more empathy with the protestors and later with the rebels.  
Christians in general are more conservative and feared change.  For me, I didn’t experience a 
change in my relationship with Christians.  The conflict has shown us that we should have 
more honest dialogue about the type of society we need to co-create in order to co-exist.  
Ordinary people should start to think about and discuss that, and leaders should open the 
space for that.” 
 
A further political comment is added by a young man from Damascus.  “The majority of groups 
live harmoniously and work together.  We celebrate festivals.  The majority are wary in case 
the regime falls.  There is no damage religiously, but there is a political divide.  The difference 
and divide is between supporters and opposition to the government, whatever their sect.”  
This view has been echoed in a number of private conversations had with friends.  A Christian 
woman who works with colleagues from different communities said to me:  “We have always 
got on together, and we never worried about our religious identity,  but trust has broken 
down.  We do not know who supports whom, and we dare not talk about it.” 
 
The only Christian who identified ‘no impact’ is a middle-aged male who writes: “I did not 
notice a change in Damascus.  Love and respect for each other still exists.  But there have been 
changes in areas deeply affected by the conflict.” 
 
Each response contains its own truth, and is true for the person who is conveying it.  
Therefore, none of the responses can be dismissed outright.  
 
It is to be expected that the largest number of respondents (65%) declared that the conflict 
had had some impact on Christian-Muslim relations.  The greatest impact on Christian-Muslim 
relationships is declared to be lack of trust, which is mentioned in the majority of responses.  
And yet, most respondents assert, as is plainly evident on the streets of villages, towns and 
cities throughout Syria, that this has not prevented daily social co-existence, or co-operation in 
working together for the welfare of communities.  
 
For some of the Muslim respondents, there is an awareness of the need to recover the priority 
of moderate Islam.  As one woman put it: “We need to recover a truer understanding of Islam, 
that we are a religion of mercy and good behaviour.  And we need to remember that there are 
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bad people in every community and every place.”  An added dimension of this was referred to 
by one respondent who wrote.  “Christians are understandably worried.  But I have not 
noticed a difference between Christians and Muslims.  There is rather a difference between 
Islamic groups.  The problem lies with Muslims themselves.” A young Syrian woman from Saudi 
Arabia responds similarly: “The conflict has distorted the image of Islam and brought hatred 
between Muslims.  It has not affected all Christians who continue to look at Muslim friends in a 
positive way.  Each of us is responsible to show our faith in the best way and respect other 
religious beliefs.”   Echoes of this are to be found in the response of a young man from Aleppo, 
who wrote: “Most Christians know that Muslims will not harm them.  Churches were protected 
by Muslims.  Islam teaches we cannot harm any one of the people of the book.  We need to 
return to our history and see how our forefathers co-existed.  Stop listening to outsiders.  No 
one in the West or East can lecture Syrians on co-existence.”   Another young man from 
Aleppo writes similarly and echoes many Syrians when he adds: “We lived together as friends, 
colleagues, neighbours for hundreds of years.  Christians are a part of Syrian society.  Some 
support the regime.  Others the opposition.  The war is about right and wrong, not between 
religions.  Time will heal, because this is the nature of Syrian society.”   
 
Question 4.   What do you think needs to be done to enable faith communities to restore trust 
and maintain co-existence and respect?  Is this an important part of what it means to be 
Christian/Muslim? 
 
Respondents were unanimous in replying positively to the second part of this question, and 
some of the responses shared above reflect that understanding.   The responses to the first 
half of the question, about what needs to be done to restore and maintain positive co-
existence and respect, were also consistent.  Education, communication, social activities, and 
joint charitable work, all feature significantly in the responses, as areas in which the Christian-
Muslim dynamic in Syrian society can be enhanced. 
 
An Ismaili woman from Hama wrote: “ We continue to teach diversity and tolerance, and do 
social activities for youth of all communities.”   Another from Damascus wrote: “We need to 
conduct religious awareness programmes and teach people about the faiths, and continue 
social functions to restore connections and respect,” whilst another woman from Damascus 
wrote: “We need to build social cohesion and fight ignorance.”  Education features in a 
number of other responses from both men and women: “It is important to find ways of mutual 
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love and respect, and to find compatible living formulas, especially through activities and 
education about each other nationwide.”  Similarly: “It is very important for education to instil 
the values of harmony and joint charitable exercises,” and; “More communication and respect 
are needed,” and; “In safe areas of the country, people support and listen to each other.  We 
should have common education and entertainment activities, and joint meetings in both 
official and non-official ways.”  Another writes: “To continue co-existence, we have to continue 
humanitarian work, both practically, and with respect for each other.” 
 
In conclusion, the responses to the questionnaire reveal a diversity of attitudes to Christian-
Muslim relations. This is to be expected, and adds authenticity to the sample.  Most agree that 
relations have for the most part been positive, but there is divergence of opinion in how 
effective interreligious relations have been in the past and how they have been impacted by 
the conflict.  This reflects the variation of the level and nature of engagement according to 
context, and that the conflict has impacted different communities in different ways.   That 
trust between communities has been damaged is evident, but most clearly wish to see the 
restoration of co-existence and co-operation, at least on a humanitarian level.  Whatever their 
personal and political views, all respondents desire an end to the conflict so that healing can 










The plight of Christians in the Middle East.                                                                       
A Questionnaire for reflection.  Archbishop Jean-Clement Jeanbart 
 
In January 2015, Archbishop Jeanbart drew up a document entitled ‘The plight of Christians in 
the Middle East’.  It takes the form of a questionnaire designed around a series of themes, to 
enable Christians in Syria to reflect on their context and experience, and to discern what they 
imply for the future Christian presence and its place in the religious and social framework of 
Syrian society.  Written when the conflict was at its height, the questionnaire is copied here as 
a helpful framework for reflecting on these themes, and for identifying some of the main 
issues that are confronting the Christian community, and the nature of the Christian-Muslim 




a) Can Christianity survive in the Middle East and how? 
b) Besides persecution are their other factors that threaten Christianity in the Middle 
East? 
c) Is the conflict in the Middle East a clash of civilisations? 
d) Is hatred of Christians in the Middle East directly linked to hatred of the West? 
e) Can someone be both Christian and Arab in the eyes of a Muslim Arab? 
f) Could there be an autonomous Christian enclave in the Middle East? 
g) Who really ‘owns’ the land of the Middle East? 
 
2. Islam:  
a) To what do you attribute the rise and appeal of radical jihadist Islam? 
b) Has ISIS expanded the battle from territorial cleansing to conquest of souls? 
c) What are the tenets and basis of moderate Islam? 
d) Is there a moderate Islam?  How can it be defined politically, socially, culturally 
and spiritually? 
e) Can ‘Mosque and State’ ever be separated in Muslim societies? 
 
3. Persecution: 
a) How is Christian persecution carried out in the Middle East? 
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b) How did Christian communities survive the waves of persecution in the past? 
c) Describe the experience of being a persecuted minority in the Middle East. 
 
4. Social: 
a) The Western perspective points at the role of Christians in Arab societies as 
contributing to the common good.  Are Christians perceived that way by Muslims 
too? 
b) What have Christians in the Middle East accomplished, in terms of peace-making, 
healthcare, education, etc? 
c) Why is Christianity vital for the region?  Can you imagine the region without 
Christianity? 
 
5. Inter-religious dialogue: 
a) What is dialogue from a Christian perspective? 
b) What is dialogue from a Muslim perspective? 
 
6. Leadership: 
a) What is the calling of the Church in the Middle East, in our time? 
b) What are your Church’s biggest needs today? 
c) What are the main challenges that your Church needs? 
d) How would you  consider the laity with regard to the questions above? 
e) Is there an absence of lay leadership in the Churches of Middle East? 
 
7. The humanitarian crisis: 
a) Please identify the main aspects of the crisis. 
b) Discuss the magnitude of the crisis. 
c) Outline the needs, the urgencies and the practical solutions that will alleviate the 
humanitarian crisis.  
d) Explain how the Church is managing the crisis. 
e) How is the crisis affecting specifically women, children, and the elderly? 
f) What are the expectations of the refugees from the Church? 
 
8. The story of the individual: 
a) Share with us about a specific story of an individual affected by the crisis. 
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b) What is the emotional toll of this crisis?  Please touch upon the despair, the loss of 
dignity and other aspects of this suffering. 
c) Have you, personally, faced evil? 















‘The Challenges facing Arab Christians in the Middle East’                      
Patriarch Gregorios III Laham. 2013 
 
In 2013, Greek Melkite Patriarch Gregorios III Laham, summarised what he called ‘The 
Challenges facing Arab Christians” in the Middle East, for a Conference bearing that title 
hosted by King Abdullah of Jordan in Amman in 2013.  The list that Patriarch Gregorius 
compiled is revealing and provides a helpful perspective in the context of this study, and in 
reflecting on ways forward for the faith communities. It is therefore quoted here in full: 
 
• The challenge for Christians is being citizens in the full sense of the world. 
• The challenge for Christians is to believe in freedom without restrictions imposed by 
their Muslim brothers on their worship and faith. 
• The challenge for Christians is to secure the opportunity for study, work and 
employment and make a living alongside their Muslim brethren. 
• The challenge for Christians is not to feel that they are second-class citizens because 
they are not Muslims. 
• The challenge for Christians is that they would like to hear verses from the Holy Bible 
mentioned on the media with the same respect and appreciation as verses from the 
Qur’an. 
• The challenge for Christians is to see the education curriculum at all levels reflect a 
spirit of religious freedom, equality and acceptance of others and respect for religion 
and belief; and to ensure that religious education is for all students without any 
discrimination, each according to his religion and belief. 
• The challenge for Christians is to work together in collaboration with Muslims for the 
development of their communities in genuine co-existence as true custodians of the 
above-mentioned values. 
• The challenge for Christians to Muslims is to feel that their Muslim brethren’s security 
guarantees their own security and stability. 
• The challenge for Christians comes form the division of the Arab world, which is the 
cause of tensions in our society between Christians and Muslims.  Given a united 
Muslim Arab world, I would guarantee you that all my Christian spiritual children 
would go on living here and would not emigrate. 
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• The challenge for Christians is one of feeling excluded and marginalized….which stems 
from an experience of being shut in, withdrawn, not involved in political parties and 
not participating in political life… Give Christians a role, an opportunity, a position, 
share, employment… I would guarantee that we could solve the majority of problems 
and challenges that Christians face. 
• The challenge for Christians is to succeed in making Muslims feel that they are their 
partners at home and in all walks of life. 
• The challenge for Christians is to participate in the renaissance of the Arab and Islamic 
nation.  In particular that they have a tremendous potential to be partners for their 
Muslim brothers and sisters in the development of their community, country, home 
town or village and district.  Christians have the potential of being a factor for 
cohesion, and neighbours and partners for their Muslim brethren in their homeland.  
Their fellow-citizens can benefit from these energies, which are available in our 
Christian schools, and our charitable, social, medical, cultural, educational, artistic, and 
technical services, which are open to all, and benefit numerically more Muslims than 
Christians. 
• The challenge for Christians today in the Arab world is to feel that the Arab and 
Muslim world needs them, values their presence, activities and services.. 
• The challenge for Christians today in the Arab world is to feel that the Church the 
predominantly Muslim Middle East is the Church of the Arabs and the Church of Islam; 
that it is a Church with the Arab world and for the Arab world, for its prosperity, 
progress and working to highlight the image of Islam through the reality of life at home 
and abroad. 
• The Christian challenge is to feel that security for Christians depends on that of their 
Muslim brethren.  Muslims must also feel that their own security is bound up with that 
of their Christian brethren.  This has been a theme in all my talks, conference and 
forums and in my congratulations for Eid al-Fitr for 2013 CE. 
• The challenge for Christians in the Arab world, and the so-called Arab Spring, is for 
them to have a role in the evolution of the situation in the Arab world, and in resolving 
the crisis in every Arab country.  It is not permissible to marginalize or exclude them or 
forget or trample on their rights and identity.  Christians are an integral part of the 
Arab world and its crises, problems and challenges, just as they are also part of the 
solution and building a better future for the rising generations… 
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• One of the major challenges confronting the Arab Christian community is a divided, 
predominantly Muslim Arab world.  Most dangerous is the split in the Islamic world 
and the growth of fundamentalist Islamic movements, movements in which there is no 
room for the other, other thought, other opinion… 
• One of the major challenges for the Arab Christian community is the integration of 
religion, the state and society into one, paving the way for outrages to civil liberties 
and to equality and freedoms of all kinds. 
• Another challenge associated with the previous challenge is the concept of the nation.  
This can be understood in a way that eliminates the concept of a homeland for citizens 
in a plurality of groups of citizens, with a pluralistic fabric in a pluralistic society.   
 
Patriarch Gregorios concludes these points by asserting that the response that is needed “is 
a joint Muslim-Christian responsibility” but warns that Islamic fundamentalist and extremist 
movements are causing fear for Christians and Muslims alike.   Reminding Muslim 
compatriots that Arab Christianity predates Islam and that many Muslims descend from 
Christians, he warns that unless Christians and Muslims challenge extremism and 
fundamentalism together, emigration of Christians from the region will continue, and that 









319 Patriarch Gregorios III Laham. (2017) ‘On the occasion of the Nativity 2013’. In, I am with you always. 




His Beatitude  John X Patriarch of Antioch and All the East 




Speech presented at a Conference organised by the Conference of European Churches and 
Cumberland Lodge on “Coexistence and Citizenship” London, UK, 14–16 December 2018. 
  
Introduction  
Firstly, I would like to thank you for your kind invitation to participate in this conference, which 
carries a special importance in terms of timing, content, and location. I also express my great 
joy for its convening. I regret that an unforeseen situation will not permit me to come to 
England in person. The land and people of England are very dear to my heart, since God had 
allowed me to serve there as an Archbishop for five years, from  2008 to 2012. I have 
delegated my beloved brother, His Eminence Silouan (Oner), Metropolitan of the British Isles 
and Ireland, to represent me in this conference, and to convey my sincere love to all of you 
and my best wishes for a successful conference, yielding fruitful results benefiting the 
countries of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and the entire Middle East .  
 
In my speech today, I will talk about the situation of the Christians in the Middle East and their 
relationship with the Muslims. I will also review the situation in Lebanon and Iraq, and present 
a message offered by the people of the Middle East to the world .  
 
Dear sisters and brothers,  
I write to you from the Antiochian Orthodox Holy See, where the disciples were first called 
Christians. From Antioch, the Christian message spread to the entire world by St. Paul, the 
Apostle of the Nations, to whom the Lord appeared at the gates of Damascus. St. Paul was 
blind when he entered the city of Damascus, and when was enlightened when he left this city, 
ready to preach Christ the Savior, and to sacrifice his own life for this mission.   
 
It means a lot to be able to write to you from Damascus, from its historic gate, a history that 
stretches from eternity, from the seat of the Apostolic Patriarchate of Antioch, from a land 
whose churches stand in the shadow of the Umayyad Mosque, and whose mosques are filled 
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with the smell of the churches’ incense. To write to you from Damascus means that I am 
sending rays from the deep history of holiness that cannot be overshadowed, no matter how 
the hands of terrorism try to eradicate the damascene stones, human beings, or trees. There, 
where St. Ananias, one of the Seventy, and the first bishop of Damascus lived, founding the 
very first parish; there, the Umayyads built the first state of Islam, and the latter spread from 
Damascus to the various parts of the world. Thus, we are the children of these nations, 
brothers in humanity and in history. We are brothers in terms of living in the same 
geographical area, an area blending all its components in the crucible of citizenship. We are 
also brothers in coexistence, in living together in the Middle East, and in sacrificing ourselves in 
defense of our homeland. "The soil that was mingled with the blood of martyrs did not 
examine if this blood was Christian or Muslim: this blood is the blood of truth, and when we 
are able to pour our blood freely on the soil of our homeland, a strong tree sprouts, defying 
the abominable storms, that the voice of truth remains in this world," as our predecessor, the 
Thrice blessed Patriarch Elias IV said. After this brief introduction, I would like to turn to the 
situation of Christians in the Middle East .  
  
Christians and the Situation of the Region  
The events happening in the region call for everyone to stand right and ponder. As Eastern 
Christians, we have had enough terror, bloodshed, or forced displacement. We pay, like 
others, the tax of terrorism and the pursuit of self-interests. Our human being is not a 
commodity in the market of arms and other markets!  
 
We are here to make our voice heard again: the blood of the Christians in Egypt is our blood, 
and the houses of the Christians in Iraq are our houses, since we are brothers in history and 
geography with the Muslims of this East, and with all its other components, whether minorities 
or majorities .  
In the midst of the so-called Arab Spring, we Christians had our crosses broken, our bishops 
kidnapped, and our churches destroyed. Here, in the context of our Christian-Muslim fraternal 
relations, we also say our mosques were destroyed, our homeland was swept away, our 
children were displaced, and we were forced to pay a tribute.  
 
What is happening in the East is the destruction of human civilization in the full sense of the 
word. It is even the obliteration of the historical identity. Our land was not created to be a 
breeding ground for the conflicts of others. Our human being was not born to die as a refugee. 
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Our children were not born to drown in the seas. It is better for those who seek to protect 
Christians to strive with all their might in order to bring peace to Christians and all citizens. 
Peace and terrorism cannot coexist. We are seekers of peace, and not of protection. Our loving 
homeland, the first and last, is this land in which we were born, in which we shall stay -being 
firmly rooted in the power of hope- and in which we will die, regardless of the harshness of 
time .  
 
We as Christians have never been factionalists, and we refuse to be dhimmis. We have always 
been concerned with fateful issues related to our country. We are not a minority, and we 
refuse to be called a minority, because a nation is not built on the logic of majority and 
minority, but on the logic that the little leaven leavens the whole lump. We are from the yeast 
of this East, and our message is not restricted to a specific denomination or community. If Iraq 
suffers, our churches suffer, and if Lebanon suffers, our most holy shrine of the Shaghoura 
suffers. If Syria cries, our church bells ring in sadness, and if the Holy Jerusalem grieves, our 
hearts are troubled. We are from Syria, and Syria is part of us. Syria is the country from which 
we draw our identity, our sense of belonging and existence .  
 
There is no doubt that we are in a region that is filled with complications, but none of these 
has discouraged us, and we will not be discouraged, since we shall keep our eyes fixed at the 
sight of the Cross. We have faith in Jesus Christ, and at the same time we persist on living in 
this land which He blessed by His presence. If the Cross has revealed the face of Christianity on 
earth, the light of the Resurrection has glorified the body of the Crucified One, and poured joy 
into the hearts of the disciples and in the hearts of all men. We have been entrusted with the 
Christian faith from our inception. We have preserved this faith for two thousand years in our 
original land of the East; a faith which we had never used as a tool to become introvert; and a 
faith we embodied and incarnated as true brotherhood. When we say brotherhood, we do not 
just mean a communal life, but also a one, united life with our Muslim brothers, despite all the 
bright or dark ups and downs that occurred in history .  
 
Christians shall stay in their land no matter how hard the difficulties are. The face of Christ 
cannot be eclipsed from the East. We as Christians do not want protection from anyone. Make 
peace prevail in our country. This is what we need, since we will not leave our land. The 
protection of the East and its people occurs by silencing the roaring noise of wars. Its 
protection is formulated by looking with a human eye to all that is taking place, and not with 
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the eyes of the self-interests. We are sons and daughters of this land and have a cause. We are 
not acquainted with takfirism, violence, killing, terrorism, and kidnapping that we see in many 
places. The language of terrorism, takfirism, and kidnapping is strange to the past and present 
of the Middle East .  
In spite of all that has is happening, I would like to assure you, my brothers and sisters, that 
we, in the Church of Antioch and All the East, live in great hope. We believe that encounter, 
dialogue and coexistence with other religions, societies and cultures is the basis for a lasting 
reconciliation and for the formulation of a true peace among humans .  
  
We and the Other Components Are Partners in the Homeland and Share a Common Destiny.  
I want to assure you that the Christian presence cannot be understood from the perspective of 
minorities and majorities, but from the perspective of the cultural, social and political roles in 
all stages of history. I also would like to stress the role of the Antiochian Church, which does 
not accept the spirit of exclusiveness and introversion. Our Church has always been a bridge 
relating various civilizations and languages. Societies in general are in need of a culture of love, 
not of a culture of murder and intimidation. The culture of love is founded only on the 
principle of respect for the other as he or she is, without discrimination between one brother 
and another, Thus, our culture in these countries is a culture of peace, a spring of joy, and a 
voice of truth .  
 
By the grace of God, we, as Christians, have been living in the East for two thousand years, and 
we have coexisted with our Muslim brothers for many centuries. The actions happening today 
in the East from intimidation to kidnapping and desacralizing affects both the Muslims and the 
Christians, the sheikhs, the priests and the bishops alike.  
 
The difference of religion does not separate us, but rather enriches us in many areas of life. 
Here, I would like to recall that Christians and Muslims have built a common eastern 
civilization. They are united by the one destiny. We may be born from our parents having each 
a different religion, but our human identity brings us together in fraternity and oneness of life, 
witnessing to the Lord of heaven and to the Light of His peace. Here we read in the Quran: "O 
mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes 
that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most 
righteous of you.” (Al-Hujurat 13). We also read in the first letter of St. John: "God is love." 
Through our love for the other people, even if coming from diverse religions, we are endowed 
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with the mission to witness to the One Lord, Creator of all, the Master of love. We are not here 
to beautify the image of our coexistence and brotherhood as Muslims and Christians, but to 
say that humanity was built by the intersection of civilizations and the interchange of religions 
.  
 
Accordingly, we affirm that we have good relations with our Muslim brethren. We also share 
with them our future and our hope to survive the remnants of this common crisis. Thus, our 
call today is for each of us to join hands in order to build our societies and our countries. 
Forbearing Christianity and tolerant Islam are the two lungs of this East. The affability of both 
Christianity and Islam is the core for the peace in the East and the world. Perhaps the most 
precious thing that God gave us in the Orthodox Church of Antioch is the Orthodox identity. 
This identity has an oriental affection, an existential character of dialogue, a sense of belonging 
to the nation, and a commitment to act as bridge of communication between both lungs. It is 
our proudness and responsibility to be among the line of Antiochian Patriarchs who were given 
the title of "Patriarch of the Arabs" by their Muslim brethren. This title is a proof that our 
Antiochian Church has always been on the side of the national and humanitarian causes of this 
East, and a refuge of love for all without exception. Therefore, She has been, in the eyes of all 
citizens of the East, a shelter that voices a great concern for the human beings’ causes, for 
their goodness and prosperity .  
 
It is therefore necessary to allow for the language of tolerance in all the local, regional and 
global meetings, to find its way to the minds of all people, and to dominate all issues that 
concern our Arab, Muslim and Christian society. The most cherishing subject in the world is to 
meet with other people. We have had a long experience of encounter. What if this other is to 
whom God Himself chose to witness as a Creator, and as a Lord and a Master of love and 
tolerance. We, our brothers, are called in this conference to cultivate the seeds of openness 
and tolerance, and not only in our hearts and your hearts, for yours and ours are filled with 
these seeds.  We are always called upon to nurture them in the world, in all human beings, 
despite the difficult challenges of some periods. We assure the whole world that we are 
advocates of peace, and we want to build our homeland on the foundation of citizenship and 
respect for others. We declare through this forum that we believe in coexistence, love and the 
acceptance of others. Everyone knows what Christians have offered in various fields. We 
always want to emphasize the oneness of life, fate, and future of all.  




As for Lebanon's delay in forming the government due to local, regional and international 
political tensions, we strongly call from here for the preservation of our beloved country 
Lebanon as a country of citizenship, and to strengthen the state's authority by supporting the 
constitutional institutions in it, in order for it to remain a forum of enlightened thought and 
culture, and a place of coexistence and citizenship. We also call on all parties to adopt the 
principles of peaceful and rational political and religious discourse, in order to avoid all political 
and religious consequences, which may result from deliberate or unintended extremism. This 
adoption helps to promote the national partnership and communal living that guarantees the 
continuity of constitutional life. Therefore, it is very important to preserve the constitutional 
life of this country as a practical interpretation of shared living and citizenship, and abandoning 
the sectarian logic, replacing it with the logic of crucible life of the nation, which is 
implemented through the concerted efforts of all its children .  
 
We also raise the voice for Iraq, which is drained by terrorism and suffers from economic and 
security instability, forcing its citizens to emigrate or to be displaced, as a tax to be paid. I 
assure you that Lebanon and Iraq are the lungs of Syria and that the south side of Syria is 
Jordan, where Christ was baptized in its river. Therefore, the peoples of these countries 
interact intensively with each other, and events in one of them, affect the entire region, not 
just in terms of security, but also politically, economically, and humanitarianly. Each of us has a 
role in the quest to rebuild the region, because its stability positively affects the world in 
general, and Europe in particular .  
  
The Relief and Development Work of the Patriarchate  
According to the above, the Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East established the 
Department of Ecumenical Relations and Development, which is considered as the largest, 
Christian based, non-governmental relief and development organization in Syria. Its aim is the 
rebuilding of humans, reconstruction of houses, and restore nature, in all the provinces and 
regions of Syria. Through a team of 1600 members, it implements dozens of relief and 
development programs, and provides humanitarian assistance and prepares programs that 
serve both the Christian and the Muslim. Our department’s services has reached nearly 2.5 
million beneficiaries of all religions, ethnicities and races, indicating that the church does not 
discriminate between Christians and Muslims, because all are brothers, and what brings them 
together is greater than what divides them. From here, the Antiochian Church seeks to be, 
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through all its charitable arms, standing next to the suffering people, and working through 
various relief efforts to unite the wounds of those afflicted, in an attempt to put the smile of 
Christ on their faces .  
 
The work of the Patriarchate in terms of relief efforts confirms, without a doubt, what we say 
about ourselves, that the Christian presence is not understood from the perspective of 
minorities and majorities, but from the perspective of its civilizational, cultural, social and 
political role in all stages of history. Therefore, we thank all our international partners, both in 
Syria and abroad, who seek to serve the Syrian people, alleviate all its economic and 
psychological burdens, and contribute to the reconstruction of what was destroyed at all 
levels, which would reflect positively on Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. At the same time, we stress 
the role of the United Nations, in all its institutions, in intensifying its efforts to put an end to 
the wars, to adopt peaceful political solutions, and to support the return of the displaced 
people and refugees. We also appeal to the international community to intensify its efforts to 
directly support the financing of local relief organizations in Syria, in order to save the money 
that is being paid here and there by intermediary, third –party, organizations .  
  
Our Message to the World  
Our role, wherever we may be, is always to bear the pain, sufferings, and concerns of our 
people, especially in the midst of the situation Syria is going through. Our message today to 
the entire world: stop the cancer of strife, takfirism, and terrorism before it spreads to the 
world, and work to establish peace in the East .  
 
It is time for the world to wake up and realize that establishing peace is what reassures, and 
that emigration, or rather forced displacement, is only a burden on the emigrant people and 
the immigration countries, and not at all part of the solution, but rather an inevitable negative 
consequence of the dilemma. It is time for the world to realize that takfirism, terrorism, and 
kidnapping, and sectarianism, are the first national security threat against all peoples, and not 
just in the Middle East. I do not blame others for the war that is taking place in the East, and I 
do not claim that neither my people, nor the state regimes of the East are ideal, nor do 
themselves claim this. The external face of the crisis, however, has not just overshadowed, but 
also surpassed everything. The biggest loser in the market of multifaceted self-interests is the 
innocent human being.  
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From here, I call on the world to seek a peaceful solution to end the misery of the Syrian 
people and the peoples of the region, who are suffering from the consequences of the 
devastating war, which has resulted in enormous economic and living difficulties. Therefore, I 
also draw your attention to the need to lift the economic sanctions on the Syrian people, who 
pay the high tax of war and destruction. I also underline the unity of Syrian territory and the 
need of concerted efforts for the reconstruction of this country, in order to facilitate the return 
of its children and help those who have remained in the country, to live there freely and with 
dignity.  
 
On the other hand, we must address what we are witnessing today of absurd exploitation of 
religion and subjecting religion to political ends. From this forum, I call on all religious leaders 
from all countries, to raise together the slogan of "Faith for Peace", so that we all become 
resounding advocates of peace, in a world that is in dire need of a message of peace.  
Today, we are called upon to meet and stand in solidarity, in order to present together to the 
world a true model of peace in relationships, concepts, and approaches, and internal, regional 
and international collaboration. This is how we give peace to people and witness that the true 
peace that dwells in the human heart, individually and collectively, is alone capable of healing 
every wound in historical memory and in human relations.  
 
I am absolutely certain that what brings our peoples together, despite the differences of their 
religious, social and cultural affiliations, is much more than what divides them. In our East, we 
have always appreciated the value of coexistence with our brothers from other religions and 
cultures. We have learned that pluralism is the vital domain for human enrichment, cultural 
interaction, and creativity at the levels of thought, art and beauty. There is no doubt that it is 
about time for the experience of suffering to bring our people closer, rather than to divide 
them, and to open the way for humanity to rethink the priorities of political, social and 
religious action in our modern era. We desperately need a common action to heal our societies 
with genuine reconciliation and tolerance.  
We need to move together towards reconciliation, stressing the respect for human rights and 
international charters in this regard. Therefore, we must engage in dialogue and become 
acquainted with each other, whoever this other is. Does each one of us realize the extent of his 
or her responsibility to remove the culture of disunion among peoples? Do we seek to 
overcome  
the barriers of history and build a better future for the children of the East and the world?  
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Concerning the future of Syria, a peaceful solution must be found to the Syrian crisis, a serious 
pursuit of reconstruction must be applied. Reconstruction, however, can only be valuable by 
human renewal, and by helping the citizens remain steadfast in their own land.  
 
We want the return of all the kidnapped people, primarily Bishops Boulos (Yazigi) and Yuhanna 
(Ibrahim), to which the world turn a blind eye. It is a great wound for all of us, but it gives us 
the determination to remain steadfast in our country. If some believe that such actions will 
lead us to leave our country, they are wrong. We reiterate our call for peace, stability and 
prosperity.  
We join the collective voice of the free people in this world, and look together, with all those 
who are suffering, to the governments of the United States of America, the Russian 
Federation, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the relevant regional countries, 
hoping to push for finding peaceful solutions for the world and the Middle East, for Lebanon, 
Syria, Palestine, and all the region. We always hold the deposit of peace and the good news of 
salvation, joy and truth. For the Church is the Pillar of Truth in the midst of this troubled world, 
and continues to testify the Truth, even if She is raised on the Cross on the likeness of Her 
Master.  
I conclude by saying that we are messengers of love and peace. We call on all to unite, build 
the country, and preserve the dignity and life of the human being. We call upon the entire 
international, global community to know that our approach is to achieve justice and peace, 
and to promote the concept of citizenship and respect for human rights. We call on all to push 
for a peaceful solution for everything that is happening the region, and particularly in Syria. We 
pray for peace in the East and throughout the world. I reiterate my sincere thankfulness for 
your kind invitation, and wish you a fruitful conference.  
  
JOHN X  
Patriarch of Antioch and All the East 
 
 
 
 
 
